

CALCIDIUS ON MATTER  
HIS DOCTRINE AND SOURCES

# PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA

A SERIES OF MONOGRAPHS  
ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

W. J. VERDENIUS AND J. H. WASZINK

VOLUME IX

J. C. M. VAN WINDEN O. F. M.

CALCIDIUS ON MATTER HIS DOCTRINE AND SOURCES

A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF PLATONISM



LEIDEN  
E. J. BRILL  
1965

# CALCIDIUS ON MATTER HIS DOCTRINE AND SOURCES

## A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF PLATONISM

BY

J. C. M. VAN WINDEN O. F. M.

PHOTOMECHANICAL REPRINT



LEIDEN  
E. J. BRILL  
1965

*Copyright 1965 by E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands.*

*All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated  
in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm or any other means without  
written permission from the publisher.*

**PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS**

My sincere thanks are due to Fr. B. de Goede, o.f.m., Leiden, and Fr. Dr. S. J. P. van Dijk, o.f.m., London, for the English translation of the work, to Dr. J. Hazelden Walker for her advice and hospitality at Swinton House, Berwickshire, Scotland, to Fr. E. Vrancken, o.f.m., Weert, for the accurate typing of the manuscript, to Mrs. M. A. F. Drewes-Timp, Rotterdam, for her assistance at the correction of proofs, and, last but not least, to the printer and his most experienced staff.



## CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION</b> . . . . .	<b>I</b>
The <i>Timaeus</i> and Calcidius. A survey of their history . . . . .	I
The problem . . . . .	5
Survey of the commentary as such . . . . .	10
<b>THE TREATISE ON MATTER</b> . . . . .	<b>24</b>
Structure of the treatise . . . . .	24
Analysis and investigation of sources . . . . .	28
1. Introductory paraphrase . . . . .	29
a) Outline of the treatise . . . . .	29
b) Relation between matter and Providence . . . . .	33
c) Names of matter . . . . .	39
d) The real forms and their images . . . . .	40
e) The third principle: matter . . . . .	45
f) Intelligibility of matter . . . . .	49
2. Historical and systematical treatise . . . . .	51
a) Historical part . . . . .	51
α) Matter was made: The Jews . . . . .	52
β) Matter was not made . . . . .	66
αα) It consists of small parts . . . . .	66
ββ) Matter is continuous . . . . .	69
(1) Matter has qualities and form . . . . .	71
(2) Matter has neither quality nor form . . . . .	75
(a) Aristotle . . . . .	75
(b) The Stoics . . . . .	93
(c) Pythagoras . . . . .	103
(d) The opinion of Plato . . . . .	121
(α) One interpretation . . . . .	121
(β) The other interpretation . . . . .	124
b) Systematic part . . . . .	128
α) The principles in general . . . . .	128
αα) Two ways of arguing . . . . .	128
ββ) Matter is found by means of <i>resolutio</i> . . . . .	131
γγ) The Maker and the exemplar are discovered by means of <i>compositio</i> . . . . .	134

δδ) The principles . . . . .	137
εε) The real principles . . . . .	140
β) Calcidius' own treatise on matter . . . . .	143
αα) Its name and variability . . . . .	143
ββ) Matter without quality . . . . .	150
γγ) Refutation of the Stoa . . . . .	153
δδ) Matter eternal and unlimited . . . . .	154
εε) Matter without increase or decrease . . . . .	157
ζζ) Matter neither expands nor shrinks . . . . .	158
ηη) Matter divisible? . . . . .	159
θθ) Summarizing conclusion . . . . .	160
ιι) Matter the general substratum of things .	161
κκ) Matter neither corporeal nor incorporeal .	165
3. Verifying paraphrase . . . . .	172
a) Characteristics of matter . . . . .	172
α) Matter without form and quality . . . . .	172
β) Matter without motion . . . . .	188
b) Why matter without quality . . . . .	194
c) The <i>species</i> . . . . .	203
d) Matter in itself . . . . .	219
e) Reference to Providence . . . . .	240
CONCLUSION . . . . .	243
Supplementary notes to the Photographic reprint . . . . .	248
INDICES . . . . .	260
I. List of quotations from ancient sources . . . . .	260
II. List of authors . . . . .	264
III. List of greek terms . . . . .	265
IV. List of latin terms . . . . .	266

## INTRODUCTION

### THE *TIMAEUS* AND *CALCIDIUS*: A SURVEY OF THEIR HISTORY

Among the dialogues of Plato none has made a greater impact upon the centuries of human thought than the *Timaeus*. This surprising conclusion forces itself upon everyone who considers the influence of Plato's works through the course of the centuries and does not confine himself to the present or to the near past. He will see this influence pictured in the famous 'School of Athens' by Raphael, representing the old philosopher with the *Timaeus* in his hands. Pointing this out, Rivaud also observes that Aristotle paid much attention to this work and that Crantor was the first of a whole series of commentators<sup>1)</sup>. Among these are the Stoic Posidonius and the Aristotelian Adrastus. Evidently this dialogue made a great impression, even outside the Academy.

The cause of this is found in both the special character and the subject-matter of the *Timaeus*. For whereas in his dialogues Plato usually expresses his opinion on a few points only or not at all, in the *Timaeus* he is not afraid to do so. It is true, he cautions the readers that his argument, owing to the nature of the subject, can only lay claim to probability,—it is only an opinion (86ξα) in the typical Platonic sense—but immediately he follows this up with the assertion that in this respect his theory is second to none (*Tim.* 29C). Further, the very central problem of the subject treated is the origin of things. The *Timaeus* may indeed be called 'Plato's book of Genesis'. Since he had to discuss the great problems of philosophy in this work, it could not but assume the character of a synthesis. And on account of this very character, the *Timaeus* gradually conquered the central place in the tradition of Platonism, both in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages.

In this tradition, Calcidius' work, a translation of a considerable portion of the *Timaeus* with a commentary on its most important chapters, stands at the end of the western Antiquity. The historical data about the author are extremely scarce, since the work itself

---

1) Platon, *Oeuvres Complètes*, t. X, texte et trad., Paris, 1925, p. 3 (Ed. Budé).

is the only source of information. And even this leaves the reader most uncertain. The title of the preface gives us the bare minimum. The manuscripts read: *O(s)sio C(h)alcidius*. This *O(s)sius* is generally identified with the well-known *O(s)sius* or Hosius, bishop of Cordova, who played such an important part at the councils of Nicaea (325) and Sardica (343). This is confirmed by the title of the eleventh-century *codex Excorialensis* s. III, 5: *Osio episcopo Calcidius archidiaconus*<sup>1)</sup>. Ossius was bishop during the first half of the fourth century ( $\pm$  295-357). Calcidius must have written his study in that period, probably after visiting the Near East in the company of his master. As appears from his introduction the work was commissioned by Ossius. The mystery which surrounds the author is in sharp contrast with the fame of his book. For centuries the West drew its knowledge about Plato chiefly from this work. During this time Plato's fate lay, so to say, in the hands of Calcidius. And, in consequence, the respect paid to Plato was shared by Calcidius. *Plato* chiefly meant the *Timaeus*, and the *Timaeus* as translated and explained by Calcidius. Switalski<sup>2)</sup> gives some striking examples of this esteem. At times Calcidius was extolled above Aristotle, and, as late as in 1507, he was compared to Prometheus by Jacobus Antiquarius. Today the tangible evidence of the honour paid to him is found in the great number of Calcidius' *Timaeus* manuscripts.

This state of affairs was bound to change when Plato began to be known from other and better sources. From that time the fates of the *Timaeus* and Calcidius' work became very different. The former lost its supremacy; more attention was paid to the so-called dialogues of the middle period, such as the *Phaedo*, the *Symposium* and the *Republic*. In this way the *Timaeus* was looked upon as a work of the old period and more and more relegated to the background. Not until recently has this dialogue begun to draw more attention. Instances are found in the great commentaries by Taylor<sup>3)</sup> and Cornford<sup>4)</sup>, the latter masterly correcting

1) A. C. Vega, *La Ciudad de Dios*, 152 (1936), p. 154 ss. On the testimony of the best manuscripts Vega and de Clercq (cp. p. 6, n. 1) write Calcidius instead of the customary Chalcidius. Their reading is followed by the present author.

2) *Des Chalcidius Kommentar zu Plato's Timaeus*, in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Bnd. III, Heft VI, Münster, 1902, p. 8.

3) A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford, 1928.

4) F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology. The Timaeus of Plato*, London, 1937, 1952<sup>2</sup>.

the warped perspective drawn by Taylor. This interest is entirely justified by the strong influence of the *Timaeus* on the development of philosophy, especially Platonism. It may further increase, if the *Timaeus* appears to be not one of the dialogues of Plato's old-age, but rather of the middle period, following the *Republic*. Owen<sup>1)</sup> and Wilpert<sup>2)</sup> defend this with very strong arguments.

How did Calcidius fare meanwhile? Here too a distinction should be made between esteem on account of the work's inner value and that on account of its historical value. The esteem of Calcidius as a philosopher has decreased ever since the Middle Ages. Whereas Fabricius, publishing an edition in 1718<sup>3)</sup>, was rather favourably impressed by various parts of the text, later historians, among whom Joh. Wrobel (1876), the last editor of the text, showed little respect for the author's talents. They look upon his work as entirely dependent on others, a compilation<sup>4)</sup>. The most unfavourable verdict, quoted in Switalski, is given by Gercke, who speaks of a „radebrechenden Übersetzung (des Anfangs) eines griechischen Kommentars von einem nur mit Mühe Latein schreibenden Mönche”. But it should be borne in mind that these last words do not so much concern the text as its translator.

Still, the importance of Calcidius for the history of philosophy is beyond doubt. This statement must be considered in two ways according to the sense of the word 'history'. If it is taken in the meaning of the course of events, the question arises, what was Calcidius' influence on the further development of thought? But history may also be taken as disquisition and knowledge of the past. In this case we have to ask, what does Calcidius' text, as it has come down, teach us about the development of philosophy? What does it tell us about the philosophy of those days? Which data does it provide about its past?

This twofold importance of Calcidius' text has not escaped the attention of historians. Gilson<sup>5)</sup> stresses the great influence of

1) G. E. L. Owen, *The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's Dialogues*, *Cl. Qu.* 47 (1953) 79-95.

2) P. Wilpert, *Die Stellung des Timaeos im platonischen Korpus*, in *Actes du XIe Congr. intern. de Phil.* 1953, Vol. XII, p. 71-76.

3) In *S. Hippolyti Operum* Vol. II, p. 332. Whenever Fabricius is cited without further details, the reference is to the text under discussion.

4) Cp. Switalski, *o.c.*, p. 8.

5) É. Gilson, *La Philosophie au Moyen Âge. Des origines patristiques à la fin du XIV<sup>e</sup> Siècle*, Paris, 1952, p. 117-121.

this work on the philosophy of the early Middle Ages. But no special study on this point is available; nor will it be made here. As for the study of the text: as early as 1886 Gercke, giving such an unfavourable verdict on *Calcidius* as a philosopher, wrote that his text is a precious source of historical facts <sup>1)</sup>. But sixteen years had to pass before Switalski wrote the study cited above. And only in 1912 Steinheimer <sup>2)</sup> published his criticism of Switalski. In the meantime a study appeared from the hand of Borghorst <sup>3)</sup>. *Calcidius* is not his immediate subject. Hence his remarks have passed unnoticed. But Borghorst gives important clues in the much disputed problem concerning the sources of *Calcidius*. Then in 1918 Jones <sup>4)</sup> published an article, in his turn attacking the conclusions of Steinheimer. This is the last penetrating study on the subject. But this does not mean that investigation into the *Calcidius*' problem has reached its final stage. On the contrary, the views of the various authors are diametrically opposed and, therefore, invite further criticism. In this connexion the great interest taken in the *Plato Latinus* just now is important. Professor Waszink (Leiden) and professor Jensen (Copenhagen) have taken up the task of editing a critical text of *Calcidius* <sup>5)</sup>, thereby promoting a fresh approach of the much disputed text. For the results of former studies have clearly shewn that only detailed work on the text can bring a solution for the many difficulties that are arising. The present writer was able to use the critical apparatus and the established text which are now ready for publication. With gratitude he recalls that they are of the utmost importance even in a study of limited proportions.

Ever since Aristotle the problem of matter has taken up a dominant place in philosophical thinking. In one way or another all elements and principles of 'being' are in connexion with it. Matter cannot be mentioned without form, and thus to every adherent of Platonism the question crops up about the primary form or idea, and the Demiurge, God. The principle of matter

1) Cp. Switalski, *o.c.*, p. 8.

2) E. Steinheimer, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen des Chalcidius*, Aschaffenburg, 1912 (*Programm des K. Hum. Gymnasium*).

3) G. Borghorst, *De Anatolii Fontibus*, Thesis, Berlin, 1905.

4) R. M. Jones, *Chalcidius and Neoplatonism*, *Cl. Philol.* 13 (1918) 194-208.

5) *The Warburg Institute. Annual Report*, 1956-1957, p. 137.

—χώρα or ἀνάγκη—is one of the most outstanding points in Plato's intellectualistic and idealistic system. It is the refractory relic of the chaos with which he is always confronted. That such a principle lends itself to special study is obvious. And, in fact, this is the subject of the present inquiry. It concerns the last part, the thirteenth chapter, of *Calcidius' commentary on the Timaeus*, which deals with this central problem of matter. *Calcidius* entitles this *De silva*; Aristotle would have called it Περὶ ὕλης. In view of what has been said above, the search should be patient and minute. But there is another reason too. The work done on other parts of *Calcidius* is, in some respects, more advanced, owing to a great many parallel passages. That on *De silva* has, however, not yet led to distinct conclusions, although hypotheses are not wanting. The crux of the matter is as follows.

### THE PROBLEM

In the recent revival of the *Calcidius'* study *Switalski* was the first to concern himself with the place of *Calcidius* in the history of philosophy and with his sources. On chronological grounds Historians such as *Bäumker*<sup>1)</sup> and *Prächter*<sup>2)</sup> placed *Calcidius* among the Neoplatonists. The conclusion of *Switalski*'s study was:

“Die Urquelle für den chalcidianischen Kommentar ist wahrscheinlich der *Timaeuskommentar des Posidonius*. Als zwischenglieder erscheinen uns *Adrast* und *Albinus*. Wahrscheinlich ist es indes, dass ein *späterer Grieche*, der auch *Numenius* benutzt hat, einen einheitlichen Kommentar geschaffen, den *Chalcidius* bloss zu übersetzen hatte. Die Unselbständigkeit des Kommentars lässt es nämlich für glaublicher erscheinen, dass ein *Grieche*, als dass ein so unbedeutender Lateiner verschiedene griechische Quellen benutzt haben sollte. Dem *Christen Chalcidius* gehört der Bericht über den Stern der Weisen (c. 127) und das origenistische Fragment (c. 276 ff.).

---

1) Cl. *Bäumker*, *Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophie*, Münster, 1890, p. 428.

2) K. *Prächter*, *Richtungen und Schulen im Neuplatonismus*, in *Genethliakon Carl Robert*, 1910, p. 155.

Der Gesamtcharakter des Kommentars ist der eines *eklektischen Platonikers des zweiten nachchristlichen Jahrhunderts.*”<sup>1)</sup>

It is worth while to go into Switalski's work and to consider the motives of his conclusion. After an introductory chapter chiefly about the personality of *Calcidius* and the vicissitudes of his work, the eclectic character of his commentary is discussed. Switalski demonstrates that the keynote is Platonic and Plato the highest authority. But he also shows that great authority is given to Aristotle as well, while the *Stoa* and *Numenius* are not forgotten. Switalski next discusses the question of sources. For this purpose he distinguishes four different subjects: 1) the mathematical-astronomical part (par. 8-119), 2) the treatise about fate (par. 141-190), 3) passages of a dogmatic and 4) passages of an historical nature. The first two parts are treated separately because on these subjects the study of sources had already resulted in important data.

For the mathematical-astronomical part, Switalski had access to the studies by Martin<sup>2)</sup> and Hiller<sup>3)</sup>. Martin had pointed out that lengthy passages in *Calcidius* agree word for word with *Theo of Smyrna*. Hence he came to regard *Theo* as a source. Hiller had shewn that both *Calcidius* and *Theo* were directly dependent upon *Adrastus*. Switalski, in his turn, tries to prove that this dependence covers the entire mathematical and astronomical part of *Calcidius*. And on the strength of what he believes to be a *Posidonian* character in some passages, he suggests that *Posidonius* was the primary source for all of them.

For the part about fate, Switalski could rely upon a study by Gercke<sup>4)</sup>. The latter had revealed the extensive similarity between *Calcidius* and the *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης* by *Ps.-Plutarch*, and,

1) *O.c.*, p. 113. V. C. de Clercq, *Ossius of Cordova. A Contribution to the History of the Constantinian Period*, Washington, 1954, p. 72, sums up *Calcidius'* standpoint as follows: “the general philosophical position is that of the eclectic Platonism of the second century A.D.; the main source, according to Switalski, is a Greek adaptation of *Numenius* (second century A.D.)”. De Clercq ascribes to Switalski something he certainly does not say. What he really says (the first part of this assertion) is not given as his opinion.

2) H. Martin, *Theonis Smyrnæi Platonici Liber de Astronomia*, Paris, 1849.

3) E. Hiller, *De Adrasti Peripatetici in Platonis Timaeum Commentario*, *Rhein. Mus.* 26 (1871) 582-589.

4) A. Gercke, *Chalcidius und Ps.-Plutarch*, *Rhein. Mus.* 41 (1886) 269 ss.

further, between these two treatises and some passages of Nemesius' treatise *On Human Nature*. All three, according to Gercke, had a common source, which he tried to identify with a Platonist of the early second century School of Gaius. Apart from this basic conclusion Switalski does not produce much of consequence, except that, to him, Albinus and Alexander of Aphrodisias probably used the same source.

On the ground of some parallel texts he regards Albinus as the source of the dogmatic passages in *Calcidius*. He thinks that they may favour Zeller's theory that Albinus also wrote a commentary on the *Timaeus*, from which the *Epitome* is considered to be an extract.

Finally, Switalski tries to show that the historical passages form a unity and are dependent upon Posidonius. Here, as he acknowledges himself, his arguments are far from strong. They are not much more than suggestions, based chiefly on the well-known fact that Posidonius also wrote a commentary on the *Timaeus*. The poverty of arguments is evident from the shortness of this last chapter (pp. 107-112). With these considerations Switalski assumes Posidonius to be the main source for the whole *Calcidius*.

This conclusion was strongly attacked by Steinheimer. From the Posidonian character in the first part of *Calcidius'* book, he argues, the conclusions may not be drawn that either this part or, much less, the whole commentary was derived from Posidonius. In general, he observes, if a book contains some theories characteristic of another author, this does not justify far-reaching conclusions on the whole work, for it is quite normal that, in explaining difficult points, an author is influenced by his predecessors (*o.c.*, p. 2). As for Albinus, he believes Switalski's opinion to be equally rash.

Meanwhile, there is some unmistakable similarity between the manner of Steinheimer's argumentation and that of Switalski. As the latter sees Posidonius everywhere, so Steinheimer discovers Porphyry (and consequently Plotinus) behind almost every chapter. Thus, *Calcidius'* book becomes Neoplatonic and, ultimately, only a translation of a lost work by Porphyry. But, one may ask, was such a poor work worthy of Porphyry? Steinheimer thinks it was; to him the treatise is not of inferior quality but based on good and skilfully selected sources (*o.c.*, p. 47). Steinheimer's argument is an accumulation of parallel passages all of which, in his

opinion, point to Porphyry. To discuss them one by one would be beyond the scope of this survey; several must be examined in connexion with the chapter on matter. Besides, the whole of Steinheimer's enquiry has already been criticized thoroughly in Jones' *Chalcidius and Neoplatonism*.

Jones agrees with Steinheimer in his attitude towards Switalski, but after this he examines Steinheimer's arguments. He shows that the texts of Porphyry (*i.e.*, practically of Plotinus) quoted by Steinheimer as the sources of Calcidius are either not identical or, if they are, can already partly be indicated before Porphyry and so need not have been derived from him, and are partly really met with first in Porphyry; but on this account they need not be more than parallel passages which do not guarantee any dependence. Jones also notices that, unlike the Neoplatonists, Calcidius regards matter as an independent principle. But if Calcidius, who was a Christian, should have been a follower of Neoplatonism, he would certainly have taken matter as a dependent principle, because this would have been consistent with his religious convictions. He concludes that the similarity between Calcidius and Plotinus should rather be explained from a common source.

Although the thesis by Borghorst appeared in 1905, it remained unnoticed and it may safely be treated outside the chronological order. Its starting-point was an investigation into the sources of Anatolius' treatise on numbers. The subject had been treated by others, among whom also Calcidius. Borghorst now argues that all their speculations go back to a common source, namely Posidonius. This conclusion was not surprising. Borghorst himself tells us that he found it ready-made in Schmekel's *Philosophie der mittleren Stoa*<sup>1)</sup>; he only amplified it and gave it a more solid historical foundation. This may be the reason why Borghorst's work drew little attention. Still, his considerations about Calcidius, indeed, bring something new; for Borghorst defends the theory that Adrastus was the source for almost the whole Calcidius. His argument runs as follows: when Calcidius took the first part of his work from Adrastus, he did it with so little understanding that only two hypotheses can be considered for the remaining portion of the work: he took this from either Adrastus or another commentator of the *Timaeus*. Since this portion has evidently a strong Aristotelian

---

1) Berlin, 1892, p. 424.

character—Switalski already pointed this out—and since Adrastus is known as an orthodox Aristotelian and the author of a commentary on the *Timaeus*, the conclusion is obvious: Adrastus was the source for the whole *Calcidius*, except, of course, for such passages as cannot possibly be connected with him. Such are the chapters on the Jews and on Pythagoras; for the latter *Calcidius* himself gave the source, *viz.*, *Numenius*<sup>1</sup>).

The Stoic Posidonius, the Aristotelian Adrastus, the Neoplatonist Porphyry, or even Plotinus himself are successively claimed to be the intellectual forebears of *Calcidius*. This, probably unique situation at once raises a fundamental question: what is the cause of such a striking divergency of opinions? Does *Calcidius* offer such a medley of opinions that everyone finds in his work what he is looking for? Or have modern authors perhaps built their conclusions on too narrow a basis? Have they drawn conclusions about the whole work on a restricted number of items and then read and, if necessary, twisted the whole text according to these conclusions; in other words, have they passed too easily from induction to deduction? Of all scholars Borghorst is the least blameworthy in this respect. His argument has a very strong justification in a strong Aristotelian strand which runs through the work and, especially, in a long passage which, no doubt, is derived from the Aristotelian Adrastus. Yet even here, the inductive element appears to be rather weak. He does not explain how an Aristotelian-informed *Calcidius* could profess to be a Platonist, and at least on one very important point, *viz.*, the theory of the soul, does reject the Aristotelian doctrine (par. 225). This rejection cannot come from the orthodox Aristotelian Adrastus. So Borghorst's conclusion too is not sufficiently well-founded on accurate study of the text.

The only manner to avoid this dead-lock is the method of maintained induction by a patient and exact study of the text. Here as elsewhere the first rule must be to explain the text by the text itself. By constant comparison of similar and related subjects or passages one should try to obtain insight in the content of the whole work and in the ideas which prompted the author to write as he wrote. Not until then external evidence, *i.e.*, parallel texts from others and sources, if any, can be brought in.

---

1) The articles of Vega are of no importance in the question discussed.

This method may appear to be obvious. Yet to emphasize it is not useless or superfluous. That what in theory is accepted by everyone seems often forgotten in practice, at least in the case of such authors as *Calcidius*. He is looked upon as a second-rate thinker and, consequently, incapable of notable achievement. Authors have discussed separate texts and looked for parallel passages, but no one has seriously attempted to understand his work as a whole. This attitude is very typical of an author such as *Switalski*, who never gives a comprehensive survey of *Calcidius'* point of view. The latter is, in a sense, oppressed by what *Switalski* believed are his sources. He only comes to the fore when this cannot be avoided; then we read: "Dem Christen *Chalcidius* gehört . . .". *Switalski* leaves it open that several such passages may have been inserted by the author himself, but the question as to the capacities which allowed him to do so is not raised. And yet this is important indeed, for if it appears that these genuine *Calcidian* elements fit well into the whole, the further question arises whether there are any other passages due to the same. It might then appear that one has no right to speak of 'insertions', but the duty to see between the sources an author whose work reveals a character of its own. This hypothesis is still in flagrant contradiction with the current theory. Yet it seems more logical to start from this assumption rather than to adhere to the customary opinion which fails to take *Calcidius* seriously.

#### SURVEY OF THE COMMENTARY AS SUCH

Although the last chapter of *Calcidius'* commentary alone is the real object of the present study, it is imperative to obtain a clear vision on the whole work. And for three reasons: first, because of the particular position of *De silva*; secondly, because of *Calcidius'* method of writing, and, thirdly, because of the necessity to prepare a background against which certain quotations from other parts should be seen.

*The Introduction*—*Calcidius* begins his commentary with an introduction deserving close attention. Here more than anywhere else the author is speaking himself. The paraphrase of the text<sup>1)</sup> runs as follows:

1) An abbreviation, *e.g.* 345, 2 refers to the *Calcidius* edition by *Wrobel*, page 345, line 2. Any figure preceded by the symbol p. refers to the present study.

"The *Timaeus* was looked upon as a difficult book also by the Ancients, not because it was not well written (*non ex imbecillitate sermonis obscuritate nata*), for who is more skilful in writing than Plato? No, the cause lies in the readers, who have not mastered the art displayed by Plato, the art namely of treating all questions with appropriate arguments. In a question of stars, he takes his arguments from astronomy; in a question of music, his arguments are from the doctrine of music. In this way he finds the appropriate remedy to every intellectual ailment, as a doctor applies different remedies according to the nature of the wound<sup>1)</sup> (par. 1).

Since the *Timaeus* discusses the universe and Plato wishes to account for all that is in it, a great many questions are bound to crop up, e.g., about plane and three-dimensional figures; how the soul enters the world's body (*de incorporatione animae*) and animates it, etc. All these problems had to be treated with appropriate 'remedies'. That is why many people failed to understand this work of Plato; others, experts on a special subject only discussed what was clear to them; the largest part remained obscure (par. 2).

It is evident that this dialogue was almost exclusively written for those versed in all sciences. These men ought to have let their light shine upon the others but, prompted by some deplorable kind of jealousy, they failed to communicate their wealth (par. 3).

Since I had to oblige you, although the task is beyond my humble powers<sup>2)</sup>, I was not satisfied with a simple translation. I thought that without further comment the presentation of an obscure original would be as vague as or even vaguer than this original<sup>3)</sup>. I have explained the difficulties where they occurred on the understanding that I have only explained such difficulties which could arise from the reader's ignorance of special sciences. In fact, it would have been insulting to the reader to explain what everyone

1) Calcidius uses this metaphor frequently. *Remedium* to him is 'argument' or 'solution' (70, 20; 82, 14; 88, 13; 131, 8; 213, 6; 301, 10; 359, 19). This comparison may have been suggested by *Critias* 106B, where Timaeus says that he implores the godhead to bestow upon him the best of all medicine, viz., knowledge: φάρμακον ἡμῖν αὐτὸν τελεώτατον καὶ ἀριστόν φαρμάκων ἐπιστήμην εὐχόμεθα διδόναται.

2) Cp. 184, 24 *quoad mediocritas ingenii passa est*; these words occur in an epilogue (See p. 18).

3) The same thought is found in the preface to the whole work; *non solum transtuli, sed etiam eiusdem partis commentarium feci, putans reconditae rei simulacrum sine interpretationis explanatione aliquanto obscurius ipso exemplo futurum* (4, 16-19).

can find out for himself. I did not comment at all upon the simple story at the beginning of the book (the Atlantis-myth), but thought it my duty to say something on the whole of the dialogue as well as on its scope and lay-out (par. 4).

The day before Socrates had discussed the State in ten books. In point of fact, the starting-point of the discussion had not been the State but Justice. In order to describe this virtue Socrates had given a picture of a state governed by just laws and of another deviating from such laws (par. 5).

After having looked for and found in these books justice in human relations, an investigation had still to be made into natural justice (*aequitas naturalis*). This task was appointed by Socrates to Timaeus, Critias and Hermocrates. There is therefore in this book no question of positive justice but of natural justice (*non positivae sed naturalis iustitiae atque aequitatis*), which, although not written itself, is a foundation of laws to be made and directions to be given<sup>1)</sup>. And as Socrates, when speaking about justice among men, used the example of the civil state, so Timaeus of Locri, a pupil of Pythagoras<sup>2)</sup> and well-versed in astronomy, wanted to inquire into justice as observed among the gods in this—what we may call—common city or state of the sensible world (par. 6)".

Having thus explained the *ratio totius operis* and the *propositum scriptoris*, Calcidius now gives the *ordinatio libri*. It should be borne in mind that this means the disposition of the *Timaeus* rather than of Calcidius' commentary.

In paragraph 7 Calcidius lists the twenty-seven subjects he is going to discuss. Actually, as the commentary has come down to us, only the first thirteen are discussed.

These are:

- i *De genitura mundi*<sup>3)</sup>
- ii *De ortu animae*
- iii *De modulatione sive harmonia*
- iv *De numeris*
- v *De stellis ratis et errantibus, in quarum numero sol etiam constituitur et luna*

1) *tribuit . . . substantiam*; this expression is often used by Calcidius.  
Cp. *ad par. 344.*

2) *ex Pythagorae magisterio*; cp. 119, 3-4.

3) The scheme of the book is in Latin; this will not harm comprehensibility and promote clarity.

- vi *De caelo*
- vii *De quattuor generibus animalium, hoc est caelestium praepetum nantium terrenorum*
- viii *De ortu generis humani*
- ix *Causae cur hominum plerique sint sapientes, alii insipientes*
- x *De visu*
- xi *De imaginibus*
- xii *Laus videndi*
- xiii *De silva*

This introduction provides us with the following informations. In paragraph 4 Calcidius mentions how he generously carried out the commission (by Ossius). Apparently the order to this work did not stretch beyond translation. In the prologue Calcidius says something more about this. He emphasizes that his patron and friend had wanted to do the work himself (*eiusque usum a Graecis Latio mutuandum statueras*), but had afterwards entrusted his *alter ego* with it *propter admirabilem verecundiam*<sup>1</sup>). “And”, Calcidius states, “I could not refuse this request, however difficult the task”. The similarity between the introduction to the commentary and the prologue to the whole work (i.e., translation and commentary) is obvious. Both are from a person who pretends to have produced something all his own, and not without difficulties.

Calcidius also alludes to former commentators. Here he asks for our utmost attention, for they might be his authorities. What does he say? There are comments on several parts of the *Timaeus*, but no interpretation of the whole exists. People who could have made one, neglected to do so out of some kind of jealousy. Now what did Calcidius about this? For some subject he was able to refer to extant commentaries—at once we think of the part derived from Adrastus—but he himself had to see to the whole set up. Such is the impression we receive from his own words. Once again: Calcidius does not say that he used sources; from his words we can only conclude to a possibility of use. But the impression that he actually used them can only be confirmed by detailed study of the whole commentary.

The last point to be discussed is the *ordinatio libri*. Calcidius intends to give the order of the *Timaeus*. In fact, he gives a list

---

1) Ossius of Cordova is said to have been this patron. Cp. de Clercq, *o.c.*, p. 70-71.

of twenty-seven subject-matters treated in that dialogue, but there is no apparent order. The list could be the result of cursory reading on the dialogue and the noting down of striking subjects; some of which might be titles from works by others about the respective parts of the *Timaeus*. However, this does not mean that the lay-out of Plato's work escaped Calcidius. The latter must have had a clear insight into its structure. Therefore, a second order is found in the commentary, based upon the structure of Plato's dialogue. This is Calcidius' real order. Only in this light become two remarkable facts understandable: 1) Calcidius treats only thirteen chapters of the twenty-seven announced. His commentary breaks off, because he has reached an important *caesura* in the dialogue. Before he continues his comment, he wishes to know if it pleased his patron. In the prologue he explicitly declares so (4, 19-23). 2) The thirteenth and last chapter, *De silva*, lends itself to a separate treatment. The subsequent analysis of the commentary throws light on its peculiar place.

*The commentary*—The *Timaeus* begins with a summary of an earlier conversation, the subject of which corresponds to that of the *Republic*. Then Socrates expressed the wish to see the ideal state operating before his eyes. Subsequently, Critias tells the story, said to have been heard by Solon in Egypt, of Athens' far-off days when it had been an example of the ideal state. But before Critias gives an outline of this state, Timaeus is allowed to recount the origin of the world and of man (*Tim.* 17A-27B). As he had announced before, Calcidius passes over this *simplex narratio . . . et historiae veteris recensitio*; nor does he comment upon the first part of Timaeus' account, probably because it is one of the things *quae communi omnium intellegentiae paterent* (71, 16). The commentary begins at the moment where Timaeus opens his discourse on proportion (*Tim.* 31C). Undoubtedly this subject is one of the *artes incognitae* which Calcidius thinks he should explain. Henceforth he adheres to Plato's text almost without a break up to 53C.

This, no doubt, most important treatise of the argument of the *Timaeus* is divided into two principal parts, the division being in 47E where Plato says: "In the previous discussion the operation of the *voūc* has been brought to light; now the part of *ἀνάγκη* comes up for discussion". The chapter *De silva* (= *ἀνάγκη*) thus provides comments on the entire second part of Timaeus' argument, whereas

the twelve preceding chapters are given to τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα (47E)<sup>1)</sup> or, to use the words of *Calcidius*, chapters i-xii bear upon the things *quae provida mens dei contulerit* (299, 9), while chapter xiii is about *ea quae necessitas invexit*.

The first principal part is, in its turn, subdivided into two portions. The *caesura* is found in *Tim.* 39E. In paragraph 118 he observes: *Hactenus de mundi sensibili constitutione tractavit* (184, 20). "Up to this point Plato has spoken about the constitution of the sensible world", now he passes on to the further equipment of this world: we may add, after the *constitutio mundi* comes the *exornatio mundi*. The first part *De mundi constitutione* may be subdivided into the creation of the *corpus mundanum* and that of the *anima mundi*. This subdivision is suggested by the opening words of paragraph 26: *Hinc ad animae mundi tractatum pergens* (91, 6), which should be compared with 74, 12: *ut doceat mundi corpus perfectum esse*. Next follow first a consideration of the structural similarity between the body of the world and the soul of the world under the title *De stellis ratis et errantibus*, and, secondly, a treatise about the connexion between that soul and body, entitled *De caelo*, or rather, as *Calcidius*, imitating Plato, puts it in his text, *De mundo*<sup>1)</sup>. *Calcidius* rightly subdivides again the *De exornatione mundi*, namely where the Creator ceases to produce creatures himself and leaves this task to the gods of whom He is the Maker and the Father (*Tim.* 41A). Finally, in paragraph 137 *Calcidius* says: *Hactenus de natura daemonum, deinde de mortalium genere disserit*. Thus, *Calcidius'* commentary corresponds to this scheme:

### I *Quae provida mens dei contulerit*

1 <i>De generatione mundi</i>	par.
a) <i>De constitutione mundani corporis</i> . . . . .	8-25
b) <i>De generatione animae</i> . . . . .	26-55
c) <i>De convenientia inter animam et corpus</i> . . . .	56-97
d) <i>De animae et corporis coniunctione</i> . . . . .	98-118
2 <i>De exornatione mundi</i>	
a) <i>De natura daemonum</i> . . . . .	119-136
b) <i>De mortalium genere</i> . . . . .	137-267

### II *Quae necessitas invexit (De silva)*

1) 169, 18-19. Cp. *Tim.* 28B: 'Ο δῆ πᾶς οὐρανὸς — ἡ κόσμος ἡ καὶ ἄλλο δτι ποτὲ δνομαζόμενος μάλιστ' ἀν δέχοιτο, τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ὀνομάσθω.

Within the limits of this division *Calcidius* introduces the subjects he wants to discuss in the following way. The *constitutio mundi* is to him not a *creatio ex nihilo* but an arrangement of something already in existence. *Calcidius* takes this as self-evident and asks how order arose in this body of the world? This question leads him to the problem of proportion, since *Plato* taught that there is a relation of proportion between the four elements (par. 8-22). A second problem is, how the world can be eternal, how a thing, although made, can be eternal. *Calcidius* gives three answers: 1) God is the Maker (par. 23), 2) the world contains all matter and thus no cause of destruction can come from outside (par. 24), 3) the world was made after an eternal model (par. 25).

The chapter on the *generatio animae* begins with an explanation of the fact that *Plato* spoke about the origin of the soul, which he only did to oblige unphilosophical minds—actually the soul is eternal (par. 26). Next *Calcidius* takes in hand the difficult text concerning the mixture of the soul. Already among the Ancients there was a difference of opinion about the meaning of the terms *substantia individua* and *substantia dividua*. The point namely was whether these terms to *Plato* meant forms and matter or rather the pure soul and the souls of animals and plants. Though *Calcidius* does not make an explicit statement, from what follows it is clear that he favours the second opinion (par. 54). This is moreover confirmed by his practice of mentioning his personal opinion at the end (par. 27 31).

The mixing of the soul is followed by its division. In connexion with the latter *Calcidius* discusses three questions in the five subsequent paragraphs; one of these questions is, of course, why the soul is divided into seven parts. His first argument is based on authority: *septem numerus laudatur a Pythagoreis ut optimus et naturalissimus et sufficientissimus* (100, 6-8). With it he connects some reflections on the number seven (par. 36-37). In connexion with the following text of *Plato* (*Tim.* 36A-B) *Calcidius* speaks of harmony and numbers (par. 40-50). The reason for treating this subject is explained at the end of this section: *Iste enim Timaeus, qui in hoc libro tractat, ex Pythagorae magisterio fuit, quem rationabiliter inducit Plato domesticis et familiaribus sibi probationibus utentem docere animae naturam congruere numeris, concinere etiam modulaminibus musicae* (119, 3-7).

Then *Calcidius* takes up the question about the real meaning of

this mixture and division. Why this intricate construction? And first of all, why this mixture of *substantia individua* and *dividua*? The answer is: because they are the fundamental principles of things. Considering that the soul must know everything and that, according to the Pythagorean theory, knowledge is only possible when there is equality<sup>1)</sup>, the soul must be composed of all fundamental principles. This is why, as *Calcidius* asserts (121, 8), the nature of the soul consists of numbers, which are the principles of things. The considerations of *Timaeus* on the division of the soul derive their meaning from this identity of soul and numbers. *Calcidius* summarizes his ideas and in confirmation quotes *eminens quaedam doctrina sectae sanctioris* (par. 55)<sup>2)</sup>. Finally, a summary of the whole treatise on the *anima mundi* follows: *Ac de anima quidem mundi ex duabus essentiis eiusdemque et item diversae naturae concretione conflata, deque divisione eius iuxta rationem harmonicam, arithmeticam, geometricam facta, quove modo natura eius numeris sonisque convenientia satis dictum est* (123, 1-5).

The relationship between body and soul is discussed in two further chapters. The agreement between them as regards their division (*quemadmodum animae sectio sectioni caelestium membrorum inflexionique convenientia circulorum*) is entitled *De stellis ratis et errantibus*; their union, *De caelo*. In this part Calcidius also speaks about Plato's famous chapter on time and eternity (*Tim.* 37D ss.).

The structure of the section *De generatione mundi* may be summarized as follows.—The spaced titles are those of *Calcidius* himself (cp. above p. 12).

## *I. De generatione mundi*

a) *De constitutione mundani corporis*

α) *De materiarum, ex quibus constat, germanitate, sive de analogia . . . . .* par. 8-22

1) *Est porro Pythagoricum dogma similia nonnisi a similibus suis comprehendit* (119, 17-18). Another elucidating passage is 171, 18 sqq.: *Porro quod eadem (viz., animam) modulatam esse adserit, originem eius et quasi quaedam elementa, ex quibus eadem inter initia constituit, recordatur et repetit, ut ex ternis originibus, id est individuae dividuaeque substantiae, itemque eadem diversaque naturis coagmentata similitudinem dissimilitudinemque rerum bonitatisque et malitiae diversitatem, optandaeque et execrandae naturae disparilitatem facile ipsi in rebus recognoscat, utpote quae divisa sit numeris, composita analogiis, stipata medietatibus, ordinata rationibus musicis scissaque adeo sexies et rursum devincta inmortalibus vinculis convenientibus diverso varioque totius mundani corporis motui omnia sciat et omnia iuxta naturam propriam adsequatur.*

2) For this section see *ad* par. 300 (p. 123).

β) <i>De aeternitate mundi</i>	
αα) <i>quia a deo factus est</i> . . . . .	23
ββ) <i>quia ex omnibus materiis constat</i> . . . . .	24
γγ) <i>quia ad exemplum intelligibilis mundi factus est</i>	25
b) <i>De genitura animae mundi</i>	
α) <i>Quare de ortu animae loquator Plato</i> . . . . .	26
β) <i>De mixtione et divisione animae</i>	
αα) <i>De mixtione</i> . . . . .	27-31
ββ) <i>De divisione</i>	
(1) <i>De numero septem, etc.</i> . . . . .	32-39
(2) <i>De harmonia</i> . . . . .	40-45
(3) <i>De numeris</i> . . . . .	46-50
γγ) <i>Quid mixtio haec divisioque significant</i> . . . . .	51-53
δδ) <i>Conclusio et confirmatio</i> . . . . .	54-55
c) <i>De stellis ratis et errantibus</i> . . . . .	56-97
d) <i>De caelo</i> . . . . .	98-118

The second part, which has been given the title *De exornatione mundi* opens with a survey of what precedes: "Above we analyzed the way in which the Maker, God, achieved the making of the world as a whole. There we relied upon a contemplation of nature and upon the special sciences. And, in so far as our modest talents permitted, we let ourselves be guided by the doctrines of Plato" <sup>1</sup>). Then *Calcidius* returns to the text of *Plato*, who goes on to discuss the further elaboration of the world. The Godhead, he says, wanted to make the world as similar as possible to the Being which really is. In the same way as this Being contains four forms, there should be four kinds of living beings in the universe: 1) the heavenly race of the gods (~ fire) and the earthly beings, subdivided into 2) the flying (~ air), 3) the swimming (~ water), 4) the living on earth (~ earth) <sup>2</sup>). *Plato* first discusses the immortal ones among them, the fixed stars and the earth. These are the living beings which God made Himself. By way of an appendix, he also mentions the

<sup>1</sup>) *Mundi totius perfectionem ab opifice absolutam deo praeteriti operis textu secrevimus Platonicis dogmatibus, quoad mediocritas ingenii passa est, inhaerentes iuxta naturae contemplationem artificiosasque rationes* (184, 22-185, 1). Both the *mediocritas ingenii* and the *rationes artificiosae* recall the introduction (par. 1 and 4).

<sup>2</sup>) From this it is clear that *Plato* thought the four forms or elements also to be present in the world of ideas. Cp. *ad par. 272* (p. 43).

other divine beings: the gods of mythology and of popular belief. To the word *δαιμονες* which he uses Calcidius reacts in this manner: "Plato does not confine himself to an argument about the living beings mentioned but also tries to explain the nature of angels, whom he calls *daemones*" (185, 17-19). The purest of them live in the ether, the others in the air and water. For it is unreasonable to assume that one of these elements should remain deprived of rational beings. But Plato does not pursue this question, because it is a matter *ultra naturae contemplationem*. By these last words Calcidius intends to say that the problem is beyond the scope of the *Timaeus*, the subject of which is nature. Still, this did not prevent him from subjecting these *daemones* to further enquiry, once he had discussed Plato's text about the fixed stars and the earth (par. 127-136). He calls this enquiry an *inquisitio primariae supervectaeque contemplationis, quae appellatur epoptica, altior aliquanto quam physica* (191, 13-15), thus explaining more precisely the previous and vaguer expression *ultra naturae contemplationem*<sup>1</sup>).

The treatise on the *daemones* is remarkable. Calcidius refers to Plato's *'Philosophus'*, i.e. the *Epinomis* (par. 128)<sup>2</sup>). According to this dialogue, he states, there are five regions in the universe: the highest is fire, next follows ether, also fire but a little coarser; then come sky, water and earth (par. 129). Since both the region of fire and the earth are populated with rational beings (gods and men), there should be the same in the three intermediate regions. In ether live creatures called by the Jews 'holy angels'. They take up an intermediate position between God and men<sup>3</sup>). The angels carry men's prayers to God and they make God's will known to man; this is why they were called 'angels' (*ἄγγελοι*, messengers). Greece, Latium and *omnis Barbaria* attest to this benefice, for man stands in need of their support (par. 132). Calcidius speaks about good and bad angels and the place where they belong (par. 133-135). Finally, he attacks the theory that angels are souls released from

1) About this *contemplatio epoptica* he also speaks in par. 272 (303, 11). See there.

2) Cp. E. des Places, S.J., in his introduction to the edition of the *Epinomis*. Paris, 1956, p. 93-94.

3) Here too we find the idea of proportion: *Ut enim deus iuxta angelum, sic angelus iuxta hominem* (195, 14-15).

their bodies. In his opinion, this is not in accordance with the doctrine of Plato (par. 136) <sup>1)</sup>.

From the immortal creatures Plato passes over to the mortal ones, especially man. The Godhead first made the soul of man from the same, though less pure, mixture of which the world-soul was made. To prevent these souls from being also immortal,—they would be, if the Godhead had made them Himself—He ordered the created gods to finish His work. Before doing so He placed every soul on a star where he taught it the 'laws of fate'. These laws lead *Calcidius* to a lengthy discussion of which the principal theme is the relation between Providence and fate (par. 142-190). Only after this *praeparatio animae humanae*, the children of the Godhead appear on the scene to perform their duty. From the Father they borrow the four elements in order to form the body. Combining them, they provide it with the 'cycles of the soul'. In this way man is made. Hence the title of the eighth chapter is *De ortu generis humani*.

Plato shows how at first there was disorder in this new creature; the supremacy of the rational soul was achieved slowly and with difficulty. Commenting upon these texts, *Calcidius* dedicates a special chapter to the question of the difference between the intelligence of one man and another, the answer being that the supremacy of the soul is stronger in one than in another.

Paragraph 212 is a summary of this section. So far Plato discussed the *constitutio totius hominis*, man as a whole; now he is going to consider him *membratim*. In the same way in which he first spoke about the world as a whole (*totius mundi perfectio*, 184, 22) and then about its parts, he then examined the members of the human body in particular, inquiring into their use. He also touched upon the causes of sight and hearing, the use of the senses and of their organs. Memory, dreams, visions, etc., are not overlooked. Thus *Calcidius'* summary.

The first object of study is the head. Plato asserted that it is the

---

1) This passage about *daemones* strongly reminds us of Philo (Cp. H. A. Wolfson, *Philo*, Cambridge (Mass.), 1948, Vol. I, p. 366 ss.), who also seems to follow the *Epinomis* in mentioning this special succession of the five regions (ether after fire) and in attributing definite functions to angels. The Jewish or Jewish-Christian element in this text is evident at first sight. It may have become known to *Calcidius* through the intermediary of an author such as *Numenius* (as in par. 55; cp. *ad* par. 295).

chief seat of the soul. The statement is the occasion for a broad digression. This question, however, is difficult to answer before the answer is given to another one. What exactly is the soul? The answers differ widely. There are those who follow some kind of atomic theory (*qui dividuam fore silvae substantiam . . . , 251, 21*). They do not, of course, give a definite place to the soul, for in their opinion there is only one *spiritus* penetrating everything (par. 214-217). On the other hand, there are who think the matter of things to be something continuous (*Qui iugem putant esse silvam et adunatione quadam sibi continuatam, 254, 8-9*)<sup>1</sup>). Of these Empedocles located the soul in the blood and consequently, in the heart (par. 218). Some Jewish texts seem to agree with him, e.g., *clamat apud me sanguis fratris tui* (*Gen. 4.10*). Calcidius observes that this is correct, if it is understood as relating to the animal soul alone, for blood is the *vehiculum inrationabilis animae*. But all this has no connexion with the rational soul (par. 219)<sup>2</sup>). The Stoics regard the heart as the seat of the soul but on different grounds (par. 220). Then there is the theory of Aristotle according to whom the soul is the *prima perfectio corporis naturalis organici possibilitate vitam habentis* (258, 1-2). This theory is more fully discussed by Calcidius. Aristotle, he observes, believes the soul to be present in every part of the body, but its centre is *in penetralibus cordis*, in the heart (par. 224). Both points in this doctrine are rejected by Calcidius. If the soul is the *forma corporis*, it is something accidental, a thing which appears and disappears. This is not what Plato thinks the soul to be, viz., *substantia carens corpore semetipsam movens rationabilis* (par. 225-229). It is true that the soul is present in all parts of the body, but its chief functions are thinking and wishing. The former is the most important, so that the corresponding part of the body, the head, should also be its most important part (par. 230). It is the seat of the senses which are *tamquam comites rationis* (par. 231). The head is round, because it has been formed after the image of the spherical world.

Second in dignity is the heart, the centre not of the living creature as a rational being, but merely of the living being.—A description of the structural similarity between man and the world

1) In par. 275 Calcidius is using the same division.

2) For the history of this theory cp. F. Rüsche, *Blut, Leben und Seele*, Paderborn, 1930. The theory was also held by Philo, see there p. 394. Of the same author: *Das Seelenpneuma*, Paderborn, 1933.

follows as a kind of parenthesis<sup>1</sup>), and Calcidius explains that the same order exists in the state (par. 233).

In imitation of Plato Calcidius now discusses sight. Naturally, this offers an occasion for a historical survey. A following chapter, *De imaginibus*, discusses dreams (par. 249-256) <sup>2</sup>) and images seen in a mirror (par. 257-259). This is followed by the interpretation of *Tim.* 46C-E, in which Plato argued that the senses are not self-sufficient but require a higher power, the soul, of which they are the instruments. Finally, there is a chapter on the advantage of sight and hearing. Sense-perception is explained in accordance with Plato's statements on this subject. This second part may be summarized thus:

<b>2. <i>De exornatione mundi sive De quattuor animalium generibus</i></b>	
<b>a) <i>De immortalium genere</i></b>	<b>par.</b>
α) <i>De sideribus et terra</i> . . . . .	120-126
β) <i>De daemonibus</i> . . . . .	127-136
<b>b) <i>De mortalium genere</i></b>	
α) <i>De animae praeparatione - De fato</i> . . . . .	137-201
β) <i>De ortu generis humani</i>	
αα) <i>De totius hominis constitutione</i>	
(1) <i>De animae et corporis concretione</i> . . .	202-207
(2) <i>Quare alii sapientes, alii insipientes</i>	208-211
ββ) <i>De homine membratim considerato</i>	
(1) <i>De partium ordine - De capite - Quid sit anima</i> . . . . .	213-235

1) It is interesting to see how great the similarity between micro- and macrocosmos is to Calcidius: *Quare si mundus animaque mundi huius sunt ordinationis, ut summitas quidem sit dimensa caelestibus hisque subiecta (sc. loca) divinis potestatibus, quae adpellantur angeli et daemones, in terra vero terrestribus, et imperant quidem caelestia, exequuntur vero angelicae potestates, reguntur porro terrena: prima summum locum obtinentia, secunda medietatem, ea vero quae subiecta sunt inum, consequenter etiam in natura hominis est quiddam regale, est aliud quoque in medio positum, est tertium in imo: summum quod imperat, medium quod agit, tertium quod regitur et administratur. Imperat igitur anima, exequitur vigor eius in pectore constitutus, reguntur et dispensantur cetera pube tenus et infra* (268, 26-269, 9).

2) On this passage cp. J. H. Waszink, *Die sogenannte Fünfteilung der Träume bei Chalcidius und ihre Quellen*, *Mnem.* Ser. III, Vol. 9 (1941) 68-85. Here too Philo's influence seems to be a fact. As in the treatise on the *daemones*, Plato's *Philosophus* is referred to here.

(2) <i>De sensibus, sc. de visu et auditu</i> . . .	236-267
(a) <i>De visu</i> . . . . .	236-248
(b) <i>De imaginibus</i> . . . . .	249-259
(α) <i>De somniis</i> . . . . .	250-256
(β) <i>De simulacris in speculis</i> . . .	257-259
(c) <i>Sensus incorporeae potentiae famulatur</i> . . . . .	260-263
(d) <i>De utilitate visus et auditus</i>	264-267

After this discussion of the order in the universe, in which he passes from the macrocosmos to the microcosmos, Plato and after him *Calcidius*, is now returning to the initial stage of things. This enables him to discuss the principles, in particular the one principle found by the Demiurge when he started his harmonizing activity, namely matter. The reason for this peculiar arrangement of the subject-matter is to be found in the fact that Plato only now comes to an explicit discussion of the substructure of his system. Therefore, *Calcidius'* lengthy chapter on matter is actually more than a treatment of one of the two principal subjects (cp. the diagram on p. 15). It is, in point of fact, the fundamental part of his entire commentary.

## THE TREATISE ON MATTER

### STRUCTURE OF THE TREATISE

At first sight the chapter *De silva* seems to be a running commentary on *Tim.* 47E-53C, interrupted by both historical and systematic discussions of the subject in question. Thus, from a merely external point of view the following scheme could be drawn up:

1. Paraphrase of *Tim.* 47E-49A . . . . . par. 268-274
2. Historical and systematic discussion . . . . . par. 275-320
3. Paraphrase of *Tim.* 49A-53C . . . . . par. 321-354

A further paragraph (355) forms the link with the following part which, although announced in the prologue (p. 4, 19), is totally unknown.

On close consideration, however, it becomes clear that Calcidius' division is not based on external grounds alone. Plato's text remains the foundation of the lay-out, as indeed the entire work is based upon the *Timaeus*. In *Tim.* 49A Plato passes from an introductory consideration of the subject of matter to the real treatment of the question. Likewise Calcidius' paragraphs 268-274 are an introductory essay and a first outline of his treatise on matter. They are followed by both historical and systematic parts, in which the author describes first the evolution of the philosophical doctrine and then his own opinion. The third part verifies his theory on the basis of the further texts of Plato. Thus, what at first sight seems to be rather unsystematic, assumes the form of a well-founded treatment. The above scheme, therefore, can also be worded thus:

1. Introductory paraphrase of *Tim.* 47E-49A . . . par. 268-274
2. Historical and systematic treatise . . . . . par. 275-320
3. Verifying paraphrase of *Tim.* 49A-53C . . . . . par. 321-354

Insight into this structure of Calcidius' treatise on matter is, obviously, of the greatest importance. It, at once, explains why Calcidius approaches the same problem sometimes two or even three times. The design of the treatise makes this necessary: central problems had to be treated in the introduction as well as in the systematic and the verifying parts. Needless to repeat that

a composition of this kind urgently requires the application of the maxim mentioned before, *viz.*, that a work should be explained by the work itself.

*Further analysis* — 1. In the first section, the introductory paraphrase, *Calcidius* gives a preliminary explanation of matter itself (par. 268) and its relation to Providence (par. 269-270). An explanatory list of some names given by *Plato* to matter (par. 271) follows next. *Plato's* mentioning that philosophers before him considered fire, water, earth and air to be principles—which they are definitely not—gives *Calcidius* the opportunity for explaining briefly the real nature of these principles, meanwhile paying special attention to forms (par. 272). After paraphrasing *Plato's* invocation of the Godhead he asserts with the master that alongside the (two-fold) *species* a third principle should be accepted. And after stating this, he again affirms that this principle is very difficult to grasp (par. 274).

2. The difficulty of understanding the real nature of matter gave rise to the most variegated opinions. In his historical and systematic treatise *Calcidius* first gives a survey of these different opinions (par. 275), and then elaborates this paragraph historically (par. 276-301).

Those who consider matter as generated, such as the Jews (par. 276-278), are opposed by those who flatly deny this (par. 279-301). These opponents are, again, distinguished into two groups. There are who regard matter as consisting of particles (par. 279), while others think it to be a *continuum* (par. 280-301). The latter are again divided into thinkers who ascribe certain qualities to matter, for example *Thales*, *Anaximenes*, *etc.* (par. 280-282); the rest consider it to be entirely without qualities: *Aristotle* (par. 283-288), the *Stoicks* (par. 289-294), *Pythagoras* (par. 295-299). In two subsequent paragraphs *Calcidius* mentions two different interpretations of *Plato*. They constitute a kind of transition to the systematic section, which follows.

This second section opens with the question which of these two interpretations is the correct one. In answering it, *Calcidius* begins, as it were, *ab ovo* in order to find the underlying principles. There are, he states, two ways of reasoning, *syllogismus* and *resolutio* (par. 302). By means of the *resolutio* he traces matter (par. 303); by means of what he now calls *compositio* he finds the Maker and the

model (par. 304). In order to discover afterwards whether he has really to do with principles, he examines which qualities they should have. Hence a short treatise 'On the qualities of principles' leads to the conclusion that these should be simple, without quality and eternal (par. 305-306). After pointing out that fire, earth, *etc.*, do not answer to these requirements, he lays down, by means of a remarkable argument, that the principles are threefold: *deus*, *silva*, *exemplum* (par. 307).

Now at last Calcidius ventures upon his treatise on matter: *Nunc iam de silva tractabitur*. It is at this point that Calcidius' own treatise on matter really begins. First Calcidius speaks about the names which matter has in Plato, its variability (par. 308-309) and its lack of qualities (par. 310). Next he defines his position towards the Stoia. What exactly the Stoics think about matter (par. 311); whether it is limited or infinite (par. 312); whether it can increase or diminish (par. 313), expand or shrink (par. 314), whether it is divisible (par. 315). After treating all these questions he says: "So our opinion that matter is not water, earth, *etc.*, but a *materia principalis*, *etc.*, is correct" (par. 316). By means of analysis of the process of change Calcidius now proves that there is such a substratum (par. 317-318). Finally, he wonders whether matter is a *corpus* or something *incorporeum* and the conclusion is that it is neither (par. 319-320).

3. With a verifying paraphrase Calcidius continues the text of the *Timaeus*. Since he is bound to the latter, no straight line of thought and explanation is to be expected. Matter is without form and quality and, moreover, without motion. That, in spite of this, it appears to be liable to change is due to an other principle, *viz.*, the *species*. For the moment Plato does not enter into this question; he only affirms that the three principles may be compared to father, mother and child (par. 320-330). Calcidius, in his turn, after discussing why matter is without any quality and how it is related to the ten categories (par. 331-336), speaks about the *species*. They are the forms and their images. Do these forms exist? What is their relation to quality and form? From Plato's text about insight and opinion, he concludes that there is an eternal *species*. Finally, he speaks about the *species secunda*, the form of things (par. 337-343).

These two kinds of *species* explained, Calcidius, following Plato, returns to matter which, in the passage under discussion (52B),

is called *χώρα* by Plato. After pointing out the particular difficulty of conceiving it, Calcidius discusses the text in which this act of cognition is described by the Greek philosopher. Then he observes that, in spite of the difficulties, matter has such an influence on human knowledge that we cannot imagine anything without it—it is due to the influence of matter that we have no eye for intelligible reality (par. 344-349).

Finally, like Plato, he repeats his opinion of the *silva*. He clearly explains how he imagines the course of events 'in the beginning', and finishes at the point where divine Providence begins its work (par. 350-354).

This survey plainly shows that the *De silva* is, indeed, the fundamental treatise of the whole commentary. The principles of things are discussed in each of the three parts. In the systematic section there is even a special portion 'On the principles'. One is again struck by the fact that Calcidius winds up with referring to Providence. The first part of the commentary (ch. i-xii) indeed discussed τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα, which Calcidius will explain in paragraph 268 as the works of the *provida mens dei*. In imitation of Plato, he returns to the point from which he started.

The outline of the whole treatise on matter is now obvious:

1. Introductory paraphrase	par.
a) Outline of the treatise . . . . .	268
b) Relation between matter and Providence . . . . .	269-270
c) Names of matter . . . . .	271
d) The real forms and their images . . . . .	272
e) The third principle: matter . . . . .	273
f) Intelligibility of matter . . . . .	274
2. Historical and systematic treatise	
a) Historical part	
Survey . . . . .	275
α) Matter was made: the Jews . . . . .	276-278
β) Matter was not made	
αα) It consists of small parts . . . . .	279
ββ) It is continuous	
(I) It has qualities and form . . . . .	280-282
(2) It has neither quality nor form	
(a) Aristotle . . . . .	283-288
(b) The Stoics . . . . .	289-294

(c) Pythagoras . . . . .	295-299
(d) Plato	
(α) One interpretation . . . . .	300
(β) The other interpretation . . . . .	301
b) Systematic part	
α) The principles in general	
αα) Two ways of arguing . . . . .	302
ββ) Matter is found by means of <i>resolutio</i> . . . . .	303
γγ) The Maker and the exemplar are discovered by means of <i>compositio</i> . . . . .	304
δδ) The principles . . . . .	305-306
εε) The real principles . . . . .	307
β) Calcidius' own treatise on matter	
αα) Its names and variability . . . . .	308-309
ββ) Matter without quality . . . . .	310
γγ) Refutation of the Stoa . . . . .	311
δδ) Matter eternal and unlimited . . . . .	312
εε) Matter without increase and decrease . . . . .	313
ζζ) Matter neither expands nor shrinks . . . . .	314
ηη) Matter divisible? . . . . .	315
θθ) Summarizing conclusion . . . . .	316
ιι) Matter the general substratum of things . . . . .	317-318
κκ) It is neither corporeal nor incorporeal . . . . .	319-320
3. Verifying paraphrase	
a) Matter without form, without quality and without motion . . . . .	321-330
b) Why matter without quality? . . . . .	331-336
c) The <i>species</i> . . . . .	337-343
d) Matter itself . . . . .	344-349
e) Reference to Providence . . . . .	350-354

### ANALYSIS AND INVESTIGATION OF SOURCES

We now turn to a detailed discussion of the individual paragraphs as they occur in Wrobel's text. In several cases, however, where his paragraphs harm correct understanding of the text, we shall be obliged to depart from it. First a translation is given of the relevant part of the text—if necessary expanded—next follows its interpretation, first from the whole text of Calcidius, then from occasional parallel texts. The conclusions drawn from some parts offer opportunities for general reflections.

## I. INTRODUCTORY PARAPHRASE

a) *Outline of the treatise*

[268] Next Plato states: "Since, apart from a few exceptions, we have considered all that the insight of the provident spirit has wrought, we have now to speak of the role of necessity". Plato who wants to explain the whole of the sensible world, rightly states that he has dealt with almost everything wrought by the provident spirit of God, making, as he did, the sensible world after the image and semblance of the intelligible world. What remains to be discussed is the role of necessity, for the world seems to be composed of two factors: Providence and necessity.

By the term 'necessity' Plato indicates the *祿η*, that we in Latin can call *silva*. It is out of this that the universe came into being. It is a patient nature, because it is the primary substratum of all corporeal (*i.e.* material) things, in which quality, quantity and all further accidents show themselves. Though it never recedes from its own being, it is liable to change in so far as it assumes different and even opposite forms. Plato wished to give an explanation for this (*silva*), but he first explains why he could not omit this subject.

NUNC QUONIAM Plato: Τὰ μὲν οὖν παρεληλυθότα τῶν εἰρημένων πλὴν βραχέων ἐπιδέδειται τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα· δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ δι' ἀνάγκης γινόμενα τῷ λόγῳ παραθέσθαι (47E). SUBSTANTIAM Cp. 345, 2 and 368, 9 (p. 221). PROVIDA MENS DEI In these words Calcidius repeats the expression *providae mentis intellectus* in the translated text of Plato on which he is commenting. There is, of course, a difference between the two expressions which is well qualified by the words applied by Thévenaz to Plutarch's doctrine of the world-soul, *viz.*, a "mythologie fabricatrice du Timée, qui est devenue la théologie du Dieu créateur" (*L'Âme du Monde, le Devenir et la Matière chez Plutarque*, Inaugural diss., Neuchâtel, 1938, p. 105). The fact that Calcidius can and does use these two different modes of expression indiscriminately is consequent upon his concept of Providence, formulated in his treatise on fate, in this way: *Principio cuncta quae sunt et ipsum mundum contineri regique principaliter quidem a summo deo, qui est summum bonum, ultra omnem substantiam omnemque naturam existimatione intellectuque melior, quem cuncta expetunt, cum ipse sit plenae perfectionis*

*et nullius societatis indigens . . . Deinde a providentia, quae est post illum summum secundae eminentiae, quem νοῦν Graeci vocant. Est autem intelligibilis essentia aemulæ bonitatis propter indefessam ad summum deum conversionem, estque ei ex illo bonitatis haustus, quo tam ipsa ornatur quam cetera, quae ipso auctore honestantur. Hanc igitur dei voluntatem tamquam sapientem rerum omnium tutelam providentiam vocant homines, non, ut plerique existimant, ideo dictam, quia praecurrit in videndo atque intellegendo proventus futuros sed quia proprium divinae mentis intellegere, qui est proprius mentis actus et est mens dei aeterna. Est igitur mens dei de intellegendo aeternus actus.* (par. 176. As a third divine reality he also mentions *fatum* taken in the sense of the world-soul (*anima mundi tripartita*). He also calls this *mens secunda* as distinguished from the *mens dei* which is *providentia*. Calcidius again summarizes his theory in paragraph 188: *Originem quidem rerum, ex qua ceteris omnibus quae sunt substantia subministratur, esse summum et ineffabilem deum. Post quem providentiam eius secundum deum, latorem legis utriusque vitae tam aeternae quam temporariae. Tertiam porro esse substantiam, quae secunda mens intellectusque dicitur, quasi quaedam custos legis aeternae.* And he concludes: *Ergo summus deus iubet, secundus ordinat, tertius intimat.*) Whenever Calcidius speaks of *mens dei* or *mens provida dei*, his concept of Providence should be borne in mind.

It is generally known that the concept of Providence was fully elaborated by the Stoics. There is, however, no need to think of a direct influence of the Stoa on Calcidius; from what follows it will be evident that one should think rather of Numenius. Numenius, like Calcidius, distinguished three phases in the Godhead.

AD EXEMPLUM ET SIMILITUDINEM INTELLEGIBILIS MUNDI Presently the world of ideas is mentioned, though only in passing. According to Wolfson (*Philo*, Cambridge, 1948, Vol. I, p. 291), Philo was the first to use the expression *χόσμος νοητός* of which *mundus intelligibilis* is clearly the translation. Plato used the term *ζῶον νοητόν*. This is noteworthy in an author who, also elsewhere, seems to have been influenced—directly or indirectly—by Philo. (See the general survey and par. 276-278.) Further the expression *ad exemplum et similitudinem* is worthy of notice too. It is one of the frequent duplicates in Calcidius, as, for instance, 345, 10 the similar *geminatio: imagines et simulacra*. To quote one more instance; for 'origin' we find *origo et arx* (91, 20), *auctoritas et origo* (91, 17-18), *pontificium et auctoritas* (91, 22-23), *exordium et fons*

(94, 5), *originem et causam* (123, 14). Calcidius is obviously very fond of such phrases which, moreover, often afford a rhythmical clausula.

NECESSITATEM NUNC ADPELLAT HYLEN The identification of Aristotle's *ὕλη* with Plato's *ἀνάγκη* or *χώρα* has been generally accepted ever since the age of Aristotle. Sometimes one gets the impression that *ὕλη* is a Platonic term (304, 6; 336, 10, see p. 145). The use of the term *silva* throughout the present treatise is a clear proof of the profound influence of Aristotle. QUAM NOS LATINE SILVAM POSSUMUS NOMINARE In par. 273 (304, 4-5) Calcidius says: *quamque iuniores hylen, nos silvam vocamus*; in par. 123 (188, 11-12): *Chaos, quam Graeci hylen, nos silvam vocamus*. The question should be raised whether Calcidius introduced the term *silva* himself. Nothing can be concluded from the pronoun *nos*; this may mean *nos Latini* (as is actually given by some of the manuscripts), in which case, as in par. 123, the *Latini* are opposed to the Greeks. However, *possimus* may be regarded as containing a hint of personal authorship. At any rate, no earlier use of the term *silva* for 'matter' is known. Isidorus of Sevilla, Calcidius' compatriot, wrote the noteworthy words: *Hanc ὕλην Latini materiam appellant, ideo quia omne informe, unde aliquid faciendum est, semper materia nuncupatur. Proinde et eam poetae silvam nominaverunt* (*Etymologiae* XIII 3, 1). Finally, it should be remembered that, according to Gilson (*La Philosophie au Moyen-Âge*, Paris, 1952, p. 118), medieval authors used the term *silva* in consequence of Calcidius. EADEMQUE PATIBILIS NATURA It seems that, under influence of the Greek original, a second relative clause is avoided here. One should, of course, understand *quaeque est patibilis natura*. For *patibilis natura* compare Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* 324 b 18: *ἡ δὲ ὕλη ἡ ὕλη παθητικὸν SUBIECTA CORPORI PRINCIPALITER* These words, too, strike us as Aristotelian; *Phys.* 192 a 31: *λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἔχαστω*. Elsewhere Calcidius says: *materiam principalem et corporis primam subiectionem* (340, 13-14). However, Calcidius may have derived this phrase from Aristotle as a variant to Plato's *πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχή* (*Tim.* 49A). IN QUA Cp. 306, 1-2. Whereas just above matter was said to be that out of which (*ex qua*) the world was made, it is now introduced as that in which (*in qua*), as within some space, the qualities occur. The latter version is more Platonic. According to Plato, the world is formed by merging of form into matter. The former suits better

Aristotle, according to whom the world is moulded out of matter and form. *QUAE CUM A NATURA PROPRIA NON RECEDAT* This is an exact rendering of *Tim.* 50B: Ταῦτὸν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἔαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔξισταται δυνάμεως. Calcidius is formulating this idea repeatedly: 337, 19; 343, 19-20; 351, 9-10 (where he translates the very text of the *Timaeus*), and 374, 17. Illustrative of the difference between the Platonic and Aristotelic views is the following text of Simplicius, *In Phys.* 320, 21 ss. Diels: διὸ καὶ ἔξ ὅλης καὶ εἴδους τὸ σύνθετον οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ λέγουσι ὡς συνεξαλλοιουμένων ἀλλήλοις τῶν ἀπλῶν ἐν τῇ τοῦ συνθέτου γενέσει. οἱ δὲ Πλατωνικοὶ τὴν ὅλην ἀτρεπτὸν λέγουσι τοῖς ἐν Τιμαιώ λεγομένοις ἀκολουθοῦντες, ἐν οἷς φησι "ὁ αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως· ταῦτὸν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἔαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔξισταται δυνάμεως" . . . διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οὐκ ἔξ ὅλης καὶ εἴδους φασὶν εἶναι τὸ σύνθετον ὡς μὴ συναλλοιουμένων ἀλλήλοις, ἀλλ' εἴδος ἐν ὅλῃ. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου . . . ἔξ ὅλης καὶ εἴδους λέγουσι τὸ σύνθετον τῆς τε ὅλης εἰς τὸ εἴδος μεταβαλλούσης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους ὅλουμένου. Thus the Platonists speak about an εἴδος ἐν ὅλῃ, the Peripatetics of something composed ἔξ ὅλης καὶ εἴδους. For Plato's viewpoint Simplicius quotes the same passage as Calcidius.

**DIVERSIS TAMEN** Matter remains what it is, but it assumes different forms in the same way as gold remains gold though it is founded in diverse forms (cp. *Tim.* 50C and Albinus, *Epit.* VIII 2: *ἰδιότητα δ' ἔχειν . . . μηδὲ ποιότητα*).

This short opening paragraph of the *De silva* is heavy-laden. In a few words Calcidius gives the principal characteristics of matter. At first sight the Aristotelian doctrine preponderates: the terms and expressions *silva*, *patibilis*, *subiecta corpori principali*, *ex qua*. On reconsideration, however, the Platonic character proves, at least, to be equally strong, especially in the intrinsic immutability ascribed to the *silva*: Evidently Calcidius wanted to associate himself closely with Plato. The expressions which, to us, sound purely Aristotelian, were, to him, in perfect agreement with Plato (cp. p. 76).

That Calcidius calls matter *patibilis* is important for the question whether he depends upon Plotinus, for the latter definitely asserts that matter is ἀπαθής (*Enn.* III 6, 9). Furthermore, this qualification is also remarkable within the scope of the ideas of Calcidius himself, for how can matter be called *patibilis*, if it is intrinsically immutable? This problem must be dealt with at some length later

on (cp. par. 309). Henceforth Calcidius asserts the mutability of matter with great emphasis, but elsewhere he will also call it *imperibilis*, an expression which can be understood in the light of what has just been said. However, the most important thing to be noted is this: Calcidius' explicit assertion of the *possibilitas* of matter makes it highly improbable that he is dependent upon Plotinus.

b) *Relation between matter and Providence*

[269] Finally Plato adds: "For the generation of the sensible world was of a mixed nature and was caused by cooperation of necessity and mind". Therefore, since he discusses the generation of the world and has to do this thoroughly, he is bound to discuss the two factors contributing to it. And with this, the necessity of a treatise on matter becomes obvious. Plato speaks about a 'mixed' generation, because the two elements are of a different nature; he speaks rightly of a 'generation' from necessity and Providence, for the world has not its origin in a mechanical mixture of these two, as might be supposed from the term 'mixture'. On the contrary, the world came into being through both planning of a provident spirit and factors of necessity. In this way Providence was the active agent, whereas matter underwent its action and let itself be 'adorned' willingly. The divine spirit moulds it in such a manner that it is entirely pervaded by it, not as forms are conferred in sculpture, where only the surface is operated upon, but rather in the manner in which nature and the soul pervade and animate solid bodies.

MIXTA ... GENERATIO Μεμειγμένη γάρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως ἐγενήθη (47E-48A). The ideas on which this section hinges are *mixta* and *generatio*. At the end of the previous one, Calcidius announced that Plato was going to give the reason why he should speak of matter. Quoting Plato's words, Calcidius concludes: Thus, because this is a generation in which two different principles cooperate, Plato will have to speak of both and, therefore, also of the *silva*. DE UTROQUE GENERE For the term *genus* in this connexion, see paragraph 330: *genera nunc inproprie adpellans; neque enim silva nec vero exemplum genera sunt, sed ut adpellatio generum significet primas substantias* (354, 10-12). MIXTAM VERO GENERATIONEM Calcidius now explains Plato's

text. In the words quoted *mixtam* should be strongly stressed; it points to the fact that there is question of principles of a different nature. (In the same way as we speak of 'mixed feelings', Plato spoke of a 'mixed generation'.) In order to follow the line of thought one should hold on to the idea of *generatio*. Calcidius: "and rightly Plato speaks of a generation from necessity and Providence, for we should not, on account of *mixtam*, think of something mechanical". In other words, Calcidius wants to show that ἐκ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ does not only belong to μεμειγμένη but also to ἐγεννήθη.

Although in this exegesis the text in the manuscripts is explained satisfactorily, the question arises whether there is something missing. The more so, since the words *ex necessitate et providentia* are no literal quotation. One cannot find fault with the word *providentia*, for Calcidius may safely exchange it with *intellegentia*; the disturbing element is the absence of the idea 'generation'. This disturbing element would not have occurred, had Calcidius quoted Plato's words literally, and *coetus* had formed the missing link. It seems quite probable that Calcidius wrote it and that the text should be read thus: *recteque <ex necessitatis providentiaeque coetu, non> ex necessitate et providentia ...* However, the reading of the manuscripts is by no means impossible; in which case the meaning should be: *recteque ex necessitate et providentia <progenitum esse mundum>*. One may here also refer to par. 296 (325, 14): *Denique ex providentia et necessitate progenitum (sc. mundum) veterum theologorum scitis haberi*. This text occurs in the quotation from Numenius. The observation is important, because like elsewhere, Calcidius' terminology shows a great resemblance to that of Numenius. The quotation reads: *Sed providentia quidem est dei opus et officium, caeca vero fortuitaque temeritas ex prosapia silvae, ut sit evidens iuxta Pythagoran dei silvaeque, item providentiae fortunaeque coetu cunctae rei molem esse constructam* (327, 9-13). Anyhow, whatever reading is preferred, the resemblance between Calcidius and Numenius is striking. Already in the preceding section Calcidius spoke the same terms: *quando providis necessariisque rationibus mundi universitas constare videatur*. This explanation is here repeated. CONSULTIS PROVIDAE MENTIS In the passage from Numenius one finds moreover: *ex providentiae consultis salubribus* (326, 6) and a little further on: *et adversatur providentiae consulta eius in pugnare gestiens (sc. necessitas)*. OPERANTE QUIDEM Cp. the following section and par. 299. PENETRATAM SQUIDEM

EAM USQUE QUAQUE Switalski (o.c., p. 37) discovered here influence of the Stoics: the divine spirit (*divina mens*) pervading the whole matter (*usque quaque* = δι' ὅλων). He refers to Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* IX 75 and quotes [Arist.] Περὶ κόσμου 5, 396 b 27: γῆν τε πᾶσαν . . . καὶ τὸν ὅλον οὐρανὸν διεκόσμησε μία ἡ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα δύναμις . . . , τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον δημιουργήσασα. Another parallel is furnished by Diogenes Laërtius VII 134; the contrast *agens-patiens* is as conspicuous as in Calcidius: δοκεῖ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀρχὰς εἶναι τῶν ὅλων δύο, τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσχον εἶναι τὴν ἀποιον οὐσίαν τὴν ὑλην· τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν τὸν ἐν αὐτῇ λόγον τὸν θεόν. τοῦτον γὰρ ὅντα ἀτδίον διὰ πάσης αὐτῆς δημιουργεῖν ἔκαστα.

Consequently the passage shows unmistakably Stoic features, although it is not necessary to assume a direct influence. Like the Stoic notion of Providence itself, this passage may well have come into the text of Calcidius via Numenius, just as other texts which precede and follow.

[270] Next Plato shows the relationship between intellect and necessity when he says: "while intellect dominates". There are two kinds of domination; one is violent, like the rule of a tyrant, the other is like the *sanctitas* of the Emperor. The violent rule does not preserve the subject for a long time but ruins it, whereas "wise domination", as Plato says, "improves its subject". In order that the world should be eternal, matter <should not be up against a tyranny which ruins it in the long run. On the contrary, it should be under wise ruling. This it> should obey patiently and without demur; and it should willingly yield to the majesty of the Maker and His wisdom. Therefore Plato adds: "while, by means of salutary persuasion, the intellect is continuously urging the harshness of necessity to what is best. And since, in this way, necessity let itself be conquered by Providence and listened to its dictates, the first beginnings of things were brought into existence". The idea is here that necessity was deliberately obedient>, because there exists yet another, less deliberate obedience, which is called error or servile docility. And God's work is such that it persuades by strength and imparts persuading strength, which means that persuasion entails strength and strength persuasion. This can be observed in the behaviour of sensible men when they are ill: they let themselves be burnt and cut by physicians.

**INTELLEGENTIAE NECESSITATISQUE CONSORTIUM** In what precedes the question was chiefly concerned with the share of intellect and of necessity, although the relation between these two powers was mentioned. Now *Calcidius* dwells more fully on this subject. **DOMINANTE INTELLECTU** νοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἀρχοντας (48A). **DUPLEX PORRO EST DOMINATIO** *Calcidius* is fond of distinctions, as appears from what follows, *e.g.*, par. 333. **ALTERA VIOLENTIOR TYRANNICAE POTENTIAE SIMILIS** Cp. 212, 23: *alicuius vitii tyrannica dominatio*. **OMNE PORRO VIOLENTUM NON DIU SUBIECTUM CONSERVAT** Cp. 227, 7-10: *Quae vero reguntur hac lege, ratione, ordine ac sine vi reguntur, nihil enim ratione et ordine carens non violentum; quod vero tale est, non diu perseverat, utpote quod contra suam naturam distrahatur*. **OMNE, INQUIT** *Politicus* 297B: . . . τὸ μετὰ νοῦ καὶ τέχνης δικαιότατον ἀεὶ διανέμοντες τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει σώζειν τε αὐτοὺς οἷοι τε ὄσιν καὶ ἀμείνους ἐκ χειρόνων ἀποτελεῖν . . . **UT Igitur** In the concept of eternity special attention is drawn to imperishableness, to being without end. This is clear from the context; in our paraphrase the argument is slightly expanded. Hence the approach to the problem is quite different from that in par. 23-25 where the point at issue is the eternity of the *corpus mundanum* and 'eternal' has the meanings of 'being without a beginning in time'. Moreover, the question of the eternity of principles (par. 306) has no bearing on the present passage, in which *Calcidius* simply presupposes the eternity of the world (cp. 207, 16-17). **MAIESTATI OPIFICIS** The term *maiestas* reminds one of the expression *sanctitas imperatoria* used above. By *opifex* *Calcidius* indicates the other principle, which he calls *deus* a little further. More frequently he uses both terms, writing *deus opifex*. **SALUBRI PERSUASIONE** τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἄγειν, ταύτη κατὰ ταῦτα τε δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος οὕτω κατ' ἀρχὰς συνίστατο τόδε τὸ πᾶν (48A). For the right understanding of *Calcidius'* translation here it is important to note that the subject of *trahente* and *dominante* is the same (300, 17), *viz.*, *intellectu*. In the translation one reads: *dominante intellectu et . . . trahente* (58, 15-59, 1). One is also struck at once by the epitheton *salubris* to *persuasio*. *Plato* simply writes τῷ πείθειν. Although *Calcidius'* style is usually on the florid side, this *salubris* seems to be more than just a *epitheton ornans*. For though *Calcidius* uses this adjective frequently, it also occurs in the passage translated from *Numenius*, which, moreover,

shows a striking resemblance to the present one. There we read: *ex providentiae consultis salubribus* (already quoted *ad* 300, 9). The further wording of this phrase also shows similarity to the passage from Numenius, *e.g.*, *providis auctoritatibus, minus consulta parentia, provida parentia*. Hence *salubris* seems to come from Numenius. However, the occurrence of the same word in the translation points to an influence of Numenius rather than to verbal adoption. The expression *rigorem necessitatis* too is more flowery than Plato's *ἀνάγκης*, but, again, this word is not a mere ornament. As against the *morigera* and *libens* found a few lines earlier, it seems to suggest some resistance in matter. This resistance may be compared to that of the nature of difference in *Tim.* 35A: *τὴν θατέρου φύσιν δύσμεικτον οὖσαν εἰς ταῦτὸν συναρμόττων βίᾳ*. Calcidius uses here the term *vis*. Remarkably, Numenius' text reads not only of obeying on the part of matter but also of resisting: *consulta eius (sc. providentiae) inpugnare gestiens* (327, 8-9). Furthermore, this twofold behaviour is combined in a text, which will appear to be Numenian, *viz.*, 329, 1-4: *cum divina sapientia intellegentiaque opificis dei silvae severe atque efficaciter persuaderet praebere cultui atque exornationi suae patientiam*. So from the side of the Creator there is persuasion, but combined with severity and even some violence. A certain contradiction exists between these concepts and, curiously enough, the same is met in Calcidius. An explanation of this interesting doctrine will be attempted in due course (p. 120).

**ERROR ET FACILITAS** The explanation of *facilitas* (also used in the prologue (3, 4)) is obvious: it denotes an objectionable indulgence as opposed to the *parentia provida*. Less clear is *error*. Perhaps the most obvious solution is to regard the use of these two terms as one more example of *geminatio*, a figure so obviously favoured by the author (cp. p. 30)—though, of course, *facilitas* emphasizes the element of will-lessness, *error* that of disorderliness. One may also find a *hendiadys* here: *facilitas erroris*.

**UT SIT PROVIDA PARENTIA RATIONE NIXA NECESSITAS** This phrase may be translated differently according to whether *provida* is taken as a nominative, belonging to *necessitas* or as an ablative, belonging to *parentia*. In the latter case, *ratione nixa* is a further explanation of *provida parentia*. One might even ask whether this is not a marginal note inserted into the text. Anyhow, necessity is here said to be *provida*, for, even if *provida* is to be connected with *parentia*, necessity should be said to possess *provida parentia*.

It may be asked whether, in Plato's text, Calcidius has connected ἔμφρονος with ἀνάγκης. This does not seem to be the case, since *providis auctoritatibus* is the evident translation of ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἔμφρονος. Calcidius clearly calls matter provident, for it is wise enough to obey a wise Maker. Above was said already *libens cedat pareatque*. For the whole of this text one should, in my opinion, think of *Tim.* 56C where Plato states that the Godhead "exactly ordained the movements and other forces where necessity admitted this freely or after persuasion" (διππερ ἡ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔχοῦσα πειθεῖσά τε φύσις ὑπεῖχεν).

ET OPUS DEI TALE EST After concentrating upon the activity of the *necessitas*, Calcidius passes on to a discussion of the other principle which earlier was only hinted at in the words *dominante intellectu*. He changes the terminology by writing *deus* instead of *intellectus* (likewise, in the preceding chapter he wrote *provida mens dei* besides *providae mentis intellectus*). God is said to exert "a compelling persuasion or a persuasive compulsion" (Calcidius' formulation is hardly more than a pun). The behaviour of matter, when it patiently undergoes the regulating activity of God, is compared to the behaviour of a sensible man who during an illness submits to the painful treatment of a physician. This treatment is described by Calcidius as *urere et secare*. This combination is found in many places, first of all in the *Timaeus* itself, 64D and 65B (τομαὶ μὲν καὶ καύσεις; περὶ τὰς καύσεις καὶ τομάς). Simplicius (*In Phys.* 249, 10 ss. D.) speaks about the *ὕλη* and *στέρησις* as the *ἔσχατα ἀγαθά*, necessary but not desirable, as the doctor's knife and cauterizing (ώς τὸ βλεβότομον καὶ ἡ καῦσις ἡ ἰατρική). In *Contra Rufinum* (III 39; *P.L.* XXIII 507B) St. Jerome quotes a number of Pythagorean theses, the first of which he also gives in the Greek version: Φυγαδευτέον πάσῃ μηχανῇ καὶ περικοπέον πυρὶ καὶ σιδήρῳ . . . ἀπὸ μὲν σώματος νόσον, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχῆς ἀμαθίαν. This text, possibly taken from the biography of Pythagoras by Porphyry (22; cp. P. Courcelle, *Les Lettres grecques en Occident. De Macrobe à Cassiodore*, Paris, 1948<sup>2</sup>, p. 61), shows perhaps the source of this widely used comparison. In a different connexion Seneca wrote (*De Benef.* V 20, 2): *Multa beneficia tristem frontem et asperam habent, quemadmodum secare et urere*. As we have observed, the two preceding sections display a great resemblance in formulation with the passage from Numenius. And it is remarkable indeed that this influence even persists in the translation.

c) *Names of matter*

[271] Plato continues: "If, therefore, one wants to explain truly and faithfully how the world was brought into existence, one should also set forth what the 'erratic cause' of a thing is". Matter is here given yet another name, *viz.*, *error*, on account of its earlier wavering condition; likewise it is called necessity, because matter is not the primary cause of the world, but must necessarily be assumed on the basis of the materiality of things. It is something in the nature of a *conditio sine qua non*.

SI QUIS Εἴ τις οὖν ἡ γέγονε κατὰ ταῦτα ὄντως ἔρει, μεικτέον καὶ τὸ τῆς πλανωμένης εἰδος αἰτίας. ERRORIS NOMINE Just above matter was said to be without *error* in its relation to the Godhead; here it is actually denoted by the term *error*: taken by itself it is *error*, being so *propter inordinatam eius antiquam iactationem*. Here it is for the first time that the idea of chaos crops up. This notion is particularly prominent in Numenius. In the same context as the *Numeniana* quoted above we read: *Itaque si deus eam (sc. silvam) correxit . . . redigitque in ordinem ex incondita et turbulentia iactatione* (327, 2-4); *ordinem inordinatae confusionei . . . coniungens* (327, 23-24); cp. also 328, 17; 329, 12-13; and 375, 14-376, 1. We touch upon a theory already present in Plato, namely that a confusion of elements existed before the activity of God afterwards brought order. Bäumker (*o.c.*, p. 136) discusses the passages from Plato in detail and, following Stallbaum, Martin and others, calls this concept 'secondary matter'. Alongside this concept of chaos or secondary matter, there is yet another, *viz.*, that of empty space, which Bäumker calls 'primary matter'. In his opinion Plato denotes the same by these terms, chaos being a more plastic representation of what elsewhere is called space. One could also say that chaos appeals more to the imagination, whereas space—which found a continuation in the *ὕλη* of Aristotle—is more abstract. In order to grasp Calcidius' doctrine, it is of primary importance to draw a clear distinction between these two modes of approaching matter. Calcidius, in fact, has a theory of his own on the relation between matter as such (=  $\chi\omega\rho\alpha$  =  $\mathcal{H}\lambda\eta$ ) and chaos. The latter he sees as a second stage of the first (cp. p. 236). In this preface, however, we cannot as yet find anything of this typically Calcidian view. But—as appeared already on the occasion of *rigorem necessitatis* (301, 3)—there is some inconsistency in the description of the part of matter.

The ultimate cause of this lies, in my opinion, in Plato's ambiguity. In the present text the aspect of chaos prevails, and the term *rigor necessitatis* is in the right place. But where matter is said to be *morigera* and *libens maiestati cedens*, Calcidius has Plato's *χώρα* in mind, or rather the *ὕλη* of Aristotle.

**NECESSITATEM** In passing Calcidius also gives an explanation of this term. Matter is called necessity, because it is a *conditio sine qua non* of materiality. The difference between primary cause and *conditio sine qua non* is also found in *Tim.* 68E-69A: Διὸ δὴ χρὴ δύ' αἰτίας εἰδὴ διορίζεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ θεῖον, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον ἐν ἀπασιν ζητεῖν κτήσεως ἔνεκα εὐδαίμονος βίου, καθ' ὅσον ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἔκεινων χάριν, λογιζόμενον ὡς ἀνευ τούτων οὐδενατά αὐτὰ ἔκεινα ἐφ' οἷς σπουδάζομεν μόνα κατανοεῖν οὐδ' αὐτὸν λαβεῖν οὐδ' ἄλλως πως μετασχεῖν. In *Phaedo* 99B Plato distinguishes between τὸ αἴτιον τῷ δητὶ and ἔκεινα ἀνευ οὐ τὸ αἴτιον οὐκ ἀν ποτε εἴη αἴτιον. Aristotle adopts this description of matter as *conditio sine qua non*. He further defines this necessity by speaking of ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον (cp. Bäumker, o.c., p. 268). Simplicius puts it in this way: Τοῦτο οὖν ἀποδοκιμάζει (sc. Aristotle, *Physics* 199 b 34) τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης λεγόμενον, ἐγκρίνει δὲ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, δι' οὗ δείκνυσι δτι οὐκ ἀνευ μὲν τῆς ὕλης γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὴν ὕλην ὡς διὰ τινα κυρίως αἴτιαν, ἀλλ' ὡς δι' ὕλην μόνον καὶ δι' ὕλικὴν αἴτιαν (o.c., p. 384, 29-32). In his enumeration of causes existing according to Aristotle, Seneca says: *prima, inquit, causa est ipsa materia, sine qua nihil potest effici* (*Ep.* 65, 4).

#### d) *The real forms and their images*

[272] Hence Plato returns upon his steps in order to make a study of the principles, taking as his starting-point the time previous to the generation of the world. He also investigates the nature of pure and unmixed fire, its properties and passions, and not only of fire but also of the other pure and unalloyed elements. For all those who discussed the principles of the universe, proposed these four elements, which, on account of their mutual mixture, received the name of the dominating element. "But how far and from what the same elements were generated, no one has explained thus far. Still, they spoke of fire, air, earth and water as elements of the sensible world, as if they knew the nature of these things in their purity, though in fact they cannot

even be compared with syllables". The elements of a word are the letters, the syllables coming in the second place. This is why Plato rightly states that these four elements of the world cannot even be placed on a level to syllables. The first element of the universe is matter, shapeless and without quality. In order to become 'world' matter is moulded by the intelligible forms. And from these two, matter and form, pure and intelligible fire, and the other four *sinceræ substantiæ* proceed. From these, again, come forth the materials perceived by our senses, *viz.*, those consisting of fire, water, earth and air. Pure fire and the other pure intelligible substances are types of the bodies, called 'ideas'.

As for these ideas, for the moment Plato leaves alone the question whether we should assume one common original form for everything or rather innumerable forms according to the number of things constituting the universe. Or perhaps the same is at once one and many, as he taught in the *Parmenides*. The reason why Plato avoids this question was not so much its difficulty as the wish not to insert a subject which does not belong in the present discussion. It is a *disputatio naturalis*, the other subject a *disputatio epoptica*. The former gives a rather uncertain image of truth, which only allows for a certain degree of probability, whereas the latter flows from the source of purest science.

**FACTO Igitur RECURSU** It is important to realize the meaning of this *recursus*. In the preceding part of his argument, Calcidius states, Timaeus has spoken of the action of the νοῦς, which is Providence; this action arranged the universe, the creation of order or, in yet other words, the *generatio* or *constitutio mundi*. For his starting-point he chose the moment—if it is allowed to use this term—at which Providence began its task of bringing the four elements into their correct relation (cp. 304, 17-18: *Tunc ergo compendio principalibus materiis quattuor sumptis exaedificaverat sermone mundum*). Now Timaeus returns to this point and begins the inquiry into the real status of these elements: are they really original principles as generally assumed, or does there exist something more fundamental? His thoughts are then turned to the pure forms, but the problems connected with them are not developed. Calcidius' words *Facto recursu* literally occur in his translation (59, 7): they are much closer to Plato's text than appears from Wrobel's text: ὥδε οὖν πάλιν ἀναχωρητέον. **REDIT AD INDAGINEM**

INITIORUM ἀρχὰς αὐτὰ τιθέμενοι (48B) ET INCIPIT ... MUNDI τὴν δὴ πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως . . . φύσιν (48B). As is evident from what has been said so far, the sentence 'the time before the origin of the world' denotes the space of 'time' preceding the moment at which Providence began its work. At the end of this treatise Calcidius again returns at this point. There he speaks of a time *ante mundi constitutionem* (377, 8) and, as meaning quite the same, *ante mundi exornationem* (377, 19-20 and 306, 22-23); see at the end of the first chapter (p. 23). QUAERIT QUOQUE The use of *quoque* is remarkable: it gives the impression that the subsequent question is not connected with the previous one, or, at least, that there is an abrupt transition. For Calcidius this is so. He considers Timaeus' words to bear upon the ideas immediately. This, however, appears to be incorrect, as can be seen from the survey just given. Timaeus asks: "what is the real status of these elements which are usually taken as real elements?" Calcidius answers: besides the *silva*, Plato also discusses *naturam ignis sinceri et sine permixtione, qualitatem quoque corporum . . .* which is definitely meant as a rendering of Plato's words immediately following the words quoted just now τὴν . . . πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς φύσιν θεατέον αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ πρὸ τούτου πάθη (48B). By *ignis sincerus* Calcidius means the ideal fire, as appears from the rest of this section. OMNES QUIPPE All those who up to now discussed the principles, mistook the fire around us for the pure fire, and so on. In reality this is no pure fire, etc.; it is a mixture of various elements in which one element preponderates. The mixture gets its name after this element (cp. par. 119, 185, 12-13: *quodque corpora ex maiore parte terrena ex obtinentis materiae vocabulo cognominantur*). It should also be observed that Calcidius denotes the four so-called elements as *materiae*. He does so in a great many places, e.g., 73, 19; 162, 29-163, 1 (*elementis materiisque*); 205, 9-10; 243, 3, to mention only some explicit texts. They are, however, also called *corpora* (302, 14; 303, 1). QUATENUS PORRO νῦν γάρ οὐδεὶς πω γένεσιν αὐτῶν μεμήνυκεν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰδόσι πῦρ δτι ποτέ ἔστιν καὶ ἔκαστον αὐτῶν λέγομεν ἀρχὰς αὐτὰ τιθέμενοι στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός, προσῆκον αὐτοῖς οὐδ' ὡς ἐν συλλαβῆς εἶδεσιν μόνον εἰκότως ὑπὸ τοῦ καὶ βραχὺ φρονοῦντος ἀπεικασθῆναι (48B). QUAIA SERMONIS Calcidius is explaining Plato's assertion in which, playing upon the double meaning of *στοιχεῖον*, viz., 'element' and 'letter', he explains that these so-called elements are not elements (i.e., letters), nor even syllables. The most simple thing,

which really deserves the name 'element', says Calcidius, is matter moulded by the intelligible form. From these two proceed the pure intelligible substances, the ideas, which, therefore, may be put on a level with syllables. Not until then come the *materiae sensiles*, fire, earth, *etc.*, as we know them. They were formed after the exemplars of the ideas.

What is most striking in this passage is that the ideas appear to be composite, *viz.*, of matter and a *species intelligibilis*. As regards this *silva*, one shall have to think of the *silva intelligibilis* of which Calcidius speaks in connexion with the exegesis of *Genesis* (310, 1). From Aristotle, however, we know already that, under the influence of the doctrine of Pythagoras, Plato assumed a twofold principle in the ideas. To Pythagoras numbers were the deepest essence of things and of them unity and duality were the principles, as we read in Calcidius himself, par. 53: *Sic igitur antiquissima numerorum natio esse invenitur omnibus rationibus. Ipsorum porro numerorum initia et principia sunt singularitas et item duitas, siquidem has duas ceterorum numerorum origines esse constat* (121, 14-17). Calcidius also mentions the Pythagorean principles in the passage translated from Numenius (par. 295). So, when Plato came to identify his ideas more and more with numbers, he was compelled to assume a double principle in the ideas. In this respect the following remark of Simplicius is interesting (*In Phys.* 151, 6 D.): Λέγει δὲ Ἀλέξανδρος διὰ “κατὰ Πλάτωνα πάντων ἀρχαὶ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἴδεων τό τε ἔν ἔστι καὶ ἡ ἀόριστος δύάς, ἣν μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ἔλεγεν, ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τάγαθοῦ Ἀριστοτέλης μνημονεύει”. (cp. *ib.*, 229, 11 ss. *ad* par. 320. Also W. v. d. Wielen, *De Idee-getallen van Plato*, Amsterdam, 1941, *passim*). It does not seem difficult to establish the origin of this theory in Calcidius. This combination of Pythagorean ideas must have been derived from the man from whom he took his long Pythagorean fragment, Numenius. A strong confirmation of this is found in the fact that, in this introductory paraphrase, Calcidius again and again expresses himself in an unmistakably Numenian style.

It is also remarkable that Calcidius thinks that the four elements are also present in the world of ideas. He follows in Plato's steps (cp. *Tim.* 51C (Calc. par. 337) and 39A (see general survey *ad* par. 119)). There is, moreover, an interesting text of Simplicius asserting that Plato borrowed this theory from Empedocles: *In Phys.* 31, 18 ss. D.: Ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς περὶ τε τοῦ νοητοῦ

κόσμου καὶ περὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ διδάσκων καὶ ἐκεῖνον τούτου ἀρχέτυπον παράδειγμα τιθέμενος ἐν ἑκατέρῳ μὲν ἀρχάς καὶ στοιχεῖα τὰ τέτταρα ταῦτα τέθεικε πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, καὶ ποιητικὰ αἰτία τὴν φιλίαν καὶ τὸ νεῖκος, πλὴν ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τῇ νοητῇ ἐνώσει κρατούμενα διὰ φιλίας μᾶλλον συνάγεσθαι φησι, τὰ δὲ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους μᾶλλον διακρίνεσθαι. Ὡς καὶ ὁ Πλάτων κατακολουθῶν, ἡ πρὸ Πλάτωνος ὁ Τίμαιος, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ παραδείγματι τῷ νοητῷ τὰς τέτταρας ἴδεας προϋπάρχειν φησί. *Calcidius* expresses himself rather curiously, saying: *ignis purus . . . ceteraeque sincerae substantiae quattuor*. As he repeatedly speaks of four elements, we cannot reasonably suppose five elements. The simplest solution is perhaps to understand: "pure fire and the other pure substances, four in number, *viz.*, together". QUARUM AD PRAESENS DIFFERT EXAMINATIONEM Here *Calcidius* continues his paraphrase of *Plato's* text: τὴν μὲν περὶ ἀπάντων εἴτε ἀρχὴν εἴτε ἀρχάς εἴτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ τούτων πέρι τὸ νῦν οὐ ῥητέον (48C). UNANE SIT ARCHETYPΑ SPECIES (=εἴτε ἀρχήν) The term *archetypa species* reminds us of *archetypum exemplum* (353, 7 and 10). Elsewhere *Calcidius* speaks of *species principalis* (e.g., 361, 7; 363, 4-5) as distinct from a *species secunda* (cp. par. 337-338). The theory that there is only one idea, after which the world is made, is suggested in *Albinus*, *Epit.* XII 3: μονογενῆ τὸν κόσμον ἐποίησε καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῇ ἴδεᾳ εἰκασμένον μίᾳ οὖσῃ. AN INNUMERABILES *Seneca* states that, according to *Plato*, there are innumerable ideas: *innumerabilia haec sunt, sed extra nostrum posita conspectum* (*Ep.* 58, 18), and: *Talia ergo exemplaria infinita habet rerum natura* (58, 19). *Aristotle* also touches upon this question in *Physics* I 9 (192 a 34). AN VERO IDEM UNUM PARITER ET MULTA This seems to be an extension of *Plato's* εἴτε ὅπῃ δοκεῖ. UT DOCUIT IN PARMENIDE The question 'unity-multiplicity' is, indeed, dominant in the *Parmenides*, to which *Calcidius* refers in par. 335. QUAE CAUSA DECLINANDI *Calcidius* again turns to the text of which he gives a short paraphrase. The reason was not the difficulty of the question, but *Plato* wanted to avoid an insertion which did not fit in here. Why should it be inappropriate to discuss this question here? Because this is a treatise on things of nature, which only give probability. The science of the ideas, on the contrary, provides knowledge of the purest quality. *Calcidius* here makes a distinction between *disputatio naturalis* and *disputatio epoptica*. It is also found in the treatise on the *daemones*: *non quo disputatio haec a philosophis aliena sit . . . sed*

*quod inquisitio istius rei primariae supervectaeque contemplationis sit, quae appellatur epoptica, altior aliquanto quam physica* (191, 12-15; *physica* is of course the same as *naturalis*). Connected with this is 195, 23-24: *Quem quidem tractatum, quod sit elatior et ultra naturae contemplationem . . .* (cp. *iuxta naturae contemplationem*, 184, 24-185, 1). A similar expression occurs in 175, 8-10: *Verum haec disputatio, quia nihil pertinet ad naturalem tractatum, cum sit rationalis, differetur.* In this last quotation the *silva* is said not to pertain to a *disputatio naturalis* but to a *disputatio rationalis*. This seems to contradict the scope of the present section. Yet from this text it may perhaps be concluded that *rationalis* means the same as *epoptica*. This term is obviously a Greek loanword; it seems to have been taken from the mysteries; ἐποπτεία is the highest degree of initiation into the Eleusinian mysteries. The application of this term to the knowledge of the most sublime objects of philosophy is clear. Perhaps *Calcidius* also derived it from *Numenius*.

e) *The third principle: matter*

Invocation of the Deity

[273a] Plato says: "I now invoke God to save us from the rough and tempestuous sea of this explanation". The author does his utmost to bring us into a pious and reverent mood towards the Godhead, whose help he implores now that he is setting out on the tempestuous sea of the discussion of the nature of the *silva*, tempestuous on account of the new and uncommon character of the discussion.

DEUM ERGO Θεὸν δὴ καὶ νῦν ἐπ' ἀρχῇ τῶν λεγομένων σωτῆρα ἐξ ἀτόπου καὶ ἀήθους διηγήσεως . . . ἐπικαλεσάμενοι (48D). EX TURBIDA ET PROCELLOSA SERMONIS IACTATIONE At first sight, one would take this for a translation of ἐξ ἀτόπου καὶ ἀήθους διηγήσεως, the more so, since it occurs in the translation (60, 7), but the remarkable fact faces us that a little further *Calcidius* gives a much more literal translation: *propter novum atque insolitum . . . disputationis genus*. How we are to explain this? It seems to me that *ex turbida et procellosa sermonis iactatione* should be taken as a further elaboration of the image evoked by *σωτῆρ* and that the actual translation of ἐξ ἀτόπου, etc., follows in *propter novum etc.* This means that, in the real translation (60, 7), the sentence has remained untranslated from ἐξ ἀτόπου onwards. The same holds

for the words which, further on, are rendered by *Rursum ergo ab exordio dicamus*. Needless to say that, when Wrobel prints these words as a translation, he should have done the same for *propter novum . . . genus*.

To depict the discussion concerning the *silva* Calcidius uses the image of the tempestuous sea. This image is customary for descriptions of the *silva* itself, especially the *silva* as chaos; Porphyry: πόντος δὲ καὶ θάλασσα καὶ κλύδων καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἡ ὑλικὴ σύστασις (*De antro Nymph.* 34, p. 80, 1 Nauck; cp. *Tim.* 43A and 53A with the comments by Calcidius: see *ad* par. 353; also *Rep.* 661E: ἐκκομισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ πόντου ἐν φυν ἐστίν). In this connexion the terms *turbidus* and *iactatio* are typical (cp. the discussion of par. 271 (p. 39) where the image of chaos is mentioned).

[273b-274a] “Let us, therefore”, says Plato, “make a fresh start”. Rightly so, for above he had already discussed the two principles, the exemplary and the corporeal, assuming that the sensible world has come forth from these two. *«Alongside the primary form there is a corporeal form,»* for what comes to be, perishes and does not exist always and truly, is the corporeal form. Now these bodies, (*i.e.*, these bodily, corporeal forms,) cannot exist by themselves, alone and without something which appropriates them. The appropriating subject is now called ‘mother’ by him, then ‘nurse’, sometimes ‘womb of all coming into being’ and also ‘place’. The younger Platonists call it ὄλη, we call it *silva*. In order to supply what was wanting, he therefore adds the present treatise on matter to that on the principles and says ‘a second, more detailed division should be made’. For above two principles were mentioned; one is the intelligible form, shaped in His mind by God, the Maker of the world, which form Plato called *idea*, the other being its image which is the nature of all things corporeal.

When these bodies are considered by themselves, they seem to possess a complete independence, but if we look at their origin, we find that they all, like their ‘impulses’, lie in the womb of matter. Formerly Plato, for the sake of brevity, had started from the four primary bodies and built the world in this way. Yet, since it is proper to a philosopher to inquire into anything connected with causes, and since reason had shewn that matter with its susceptibility underlies the diversity of corporeal things,

he rightly thought this very state of things to require further explanation.

RURSUM ERGO AB EXORDIO DICAMUS πάλιν ἀρχώμεθα λέγειν (48E). DE UTRAQUE ORIGINE TAM EXEMPLARI QUAM CORPOREA It is at once evident what is meant by *origo exemplaris*, *viz.*, the *idea*. On the other hand, the expression *origo corporea* might be misunderstood as referring to matter. However the context shows that Calcidius means the *species corporeae*, the forms which are present in all things and, for the sake of shortness, sometimes called *corpora*. The same wavering terminology is also found in Plato himself, cf. *Tim.* 50B: περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως. Bäumker rightly observes: "So kann Plato unter dem Werdenden bald die sinnlichen Dinge, bald die ein- und austretenden Formen verstehen, die Materie als Aufnehmerin bald der Körper (50B), bald der Formen schildern" (*o.c.*, p. 132). QUIPPE ID This context immediately reminds one of Aristotle, who, describing the *ūlη*, started from the phenomena of change, whereas Plato did so from the idea of *míμημα*. The term *corporeæ species* is clearly Aristotelian (τὸ ἔνυλον εἶδος). EX EADEM ESSENTIA Cp. *Tim.* 50B: Ταῦταν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον. The second *essentia* seems to be superfluous. QUAM MODO MATREM μήτηρ (50D, 51A); ALIAS NUTRICULAM τιθήνη (49A, 52D, 88D); TOTIUS GENERATIONIS GREMIUM may refer to πάσης γενέσεως ὑποδοχή. In par. 308, where Calcidius discusses the names of matter in detail, he gives as one of them *nutricula totius generationis*, probably because Plato says: πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτὴν οἶον τιθήνην. Usually, however, Calcidius speaks of *receptaculum*, which is indeed the literal translation of ὑποδοχή. For *locus*, see the comments on par. 344. QUAMQUE IUNIORES HYLEN, NOS SILVAM VOCAMUS Cp. 299, 14-15. *Nos* is opposed to *iuniores* not to *Graeci* as in par. 123. This makes it more probable that in the present passage *nos* denotes Calcidius himself. Of course, by *iuniores* are meant Plato's pupils, as is explicitly said in 336, 10: *nomen ei* (*sc. silvae*) *dederunt auditores Platonis* (cp. the comment *ad locum*, p. 145). UT QUOD DEERAT ADDERET The above had clearly shown that yet a third principle should be discussed; in this way an explanation is given of the words in the *Timaeus*: ἡ δ' οὖν αὖθις ἀρχὴ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ἔστω μειζόνως τῆς πρόσθεν διηρημένη (48E). The text which follows is again a paraphrase of Plato:

TUNC QUIPPE RES OMNIS IN	Τότε μὲν γὰρ δύο
DUO FUERAT INITIA DIVISA,	εἴδη διειλόμεθα . . .
QUORUM ALTERUM INTELLLEGIBILIS	ἐν μὲν ὡς παραδείγματος
ERAT SPECIES	εἴδος . . . νοητὸν καὶ ἀεὶ ταῦτα ὅν,
QUAM MUNDI OPIFEX DEUS MENTE	
CONCEPIT, EAMQUE IDEAN COGNOMINAVIT PLATO,	
ALTERUM IMAGO EIUS,	μίμημα δὲ παραδείγματος δεύτερον
QUAE NATURA EST CORPORIS,	

In *quam mundi . . .* Plato one finds a first indication of the theory that the ideas are thoughts of God. We prefer to study this in the comment on par. 339 (p. 210), where the nature of the ideas is fully discussed in a passage taken almost literally from Albinus. In the second addition, *viz.*, *quae natura est corporis* (above Calcidius said *species corporea*), the Aristotelian influence appears again for a moment. The same mixture of Platonic and Aristotelian elements is found in other authors, such as Galen and Albinus (cp. the comment on par. 337, p. 204). *OPIFEX DEUS* Cp. above p. 36 (*ad* 301, 1). *PORRO CORPORA* Calcidius continues his argument on the subject discussed above, *viz.*, the *corpora i.e.*, the *imago*, *quae natura est corporis*, the *species corporea*. *SED SI* These words contrast with *si per se ipsa spectentur*, and *originem* should be strongly emphasized: "if one considers the forms in themselves, they do not seem to need anything else (*perfectam . . . habere substantiam*), but if one pays attention to the fact that they have come to be, one arrives at a different conclusion". If I am not mistaken, the accusative *originem* should be regarded as a rendering of the words *γένεσιν ἔχον* in the corresponding sentence of the *Timaeus* (48E). It is clear once more that the first part of par. 274 should be read together with par. 273. *INVENIES CUNCTA* This can be 'found' in the Aristotelian way, *i.e.*, by means of an analysis of change (par. 317-318) or by Plato's method, which leads to the conclusion that the images of the ideas must be received by something (cp. above *sine suscipiente essentia esse non possint*). By the *scaetabrae eorum* (*sc. corporum*) Calcidius probably means the *τύχη* of the elements, about which Plato speaks in *Tim.* 53B and which he there translates with *vestigia*. See the comment on par. 354 (p. 241). *TUNC ERGO* For this see what was said at par. 272 (p. 42). For *sermone*, cp. *λόγοις* (*έμφανται*) *Tim.* 49A. *SED QUILA* This reminds one of the opening phrase of Aristotle's *Physics*, where

science is said to be a question of knowing ἡ αἰτία ἡ στοιχεῖα. SILVAE CAPACITATEM Cp. 356, 15; 175, 20-21 and the comment on p. 63 s.

f) *Intelligibility of matter*

[274b] It is very difficult to obtain insight into the nature of the *silva*, but it is even more difficult to explain it to others. The difficulty with principles is that they cannot be explained by means of examples—indeed, there exists nothing that could be used as an example. Nor can they be illustrated by means of anything existing either, since there is nothing which precedes a principle. The only result which one can possibly attain in this case is an obscure and vague notion, which is not of such a nature that one can explain simply what it is. It is, in fact, arrived at in such a way that whatever is proper to separate things is taken away, and only what one tries to understand is left over. In other words, one eliminates all bodies which, in the womb of matter, are formed in a rich variety by transition from one to another. After that, one arrives at an idea of that empty womb itself.

DIFFICILE OPUS Calcidius again comes close to Plato's text: νῦν δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔστιν εἰσαναγκάζειν χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἰδος ἐπιχειρεῖν λόγοις ἐμφανίσαι (49A). The wording of this idea reminds one strongly of the well-known passage on the knowledge of the Maker and Father of the universe: "The Maker and Father of the universe is difficult to be found; when He is found, it is impossible to communicate knowledge about Him to others" (*Tim.* 28C). TALIS QUIPPE NATURA EST INITIORUM With principles there can be no question of an example, which is either simpler or earlier, for, by definition, principles are both the first and the simplest things. SED OBSCURA QUADAM *Praesumptio* seems to be a translation of πρόληψις; Calcidius uses the term frequently. From 345, 3-5 it is evident that, to him, it has the general meaning of 'intellect' or 'knowledge'. For similar passages, see the comment on 345, 3-5 (p. 174). *Luminis* is, in my opinion, an intentionally vague designation for the faculty of knowing. *Obscura* seems to refer to Plato's ἀμυδρόν. A ἀμυδρὸν εἰδος will only admit of a vague and obscure cognition. This knowledge is obtained by paying attention to the fact that the different bodies change into another. We can, thus, conceive a vague idea of what underlies this change by gradually

eliminating in our thoughts all these bodily forms.—By his punctuation Wrobel suggests that *mutua ex alio in aliud resolutione* belongs to *ademptis* and denotes a way of thinking. However, it certainly belongs to *formantur*; Wrobel's comma after *formantur* should, therefore, come after *resolutione*. Calcidius uses a similar phrase frequently: 341, 2-3; 342, 12; 345, 1-2; 348, 12. From the context of 348, 12 (par. 325), where he means the same with *mutua elementorum ex alio in aliud conversione*, it will become evident that he believes himself to be in perfect agreement with Plato's words; however, in that of 341, 2-3 (par. 317-318) there is also an undeniable influence of Aristotle.

A striking parallel to the whole present text occurs in the passage taken from Numenius; it is worth while to put them side by side:

305, 1-2 *censuit hanc ipsam rationem trahendam usque ad intelligentiae lucem.*

305, 10-13 *ut universis corporibus, quae intra gremium silvae varie varia formantur mutua ex alio in aliud resolutione, singillatim ademptis*

*solum ipsum vacuum sinum speculatione mentis imagineris.*

328, 3-8 *Idemque nudam silvae imaginem demonstrare et velut in lucem destituere studens detractis omnibus singillatim corporibus, quae gremio eius formas invicem mutuantur et invicem mutant,*

*ipsum illud, quod ex egestione vacuatum est, animo considerari iubet.*

As observed above, Calcidius found the concept of bodies changing into one another in Plato (*Tim.* 49B ss.; μεταπλάττων 50B), but here we miss the concept included in *detrahere* or *adimere*, that is, the concept of abstraction. In Aristotle, however, this idea is very distinct, e.g., *Met.* 1029 a 16-19: ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀφαιρουμένου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους οὐδὲν ὄρῶμεν ὑπολειπόμενον, πλὴν εἴ τι ἔστι τὸ δριζόμενον ὑπὸ τούτων, ὡστε τὴν ὑλὴν ἀνάγκη φαίνεσθαι μόνην οὐσίαν οὕτω σκοπουμένοις. The idea can easily be combined with that of *Tim.* 49B ss. This ἀφαιρεσίς has also been applied by Albinus in his investigation into the divine principle; *Epit.* X 5: "Εσται δὴ πρώτη μὲν αὐτοῦ νόησις ἡ κατ' ἀφαιρεσιν τούτων (i.e., the properties). This is particularly important, because, in other places as well, Albinus' discussion on the divine principle is very similar to Calcidius' treatment on matter, the material principle. (Cp. the comments on par. 318 ss., p. 168 ss.) Finally, a remarkable parallel

to the present text is found in Origen, *De princ.* IV 6 (33) (V p. 357 K.): *ignem aërem aquam terramque mutari in semetipsa invicem ac resolvi aliud in aliud elementum mutua quadam consanguinitate . . .*

The main impression given by the whole introductory paraphrase is that *Calcidius* was strongly influenced by *Numenius*. Again and again his wording is that of his source. Moreover, although he closely adheres to the text of *Plato*, a good number of strands can be detected from *Aristotle* and *Albinus*. Further study will define how the relations between them have been worked out by *Calcidius*.

## 2. HISTORICAL AND SYSTEMATICAL TREATISE

### a) *Historical part*

[275] In this way the following situation could arise: none of the Ancients doubts the existence of matter, but opinions differ about the question whether it was created (made) or not. The greater part of those who pretend that it was *infecta et innata* believe it to be continuous by nature, others, however, teach that it consists of different parts. In this last group, some consider it to be shapeless and without quality, others as possessing a definite form. Those who take it to be continuous quarrel about the qualities and the form of what is contained in matter and about all the other accidents in it, *viz.*, whether these things proceed from the *silva* itself or are brought into it by a superior power. Their opinion will now be reviewed.

QUA RATIONE FACTUM EST Because matter is a *χαλεπὸν καὶ ἀμυδρὸν εἴδος*—and hence difficult to recognize—different opinions have been held about it. The last sentence of *Plato's* introduction gives *Calcidius* an opportunity for a historical digression which, however, gradually changes into a systematic treatise. In this first section he gives a summary of the relevant theories. As this summary is included in the survey of this treatise (p. 27), there is no need to repeat it. CUM NULLUS EAM VETERUM DUBITET ESSE One might be surprised at *Calcidius'* assertion that no philosopher has doubted the existence of matter, but it should be borne in mind that the problem of matter was, in fact, the problem of the first material principle of things, and that this was the central problem of ancient philosophy. UTRUM TAMEN FACTA AN CONTRA INFECTA SIT Further

on Calcidius says *infectam sine generatione* and in par. 276 writes *generatam* instead of *factam* (306, 5). It is clear that he regards these terms as identical, as is shown by 266, 6-7: *similiter ergo etiam generatum quidem, quod ex aliquo temporis initio natum factumve sit, ut statuam*, and par. 334 (358, 24): *Factum vero generatumque . . .* All these texts prove conclusively that Calcidius does not regard birth as a higher origin than creation, as Waszink observes with regard to Tertullian (*Tertullianus. De anima*, 1947, p. 22). **PLERIQUE CONTINUAM ET IUGEM, ALII VERO DIVISAM PUTENT** This same distinction is found elsewhere in Calcidius, also in historical digressions, *viz.*, 251, 20 ss.: *Qui dividuam fore silvae substantiam censuerunt interponentes inmeno inani modo expertia modo partes quidem, sed indifferentes, sui similes, tum atomos vel solidas moles . . .* and 254, 8 ss.: *At vero ex illis, qui iugem putant esse silvam et adunatione quadam sibi continuatam . . .* One should also observe how Calcidius uses the adjectives *divisus* and *dividuus* indiscriminately: 103, 26 *corpus indivisum aique individuum. RURSUMQUE EORUM* This distinction will be developed in par. 279. **II VERO, QUI IUGEM CONTINUATAMQUE POSUERUNT** This distinction is parallel to the previous one but the formulation is slightly different. Above, in the case of the Atomists, the point at issue is whether atoms possess qualities or not, whereas in the present passage the question is whether the qualities proceed from the *silva* itself or are bestowed upon it by some superior power. **DE QUALITATIBUS** Cp. 299, 17-18: *in qua qualitates . . . et omnia quae accident proveniunt.* The words *quae ibidem conformantur* have the same meaning as *in qua qualitates . . . proveniunt.* For the term *conformare*, cp. *conformatio*nes in 353, 3 and 374, 2. Calcidius refers to the element of form. *Forma* should be regarded as designing not the *μορφή* of Aristotle, but rather the forms ascribed by Plato to the elements (cp. par. 326). **EX ALIO POTIORE NUMINE** Calcidius means the same power which he denotes elsewhere by the term *providentia* or *provida mens dei*.

**α) Matter was made: the Jews**

[276a] The Jews think that matter was made. Their greatest sage, Moses, they say, relied on divine inspiration rather than on human eloquence. He began his book, entitled *Genesis*, in this way, according to the version of the seventy wise men: "In the beginning God made heaven and earth. But the earth was

invisible and shapeless". According to the version of Aquila the text runs: "As the head of all things, God founded heaven and earth; the earth was empty and nothing". And according to Symmachus: "In the beginning God founded heaven and earth: the earth lay inert, confused and disorderly". But Origen asserts that the Jews convinced him that the translations differ greatly from the original text which reads: "But the earth was lying in speechless admiration". In all this, they (the Jews) say, they agree that matter, underlying all bodies, was generated and they explain the terms used in the following manner.

**HEBRAEI** The opinion of these philosophers is discussed by Calcidius in this way: first he gives the text which expresses their standpoint in its different versions (par. 276a); next follows an interpretation of the terms 'beginning' (par. 276b) and 'heaven and earth' (par. 277-278a), and, finally, of the term 'made' (par. 278b). **QUORUM SAPIENTISSIMUS MOYSES** In the beginning of *De mundi opificio* (2 p. 2, 15-23 Cohn), Philo says that Moses not only reached the highest summits of philosophy but also spoke by divine inspiration. Also beyond the circle of Jewish scholars Moses was highly esteemed, as appears from the famous assertion of Numenius that Plato was a Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων. **UT FERUNT** On the ground of these words Mosheim (cp. Switalski, *o.c.*, p. 3) concluded that Calcidius did not think Moses an inspired person. This is going too far: Calcidius refers the opinion of the Jews as an outsider. His *ut ferunt* is here the same as *aiunt* further on (306, 19). A certain personal feeling about the text is not expressed until the end: *opinor* (309, 23). His attitude towards the Jews can only be defined by the other texts on the same subject. Calcidius frequently quotes the opinion of the Jews as a confirmation of the theory defended by himself. Hence the present instance should not be taken as an attempt to dissociate himself from their theory. *de genitura mundi* is an exact translation of Γένεσις. *censetur = vocatur* (cp. Waszink, *Tert.*, p. 293). Calcidius uses this term elsewhere: 309, 19; 329, 15. *est profatus = προφήτευσεν*, *i.e.*, *divina inspiratione locutus est* (cp. Waszink, *ib.*, p. 468).

**INITIO DEUS FECIT CAELUM ET TERRAM. TERRA AUTEM ERAT INVISIBILIS ET INCOMPTA.** 'Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν. ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀδρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος.'

**UT VERO AIT ACYLES 'Acyles'** (the version of the best MSS)

still betrays the original Greek text ('Ακύλης, Latin *Aquila*).

CAPUT RERUM CONDIDIT DEUS	'Εν κεφαλαιώ ἔκτισεν θεὸς συν
CAELUM ET TERRAM. TERRA POR-	τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ συν τὴν γῆν.
RO INANIS ERAT ET NIHIL.	ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν κένωμα καὶ οὐθέν.
AB EXORDIO CONDIDIT DEUS	'Εν ἀρχῇ . . .
CAELUM ET TERRAM. TERRA PORRO	ἡ δὲ γῆ ἐγένετο ἀργὸν καὶ
FUIT OTIOSUM QUID CONFUSUM-	ἀδιάκριτον ( <i>alii</i> : ἀδιαίρετον).
QUE ET INORDINATUM.	

The accuracy of the latin translations is remarkable. We have put the Greek versions from Field's *Hexapla* edition alongside. Calcidius translates κεφάλαιον by *caput rerum* (cp. the addition of *mundi* in *de genitura mundi*, 306, 7). "Ἐκτισεν" is translated by *condidit*. Since Calcidius uses the same verb in the version of Symmachus, it may be assumed that he had read ἔκτισεν there too. Field does not give this part of Symmachus' text, but Fabricius will not be far wrong with his version: 'Εν ἀρχῇ ἔκτισεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν γῆν. The term ἀργός in Symmachus, which Calcidius renders by *otiosus*, also occurs in Plutarch, *De Stoicorum repugnantiis*, who refers to the theory of the Stoics on matter: τὴν ὑλὴν ἀργὸν ἐξ ἐκατῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκεῖσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν ἀποφαίνουσι (sc. *Stoici*) (S.V.F. II 449). See also Plut., *De an. procr.* 1015a: οὐ γὰρ οἶν τε τὸ ἀποιον καὶ ἀργὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀρρεπὲς αἰτίαν κακοῦ καὶ ἀρχὴν ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸν Πλάτωνα. SED ORIGENES The preceding list of versions has already turned the reader's thought to Origen's *Hexapla*. The occurrence of his name proves that he was right in doing so. But no trace is left of the translation which is supposed to have been the correct one. The best that can be done is to explain this version from the Hebrew, as is done by Fabricius. Origen must have treated this question in his lost commentary on *Genesis*. Now the question arises whether Calcidius copied from Origen solely the remark about the correct translation or something more. Fabricius believes that the present passage was entirely derived from Origen. This indeed seems very probable, for Origen is one of the few authors who could be regarded here as Calcidius' authority. Moreover, Origen is well-known for his interest in the Bible versions. One may insist even more. Calcidius says that Origen asserts: "The Jews have convinced me that we should read: *terra autem stupida quadam erat admiratione*". In the book in which the latter asserts this—not in the *Hexapla*, for it contains only the versions

of the text—Origen must also have discussed the other versions. (See the comment on par. 277, where Origen himself seems to confirm this.) It is, therefore, almost certain that the whole first half of par. 276 was derived from Origen's commentary on *Genesis*.

Calcidius writes about the opinion of the Jews as an objective onlooker: *ut ferunt*. After mentioning Origen, he continues to do so: *omnia tamen haec in unum aiunt (sc. Hebraei) concurrere*, and further on: *sic probant* (310, 3) and *adferunt* (310, 8). What is more obvious than to add to these words: “as I find in Origen”.

[276b] 'Beginning', they say, has no temporal meaning, for before the ordering of the world there was neither time nor succession of day and night, the very things by which time is measured. Besides, 'beginning' has more than one meaning. Solomon, for instance, says: "The beginning of wisdom is the worship of God", and "The beginning of a good way is to do right". And in his hymn on wisdom the heavenly author says: "The beginning of life is bread, water, a vestment and a house to cover privy parts". In these texts the term 'beginning' has not the same but various meanings. Yet there is one beginning of everything about which Solomon in the Book of Proverbs says: "God created me as the path along which he wanted to go in order to rely on it in performing his divine works. He made me before the origin of the world and the earth, before he founded the deep and caused the sources to flow and the mountains to rise". He clearly indicates that God, first, created divine Wisdom and afterwards heaven and earth, and that divine Wisdom is the origin of the universe. Thus Wisdom appears to be made by God, but not in time, for there cannot have been any time in which God was without Wisdom. That man comes to knowledge of God before he comes to Wisdom is necessary on account of the sublimity of His nature. First we know the owner of a thing (God) and only then the thing itself (Wisdom). It is in this way that we should understand the term 'beginning'.

INITIUM MINIME TEMPORARIUM Calcidius excludes the most obvious meaning of 'beginning'. The word can have no temporal meaning, for time did not exist before the ordering of the world (*κόσμος*); here there is only question of the phase *ante mundi exornationem* (cp. p. 239); cp. Calcidius par. 105 (173, 17 ss.: *rec-*

*teque uno eodemque momento mundus exaedificabatur sensilis et dierum noctiumque instituebantur vices . . . and also par. 23 (89, 1): Par enim et aequaevum natale naturae ac temporis.*

The further course of the argument could be sketched as follows: 'Beginning' cannot be taken in a temporal sense. But, as the Jews say, that is not necessary either. From the Bible it is clear that the term 'beginning' may have various meanings, although the same source admits that there is one beginning of all things, *viz.*, Wisdom. Solomon points out: "God created me as the path he wanted to go". Hence Wisdom was created first and everything else afterwards. Evidently there can be no question of a creation in time, since there would have been a time in which God was without Wisdom. This is impossible.—The fact that human thinking distinguishes between 'earlier' and 'later' in these matters is caused by the sublimity of the object not by a really existent before and after.

INITIUM SAPIENTIAE TIMOREM	<i>Prov.</i> 9, 10 'Αρχὴ σοφίας φόβος
DOMINI FORE	κυρίου (cp. I, 7).
INITIUM SAPIENTIAE CULTUS	<i>Prov.</i> 1, 7 Εύσέβεια δὲ εἰς θεὸν
DEI	ἀρχὴ αἰσθήσεως.
INITIUM VIAE BONAE ACTUS	<i>Prov.</i> 16, 7 'Αρχὴ ὁδοῦ ἀγαθῆς
IUSTUS	τὸ ποιεῖν δίκαια.
INITIUM VITAE PANIS ET AQVA	<i>Sirach</i> 29, 21 'Αρχὴ ζωῆς ὕδωρ
ET TUNICA ET DOMUS IDONEA	καὶ ἄρτος καὶ ιμάτιον καὶ
VELANDIS PUDENDIS	οίκος καλύπτων αἰσχη- μοσύνην.

QUIPPE IN HIS The one point we miss in this list of texts bearing on the meaning of *ἀρχή* is an answer to the obvious question: what is the difference between these 'beginnings'? Basilus has another digression on the term *ἀρχή* (there, however, taken in a temporal sense). It is clearly based on Aristotle *Met.* IV 1 (1012 b 34 ss.), where Aristotle explains its different meanings. To each of them Basilus adds an example from the Bible: Λέγεται μὲν οὖν ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ πρώτη κίνησις· ὡς, Αρχὴ ὁδοῦ ἀγαθῆς τὸ ποιεῖν δίκαια. Ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν δικαίων πράξεων πρῶτον κινούμεθα πρὸς τὸν μακάριον βίον. Λέγεται δὲ ἀρχὴ καὶ θεοὶ γίνεται τι, τοῦ ἐνυπάρχοντος αὐτῷ ὡς ἐπὶ οἰκίας θεμέλιος, καὶ ἐπὶ πλοίου ἡ τρόπις, καθὸ εἰρηται, 'Αρχὴ σοφίας, φόβος κυρίου . . . (Basile de Césarée, *Homélies sur l'Hexaémeron*, 16A, éd. St. Giet (sources Chrétiennes), p. 108). The text confirms the supposition that Origen gave a similar explanation, from

which the text of *Calcidius* may be an abbreviation *EST TAMEN UNUM RERUM OMNIUM INITIUM* With this antithetical transition (*diversa et multiplex - unum*) suddenly quite a different question is raised: what is this 'beginning'?

CREAVIT ME DEUS PROGRESSIONIS  
SUAE SEMITAM, CUI NITENS EFFI-  
CERET OPERA DIVINA, CONSTITUIT-  
QUE ANTE ORTUM MUNDI TERRAEQUE  
ET PROFUNDI FUNDATIONEM, ANTE  
TRACTUS FONTIUM AGGESTIONESQUE  
MONTANAS

*Prov. 8, 22-25* Κύριος ἔκτισέν  
με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ εἰς  
ἔργα αὐτοῦ, πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος  
ἐθεμελίωσέν με ἐν ἀρχῇ, πρὸ  
τοῦ τὴν γῆν ποιῆσαι καὶ πρὸ τοῦ  
τὰς ἀβύσσους ποιῆσαι, πρὸ τοῦ  
προελθεῖν τὰς πηγὰς τῶν ὑδά-  
των, πρὸ τοῦ ὅρη ἐδρασθῆναι.

This text was frequently used. Tertullian gives a similar argument in *Adversus Hermogenem*, opposing the thesis of Hermogenes that the world was made by God from pre-existing, uncreated matter. Tertullian argues: If God needed some matter in order to make the world, he had at his disposal a material much more sublime and more apt than the matter of the philosophers, *viz.*, Wisdom. This may rightly be called the source and origin of everything, 'the matter of matters', not matter with all kinds of defects—here Tertullian enumerates some qualities of the *ὑλη*—but matter in perfection. (*Quis non hanc potius omnium fontem et originem com- mendet, materiam vere materiarum, non fini subditam, non statu diversam, non motu inquietam, non habitu informem, sed insitam et propriam et compositam et decoram . . .* ed. Wasz. p. 34, 22-25). From *Prov. 8, 22* Tertullian concludes to the evidence that this Wisdom of God was made; *a fortiori* everything else outside God was made, and, therefore, there can be no question of unmade matter. The similarity between Tertullian's argument and *Calcidius*' theory of the Jews is evident.

Immediately the question arises what Origen thinks of this theory. Does he also speak of Wisdom? He does and—just as Tertullian—identifies it with the Son of God, Christ. Thus in *De princ. I 2* (Περὶ Χριστοῦ): "Wisdom originated but without a beginning in any sense whatsoever; it is the *unigenitus dei filius*. This Wisdom is *generata* not *creata* or *facta*". So Origen really distinguishes between *genitus* and *factus* (cp. the *γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα* of the old *Symbola Fidei*). So far there is no great resemblance between Origen and *Calcidius*. Next Origen asks how

then *Prov. 8, 22* can speak of a Wisdom which was made, since it says: *Creavit me deus . . .* "Wisdom can say this", he observes, "on account of the foreshadowings of the things present in it". In other words, speaking of *me*, Wisdom indicates the images of the things within itself. Hence these may also be denoted by the name 'Wisdom'; and, consequently, there are both a *infecta* and a *facta sapientia*<sup>1</sup>).

According to Evans, Tertullian gives the same interpretation of this text in *Adv. Prax. 6*. (E. Evans, *Tertullian's Treatise against Praxeas*, London, 1948, p. 217: "In the present passage he interprets even this primary generation as a generation not of Wisdom itself but of the projected world *in dei sensu*, so anxious is he to maintain that Wisdom itself is coeternal with God".) Nothing is more obvious than to assume that Wisdom, about which we read in Calcidius, is the same as the 'second' *sapientia* of Origen. In this place Origen possibly did not mention the *unigenitus dei filius* (i.e., the 'first' *sapientia*). It is also possible that Calcidius' text is a shortened and simplified reproduction of Origen. In favour of this second alternative is the other possibility of abbreviation by Calcidius referred to above (p. 56-57).

Attention should also be drawn to another text of Calcidius (par. 23), where he speaks of *origo non temporaria*, a subject not very different from the present one, the *initium non temporarium*. There Calcidius tries to explain how the body of the world was made and yet is eternal. He argues as follows: in nature everything has a beginning and an end, for nature is as old as time (*aequaevum*). But things are quite different with the works of God: their origin is beyond understanding. Here one cannot speak of time of origin,

1) *Propter quod nos semper deum patrem novimus unigeniti filii sui, ex ipso quidem nati et quod est ab ipso trahentis, sine ullo tamen initio, non solum eo quod aliquibus temporum spatiis distingui potest, sed ne illo quidem quod sola apud semet ipsam mens intueri solet et nudo, ut ita dixerim, intellectu atque animo suspicari. Extra omne ergo quod vel dici vel intellegi potest initium generatam esse credendam est sapientiam. In hac ipsa ergo sapientiae subsistentia quia omnis virtus ac deformitas futurae inerat creaturae, vel eorum quae principaliter existunt vel eorum quae accidunt consequenter, virtute praescientiae praeformata atque disposita. Pro his ipsis, quae in ipsa sapientia velut descriptae ac praefiguratae fuerant, creaturis seipsam per Salomonem dicit creatam esse sapientia "initium viarum" dei continens scilicet in semetipsa universae creaturae vel initia vel rationes vel species. Cp. I 4, 4.* It is remarkable that in the translation of *Prov. 8, 22* by Calcidius the word *initium* does not occur, whereas he announces it with the words: *Est tamen unum rerum initium.*

but at the most of a cause. For, just as the things of nature have their origin in seeds, so the things of God arise from *causae, quae sunt perspicuae divinae providentiae*. Therefore, one should not speak of an *origo temporaria* but of an *origo causativa*. I wonder whether to *Calcidius* these *causae* were not identical with the *sapientia* discussed in the present passage. This would confirm the opinion that here the second *sapientia* is meant. One should also note that par. 23, like the present text, does not refer to the ideas. Is this because *Origen* did not mention the ideas in this context? Perhaps the clue is found in *Origen's* statement on the word of Christ *non sum ex hoc mundo* (Jo. 17, 14 and 16). He writes: *Cuius mundi difficultem nobis esse expositionem idcirco praediximus, ne forte aliquibus praebeatur occasio illius intellegentiae, qua putent nos imagines quasdam, quas Graeci ἴδεας nominant, affirmare: quod utique a nostris rationibus alienum est mundum incorporeum dicere, in sola mentis fantasia vel cogitationum lubrico consistentem* (*De princ.* II 3, 6 p. 121, 26-122, 4 K.). This should be combined with what is said in his preface to *De princ.* ch. 8-9. There he emphatically rejects the *ἀσώματον* (i.e. *incorporeum*) of the *Graeci*. *Origen* seems to combat the concept of a *mundus incorporeus* outside God and apparently takes the world of ideas of the *philosophi Graeci* as such. **NEQUE ENIM FUERIT** Cp. *Origen*, *De princ.* I 2, 3 p. 30, 19-31, 4 K.: *Qui autem initium dat verbo dei vel sapientiae dei, intuere ne magis in ipsum ingenitum patrem impietatem suam iactet, cum eum neget semper patrem fuisse et genuisse verbum et habuisse sapientiam in omnibus anterioribus vel temporibus vel saeculis, vel si quid illud est quod nominari potest.* This is exactly what *Calcidius* says. *Origen*, too, takes his starting-point from the concept of *initium*. A similar text is found in *De princ.* I 2, 2 (p. 29, 3-6 K.). **QUODQUE DEUM** Evidently the argument runs as follows: Yet it may seem that God's Wisdom is posterior to God Himself, because the human mind first attains to a knowledge of God, and only then to a knowledge of His Wisdom. However, question of a difference in time is in the human mind alone, not in the relation between God and His Wisdom. In *Origen* (p. 58 n.) *sapientia* is said to have no beginning whatsoever, *ne illo quidem quod sola apud semet ipsam mens intueri solet et nudo, ut ita dicam, intellectu atque animo suspicari.* These words seem to refer to the same problem and to clash with the theory of *Calcidius*. One should, however, remember that *Origen* is speaking of the 'first' *sapientia* and

Calcidius, as it seems, of the 'second'. The general impression of par. 276 is that the argument of Calcidius is nearer to that of Origen than appears at first sight.

[277-278] 'Heaven and earth'

[277] Now we should see which heaven and which earth the Bible is speaking about. Those who are satisfied with a confused concept think that the heaven we see and the earth which carries us are meant, but those with a deeper insight say that this heaven was not made in the beginning but on the second day. For in the beginning light was made and called 'day', and after it this heaven which God called 'firmament'. On the third day, after the removal of waters, the dry land appeared and this was called 'earth'. From this it is clear that in the passage quoted it is not our heaven and earth that are meant but other things which are older and should rather be perceived by the intellect than by the senses. Thus the Bible testifies that the true heaven is something different from the firmament, and, further, that the earth meant here is something different from the dry earth which appeared on the third day.

This perfectly clear argument, based on *Genesis*, is also found in Origen, *De princ.* II 3, 6: *Ex illius namque terrae nomine etiam hanc nostram, cui 'arida' prius nomen fuerat, cognominatam volunt, sicut et 'firmamentum' hoc 'caelum' illius vocabulo nuncupatum est. Verum de huiuscemodi opinionibus plenius in illo loco tractavimus, cum requireremus, quid esset quod 'In principio fecit deus caelum et terram'. Aliud enim 'caelum' atque alia 'terra' indicatur esse quam illud 'firmamentum', quod post biduum factum dicitur, vel 'arida' quae postmodum 'terra' nominantur.* In my opinion, Origen refers to the passage from which Calcidius' par. 276 was derived. It should be noted that Origen, too, first mentions the authors who, in his opinion, *tumultuario contenti sunt intellectu*. In *De princ.* II 9, 1 he gives the second theory: *Certum est enim quia non de 'firmamento' neque de 'arida' sed de illo caelo ac terra dicatur, quorum caelum hoc et terra quam videmus vocabula postea mutuata sunt.* In the last-mentioned passage Origen already hints at the real meaning of these terms, a solution which Calcidius expresses in the words *intellectu potius quam sensibus haurienda*.

[278] What kind of heaven did God create before the rest, and what kind of earth? Philo thinks that they are immaterial and intelligible creatures, ideas and models of both this earth and the firmament. "After all", he says, "God first created intelligible man, the prototype of the human race, and only afterwards bodily man". Others take it that the prophet, knowing that all things have a double feature, *viz.*, an intelligible and a sensible one, indicated the qualities of the two natures by the terms 'heaven' and 'earth', by 'heaven' the immaterial nature, by 'earth' that which is the substance of bodies and which the Greeks call  $\delta\lambda\eta$ . This interpretation is supported by the text which follows immediately: "the earth, however, was invisible and shapeless". This must refer to corporeal matter, the primary substance of the world before it assumed various forms shaped by the skill of the divine Maker. During this phase it was still without colour or quality, and that what is in such a condition is certainly invisible and shapeless. It is also called "empty and nothing", because, although a recipient of all qualities, it possesses no quality of itself. Matter as the recipient of all accidents is called 'empty' because, as it seems, it can never be filled up. It is called 'nothing' because of itself it is devoid of anything. Symmachus calls it "inactive and disorderly"; 'inactive', because of itself it cannot do anything; 'disorderly', because it has the aptitude of being ordered by the Creator of the world who decorates it. The expression "speechless with amazement" points at a certain similarity to a soul, for, as these words express, it was struck with amazement by the majesty of its Maker and Creator.

But if God made a corporeal matter which once was shapeless and which the Bible calls 'earth', there is seemingly no reason for doubting that there is also an intelligible matter of immaterial nature, which is indicated by the name 'heaven'.

It is made and made in such a way that now exists what did not exist. This is posed by them in this way: A mortal workman obtains his material from another workman, the latter receives it from nature, nature from God, but God from nobody, for there is nothing before God. He, therefore, made sufficient material for the making of the world. They adduce many other arguments all of which we cannot discuss.

PHILO It is true that, according to Philo, *Genesis* 1, 1, describes the creation of the κόσμος νοητός (see the comment on 299, 10-11: *intelligibilis mundi*, p. 30), which God created first as the model of the sensible world. God knew, Philo says, that without the example of a beautiful world the world could not become beautiful; *De opif. mundi* 3, 15-4, 16: 'Εκάστη δὲ τῶν ἡμερῶν ἀπένειμεν ἔνια τῶν τοῦ παντὸς τμημάτων τὴν πρώτην ὑπεξέλόμενος . . . Περιέχει γάρ (sc. ἡ πρώτη ἡμερά) τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον ἔξαίρετον, ὃς ὁ περὶ αὐτῆς λόγος μηνύει. Προλαβὼν γάρ ὁ θεὸς ἀτε θεὸς ὅτι μίμημα καλὸν οὐκ ἀν ποτε γένοιτο δίχα καλοῦ παραδείγματος, οὐδέ τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀνυπαίτιον ὁ μὴ πρὸς ἀρχέτυπον καὶ νοητὴν ίδεαν ἀπεικονίσθη βουληθεὶς τὸν ὄρατὸν κόσμον τουτονὶ δημιουργῆσαι προεξεπύπου τὸν νοητόν, ἵνα χρώμενος ἀσωμάτῳ καὶ θεοειδεστάτῳ παραδείγματι τὸν σωματικὸν ἀπεργάσηται, πρεσβυτέρου νεώτερον ἀπεικόνισμα, τοσαῦτα περιέξοντα αἰσθητὰ γένη διαπερέ ἐν ἐκείνῳ νοητά. All terms used by Calcidius are present: *carentes corpore* ~ ἀσωμάτῳ; *intelligibiles* ~ νοητόν; *ideas* ~ ίδεαν; *exemplaria* ~ παραδείγματος; *archetypum* ~ ἀρχέτυπον. See also *De confusione linguarum* 34, 172: διὰ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων ἀσώματος καὶ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος, τὸ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀρχέτυπον, ίδεας ἀράτοις συσταθεὶς, ὡσπερ οὗτος σώμασιν ὄρατοις. Philo finds a confirmation of his theory in the fact that Holy Scripture describes the creation of man twice: *Gen.* 1, 27 and 2, 7. He brings the former in connexion with the creation of the intelligible man, the latter with that of corporeal man; *De opif. mundi* 46, 134: ὁ μὲν γάρ διαπλασθεὶς αἰσθητὸς ἥδη μετέχων ποιότητος . . . , ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα ίδεα τις ἡ γένος ἡ σφραγίς, νοητός, ἀσώματος, οὔτε ἀρρεν οὔτε θῆλυ, ἀφθαρτος φύσει. With good reason, therefore, Calcidius also mentions man together with heaven and earth. ALII NON ITA Another group of Jews is against Philo. According to them, the prophet (i.e., Moses) means the two features proper to all things. By 'heaven', they think, he means *natura incorporea*, by 'earth' matter. What exactly is this *natura incorporea*? Since it is opposed to matter, one is inclined to think of the element of form in things, especially of the ideas. But the answer depends on the interpretation of *Quod si facta est . . .* (309, 22). Calcidius first shows how the Jews see their interpretation of 'earth' confirmed by the second phrase of *Genesis* in its different versions. QUAE SUBSTANTIA EST CORPORUM Elsewhere matter is called *prima subiectio corporum* (see the comment on 299, 16, p. 31). *Substantia* here obviously means the same as the Greek ὑποκείμενον (cp. *ad* 368, 9 p. 221). See also

309, 7-8: *vetus mundi substantia*. QUAM GRAECI HYLEN VOCANT Cp. 299, 14; 304, 6. TERRA AUTEM ERAT INVISIBILIS ET INFORMIS In par. 276 Calcidius reads *incompleta* instead of *informis*. In *De princ.* IV 4, 6 (33) Origen says: *Quam plurimi sane putant ipsam rerum materiam significari in eo quod in principio Genesis scriptum est a Moyse: "In principio fecit deus caelum et terram, terra autem erat invisibilis et incomposita"; 'invisibilem' namque et 'incompositam terram' non aliud eis Moyses quam informem materiam visus est indicare.* This is very similar to the present passage from Calcidius. *Plurimi* leaves room for a different opinion, which would be Philo's. Of course, these *plurimi* are the *alii* of Calcidius. The question who they actually were again remains unanswered, but they must be the other Jewish philosophers. SILVAE CORPOREAE is opposed to the *silva intellegibilis* or *incorporea* about which there is question below (p. 64). VETUS MUNDI SUBSTANTIA Cp. *quae est substantia corporum* (309, 5). DEI OPIFICIS This expression so often met with in Calcidius (cp. *ad* 301, 1) is also found in (the translation of) Origen. On the creation of matter he writes: *Et miror quomodo isti culpent eos, qui vel opificem deum vel providentiam huius universitatis negant* (*De princ.* II 1, 4). It should be noted that in the first chapters of Calcidius' treatise *De silva*, *deus opifex* and *providentia* are interchangeable terms. In the same text Origen speaks about matter *secundum propriam rationem*, i.e., without qualities. This is exactly what Calcidius writes. Origen adds that matter actually is nowhere found without quality; Calcidius says the same in par. 310. Further on he often speaks about matter as being without quality or form. INANIS PORRO ET NIHIL Matter is receptive of everything (*receptrix* = ὑποδοχή, *Tim.* 49A; Calcidius often uses the term *receptaculum*) and so has nothing of its own. CUNCTA QUAE ACCIDENTUNT Cp. *omnia quae accidunt* (299, 17). Matter seems never to become filled up, hence it is 'empty'. OTIOSA VERO ET INDIGESTA Matter is *otiosa* because it is no active principle, and *indigesta* because, although disorderly, it has the aptitude of being ordered by the Creator. OPPORTUNITATEM SUSCIPENDI ORDINIS Cp. 344, 25-26: *Vim nunc adpellat opportunitatem silvae vultus induendi*; 356, 3: *opportunitatem facilitatemque formabilem*; 375, 11: *naturalis opportunitas ad motus stationisque perceptionem*; 376, 14: *esse in silva potentiam opportunitatemque formarum recipiendarum*; 377, 25: *ex opportunitate providae ordinationis*; 378, 2: *cum naturali opportunitate suscipienda pulchritudinis*. In 304, 22 there was question

of *capacitas silvae* (cp. also 356, 15 and 375, 20). STUPIDAE VERO EX ADMIRATIONE As this reading must have been in Origen, its explanation—and, for that matter, the whole preceding part—must have been taken from him as well. “Matter was speechless with astonishment before the *maiestas opificis*”. This terminology reminds one of par. 270: *sed ita victimam, ut maiestati opificis libens cedat . . .* (301, 1). This, in its turn, refers to the passage from Numenius (p. 120). QUOD SI FACTA After demonstrating in an elaborate way how authors find support in the various translations of *Gen.* 1, 1 for their interpretation of the term ‘earth’, Calcidius returns to the explanation of the term ‘heaven’. He had already called it *incorpoream naturam* (309, 4), which is now interpreted as *intelligibilis silva incorporei generis*. The meaning of the passage, at first sight fairly difficult to understand, may be paraphrased as follows. “If the term ‘earth’ denotes corporeal matter, the term ‘heaven’, in our opinion, may be interpreted as ‘intelligible, incorporeal matter’; both are to be regarded as created by God”. Two details are noteworthy here, namely the fact that the author himself comes forward (*opinor*) and, furthermore, the concept of an incorporeal matter. As to the first point, one may be inclined to find in this passage a further argument independent from the opinion of the *alii* just reported. However, one detail warns us to be cautious, *viz.*, the circumstance that in par. 280 (311, 8) Calcidius uses the same *opinor* in a passage evidently borrowed from Aristotle. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that in the present passage this verb is added to an account of Origen’s opinion. Indeed, much speaks in favour of this hypothesis, for it is almost certain that Origen said something about this *natura incorporea*. The structure of the argument presupposes this. That Origen did defend such a theory may be inferred from his assumption that in the beginning God created a sufficient amount of matter and spirit. In *De princ.* II 9, 1, discussing the text of *Sap.* 11, 20 ἀλλὰ πάντα μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ διέταξας he writes: *porro autem sicut et scriptura dicit “numero et mensura universa” condidit deus, et idcirco ‘numeris’ quidem recte aptabitur rationabilibus creaturis vel mentibus, ut tanta sint, quantae a providentia dei et dispensari et regi et contineri possint. ‘Mensura’ vero materiae corporali consequenter aptabitur; quam utique tantam a deo creatam esse credendum est, quantam sibi sciret ad ornatum mundi posse sufficere. Haec ergo sunt quae in initio, id est ante omnia, a deo creata esse aestimandum est. Quod quidem etiam in illo initio,*

*quod Moyses latentius introducit, indicari putamus, cum dicit: "In principio fecit deus caelum et terram".* As regards corporeal matter, Calcidius' terminology is in complete accordance with that of Origen. Yet, while Origen speaks of *creatuae rationales vel mentes*, Calcidius uses *silva intellegibilis*. This expression does not occur elsewhere in Calcidius but in par. 272 a passage is found where the existence of such an intelligible matter seemed to be presupposed. In that passage an influence of Numenius was evident (cp. p. 43). This leads to the supposition that in the present passage Calcidius reports the doctrine of Origen but in a manner which betrays the influence of Numenius. That Calcidius is, indeed, working upon material from Origen is also shown by the words soon following: *ipse (sc. deus) igitur silvestras inpensas mundi fabricae sufficientes utilesque constituit.* They contain the typically Origenian idea of the 'sufficient material'.

**FACTAM VERO** Finally, Calcidius reflects upon *fecit* in *Gen. I, I.* The Jews interpreted this term as referring to a *creatio ex nihilo* and they explain it in this way: "The human workman receives his material from another workman (e.g., the carpenter from a forester), the latter from nature, nature from God, but God from nobody, for there is nothing earlier than God. He himself has made the material in sufficient quantities". As already stated, this last idea strongly reminds one of Origen, who also defended a creation out of nothing, and it may be assumed that the argument too is derived from him. Similar sounds can be heard in Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* II 10: "And in the first place they (the prophets) have taught us unanimously that He made the universe out of nothing. For nothing was equal in time to God", and *ib.* 24: "For when a craftsman has received his material from someone, he makes out of it whatever he wants. But the power of God is shown by this that He makes whatever He wants out of nothing" (Quoted by J. H. Waszink, *Tertullian, The Treatise against Hermogenes*, London, 1956, p. 10). Tertullian only accepts an existence of matter, if it is regarded as identical with God's Wisdom. It is for this reason that he attacked Hermogenes' theory about eternal matter, and so he, too, actually assumed a *creatio ex nihilo*. Speaking of matter in connexion with God is according to Basilius (*o.c.*, p. 144-146) an anthropomorphism. Needless to repeat that Calcidius also found this theory in Origen.

If the given interpretation is correct, we have in par. 276-278

a passage derived from Origen—most probably from his commentary on *Genesis*—but re-interpreted by Calcidius in a Numenian sense. If so, this text gives us a first inkling of Calcidius' method of working. Numenian influence occurs in other texts of Calcidius on the Jews (see *ad* par. 295 and 299). In point of fact, Numenius' respect for the doctrine of the Jews is well-known. Of course, it is out of the question that Origen should have influenced Calcidius through the intermediary of Numenius; Numenius lived before him. Therefore we have to assume a direct influence of Origen on Calcidius, the latter interpreting his source in a Numenian fashion, at least in some passages.

β) Matter was not made

αα) It consists of small parts

[279] The opinions of those who say that corporeal matter has not been generated must still be studied. Their theories are equally divergent. Some say that matter displays some coherence, because it consists of particles, sooner perceived by the intellect than by the senses, which are mutually connected, placed in some position or other and have a certain shape; thus Democritus and Epicurus. Others, such as Anaxagoras, say that the particles also have some quality, but the latter thinks that the nature and the peculiarity of all matters are contained in each particular kind of matter. Others, again, think that matter with its fine structure is formed by the smallness of the indivisible particles; thus Diodorus and some Stoicks. The union and separation of these particles is said by them to be accidental. Since there are unnumerable theories of this kind, I omit them.

CORPOREAM SILVAM There will be no more question of intelligible matter (cp. 309, 22 ss.). QUORUM AEQUE DIVERSAE OPINIONES SUNT In par. 275 Calcidius enumerated various theories of those who think matter continuous. Here it appears that among the 'Atomists' the divergences are just as great. TEXTUM EIUS ET QUASI CONTINUATIONEM These words seem to take a stand against those who think that matter, since it gives the impression of being continuous, is continuous in reality. There is only a *quasi continuatio*, these authors say; in actual fact matter is a texture (*textum*) of small particles. These words at once show from which

angle Calcidius approaches the different points of view. His attention is concentrated not so much on the way in which these philosophers explain the qualities—though these may be discussed indirectly—but rather on the way in which they explain the appearance of continuity in matter. In this context reference should be made to Aristotle's *Phys.* 203a 22-23, where Aristotle says about Anaxagoras and Democritus: τῇ ἀφῇ συνεχὲς τὸ ἀπειρον εἶναι φασίν. QUAE INTELLEGANTUR POTIUS QUAM SENTIANTUR Cp. 363, 19: *intellectu potius quam sensibus adsequenda* and the comment on that text (p. 214), and further Aëtius, *Plac.* I 3, 18: 'Επίκουρος . . . κατὰ Δημόκριτον φιλοσοφήσας ἔφη τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά. In the description of the theory of Anaxagoras there is question of particles, & ἡ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ μόρια (*ib.*, I 3, 5). IN ALIQUO MODO POSITIS ET ALIQUATENUS FIGURATIS Speaking about Leucippus and Democritus, Aristotle mentions three causes of difference between the ἀτομα, *viz.*, σχῆμα τε καὶ τάξιν καὶ θέσιν (*Met.* 985 b 14). In *Phys.* 184 b 15 ss. he only mentions the difference in σχῆμα and εἶδος. Since this text appears to me rather important for the distinction made by Calcidius in these paragraphs, it is quoted in full: 'Ανάγκη, δ' ἡτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡ πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἡτοι ἀκίνητον (ῶς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος) ἡ κινουμένην (ῶσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μεν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δὲ ὄντωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχήν)· εἰ δὲ πλείους, ἡ πεπερασμένας ἡ ἀπείρους· καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένας πλείους δὲ μιᾶς, ἡ δύο ἡ τρεῖς ἡ τέτταρας ἡ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμὸν· καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἡ οὔτως ὡσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἐν σχήματι δὲ <διαφερούσας>, ἡ εἴδει διαφερούσας ἡ καὶ ἐναντίας. UT ANAXAGORAS Cp. Aëtius, *Plac.* I 3, 5: 'Οτι ἐν τῇ τροφῇ τῇ προσφερομένῃ πάντα ἔστι τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων πάντα αὐξέται. ALII PROPTER EXIGUITATEM According to others, the subtlety of structure—this *quasi continuatio*, as one could say—is due to the exiguity of the *individua corpora*. *Individua* must here have the sense of 'indivisible', as is clear from a parallel text in Sextus Emp., *Pyrrh. Hypost.* III 32: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ 'Επίκουρος ἀτόμους, 'Αναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὅμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα (~ *exiguitas*) καὶ ἀμερῆ (~ *individuorum*) σώματα . . . A similar report occurs in *Adv. Math.* IX 363 (see p. 69). That we have here a common doxographical report is evident; both the *Historia Philosophiae* by Galen and the *Placita* by Aëtius give the same formulation of the theory of Diodorus, the latter even twice. Galen, n. 18 (*Dox. Gr.* 611 D.): Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ Κρόνος

ἐπικεκλημένος ἀμερῆ καὶ ἐλάχιστα σώματα. *Plac.* I 3, 27 (*Dox. Gr.* 289): Διόδωρος ἐπίκλην Κρόνος τὰ ἀμερῆ σώματα ἀπειρα, τὰ δ' αὐτὰ λεγόμενα καὶ ἐλάχιστα and I 13, 3 (*Dox. Gr.* 312) Ξενοκράτης καὶ Διόδωρος ἀμερῆ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ὠρίζοντο. *ET NON NULLI STOICORUM* This addition is just as unusual as all the previous data are common, for the Stoics are not mentioned anywhere in the parallel passages relating to Diodorus. According to all, the Stoics considered matter to be continuous. Calcidius himself says the same in his lengthy discussion of the Stoic view of matter in par. 289-294 (See also the beginning of par. 280). Here, however, Stoics are mentioned who pretend that matter consists of an infinite number of indivisible particles—smallness seems to be their only characteristic—which assemble or separate fortuitously. Bäumker (o.c., p. 342, n. 5) speaks of “eine unorganische Verbindung der stoischen mit der epicureischen Lehre”. The ‘inorganic’ factor in the combination is, of course, to be found in the element of chance which has taken the place of the Stoic *providentia*. (Bäumker is certainly wrong when he says that Calcidius lists Diodorus among the *non nulli Stoicorum*; he mentions him separately. This Diodorus was one of the masters of Zeno of Citium (See P.W. V 705).) Elsewhere Calcidius gives yet another list of adherents of ‘*corpuscula*-theories’; among the philosophers named above he includes Empedocles. Another difference occurs in the latter passage where there is no question of *non nulli Stoicorum* but simply of *Stoici*. This second list is entered in the passage of the γόμφοι, the ‘rivets’, by means of which, according to Plato (*Tim.*, 43A), man was built up by the lower gods. Calcidius explains how these rivets are to be understood: ‘*Invisibles*’ porro ‘*coniunctiones gomphos*’ *adpellat*, *vel* *minorum corpusculorum coacervationem* *ut Diodorus*, *vel* *eorundem similium* *inter se* *conglabationem* *formabilem* *ut Anaxagoras*, *vel* *supra dictorum multiiformem implicationem* *ut Democritus et Leucippus*, *vel interdum concretionem*, *interdum discretionem* *ut Empedocles*, *concretionem* *quidem amicitiam*, *discretionem* *porro et separationem inimicitiam* *vocans*, *vel ut Stoici corporum diversorum usque quaque concretionem*. *Quorum omnium quendam nodum concatenationemque dicit esse in minutis solidisque corpusculis*, *quae gomphos cognominat* (par. 203; 243, 19-244, 5). Reading this one wonders what exactly these *gomphi* are. Are they *corpuscula*, as Calcidius says at the end, or *coniunctiones*, as he says earlier on? The answer is, of course, that they are both. They are *corpuscula* in so far they form com-

binations. One may also say that 'combination' is to be taken in the sense of what we call 'a chemical combination'. When at the end of this quotation there is question of *minuta et solida corpuscula*, the doctrine of the *non nulli Stoicorum* of par. 279 comes, naturally, to the fore. Who were they? Did some Stoics follow Diodorus in this respect rather than his pupil Zeno? The answer can only be guessed at. Still, another solution is equally possible. Everyone will be struck by the fact that in the list just quoted the last two mentioned, Empedocles and the Stoics, do not really belong there. The text of Sextus referred to, *viz.*, *Adv. Math.* IX 363, runs in this fashion: Οἱ δὲ περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ (τέσσαρα γὰρ πάντων ῥίζωματα πρῶτον ἀκούε .. .). Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀτόμους, εἰ μή τι .. . Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ ὁ Κλαζομένιος ὅμοιομερείας, Διόδωρος δὲ ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Κρόνος ἐλάχιστα καὶ ἀμερῆ σώματα. Inverting the order of these authors, it agrees exactly with that given by Calcidius in par. 203. The one difference is that Calcidius mentions Leucippus instead of Epicurus. The assumption, therefore, that Calcidius took the enumeration in par. 203 from a similar source is perfectly admissible. He thus ranked the Stoics with the Atomists. What has happened in par. 279? We venture to suppose that, at second thought, Calcidius reasoned: I cannot possibly write "Diodorus and the Stoics", because the Stoa is of a different opinion. So it can only have been some of the Stoics who held this view. Empedocles was left out, because he was yet coming up for discussion. In this supposition the formulation *non nulli Stoicorum* must have been conceived by Calcidius. He brought different sources into accord with each other. This explanation is strongly supported by the fact that the other data in this section (par. 279) agree with those in other sources.

### ββ) Matter is continuos

#### Transition

[280a] Those, however, who profess that the constitution of matter too is a work of Providence, think that it is a continuous whole from beginning to end. But for the rest opinions vary greatly among all philosophers involved, *viz.*, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. However, they all consider matter to be shapeless and without quality.

**QUI TAMEN** Now that *Calcidius* passes from the 'Atomists' to those who might be called the 'Continuists', the following trend of thought—also on the ground of the distinction made in par. 275—would be expected. "We now come to the philosophers who take matter to be continuous. Some reason that matter possesses qualities of itself (for instance, *Thales* c.s.), whereas others deny this and think those qualities and forms to have come from some different principle"; *ex aliquo potiore numine*, *Calcidius* par. 275, which equals his *providentiae opus* here. But what does one actually find? *Calcidius* continues: *Qui tamen providentiae opus pronuntiaverunt*. In this way, it seems, he connects the doctrine of Providence with that of continuity, thereby contradicting what is said in par. 275. He distinguished the 'Atomists' from the 'Continuists' and subdivided the latter into two groups, and only the second group appealed to another principle. Here he distinguishes the 'Atomists' from the thinkers *qui providentiae opus*, etc., seemingly suggesting that all 'Continuists' profess the doctrine of Providence. However, this is not *Calcidius'* real thought. By *qui tamen providentiae opus*, etc. he does not mean all 'Continuists' but only Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. These alone are singled out as opponents of those who ascribe quality to matter. This train of thought is tortuous and illogical, but it can be explained. *Calcidius*, eager to raise the question of Providence, creates a contrast between the theories coming up for discussion and those already discussed in which both the union and the segregation of the particles were said to be *fortuitus*.

The *silvae constitutio* is probably identical with the initial stage of the *constitutio mundi*, the conferring of the first forms and qualities on matter. Therefore, he stresses that these too are the result of Providence's activity. In other words, Providence did not become active at a second stage of the *constitutio mundi*. This would confirm what is said just now, *viz.*, that *Calcidius* here only means Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and not *Thales* c.s. **AB EXORDIO USQUE AD FINEM** At first sight this wording expresses the continuity in time, but *Calcidius* definitely means a continuity in space. It is worth noting how emphatically matter is presented as an independent reality, as was always done by the Stoics. Another resemblance to the Stoic doctrine of matter lies in the stress on its unity (*unam*, cp. 321, 16: *unamque eam . . .*; 322, 12, 14: *unum*). **PYTHAGORAS, PLATO, ARISTOTLE, STOICI** *Calcidius* lists

the names in their historical sequence, but in the discussion of their views in par. 283-301 the order differs: Aristotle, Stoicks, Pythagoras or rather Numenius' interpretation of Pythagoras and, finally, Plato. Since Calcidius' chief aim is to interpret Plato, his theory concludes the discussion. But Numenius is really the last author treated by Calcidius. From what has been said above, it is only logical that this author is treated in the last place but one.

(1) Matter has qualities and form

[280b] Others gave matter a form, such as Thales, who is said to have been the first to investigate the mysteries of nature. Thales asserted that water was the beginning of all things. He did so, I think, because he saw that all food consumed by living creatures is damp. The same idea is found in Homer where the poet says that Oceanus and Tethys are the parents of whatever came into being, and also where he says that the gods swear by water—which, however, he himself calls Styx. Homer did this, because he believed that honour is due to what is oldest and because, in his opinion, nothing is more venerable than the oath. But according to Anaximenes the principle of everything is air, also of water. He, in his turn, disagrees with Heraclitus who considers fire to be the origin of things. So all these philosophers, putting first water, air or fire, think that the principle is in motion.

[281] However, others defend that matter is immovable and made as one big whole out of everything. They think that the universe is something immovable without a beginning or end; thus Xenophanes, Melissus and Parmenides. But Parmenides says that this whole, comprising everything, is perfect and limited, Melissus that it is undefined and unlimited.

[282] The teaching of Empedocles is this: matter is variegated and multiform, sustained by four roots, *viz.*, fire, water, air and earth, from which now a union now a separation of all bodies come forth. The union he calls friendship, the separation discord. These, I think, are the philosophers who say that matter has form, qualities and body.

ALII FORMAM DEDERUNT Calcidius now discusses those who in par. 275 were denoted by the words *utrum ex silva proveniant* (sc., *qualitates et forma*). Although he did not divide them into groups

there, he yet had a distinction in mind, which he indicates during the discussion. This grouping is:

- a) Matter is uniform
  - α) in motion: Thales, Anaximenes, Heraclitus
  - β) immovable: Xenophanes, Melissus, Parmenides
    - αα) limited: Parmenides
    - ββ) unlimited: Melissus.
- b) Matter is pluriform: Empedocles

UT THALES What *Calcidius* says of Thales agrees strikingly with Aristotle's *Met.* 983 b 18-33: τὸ μέντοι πλῆθος καὶ τὸ εἶδος τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντες λέγουνται, ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὅδωρ φησὶν εἶναι (διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ' ὅδατος ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι), λαβὼν ἵσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὅραν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ' ἔξ οὖ γίγνεται, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων) . . . εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας οὔτως οἰονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως ὑπολαβεῖν. Ὁκεανόν τε γάρ καὶ Τηθύν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας, καὶ τὸν ὄρχον τῶν θεῶν ὅδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν Στύγα· τιμιώτατον μὲν γάρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον, ὄρχος δε τὸ τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν. *Calcidius'* distinction in these paragraphs is, to some extent, included in the first words: τὸ μέντοι πλῆθος (uni- or pluriform) καὶ τὸ εἶδος (water, air or fire). The *opinor* deserves attention. One might suppose that *Calcidius* formulates his own opinion. But on close examination this *opinor* turns out to be no more than a translation of Aristotle's *ἵσως*. From this practise of *Calcidius* an important conclusion could be drawn in 309, 23 (cp. p. 65). Aristotle alludes to Homer, but *Calcidius* mentions him explicitly. In connexion with the γένεσις τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Plato too mentions Oceanus and Tethys (*Theaet.*, 180D) and uses the same παμπαλαίους of Aristotle (cp. Ross *ad Met.* 983 b 27). The texts referred to here are: Ε 201 (and 302) Ὁκεανόν τε, θεῶν γένεσιν, καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν (cp. Sextus Emp., *Pyrrh. Hypost.* I 150; see also Diels, *Dox. Gr.*, s.v. *Tethys* in the index), and

Ο 36-38 *ἵστω* νῦν τόδε γαῖα, καὶ οὐρανὸς εύρυς ὑπερθε  
καὶ τὸ κατειθόμενον Στυγὸς ὅδωρ, ὃς τε μέγιστος  
ὄρχος δεινότατός τε πέλει μαχάρεσσι θεοῖσι.

The translation of καὶ τὸν ὄρχον τῶν θεῶν ὅδωρ, κτλ., especially of the accusative ὅδωρ is strikingly literal. The argument is: Swearing

is the highest form of homage, which should be paid to the oldest being. Since the gods swear by water, therefore water is the oldest being, *i.e.*, the principle of things. AT VERO ANAXIMENES Calcidius evidently summarizes, otherwise his argument would not take the curious turn: "Thales thinks water to be the first principle, but Anaximenes does not agree with Heraclitus". Perhaps this passage is no more than a paraphrase of Aristotle, *Met.* 984 a 5-8: 'Αναξιμένης δ' ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρότερον ὄδατος καὶ μάλιστ' ἀρχὴν τιθέσαι τῶν ἀπλῶν σωμάτων, "Ιππασος δὲ πῦρ ὁ Μεταποντῖνος καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος. There is, indeed, a striking similarity between the short additions *et ipsius aquae* and *πρότερον ὄδατος*. From the difference in the number of authors we may suppose that Calcidius used an intermediate source. For the expression *caput rerum*, see Aquila's translation of *Gen.* 1, 1, where *caput rerum* was the translation of 'Εν κεφαλαίῳ. OMNES H̄I As often, Calcidius gives the actual scheme of groups at the end. SUNT TAMEN QUI INMOBILEM Here too reference should be made to Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *viz.*, 986 b 10-24 εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς ὡς μιᾶς οὕσης φύσεως ἀπερήναντο, τρόπον δὲ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν πάντες . . . ἔκεινοι μὲν γὰρ προστιθέασι κίνησιν, γεννῶντές γε τὸ πᾶν, οὗτοι δὲ ἀκίνητον εἶναι φασιν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτόν γε οἰκεῖόν ἔστι τῇ νῦν σκέψει. Παρμενίδης μὲν γὰρ ἔοικε τοῦ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐνὸς ἀπτεσθαι, Μέλισσος δὲ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὅλην (διὸ καὶ ὁ μὲν πεπερασμένον ὁ δ' ἀπειρόν φησιν εἶναι αὐτό)· Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἐνίσας (ό γὰρ Παρμενίδης τούτου λέγεται γενέσθαι μαθητής) οὐθὲν διεσαφήνισεν, οὐδὲ τῆς φύσεως τούτων οὐδετέρας ἔοικε θιγεῖν, ἀλλ' εἰς τὸν ὄλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναι φησι τὸν θεόν. Calcidius describes the difference between Parmenides and Melissus in the same way as Aristotle. In the formulation of the similarity between the respective doctrines (*et eandem ex omnibus in unam molem reductam*) more attention, it seems, is paid to the doctrine of Melissus than to that of Parmenides, for the latter teaches a unity κατὰ τὸν λόγον, the former a unity κατὰ τὴν ὅλην. This is why Calcidius treats of Parmenides in some kind of *addendum*, that is after the discussion of Xenophanes (who, according to Aristotle, did not speak about the nature of the unity at all), and Melissus. From par. 350 (373, 19-20 *alii sola intelligibilia, ut Parmenides*) it appears that Calcidius was positively acquainted with the latter's doctrine. EMPEDOCLES Aristotle mentions Empedocles in *Met.* 984 a 8-11 and 985 a 23-24, but Calcidius shows a greater similarity with Aëtius, *Plac.* I 3, 20: 'Εμπεδοκλῆς Μέτωνος

Αχραγαντῖνος τέτταρα μὲν λέγει στοιχεῖα, πῦρ ἀέρα ὕδωρ γῆν, δύο δὲ ἀρχικὰς δυνάμεις, φύλαν τε καὶ νεῦκος· ὃν ἡ μὲν ἔστιν ἐνωτική, τὸ δὲ διαιρετικόν. φησὶ δὲ οὔτως· τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων ῥιζώματα πρῶτον ἀκούε. It is interesting that *Calcidius* translates the poetical *ῥιζώματα* literally by *radicibus*. The same details are also found in *Sextus Emp.*, *Adv. Math.* IX 362 and X 315-317. They are evidently well-known doxographical details. In the text quoted on p. 68 *Calcidius* also mentioned *Empedocles*; instead of *discretio* and *discordia* he there uses *separatio* and *inimicitia*. **HI SUNT** This final clause contains a surprising element, *viz.*, the words *et corpus*. By now we are well enough acquainted with *Calcidius'* style to know that at such unexpected turns the context should be examined. And, indeed, the context, again, furnishes the solution: *et corpus* is set against *sine consortio corporum* in the first period of the subsequent paragraph. Likewise the unexpected *providentia* (310, 23) was set against *fortuitus* two paragraphs earlier. But, as in this case something more should be said about this distinction, since both expressions are inaccurate. Not all authors discussed above hold that matter is a *corpus* nor do all those to be discussed hold that it is incorporeal. For instance, among the former is *Parmenides* of whom elsewhere (373, 19) *Calcidius* himself says that he held the universe to be intelligible and hence incorporeal. And among the latter are the *Stoics* about whom *Calcidius* shows that, to them, matter and even God are corporeal. This apparent inconsistency betrays a lack of mastery of the subject. Fond of making distinctions, *Calcidius* must have wrongly elaborated or abbreviated his source. Meanwhile, it is perhaps possible to trace his train of thought. Although intent upon an adequate distinction, his attention is drawn so much to the theory of *Aristotle*, that he writes *sine consortio corporum*. This expression indeed holds for *Aristotle*, but not for all subsequent authors. Nor did the *Qui tamen providentiae opus* in par. 280. The words *et corpus* were added in order to stress the distinction.

The general impression of the paragraph concerning the *Pre-Socratics* is that of a strong agreement with the well-known doxographical details. For the greater part *Aristotle* is their source. The main activity of *Calcidius* is a not always successful attempt to give a more systematic distinction.

## (2) Matter has neither quality nor form

## (a) Aristotle

[283] But of those who, rejecting the occurrence of qualities and a form in matter, conceive it by itself without any form of corporeality, Aristotle admits three principles of material things, *viz.*, matter, form and privation. He studies each of these separately, although he states that the one cannot exist without the others. He says that the world is without beginning or end but that divine Providence gave it eternal existence. Because his opinion is both famous and very suitable for pondering upon Plato's doctrine, we should not pass it heedlessly.

But first, I think, the argument of the old philosophers should be explained, who asserted that nothing of what exists came to be or will perish. They argue in this way: "If a thing comes to be, it arises from either nothing or a thing already existing. Neither is possible: it can spring from no existing thing, because what already exists cannot again begin to exist, for what comes to be does not as yet exist. Nor can it come from what does not exist, for whatever comes to be needs something underlying from which it arises. Hence nothing comes to be. Nor does anything perish, for what perishes is dissolved into either a remnant or nothing. But neither is possible, as will soon appear. So nothing comes to be and nothing perishes. Now, why can it be said <what above is left to be proved> that what exists or perishes cannot be dissolved into nothing? The reason is that, in this case, the same thing exists and perishes: for if it is not dissolved into a remnant it will at once exist and not exist, which is impossible. On the other hand, if what dissolves becomes something else, it perishes and does not perish, which is equally impossible.

AT VERO The absence of the antecedent of this relative clause (one would expect: *At vero ex eorum numero, qui . . .*) seems to be due to the Greek δοτι, which is more easily used without an antecedent. Three properties (which below *Calcidius* mentions quite frequently) of matter are mentioned: it is lack of 1) qualities, 2) form, 3) body. The formulation of the third property is peculiar: alongside *detrahunt ei qualitates* and *informem constituunt* one would expect *et sine consortio corporum eam esse dicunt, si sola per semet ipsa mente consideratur*. This is what *Calcidius* wants to say, but the two

thoughts are rather awkwardly expressed in a single phrase. Attention should also be paid to the expression *mente intuentur*, which reminds one of what is said above about the way in which matter can be known (par. 274b, p. 50). This mental process is certainly in his mind when he says: "they grasp it by itself alone". *Mente intuentur* reminds one of *speculatione mentis imagineris* in 305, 13; also cp. 328, 7: *animo considerari*. **SILVAM SPECIEM CARENTIAM** They are expressly mentioned in *Met.* 1070 b 18-19 . . . ὡσπερ εἴ τις εἴποι ὅτι ἀρχαὶ εἰσὶ τρεῖς, τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ὄλη, and in *Met.* 1069 b 32-34 he says: τρία δὴ τὰ αἰτια καὶ τρεῖς αἱ ἀρχαὶ, δύο μὲν ἡ ἐναντίωσις, ἡς τὸ μὲν λόγος καὶ εἶδος τὸ δὲ στέρησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἡ ὄλη. **LICET PROFITEATUR** That these principles cannot exist by themselves is discussed in *De gen. et corr.* 329 a 24 s. in this way: ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν μὲν εἶναι τινα ὄλην τῶν σωμάτων τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ ταύτην οὐ χωριστήν, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ μετ’ ἐναντιώσεως, ἐξ ἡς γίνεται τὰ καλούμενα στοιχεῖα (cp. Zeller II 2, p. 324). **DIVINA PROVIDENTIA** Needless to say that this formulation is not from Aristotle, but from Calcidius, or rather from Numenius, on whom he depends in several other passages where there is question of Providence. For the rest one finds here a correct explanation of Aristotle's doctrine in *Phys.* I 8-9. The greater part of the following treatise is taken from it.

**CUIUS SENTENTIA** Aristotle's opinion is discussed because "it is so suitable for a close study of Plato's doctrine". Calcidius' purpose is to interpret the doctrine of Plato, and no more. Aristotle, to him, is only important in so far as his treatment of the problems can increase understanding of Plato. Indeed, Calcidius sees Aristotle in the first place as an *auditor Platonis* (336, 10) and, for this reason, regards him as not opposed to Plato but rather as following in the same line. Henceforth there are more than one opportunity to elaborate this point.

**PRIUS TAMEN** *Videtur* might appear to refer to some initiative of Calcidius himself, but what follows is an almost literal rendering of the argument by Aristotle in *Phys.* I 8. Two similar cases are noted in 311, 8 and 309, 23, in connexion with *opinor*. Again this shows the author's method of procedure. Material from others is assimilated and occasionally adapted for his own way of thinking; see, for instance, above in *divina providentia* (312, 16). A comparison between Aristotle and Calcidius produces this result:

PRIUS TAMEN EXPONENDUS VIDETUR  
PHYSICORUM VETERUM SYLLOGISMUS,

Ζητοῦντες γάρ οἱ κατὰ φι-  
λοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλή-  
θειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν  
ὄντων . . .

QUI ADSERIT NIHIL EORUM  
QUAE SUNT GENERATUM ESSE  
NEC PERITURUM FORE.

καὶ φασι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι  
τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν  
οὔτε φθείρεσθαι

FORMULA SYLLOGISMIS TALIS EST:

διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι  
γίγνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον  
ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος,  
ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων  
ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γάρ τὸ  
ὄν γίγνεσθαι (εἶναι γάρ ἤδη)

SI QUID FIT, ID NECESSE EST  
VEL EX EO FIERI QUOD IAM  
EST, VEL EX EO QUOD NON EST.  
UTRUMQUE AUTEM IMPOSSIBILE:  
DE EXISTENTE QUIDM,  
QUIA QUOD IAM DUDUM EST FIERI  
AD PRAESENS NON POTEST; ID  
ENIM QUOD GIGNITUR NONDUM EST.  
NEC VERO DE NON EXISTENTE,  
QUIA NECESSE EST EI QUOD FIT  
SUBESSE ALIQUAM MATERIAM  
EX QUA FIAT.  
NIHIL ERGO FIT.

ἢ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἀν-  
γενέσθαι· ὑποκείσθαι γάρ τι  
δεῖν.

The similarity is so striking that no doubt is left that *Calcidius* translated Aristotle, wherever he may have found his text. *Calcidius'* verbosity, of course, harms in no way this statement. This is quite obvious when comparing the text of the *Timaeus* with his Latin version. The real difference lies in the fact that *Calcidius* (or his source) also elaborates the impossibility of destruction, a point which Aristotle omitted, because it was easily proved from his preceding argument. *Calcidius* again admits two possibilities: What perishes is dissolved into a remnant, or into no remnant at all. Both suppositions are impossible, "as we will prove", says *Calcidius*. Then he draws the conclusion that nothing begins to exist or perishes. He continues: Why can one say that there is no question of a real destruction into nothing? The reason is the implication that the same thing exists and perishes. This is proved then for the two possibilities distinguished above, *viz.*, a dissolution into nothing or a dissolution into something. In the first case, *Calcidius* says, there would be being and not being at the same time, since something would dissolve into nothing. In the second

case destruction and no-destruction would exist at the same time, since something would dissolve into something, and so would not perish. The second argument, obviously, starts from the same *a priori* as the first. Similar digressions must have been rather frequent in Aristotelian literature. Aristotle himself points the way: *καὶ οὗτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὗξοντες* (*ib.*).

[284] By means of this argument the old philosophers tried to prove that neither coming-to-be nor destruction exists. But Aristotle makes distinction in this argument, having shewn first, that the terms to-exist and not-to-exist, to-become and to-perish have a double meaning. There is, indeed, a becoming with regard to the nature of a thing and with regard to an accident, for instance in the case of a sick musician recovering from his illness. Nature here is ill and recovers, but this happens not because the subject is a musician; it is accidental to his being a musician, for it was accidental that the musician was ill. The same holds for destruction: if a white object of a foot high changes into (lit.: perishes into) a black one, in principal it undergoes a change of essence, because it is white. But it undergoes this change accidentally in so far as it is a foot high. Therefore, when we say that the musician is recovering, his recovery happens accidentally, for he recovers indeed. If we say: he is ill, his nature suffers. And again, if we say: the white object of a foot high perishes because it becomes black, we say that this happens accidentally; if we call it white, we speak of the nature.

Therefore, when we say that something arises out of non-existence, the non-existence is twofold. First, non-existing of the nature, and in this case what has been said is impossible, *viz.*, that out of what does not exist at all something would arise, so that it really exists. Secondly we speak of non-existing with respect to an accident, *viz.*, if what becomes, becomes in the sense of becoming different from what is was before, and thus acquiring something more than what it had by nature. For instance, when a statue arises out of a shapeless mass. Bronze is shapeless by nature, the shape impressed on it by the artist arises out of not-being; therefore we say that it arises accidentally. It is also possible that something else arises out of an existing thing; but this only happens accidentally, for instance, when a grammarian acquires the science of medicine. For here a man,

expert in one science, becomes an expert in another branch too. Consequently, we also speak of a thing perishing and dissolving into something else, not in the proper sense but only by accident, for instance, when a statue of father Liber is altered into one of Apollo. In this case also the shape seems to alter into another, not in the proper sense, but only accidentally. In the same way, an existing thing can perish and dissolve into a non-existing thing, but not to such an extent that this destruction implies total annihilation, *i.e.*, that what existed before does not exist any more.

The interpretation of this paragraph is greatly facilitated by our knowledge of Aristotle's text to which *Calcidius* refers. He evidently continues his comment of *Physics* I 8. Aristotle, after demonstrating how earlier philosophers came to regard all coming-to-be and passing-away as impossible, expounds his conflicting view (191 a 34 ss.): "Our explanation on the other hand is that the phrases 'something comes to be from what is or is not' and 'what is not or what is does something or has something done to it or becomes something whatever', are to be taken in the same sense as 'a doctor does something or has something done to him', and 'is a doctor or becomes something else'. These expressions may be understood in two ways. The same holds for 'from being', and 'a being acts or is acted upon'. A doctor builds a house, not *qua* doctor but *qua* builder; he turns gray, not *qua* doctor but *qua* being dark-haired. On the other hand, he doctors or fails to doctor *qua* doctor." A similar distinction, Aristotle continues, must be made in the question whether what is and what is not comes to be, for two things can be meant: what is and what is not, as such and not as such. The difference is this: in the case of the doctor both changes are possible, whereas what is and what is not can only undergo a change not-as-such, *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, as Aristotle says in 191 b 15—in the first case the adverb *κυρίως* is used (191 b 7).

In this argument Aristotle finds the starting-point for solving the problem of change in the way in which we use to speak about things. In 191 b 2 he says: *διχῶς λέγεται*. Without further comment he passes from the order of speaking to the order of being. In other words, his analysis of change is, in fact, an analysis of the speaking about change which, in its turn, is the expression of thought. In exactly the same way he begins in *Physics* I 7 from the various

ways of speaking in order to reach his fundamental thesis, *viz.*, δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τὸ γίγνομενον: every kind of coming-to-be requires an underlying something (190 a 14-15; further 190 a 34; 190 b 10; 191 a 4-5, 16-17, 31). Thus the value of Aristotle's doctrine on matter is immediately dependent on the question whether passing from the order of speaking (or thinking) to that of being is admissible.

Calcidius renders Aristotle's argument in this way. Aristotle distinguishes saying that the terms 'being', 'not-being', 'coming-to-be' and 'passing-away' can have two meanings. One may speak, for instance, of a coming-to-be *secundum naturam* and a coming-to-be *ex aliquo accidenti*. These terms, obviously, are the Latin translation of Aristotle's *χρήσις* and *κατά συμβεβηκός*. Next Calcidius, like Aristotle, gives a further explanation of (our speaking about) some concrete processes of change. The proposition 'A musician recovers not *qua* musician but *qua* patient', which is purely Aristotelian (cp. 191 b 5: ὁ ιατρὸς . . . λευκὸς γίγνεται οὐχ ἦιατρὸς ἀλλ' ἦ μέλας), is rather awkwardly expressed by *quod quidem ex natura est, aegrotat et convalescit, non tamen quia musicus est; ex accidenti porro, quia musicus est* (the example reminds one of the *μουσικὸς θνητωπος* in *Physics* I 7). In the same way Calcidius treats a second example which bears upon not coming-to-be but passing-away. That Calcidius, too, finds no difficulty whatever in passing from the order of speaking to the order of being is shewn by his further explanation: *Cum igitur dicitimus musicum convalescere, tunc quod fit ex accidenti fit*. It is self-evident to him that this speaking *ex accidenti* has its real counterpart in a coming-to-be *ex accidenti*; cp. his words *quia provenit ut convalescat*. Now in coming-to-be as such, Calcidius continues, the same distinction can be made between *fieri secundum naturam* and *fieri ex accidenti*. However, a coming-to-be as such (*secundum naturam*) is impossible, since this would mean that something comes to be out of nothing. This contradicts the fundamental principle δεῖ τι ὑποκεῖσθαι. On the other hand, coming-to-be *ex accidenti* is quite possible. Calcidius quotes the well-known example of the shapeless bronze made into a statue, an image used by Aristotle in the same context (190 a 25). In this process something comes to be out of something which did not yet exist, but it does so *ex accidenti*. Similarly, something can come-to-be from something already existing, but, once more, this is a coming-to-be *ex accidenti*, as is the case with

somebody who possesses a certain faculty and acquires another. Finally, it is possible to speak of a passing-away into something else or into nothing, but again only a passing-away *ex accidenti* can be meant.

In general Calcidius' wording in this paragraph is far from clear. For instance, in 314, 2-4: *Rursum cum dicimus candidum illud pedalis mensurae corrumpi, quia convertatur in nigredinem, hoc ex accidenti dicimus fieri.* The noun *candidum* is superfluous, for speaking about something white becoming black implies a judgment *iuxta naturam*. Calcidius says this himself in the phrase immediately following: *cum vero candidum cognominamus, naturam eius exprimimus.* In spite of this, Calcidius stuck to the train of Aristotle's argument which is ultimately based on the axiom δεῖ τι ὑποκεῖσθαι.

[285] So this is one way in which, according to Aristotle, it is possible *<to say>* that something begins to exist out of something that is, or out of something that is not, and also that something dissolves either into something else, or into nothing. Another way is to say of a thing that it exists and does not exist, *viz.*, if a thing that will certainly come into being, when its realization takes place, is said to be, though its coming into being has not yet taken place *<and, therefore, it does not yet actually exist>*. Of all these things we say that they exist in possibility, because their existence is presumed on account of this possibility, in the same way as we say that bronze is a possible statue, though at the moment it still is a shapeless metal. Thus it is a statue and it is not: it is a statue, because it can become one, but it is not a statue, because the realization has not yet taken place. And in the same way it exists to some extent and to some extent it does not exist, and from what to some extent exists something can arise; in the same way something can dissolve and perish into something that to some extent is not. So there do exist a coming-to-be and a passing-away.

UNA IGITUR HAEC RATIO EST It is, again, clear, how closely Calcidius follows Aristotle. In *Phys.* 191 b 27 the latter continues: εἰς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, and, without elaborating this first *ratio*, as does Calcidius, he adds: ἀλλος δ' ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα λέγειν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἀλλοις διώρισται δι' ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον (A clear explanation of the same is in *Met.* 1069 b 15-19:

ἐπεὶ δὲ διττὸν τὸ δν, μεταβάλλει πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ δν τὸν (οἷον ἐκ λευκοῦ δυνάμει εἰς τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ λευκόν, ὅμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπ' αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως), ὥστε οὐ μόνον κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ὄντος γίγνεται πάντα, δυνάμει μέντοι ὄντος, ἐκ μὴ ὄντος δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. So there are two ways of becoming: 1) out of what is not, but only *per accidens*; 2) out of what is possibly. In Calcidius corresponds to this the beginning of the second phrase *Alia vero ratione* and, further, the terms *effectus* and *possibilitas*. For the rest Calcidius is, again, more diffuse and, discussing the subject in a different way, he certainly is not clearer than Aristotle. UT CUM AES is a stereotype example in this matter, e.g., *Phys.* 190 a 25; *Met.* 1013 b 6-9; *De gen. an.* 724 a 23; *Polit.* 1256 a 9-11; see also Bäumker, o.c., p. 252, n. 3. ALIQUATENUS EST, ALIQUATENUS NON EST What was just said about definite forms of being (*est statua et non est statua*) is now applied to being itself (*est et non est*).

In general, this paragraph has the same characteristics as the preceding one: arduous and verbose, it clarifies in no way Aristotle's words; there are, however, no striking inaccuracies.

[286] Because we thought these things necessary for an explanation of Aristotle's doctrine concerning the principles of things, which includes matter, we have been careful to treat them first. Aristotle's own words show the need for doing so, for he argues thus: "We think that matter should be distinguished from privation, in the sense that matter is not something existing by itself but rather accidentally, whereas privation is non-existing in the proper and absolute sense; and, furthermore, that matter has something which approaches essence, while privation possesses no essence at all. According to others, he says, privation and matter are the same, but they are wrong, for they call it 'small and great' and reduce two things to be kept separately, to one and the same thing; and they think that one thing underlies all corporeal things. For although they divide it into a bigger and a smaller part, so that there are two, yet only one thing is indicated of this duality, the other is omitted. For matter is, like a mother, cooperating in the formation of bodies, but privation does not cooperate in the formation; it hinders rather and thwarts it, for as the form is divine and desirable, privation contradicts it, while matter, yearning for

form and adornment, desires it by its own nature. Further, if privation should desire the form, it would needs desire its own opposite, and every opposite entails destruction <of its opposite>. Therefore, privation will not long for <the form, since this is> its ruin. Nor does the form long for itself, for it is a full and perfect good, and whatever longs for a thing must lack something. <Still there must be something which yearns for the form.> So only matter can desire adornment, just as the female desires the male, and what is shapeless longs for beauty. Meanwhile, the shapelessness of matter is accidental rather than essential to it.

No doubt, matter comes to be and perishes. When it comes to be, it exists to some extent, and when it perishes, it does to some extent not exist; and its ruin proceeds from the privation which is inseparable from it. Matter itself is potentially immortal and without a beginning, not by nature, because it was necessary that, underlying all things which come to be, some older substratum should exist from which things could arise and come-to-be. Now such is this nature of matter. Therefore, matter necessarily existed before it originated, because everything else arises out of it; and if a thing dissolves and perishes, it must finally return to this substratum: consequently it will also have perished before its ruin and dissolution.

First of all Calcidius' translation should be compared with the text of Aristotle, *Phys.* 192 a 3 ss.

NOBIS ERGO VIDETUR DIVIDUA  
ESSE SILVA CARENTIAE,  
ITA UT SILVA NON SIT EXIS-  
TENS QUID, SED EX ACCIDENTI,  
CARENTIA VERO PRINCIPALITER  
ET OMNINO NIHIL,  
ET SILVA QUIDEM PROPE HABEAT  
ESSENTIAM, CARENTIAE NULLA PROR-  
SUM SIT SUBSTANTIA.

ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ὅλην καὶ  
στέρησιν ἔτερόν φαμεν εἶναι,  
καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν οὐκ ὅν εἶναι  
κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὅλην,  
τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καθ' αὐτήν,  
καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν  
πική, τὴν ὅλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν  
οὐδαμῶς.

Thus far Calcidius follows Aristotle's text closely. There is a change now.

ET ALIIS, INQUIT, VIDETUR CARENTIA  
ET SILVA UNUM ESSE NON RECTE  
SPECTANTIBUS, CUM IDEM BREVE  
ET GRANDE COGNOMINENT DUASQUE  
RES SEPARATIM SPECTANDAS IN U-  
NAM EANDEMQUE REM REDIGANT  
  
ET UNUM ALIQUID SUBIACERE  
CORPORIBUS, BUTENT

οἱ δὲ τὸ μὴ δν τὸ μέγα  
καὶ τὸ μικρὸν δμοίως,  
ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ τὸ  
χωρὶς ἐκάτερον. ὥστε παν-  
τελῶς ἔτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος  
τῆς τριάδος κάκεῖνος. μέχρι  
μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προῆλθον,  
ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκεῖσθαι  
φύσιν, ταύτην μέντοι μίαν  
ποιοῦσιν.

The translation differs considerably from the original, although Aristotle's argument is sufficiently explained. Still, Calcidius may not have fully understood the terms. Aristotle observes that there are others who call  $\tauὸ\ μῆν$  by the name of  $\tauὸ\ μέγα\ καὶ\ τὸ\ μικρόν$ . To him,  $\tauὸ\ μῆν$  implies two things, as he observed above. Instead of  $\tauὸ\ μῆν$  Calcidius mentions privation and matter. He does not say at once that others call them 'the great and small' but puts it in this way: "Others think privation and matter to be one, but they are wrong, for they call it the great and small". To this he adds: "And they make a unity of two things which should be considered apart". One wonders whether this degression is an incorrect rendering of Aristotle's  $\eta\ τὸ\ συναμφότερον\ \eta\ τὸ\ χωρὶς\ ἔκάτερον$ , which includes the concepts 'apart' and 'together'. At the same time he adds what Aristotle states at the end of the passage, *viz.*, that these authors think one principle to underly the bodies. But Aristotle says it differently; having stated that his opinion differs from that of these authors, he adds: they have not yet got beyond the idea that something must underly things and so make one principle of it.—One might say that Calcidius' rendering of Aristotle has come right by accident. He gives a correct translation of the following:

QUI ETIAMSΙ DIVIDANT MAIUS  
ILLUD ET MINUS, UT SINT DUO,  
AEQUE EX HAC DUITATE UNA RES  
SIGNIFICATUR. ALIA INTERMITTITUR.  
καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις δυάδα  
ποιεῖ, λέγων μέγα καὶ μικρὸν  
αὐτήν, οὐθὲν ἡττον ταύτο  
ποιεῖ· τὴν γὰρ ἐτέραν παρεῖδεν.

The question why matter and privation are two different things is raised next.

SIQUEIDEM SILVA TAMQUAM MATER  
CORPORUM FORMATIONI ADIUMENTO  
EST.

ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπομένουσα συν-  
αιτίατῇ μορφῇ τῶν γιγνομένων  
ἐστίν, ὥσπερ μήτηρ·

ἡ δὲ ἐτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεως πολλά-  
κις ἀν φαντασθείη τῷ πρὸς τὸ κακοποιὸν  
αὐτῆς ἀτενίζοντι τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδὲ εἶναι τὸ  
παράπταν.

CARENTIA VERO NON ADIUVAT FORMATIONEM,  
SED POTIUS INPEDIT AC RENITITUR:

Calcidius deviates from Aristotle in describing the behaviour of privation. "If", the latter says, "we turn our attention to the κακοποιόν in privation, we might think that it does not exist at all". Calcidius does not say anything of this κακοποιόν (at the most an allusion to it could be seen in *inpedit ac renititur*, but these words certainly do not express Aristotle's intention. See, however, par. 288). He only adds that what applies to privation does not apply to matter. This actually shows that the train of Aristotle's argument was not clear to Calcidius, for, whereas the former tries to make the existence of privation plausible, the latter speaks of it as of a certainty. The addition also changes the connexion with what follows. Aristotle stated the impression that privation does not exist at all, but, in his opinion, this impression is wrong. For—as we may summarize his argument—on the one side there is something divine, good and desirable; on the other there are the two principles. Of these one is said to be contrary to this divine and good thing, the other to yearn for it by nature. Calcidius regards the genitive absolute ὅντος γάρ τινος θείου as indicating the cause of what follows, and he takes the whole as explaining the assertion added by himself. His argument, therefore, is this: "Being opposed to form, privation counteracts formation, as it is contrary to form, since form is something divine and desirable". However, Aristotle does not think of establishing the causal nexus. He rather states a fact.

To bring Calcidius' text more into accord with that of Aristotle, a comma should be placed after *carentia* in 317, 4 instead of a full stop. In this way we bring *silva vero...* on a level with what immediately proceeds, just as in Aristotle. In Calcidius this part of the sentence then depends on *quatenus quia*, explaining the fact that matter also cooperates in formation. Although Calcidius creates

some further relationships in the text he cannot be said to contradict Aristotle's doctrine. The text runs:

QUATENUS QUIA, CUM SPECIES  
DIVINA RES SIT ET ADPETIBILIS,  
CONTRARIA EST EI CARENTIA,  
SILVA VERO ADPETIT FORMAM ET  
INLUSTRATIONEM CUPIDAQUE EIUS  
EST IUXTA NATURAM PROPRIAM.

δόντος γάρ τινος θείου καὶ  
ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ, τὸ μὲν  
ἐναντίον αὐτῷ φαμεν εἶναι,  
τὸ δὲ διάφερον εἴρεσθαι  
καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι αὐτοῦ κατὰ  
τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν.

In what follows Calcidius indeed complies with the doctrine of Aristotle but, again, he construes his own argument, the structure of which differs considerably from his model. According to Aristotle, the authors mentioned (*i.e.*, the defenders of the theory concerning the 'great and small') actually pretend that the contrary principle desires its own destruction. Starting from the thesis that things have some yearning for form, he argues as follows: "Form in itself cannot desire anything, for it does not lack anything, nor can the contrary principle (for contrasts destroy each other). So only the third principle, *viz.*, the  $\delta\lambda\eta$ , can desire something. (Hence such a third principle exists)". Calcidius formulates this argument differently. He takes  $\tau\ddot{o}$   $\acute{e}v\acute{a}v\tau\acute{t}\acute{o}v$  in another sense than Aristotle. He translates it with *contrarietatem suam*, but with  $\tau\ddot{o}$   $\acute{e}v\acute{a}v\tau\acute{t}\acute{o}v$  Aristotle means the same *carentia* which, in Calcidius, is subject of the phrase. Furthermore, Calcidius at once combines the two passages in which Aristotle uses  $\acute{e}v\acute{a}v\tau\acute{t}\acute{o}v$  192 a 19 and 21).

PORRO CARENTIA SI ADPETAT FORMAM,  
ADPETERE EAM NECESSE EST CONTRA-  
RIETATEM SUAM.

τοῖς δὲ συμβαίνει τὸ  
ἐναντίον ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς  
αὐτοῦ φθορᾶς.

ET OMNIS CONTRARIETAS INTERITUM  
AD FERT: MINIME Igitur INTERITUM  
SUUM CARENTIA DESIDERABIT.

NEC VERO SPECIES SE IPSAM POTEST καίτοι οὔτε αὐτὸ οὔτοῦ  
CUPERE, EST ENIM PLENUM ET PERFEC- οἶνον τε ἐφίεσθαι τὸ εἰδος  
TUM BONUM. ET OMNE QUOD DESIDERAT διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐνδεές,  
IN INDIGENTIA POSITUM EST. οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον (φθαρτι-  
κὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία).

*Et omnis contrarietas interitum adfert* is the translation of what Aristotle placed at the end. The conclusion drawn by *Calcidius* (*minime igitur interitum suum parentia desiderabit*) seems strange.

One would expect: *minime igitur contrarietatem suam carentia desiderabit*. The argument can be corrected by reading *autem* instead of *igitur* and by assuming that the actual conclusion is omitted as self-evident. Still, it is highly questionable whether the text should be altered. It seems more plausible that the structure of *Calcidius*' argument is, in fact, defective, the more so because the words *interitum suum carentia desiderabit* strongly remind one of Aristotle's: *τὸ ἐναντίον ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς αὐτοῦ φθορᾶς*. Finally, *Calcidius* agrees with Aristotle in asserting that matter remains the only thing able to yearn for the form:

SOLA ERGO SILVA EST QUAE CUPIT  
INLLUSTRATIONEM, PERINDE UT FEMINEUS  
SEXUS VIRILEM ET DEFORMITAS PULCHRI-  
TUDINEM, ITA TAMEN, UT DEFORMITAS  
SILVAE NON EX NATURA SED EX ACCI-  
DENTI SIT.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἡ ὄλη,  
ῶσπερ δὲ εἰ θῆλυ  
δρρενος καὶ αἰσχρὸν καλοῦ·  
πλὴν οὐ καθ' αὐτὸν αἰσχρόν,  
ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβήκος, οὐδὲ  
θῆλυ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβη-  
κός.

In what follows *Calcidius* goes astray:

QUAE SILVA FIT ET CORRUMPITUR  
CERTE, CUMQUE FIT, EST ALIQUATENUS,  
ET CUM DISSOLVITUR, NON EST ALIQUA-  
TENUS CORRUPTELAQUE EIUS PROPTER  
INDIVIDUAM CARENTIAM PROVENIT.  
IPSA VERO POSSIBILITATE, NON NATURA  
INMORTALIS EST AC SINE GENERATIONE,  
PROPTEREA QUOD NECESSE ERAT  
IIS QUAE NASCUNTUR SUBIACERE ALI-  
QUID ANTIQUUS, EX QUO FIERENT  
ATQUE AD GENERATIONEM VENIRENT.

φθείρεται δὲ καὶ γίγνεται  
ἔστι μὲν ὡς, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ.  
ώς μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν φ, καθ'  
αὐτὸν φθείρεται (τὸ γὰρ φθει-  
ρόμενον ἐν τούτῳ ἔστιν, ἡ  
στέρησις). ὡς δὲ κατὰ δύ-  
ναμιν, οὐ καθ' αὐτόν, ἀλλ'  
ἀφθαρτον  
καὶ ἀγένητον ἀνάγκη  
αὐτὴν εἶναι. εἴτε γὰρ ἐ-  
γίγνετο, ὑποκεῖσθαι τι δεῖ  
πρῶτον ἐξ οὗ ἐνυπάρ-  
χοντος.

Aristotle: "Of coming and ceasing to be (of the ὄλη) there may be question in one sense and not in another. In so far as it (*viz.*, ἡ ὄλη) has anything in itself, it perishes as such, for what perishes is exactly in it, *viz.*, privation. But on account of its potentiality, it does not perish as such (after οὐ καθ' αὐτό supply φθείρεται), but it must be imperishable and without a beginning. For if it

would begin to be, a substratum would be needed out of which it could arise and which could be permanent". In the first phrase Calcidius seems to place a colon after γίγνεται, thus obtaining two propositions with ὅλη as presupposed subject. In the second he sees an explanation of the first one and an expression of the theory which was explained in paragraph 285: *est aliquatenus . . . non est aliquatenus, possibilitate.*

TALIS EST PORRO HAEC NATURA:	τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις
NECESSE EST IGITUR FUISSE	ώστ' ἔσται πρὶν γενέσθαι
SILVAM ANTE QUAM FIERET,	(λέγω γὰρ ὅλην τὸ πρώτον
SIQUIDEM EX EA FIUNT	ὑποκείμενον ἐκάστῳ, ἐξ
CETERA,	οὗ γίγνεται τι ἐνυπάρχοντος
SIVE QUOD DISSOLVITUR ET PERIT	μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός):
AD HANC EANDEM NATURAM POSTREMO	εἴτε φθείρεται, εἰς τοῦτο
REDEAT NECESSE EST: ERGO ETIAM	ἀφίξεται ἐσχατον, ὡστε
CORRUPTA ERIT ANTE CORRUPTELAM	ἐφθαρμένη ἔσται πρὶν
DISSOLUTIONEMQUE.	φθαρῆναι.

Calcidius indicates the reason of the first paradoxal statement rather succinctly and vaguely. Only at the words *sive quod dissolvitur* it is fully apparent to what extent Calcidius distorted Aristotle's text: a mechanical translation of εἴτε φθείρεται refers to the preceding εἴτε γὰρ ἐγίγνετο but this is lost in the confusion created by the translator.

This translation does not impress one. Only a very small portion of it can be taken as a real translation of Aristotle. And if one would prefer to regard it as a paraphrase—which, however, does not seem to have been the purpose of Calcidius—it is scarcely a clarifying one, the more so, since certain details of Aristotle's argument are incorrectly presented.

[287] In support of his theory, Aristotle says this about the principles and the nature of matter; but because his words are rather obscure, they need, I think, some further explanation. According to Aristotle, there are three principles of things, *viz.*, form, matter and privation. Form is praised by him as a divine being, equal to the allhighest God, resting on the complete and perfect Good, and, for that reason, desirable. What now is that which desires? Form does not desire itself, he says, for it does not lack anything in order to possess perfect beauty, while desire

is only present in beings which lack something. Nor does privation desire form, since in that case it would desire its own destruction: for privation is eliminated by the accession of form and does not remain what it was. So the one possibility is that matter desires adornment and embellishment; for it is misformed not, however, by nature but by privation. For the ugliness of matter consists in this, that matter is deprived of adornment and form; thus it will be bereft of form, like a woman without a husband. "And for that reason", he says, "it desires form just as the female desires the male", and because it lacks form it yearns for form and adornment. At the same time, it wishes that what is in it as a result of privation should perish and disappear. For both form and privation are contrary and contradictory to each other; if one of them gets the upper hand, it eliminates the other.

He says that this desire is not the same as that of living creatures. But as we say that a thing that begins to be made, desires completion, so, I think, matter desires form; for it can only flourish, if form joins it.

HAEC ARISTOTELES There is a distinct dividing line in the discussion of this passage of Aristotle. From 312, 19 on Aristotle or one of his commentators spoke all the time; here *Calcidius* comes to the fore, so that the passage which follows is on a level with the introduction (312, 10-19). As there, the assertion that Aristotle assumed three principles is basic. *SED QUIA OBSCURIOR SERMO EST* About *obscuritas*, cp. the comment on par. 322 (p. 176). *TRES AB EO* Cp. 312, 13. *SPECIEM LAUDAT* *Calcidius* comments on *Phys.* 192 a 16 s. δύντος γάρ τινος θείου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐφετοῦ which he had translated by *cum species divina res sit et adpetibilis*, leaving out the καὶ ἀγαθοῦ (317, 3). After the observations above (p. 86) about the translation, only one point remains to be discussed, *viz.*, the fact that from the text of Aristotle *Calcidius* reads a qualification of the *species*, not only as a *divina res* but even as "a divine thing similar to the highest God" (*summi dei similem divinitatem*). Thus, in a sense, the form becomes a second divinity, and this qualification reminds one immediately of the *secundus deus* in par. 176, who is said to be identical with *providentia* or *provida mens dei*. Moreover, *pleno perfectoque nixam bono* should be compared with what follows in par. 176: *estque ei* (*sc.* τῷ νῷ) *ex illo* (*sc.*, *deo*) *bonitatis haustus, quo tam ipsa ornatur quam cetera,*

*quae ipso auctore honestantur* (226, 10-11; cp. above p. 30). The function which Aristotle is said here to attribute to the form is exactly the same as that of the *providentia*—*ῷος* (*mens dei*) in paragraph 176. One is, therefore, justified in assuming an identity between the *species* of par. 287 and the *providentia*—*mens (intellexus) dei* of par. 176, which in its turn is identical with the ideas (par. 304; 333, 6-7: *opera vero eius (sc., opificis dei) intellectus eius sunt, qui a Graecis ideae vocantur*; cp. the discussion on this point, p. 135). Now the entire discussion of the essence of Providence in par. 176 was clearly based on the treatment of this subject by Numenius (p. 30). Therefore, again, just as in the discussion on the Jews (cp. p. 65), Aristotle's doctrine is interpreted in the spirit of Numenius. Cp. *mente intuentur* (312, 12; p. 76). PROPTEREAQUE Wrobel's version makes the text unintelligible; his comma after *deformitate* should be either placed after *cultum* or omitted. *Silva* is the subject of both *sit posita* and the whole period; *formam et cultum* are the object of a *adpetit* to be repeated. CONTRARIA SICQUIDEM Calcidius touches upon one of the basic ideas of Aristotle's doctrine; cp. in the text quoted: ἡ δ' ἐτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεως (192 a 14), τὸ ἐναντίον (*ib.*, 19, 21).

CUPIDITATEM VERO A negation like the one ascribed to Aristotle does not occur in the *Physics* discussed here. Yet one probably should not look for it elsewhere. The one word *perfectio* actually is the clue. It is a truly Aristotelian concept, *viz.*, *τέλος*; the *εἰδος* is a *τέλος* and if matter desires for the *εἰδος*, it consequently desires for completion. Therefore, the desire present in matter is like the desire of what has begun for completion. This explanation of the 'desire present in matter' is put into the mouth of Aristotle. (Places for *εἰδος* = *τέλος*: *Met.* 1015 a 11; 1041 b 1; *Phys.* 199 a 32).

[288] So, according to Aristotle, form is that which exists really and in the proper sense. Of matter he says that it exists by accident, because by nature it is the recipient of form. Finally, there is that which in the proper sense and really does not exist, *viz.*, privation. Non-existence only applies to matter accidentally, in so far as it suffers something which does not exist in the proper sense, *viz.*, privation. So in one sense matter exists, in another it does not; something may arise out of it, as out of a thing that does not exist, though not in the same but in a different sense.

Hence we must say that not matter is evil and the principle

of evil, but privation, for the latter is the shapelessness, ungracefullness and ugliness of matter, and therefore evil. This is also why Aristotle defines or rather calls matter a 'bodiless body', because it is a potential body, not actually and really.

This is Aristotle's opinion about matter. He adds that Plato has only nominally touched upon these three principles, in reality indicating only two principles of corporeal things, *viz.*, the form and the 'great and small', *viz.*, matter. "So these are not three", he says, "but two principles, form and matter", the latter he denies any existence by nature. "Or if", he continues, "we should understand the 'great and small' to be privation, then matter is omitted and, again, there are only two principles, *viz.*, form and privation".

ERGO IUXTA ARISTOTELEM Calcidius summarizes the respective relation of form, matter and privation with existence. Wrobel causes confusion by writing *rursum* of 319, 9 in lower case and *ex* in 319, 10 with a capital. It should be the other way round, for the *rursum* . . . is on a level with *Ergo iuxta* (319, 6); *Ex accidenti* . . . with *ex accidenti* (319, 7). ERGO SILVA Cp. *aliquatenus est, aliquatenus non est* (315, 16-17 and 317, 15-17). CONSEQUENTER ERGO Calcidius concludes that, therefore, not matter but privation is the source of evil. This is inferred from the fact that, contrary to privation, matter is not simply non-existent; in other words, to him, the idea of evil is connected with non-existence. Actually, Calcidius says so himself: *haec (carentia) est enim informitas et nullus cultus et turpitudo silvae, proptereaque etiam maleficentia*. Compare with this 329, 19-20: *Malitiam porro aiunt virtutis esse carentiam, ut informitatem, inopiam, intemperantiam*. In fact, Calcidius may have read this in *Physics* I 9, which he left untranslated above (see p. 85), *viz.*, 192 a 14 ss.: ή δ' ἐτέρα μοῖρα τῆς ἐναντιώσεως πολλάκις ἀν φαντασθείη τῷ πρὸς τὸ κακόν ποιὸν αὐτῆς ἀτενίζοντι τὴν διάνοιαν οὐδὲ εἰναὶ τὸ παράπαν. Here too there is connexion between evil and non-existence. The κακοποιόν is found in Calcidius' *maleficentia*. It may be that this is an elaboration of Calcidius. CORPUS INCORPOREUM In *De anima* 409 b 21 Aristotle really spoke of a σῶμα ἀσωματώτατον, but in this context there is no question of the ὄλη. UT POSSIBILITATE Cp. par. 285 and 320; also *De gen. et corr.* 329 a 33: τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητόν. HAEC ARISTOTELIS Concluding his treatise with the words: *Haec . . . sententia*, Calcidius

adds a remark which is no more than a further explanation of *Physics* 192 a 10 ss., where Aristotle says that Plato has overlooked one of the three principles, in whatever sense his 'great and small' may be understood. *Nisi quod* certainly translates the Greek πλὴν δτι (cp. *Physics* 187 a 18, also in connexion with this theory of Plato). The manner of expression is not always correct: Aristotle could scarcely have said that Plato only mentioned the three principles (*nominibus tantum attigisse*): what he said is that Plato used three names, *viz.*, form and 'the great and small'. Next Calcidius elaborates the point that, to Aristotle, Plato at all events overlooked one of the principles: either matter or privation (τὴν γὰρ ἐτέραν παρεῖδεν 192 a 12). He gives the impression of quoting Aristotle literally but the elaboration is his own work. ET SILVA A striking parallel of these words is 175, 1-3: *vel cum idem Plato silvam esse dicit in nulla substantia, propterea quod nulla silvestria habeant ullam perfectionem*, which is an obvious allusion to *Tim.* 50E: Διὸ καὶ πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν εἶναι χρεών τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένη, for *perfectio* renders εἰδός, as we saw above. To my knowledge, Aristotle has nothing where Plato is said to describe matter in this way. Hence it is more than doubtful whether Calcidius had a definite text in view. In the light of the parallels just quoted one would like to think here of a formulation by the author himself. Above Calcidius evidently appropriates Aristotelian data, for the text continues: *dum enim sunt adhuc silvestria, informia sunt ac sine ordine ac specie, ut saxa; quorum tamen est naturalis possibilitas, ut accidente artificio simulacrum fiat vel quid aliud huius modi. Quod vero sola possibilitate et sine effectu videtur esse, minime est, utpote carens perfectione* (175, 3-6). Both the present text and the parallel seem to be based on *Physics* I 8-9. Hence *quam (ait) ex natura nullam habere substantiam* may be taken for a formulation by the author himself, as it does not occur in Aristotle.

The conclusion is that the whole passage on Aristotle (par. 283-288), a fairly faithful rendering of his thoughts, is provided with an introduction and a final reflection. These seem to betray some influence of Numenius. The description of Aristotle's doctrine may have come to Calcidius through a commentator: involuntarily one thinks of the orthodox Aristotelian Adrastus from whom Calcidius has borrowed so much elsewhere. Calcidius' translation of Aristotle occasionally betrays a dubious mastery of the subject.

## (b) The Stoics

[289] The Stoics also reject the idea that matter came into being. They rather regard matter and God as the two principles of everything existing, *viz.*, God as the Maker and matter as that which undergoes the making. In their opinion, both Maker and matter have the same essence (for they are corporeal) but a different power. One principle is God because He operates, the other matter because it comes into existence. Explaining their opinion will not be without advantage.

They state: as all copper things are copper and all silver things silver, so all corporeal things are matter, since the condition of all other things is like that of copper or silver things. For one thing is more material than the other, one is more corporeal than the other, but all have the one underlying and common matter as their principle. And as a statue, though being a moulded body, has the earlier substance of bronze as its substratum, so bronze, which is an unmoulded body yet not without quality, has a still earlier substance as its substratum, *viz.*, a continuous body without quality, entirely passive and changeable. This they called matter and also essence, and defined it as follows: essence and matter is 'that which is the substratum of all bodies', or 'that from which all bodies come forth' or 'that in which all changes in the sensible world occur, while 'that' itself perseveres in its own condition'. And also: 'that which underlies the corporeal things possessing qualities, whereas it is by nature without quality itself'.

STOICI QUOQUE ORTUM SILVAE REICIUNT This was the first criterion for the disposition (*ingenitus-ortus*). In *De princ.* II 1, Origen attacks those, *qui dum deum mundi opificem et providentem autu-mant, materiam* ( $\tauὴν ἄποιον ὅλην$ ) *ingenitam esse affirment* (cp. *S.V.F.* II 304); by which, undoubtedly, he thought of the Stoa. QUIN POTIUS *Aët. Plac.* I 3, 25: *Ζήνων... ἀρχὰς μὲν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τὴν ὅλην, δῶν δέ μέν ἔστι τοῦ ποιεῖν αἴτιος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ πάσχειν.* Simplicius, *In Phys.* 25, 15 ss. D.: *καὶ τῶν πεπερασμένας* (*sc.* λεγόντων ἀρχὰς) *οἱ μὲν δύο ὡς Παρμενίδης...* *ἡ* ὡς *οἱ Στωϊκοὶ θεὸν καὶ ὅλην, οὐχ ὡς στοιχεῖον δηλοντί τὸν θεὸν λέγοντες, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν τὸ δὲ πάσχον.* For *ut opificem* see the above quotation from Origen, further *Sextus Emp., Adv. Mathem.* IX 11: *οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς δύο*

λέγοντες ἀρχάς, θεὸν καὶ ἀποιον ὅλην, τὸν μὲν θεὸν ποιεῖν ὑπειλήφασι, τὴν δὲ ὅλην πάσχειν τε καὶ τρέπεσθαι. UNA QUIDEM ESSENTIA Aristotle *ap.* Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* XV 14: ἀρχάς ὅλην καὶ θεόν, ἀλλ' οὗτος (*sc.* Ζήνων) ἀμφω σώματά φησιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον. Alexander of Aphrodisias attacks the Stoic theory that both principles, God and matter, are corporeal (*S.V.F.* II 310). Plutarch also states that, according to the Stoa, God and matter alike are corporeal. *QUIA FACIAT, DEUM, QUIA FIAT, SILVAM FORE* Seneca, *Ep.* 65, 23: *Nempe universa ex materia et ex deo constant. Deus ista temperat, quae circumfusa rectorem secuntur et ducem. Potentius autem est ac pretiosius quod facit, quod est deus, quam materia patiens dei.* QUORUM AB RE What precedes was a general introduction similar to the preface (312, 10 ss.) of the treatise on Aristotle.

AIUNT ENIM Calcidius refers to the well-known argument of the Stoics (cp. Bäumker, *o.c.*, p. 330) but fails to express himself clearly: "as all copper things are copper and all silver ones silver, so all bodily things are material". The second half of his simile should have been an argument: "so all bodily are body; body we call 'matter', so matter is a body". The difference between things can, ultimately, be reduced to being body in a greater or lesser degree (*corpulentior* = *σωματικώτερος*). This is illustrated in the example of the bronze statue which Aristotle uses in a somewhat different way. This statue is a *corpus formatum* (*et qualitate praeditum*). Its material is bronze, a *corpus informe sed compos qualitatis*, which, based in its turn on matter, is *corpus* alone. Thus the three degrees in corporeality are : 1) *corpus*, 2) *corpus compos qualitatis*, 3) *corpus formatum*. Of mere *corpus* Calcidius says that, according to the Stoa, it is *cohaerens sine qualitate, patibile totum et commutabile. COHAERENS = continuus* cp. par. 275. *SINE QUALITATE = ἀποιος.* The formula of the Stoa is *σῶμα ἀποιον* (cp. Bäumker, *o.c.*, p. 333). PATIBILE TOTUM ET COMMUTABILE As to the relation of this phrase to *ipso statu proprio manente* which occurs further on, we may refer to the discussion of par. 268 (299, 18): *cum a natura propria non recedat* (p. 32). The solution given there also holds for the present passage on the Stoa. SILVAM SIMUL ET ESSENTIAM Aristotle also speaks of matter as *οὐσία* but with some reserve, *Met.* 1029 a 1 s.: *μάλιστα γάρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον. τοιοῦτον δὲ τρόπον μὲν τινα ἡ ὅλη λέγεται . . .* For the Stoa *οὐσία* is the mere essence of things. (The contrast *ποιοῦν-πάσχον* too is primarily

Aristotelian but also used by the Stoics in their own way. Bäumker says (o.c., p. 331): "Während aber Aristoteles die Materie in erster Linie im Gegensatz zu der bestimmenden Form betrachtet, neben welchem Gegensatz der des Aktiven und des Passiven erst in zweiter Reihe inbetracht kommt, liegt bei den Stoikern die Sache umgekehrt. Weil . . . der Begriff der Formalursache ihnen in den der thätigen Kraft sich auflöst, so ist ihnen die Materie vor allem das Leidende". Cp. J. Moreau, *L'Âme du Monde de Platon aux Stoiciens*, Paris, 1939, p. 135, n. 10). For the *οὐσία* of everything is *σῶμα*, is *ὕλη*. (Diog. Laërt., VII 139: *τὴν ἄποιν οὐσίαν, τὴν ὕλην* S.V.F. II 300). **HACTENUS DEFINIENTES** Calcidius gives four definitions, the first three of which seem to belong together. One may even feel inclined to add *ipso statu proprio manente* to these three definitions, which may be a threefold attempt to express the same thing, though each has its characteristic. **QUOD SUBIACET CORPORI CUNCTO** reminds us of Aristotle's *ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον* (cp. p. 31). **EX QUO SUNT CUNCTA CORPORA** This is, of course, the *ἐξ οὗ* of Aristotle. See also Diog. Laërt., VII 150: *ὕλη δέ ἔστι ἐξ ἡς ὁτιδηποτοῦν γίνεται* (S.V.F. II 316). **IN QUO** Here one thinks of the Platonic *ἐν ᾧ*. As in the passage just quoted one is strongly reminded, again, of Calcidius' own description in par. 268, which was founded on Plato's words (*Tim.* 50B: *Ταύτὸν αὐτὴν δεῖ προσρητέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐκυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔξισταται δυνάμεως*), which correspond to *ipso statu proprio manente*. This does not support the possibility just considered that these words should also be connected with the preceding descriptions. **ITEM: QUOD SUBDITUM** This definition differs from the previous one by considering matter in its relation to quality. It is remarkable that the *De oratione* of Origen has a similar series of definitions, ascribed there to "the authors who think that the *σώματα* come in the first place and the *ἀσώματα* in the second". This clearly points to the Stoics: *Τοῖς δὲ ἐπακολουθητικὴν αὐτὴν εἰναι νομίζουσι* (sc. *τὴν τῶν ἀσώματων οὐσίαν*) *προηγουμένην δὲ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων δροὶ αὐτῆς οὗτοι εἰσὶ· οὐσία ἔστιν ἡ πρώτη τῶν δητῶν ὕλη καὶ ἐξ ἡς τὰ δητα· ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ὕλη καὶ ἐξ ἡς τὰ σώματα· ἡ τῶν δηνομαζομένων καὶ ἐξ ἡς τὸ δηνομαζόμενα· ἡ τὸ πρῶτον ὑπόστατον ἄποιν· ἡ τὸ προϋφιστάμενον τοῖς οὖσιν· ἡ τὸ πάσας δεχόμενον τὰς μεταβολάς τε καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀναλλοιώτον κατὰ τὸν ἔδιον λόγον· ἡ τὸ ὑπομένον πᾶσαν ἀλλοιώσιν καὶ μεταβολὴν* (S.V.F. II 318). The fact that both Calcidius and Origen give a series of Stoic definitions is remarkable indeed. Moreover, there is a similarity in many details.

In Origen too, the last two definitions are strongly Platonic in their formulation, especially the last but one (ἀναλλοίωτον κατὰ τὸν ἔδιον λόγον). Furthermore, in Origen these definitions are descriptions of the concept *οὐσία*. Up to a short distance before these definitions, *Calcidius* was continuously occupied with the concept *silva* (= σλη) but just before he comes to these definitions, he suddenly introduces the term *essentia* (= οὐσία). And just like Origen he begins his definition with *Essentia* . . . Still, the similarity between *Calcidius* and Origen is not such that it compels one to assume direct dependence. A common source, *Numenius* perhaps, is much more obvious. This assumption is supported by what follows.

[290] However, a great many (Stoics) distinguish between matter and essence, as did Zeno and Chrysippus. "Matter", they say, "is that which underlies everything possessing quality, whereas essence is the primary matter or ultimate basis of everything, which by itself is without appearance and form. Thus, for instance, bronze, gold, iron and such like are the matter of all things made from them, but not their essence, whereas that which is the cause of the existence of these and everything else is indeed the substance (*i.e.* essence)".

By itself the circumscription of the term *silva* might also include the *essentia*. The examples, however, clarify the author's intention. Cp. *Diog. Laërt.*, VII 150: οὐσίαν δέ φασι τῶν δοτῶν ἀπάντων τὴν πρώτην σλην, ὡς καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ Ζήνων. σλη δέ ἔστιν ἐξ ἣς ὁ τιδηποτοῦν γίνεται (see *ad* 322, 15, p. 100). Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen* III 1, p. 98) thinks that this distinction was not usual.

[291] A great many (Stoics) also distinguish between matter and essence in this way: "Essence", they say, "is the foundation of a work, so that we may rightly speak and think of an essence of the world, but of matter we speak with respect to the Maker, because He moulds and forms it".

According to these authors, the two terms denote the same reality but seen from different viewpoints. It is 'essence', if seen as *fundamentum operis*—perhaps definable as 'that out of which something is made'—but it is 'matter', if seen as 'that by means of which

the Maker operates'. In other words, seen from the work it is essence, seen from the Maker it is matter. This distinction occurs in Arius who ascribes it to Posidonius: διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὕλης, τὴν <αὐτὴν> οὐσίαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον (*Epit.*, fr. 20, *Dox. Gr.* 458. Maybe the terms *fundamentum* and *contemplatione* in *Calcidius* reflect ὑπόστασις and ἐπινοίᾳ in this text).

[292] Zeno further says of this essence that it is limited and the one common substance of all that exists. It is also divisible and totally variable, for its parts are always changing, but they do not perish in the sense of passing from existence to nothingness. But just as in the case of innumerable different forms, for instance those of wax <none of these forms being proper to wax>, so, in his opinion, matter, the basis of everything, has not a single form or shape of its own nor by itself a single quality, yet it is always inseparable from one quality or another. And because it is without origin or end—for there is no question in it of arising out of nothing nor of passing away into nothing—from eternity it is not without a spirit and a power which with reason is at times moving it as a whole, at times only as a part of it, and which causes the so frequent and violent changes in the universe. Moreover, this driving force is, in his opinion, not nature, but a soul, and a rational soul at that, which bestowed life upon the sensible world and equipped it with the beauty which now adorns it. They call the world a blessed being and God.

DEINDE ZENO Everything in this section is given as Zeno's theory but, in fact, it is the general doctrine of the Stoia. *Calcidius* knows this, which is evident from the unexpected plural *appellant* at the end. *Calcidius* uses the Stoic term for 'matter', viz., *essentia*, as explained shortly before (p. 96). FINITAM According to the Stoia, the world is limited and surrounded by the boundless empty space, the void (*S.V.F.* I 94-96; II 534 ss. *Finitum esse mundum et unitum, sed circumdataum inani infinito*; III 32, 43 (Antipater)). The world with the void they called τὸ πᾶν, the world without it τὸ δλον; Aët., *Plac.* II 1, 7: Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ διαφέρειν τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὸ δλον· πᾶν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ σὺν τῷ κενῷ τῷ ἀπείρῳ, δλον δὲ χωρὶς τοῦ κενοῦ τὸν κόσμον. (*S.V.F.* III 522; also see *ib.*, 523-525, and the references given in the comment on par. 293 (p. 100)). UNAMQUE In the texts just quoted the unity of matter is either expressed or implied (see *S.V.F.*).

III 530-533). COMMUNEM . . . SUBSTANTIAM Already in par. 291 Calcidius used the term *substantia* instead of *essentia*. DIVIDUAM This time, of course, the term should not be taken as in 305, 18, where it means *divisam*. Here it is 'divisible'. This divisibility is a result of the corporeal nature of matter, as Chrysippus had already made out; cp. Stob., *Ecl.* I 142, 2: Χρύσιππος ἔφασκε τὰ σώματα εἰς ἀπειρον τέμνεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῖς οώμασι προσεοικότα, οἷον ἐπιφάνειαν (S.V.F. II 482; see also *ib.*, 483-491 and Calc., par. 315). USQUE-QUAQUE MUTABILEM Aët., *Plac.* I 9, 2 (Dox. Gr. 307): Οἱ . . . Στωϊκοὶ τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν δλην δι' δλης (= *usque quaque*) τὴν ὥλην. See also S.V.F. II 309. Bäumker (o.c., 339) observes that in the doctrine of the Stoics the mutability of matter is more emphasized than in Aristotle. Considering their concept of matter this is obvious. Yet they agree with Plato when he says that matter *in statu proprio manet* (see 320, 23 and the comment p. 95). PARTES QUIPPE Calcidius explains how this mutability must be understood. A change of all matter is impossible, only one of parts. This same idea is expressed by Stobaeus, who also studies the divisibility of matter; S.V.F. II 317: διαίρεσιν δὲ καὶ σύγχυσιν ἐπιδεχομένην (sc. τὴν ὥλην) κατὰ μέρη, ὥστε φθορὰς γίγνεσθαι τῶν μερῶν εἰς τινα οὐ κατὰ διαίρεσιν «μόνον», ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν τῇ συγχύσει τινῶν γιγνομένων ἐκ τινῶν. SED UT Cp. the example of gold in *Tim.* 50AB. SIC NEQUE Cp. par. 310 (337, 21 ss.): *Etiam hoc communiter ab omnibus pronuntiatur silvam sine qualitate esse ac sine figura et sine specie, non quo sine his umquam esse possit, sed quod haec ex propria natura non habeat*; see the comment p. 151. CUMQUE TAM Calcidius makes the Stoics say: "Since matter is without beginning or end, i.e. eternal, the other principle—its existence is supposed without any proof here, as in par. 293 (323, 3-5)—is eternal as well". Thus the stress is on *ex aeternitate*. SPIRITUS ET VIGOR i.e. πνεῦμα καὶ τόνος (Cp. S.V.F. II 439 ss.). QUI MOVEAT Here, it seems, Calcidius alludes to the well-known theory of Zeno about a periodic recurrence which is manifest in both the cosmos as a whole and its separate parts. Hence the last words must refer to the ecpyrosis. SPIRITUM This principle, Calcidius warns us, should not be taken for nature: it is a rational soul—hence he said: *qui moveat rationabiliter*—pervading the cosmos and moulding it (cp. J. Moreau, *L'Âme du Monde*, p. 158 *ex.*; see also S.V.F. II 1047). *Spiritus* seems to be a term of Cleanthes not of Zeno. In *Apol.* 21 Tertullian says: *Haec Cleanthes in spiritum*

*congerit, quem permeatorem universitatis affirmat.* Already Verbeke (*Kleanthes van Assos*, Brussel, 1949, p. 188) thought that Calcidius does not restrict himself here to Zeno's theory. This also appears from the plural *appellant* (322, 10). For *vivificans* cp. 300, 14-15: *sed perinde ut natura atque anima solida corpora permeantes universa vivificant.* There too *natura* and *anima* are mentioned as two realities. *exornaverit . . . venustatem.* The terms used by Calcidius here strongly remind one of the terminology in par. 295 (Numenius) and 354. **BEATUM ANIMAL ET DEUM** The world is called *θεός* in Plato's *Timaeus* 34B: *τὸν . . . ἐσόμενον θεόν* and a little further: *Διὰ πάντα δὴ ταῦτα εὐδαιμονα θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐγεννήσατο.* For the Stoic, cp. *S.V.F.* II 528: "Ολον δὲ τὸν κόσμον σὺν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ μέρεσι προσαγορεύουσι θεόν . . . τοῦτον δὲ ἐνα μόνον εἶναι φασι καὶ πεπερασμένον καὶ ζῷον καὶ ἀτόμιον καὶ θεόν . . . , and finally Plutarch in *De Stoic. repugn.*: *θεὸν τοίνυν νοοῦμεν ζῷον μάκαρον* (*ib.*, III 33, p. 249).

[293] Thus, according to the Stoic, the body of the world is limited, is one, is a whole and is an essence: a whole, because it does not lack a single part; one, because its parts are inseparable and together form a coherent whole; an essence, because it is the primary matter of all bodies, (through this primary matter, they say, all-penetrating reason passes as seed passes through the genitals, and this reason, in their opinion, is the Creator Himself), a coherent body, without quality, entirely passive and variable: such, according to them, is matter or essence. It changes but does not perish, neither wholly nor partly, for all philosophers agree that nothing arises out of nothing, nor anything passes away into nothing, (for, although all bodies are subject to some process of decomposition, matter always exists as well as the Maker God, that is reason, in which [whom] it is fixed at whatever time anything arises and perishes). And so we can only speak of arising out of something that exists and of perishing into something that exists. Meanwhile, the things immortal, *viz.*, that by which a thing arises and that out of which it arises, remain.

**ERGO CORPUS** Calcidius draws conclusions from what precedes. Like the treatise on Aristotle the present one on the Stoic consists of three parts: 1) introduction (par. 289a), 2) explanation of the doctrine (par. 289b-292), 3) conclusions (par. 293-294). The similarity in formulation is striking: *Ergo iuxta Aristotelem . . .*

(319, 6) and *Ergo . . . iuxta Stoicos.* CORPUS UNIVERSUM = τὸ δλον, which here is the same as ἡ ὄλη; see *ad* 321, 15 (p. 97). DETERMINATUM EST ET UNUM ET TOTUM ET ESSENTIA Diog. Laërt., VII 150: σῶμα δέ ἔστι κατ' αὐτοὺς ἡ οὐσία καὶ πεπερασμένη, καθά φησιν Ἀντίπατρος ἐν δευτέρῳ περὶ οὐσίας (S.V.F. III Ant. 32) and *ib.*, 140: ἐν αὐτὸν κόσμον εἶναι καὶ τοῦτον πεπερασμένον (S.V.F. III Ant. 43). TOTUM is probably the translation of δλον, which is constantly in the mind of the Stoics. Calcidius explains it in the following way: outside it there is nothing, it does not lack anything. There is only empty space outside it, as we saw. UNUM AUTEM It forms one whole; there is no empty space in it; for *cohaerent*, see *cohaerens* in 320, 18 and 322, 18. ESSENTIA VERO essentia = substantia = the Stoic οὐσία. After par. 290 the expression *princeps silva* is not surprising. The *essentia* is the primary matter; cp. also Arius Didym., fr. 20 (*Dox. Gr.* 457 s.) in Stob., *Ecl.* I 322 (about Zeno): οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν δητῶν πάντων πρώτην ὄλην; 324 (about Chrysippus): τῶν κατὰ ποιότητα ὑφισταμένων πρώτην ὄλην (sc. τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι). Simplicius, *In Phys.* 227, 23: πρωτίστη ὄλη; cp. Bäumker, *o.c.*, p. 331, n. 1. PER QUAM This *ratio* is another term for *spiritus* in the previous section, which *spiritus* already appeared to be a *anima rationalis*. With the adjectives *solidam atque universam* Calcidius seems to indicate that this *ratio* pervades everything; perhaps it is the Latin rendering of δλον δι' δλου ορ κρᾶσις δι' δλου, often read in Stoic texts, for instance, S.V.F. I 102: τὴν δὲ κρᾶσιν γίνεσθαι τῇ εἰς ἄλληλα τῶν στοιχείων μεταβολῇ, σώματος δλου δι' δλου τινὸς ἐτέρου διερχομένου (Cp. Moreau, *o.c.*, p. 160 ss.). PERINDE UT Evidently this is the translation of ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται (Diog. Laërt., VII 136), which, however, means: "as seed is everywhere in the seminal fluid, so *ratio* is everywhere in the world". Calcidius misunderstood this example, as Moreau pointed out (*o.c.*, p. 167). QUAM QUIDEM For the Stoa *ratio=deus opifex* (see below). COHAERENS VERO Literally 320, 18-19. SILVAM SIVE ESSENTIAM Cp. *silvam simul et essentiam* (320, 19-20). QUAE VERTATUR Cp. 321, 18. Again the great *dogma philosophorum omnium* is mentioned. LICET ENIM In the last words there is an intimation of fate. To the Stoa God, reason and fate are only different modes of considering the same reality; Stob., *Ecl.* I 79: Χρύσιππος δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἰμαρμένης (then Chrysippus' own words follow). Εἰμαρμένη ἔστιν δὲ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος . . . ἡ λόγος καθ' διν τὰ μὲν γεγόνοτα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα

γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται (S.V.F. II 913); see also Arius Didym., *Epitomes*, fr. *phys.* 29: καθ' ὅσον δὲ εἰρομένω λόγω πάντα διοικεῖ ἀπαραβάτως ἐξ ἀἰδίου, προσονομάζεσθαι εἰμαρμένην (S.V.F. II 528); Aët., *Plac.* I 27, 6: Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Στωικὸς θεὸν ἀπερφαίνετο τὴν εἰμαρμένην (Antipater fr. 35). INMORTALIBUS PERSEVERANTIBUS As an illustration of this text may be taken: S.V.F. II 1047 (Alex. Aphrod.): μάλιστα δ' ἐν τῇ ἐκπυρώσει φαίνεται κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς τῆς ὕλης εἰδος ὁν, εἴγε ἐν τῷ πυρὶ, διόνον ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς τότε, ἡ ὕλη καὶ ὁ θεὸς σφύζονται μόνοι. Nobody will fail to notice how this summary is greatly superior to that of the preceding section.

[294] The Stoics also criticize Plato for saying that, because exemplars of all things exist of old in another sublime and most excellent substance, the sensible world was made by God after an immortal exemplar. In their opinion, no exemplar is needed, because a fertilizing reason, pervading an entirely susceptible nature, brought the whole world and all that it contains into existence.

This is what the Stoics say about matter and the principles of things, partly basing themselves on Plato, partly expressing thoughts of their own. And thus it is easy to understand that they could not have an inkling of a divine power and an incorporeal being more powerful than all bodies, more powerful even than all seeds. It is in this way that they arrived at the impious opinion, *viz.*, that God is identical with or even an inseparable quality of matter, that He passes through it as seed through the genitals, and that He is both origin and cause of everything that comes into being, not only of what is bad but also of what is shameful and obscene, and that He does and suffers everything, even what is shameful. The ugliness of this doctrine will be more patent still after the explanation of Plato's doctrine.

REPREHENDUNT "The Stoics", *Calcidius* says, "blame Plato who, on account of the existence of a sublime reality containing within itself the exemplars of everything, assumes that the world was made after an immortal example, for, so they say, no example was needed for the creation of the world. SEMINUM RATIO seems a variant of the well-known *ratio seminalis*. It mostly occurs in the plural as a translation of λόγοι σπερματικοί, but the singular is also

found, for instance in Diog. Laërt., VII 136: *καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα περιέχεται, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτον (sc. τὸν θεὸν) σπερματικὸν λόγον δύτα τοῦ κόσμου . . .* However, *seminum ratio* may also be taken in the sense of 'a system of seeds'. In which case Calcidius must have taken the metaphor in a concrete sense; the accent, then, is on *seminum* rather than on *ratio*. The words *vel etiam seminibus efficaciorē* (323, 19) definitely favour the latter interpretation.

**HAEC STOICI DE SILVA** Once more a similarity with the passage on Aristotle should be noted: *Haec Aristotelis de silva sententia* (319, 20). As there, Calcidius continues here with a criticism of the relevant doctrine.

**PARTIM A PLATONE USURPANTES**, namely that part in the Stoic doctrine which is in accordance with Plato's doctrine, or rather with Calcidius' explanation of it.

**PARTIM COMMENTI** These are the points which the author attacks in the Stoa. Of course, these words primarily reflect upon the doctrine on the Godhead; in Calcidius' opinion the Stoics did not arrive at anything beyond what is corporeal.

**PROPTEREAQUE FACTUM** In the text just quoted (S.V.F. II 1047, p. 101) the Godhead already appeared to be *τῆς ὄλης εἶδος*; hence the *ἀχώριστος* (*inseparabilis*), which Aristotle always ascribed to matter and form, is also found here. One can also refer to S.V.F. II 308: *ἄλλων δὲ καὶ ποιητικὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἀπολειπόντων, ἀχώριστον δὲ ταύτην τῆς ὄλης, καθάπερ οἱ Στωϊκοὶ μὲν ὑστερον, ἄλλοι δὲ τινες πρὸ αὐτοῦ (sc. Aristotele); ib. 307: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς εἶναι μέν, ἀχώριστον δὲ ὑφεστάναι τῆς ὄλης.* The *qualitas inseparabilis* may be explained from the fact that quality and form (*εἶδος*) are identical to the Stoics. Another illustration is found in Plotinus' *Enn.* II 4, 1, which attacks the relevant tenet: *τέλος δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ὄλην ταύτην πως ἔχουσαν εἶναι* (cp. *ad. par.* 308, p. 147). For *inseparabilem* see 322, 1 *inseparabiliter*.

**EANDEMQUE PER SILVAM** Cp. 322, 15: *per quam ire dicunt rationem solidam atque universam, perinde ut semen per membra genitalia*, and also the texts in von Arnim (S.V.F. II 1028 ss.) under the significant title: *Deum esse corpus (spiritum per omnem materiam percurrentem)*.

**ET OMNIUM** Calcidius now attacks the doctrine of the Stoa by means of *deductio ad absurdum*. I found this *deductio* in no other source, although it is quite obvious (cp. Calc. 192, 21-22). **CUIUS OPINIONIS** Calcidius refers to a refutation of the Stoa still to come. He probably means *par. 308b ss.*, especially *par. 311*.

The structure of the treatise on the Stoic doctrine is strikingly similar to that of Aristotle. Since a certain number of Numenian

elements occur in the latter it is obvious that one looks for them again. So far no decisive indication of such an influence has been found. This is now furnished by the opening phrase of the next section. *Calcidius says: Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens . . .* So Numenius did refute the Stoia, and more traces of this follow. It seems clear enough that Numenius also explained and refuted the other tenets of the Stoia, and that Calcidius derived the material of these paragraphs from him. Because of the *Numeniana* in the paragraphs on Aristotle one may go further and assume that Numenius was Calcidius' doctrinal source for his reflections both on Aristotle and on the Stoia. It is, of course, impossible to define the extent of the dependence but a dependence upon Numenius for the paragraphs on Aristotle and the Stoics can no longer be denied.

### (c) Pythagoras

[295] Now the doctrine of Pythagoras must be discussed. The Pythagorean Numenius attacks this Stoic doctrine of the principles on the basis of the doctrine of Pythagoras (with which, in his opinion, Plato's doctrine is in complete accordance), and he says that Pythagoras calls the Godhead the monad, matter the dyad. Now, according to Pythagoras, in as far as this dyad is indetermined it did not originate but in so far as it is determined it has an origin. In other words: before it was adorned with form and order, it was without beginning or origin, but its generation was the adornment and embellishment by the Godhead who regulated it. Since, therefore, this generation is a later event, the unadorned and unborn substance should be held to be as old as God by whom it was regulated. But some Pythagoreans misunderstood this theory and came to think that also this unqualified and limitless dyad was produced by the only and alone monad and that, thus, the monad abandoning its own nature assumed the appearance of the dyad. But this is wrong, because in this case that which was, the monad, would cease to exist and that which was not, the dyad, would come into being, and God would be changed into matter and the monad into the unqualified and limitless dyad. Even to people of mediocre education this is obviously impossible. Finally, the Stoics say that matter is determined and limited by nature, but Pythagoras that it is

undetermined and limitless. Where the former think that what is limitless by nature cannot be reduced to order and measure, Pythagoras asserts that this is exactly the power and might of God alone, *viz.*, that He can easily do what nature cannot do, since He is mightier and more sublime than any power and that nature itself derives its strength from Him.

**NUNC IAM PYTHAGORICUM DOGMA RECENSEATUR** It is remarkable that only now *Calcidius* comes to discuss the doctrine of Pythagoras, whereas all the other philosophers (except, of course, *Plato*) were treated in their historical order. This departure from the scheme is not sufficiently explained by the fact that not the doctrine of Pythagoras himself but that of *Numenius* is reported. The only possible explanation is that *Calcidius* thought the doctrine of Pythagoras particularly important. **NUMENIUS EX PYTHAGORAE MAGISTERIO** The expression *ex Pythagorae magisterio* is to be noted, for one must not forget that *Calcidius* comments upon the *Timaeus*. Now the man after whom this dialogue is called, was also *ex Pythagorae magisterio*, as *Calcidius* has said in the introduction. And elsewhere: *Iste enim Timaeus, qui in hoc libro tractat, ex Pythagorae magisterio fuit* (119, 3). This circumstance points out that the Pythagorean doctrine, now to be explained, is of special importance to *Calcidius*, and that this is why he discusses it last, immediately before the doctrine of *Plato* himself. This fits precisely into *Calcidius'* scheme; the opinion which he considers to be the right one is at the end (see par. 301; 30-31; 226 ss.).

A particularly interesting question is whether *Calcidius* translates literally or rather freely with a personal rendering of the Neo-Pythagorean ideas. The former alternative appears to contain the truth. First, *Calcidius* frequently uses the *oratio obliqua*; secondly, *Numenius'* name is mentioned four times and, thirdly, the style of this passage differs from *Calcidius'* usual way of writing. It recalls more than once (especially in par. 298) what *Leemans* (E.-A. *Leemans, Studie over den Wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea, met uitgave der fragmenten*, Mémoires Acad. Royale de Belgique, IIe Sér. T. XXXVII, Bruxelles, 1935, p. 19) characterized as typical of *Numenius*: "The language is full of images, somewhat turgid, the construction often mannered, the style verbose" (cp. *ib.*, p. 22: "Synonyms with unnoticeable difference in meaning are constantly juxtaposed"). Finally, the dependence on *Numenius* is confirmed

by the words *ut in Timaeo loquitur Plato* (327, 3); Borghorst (*o.c.*, p. 37) already observed that this remark is quite out of place in a commentary on the *Timaeus*, unless *Calcidius* is translating literally or, at least, closely following a text which formed no part of a commentary on this dialogue. CUI CONCINERE DICIT DOGMA PLATONICUM In *Numenius*' doctrine this statement is of the greatest importance, on account of his theory concerning a gradual decrease of the knowledge of Truth in the course of history. A philosopher's greatest merit is to preserve parts of Truth in spite of everything. *Numenius* says this of *Plato* who, because of his adherence to the older philosopher *Pythagoras*, has preserved so much of the Truth. 'Going back' (ἀναχωρήσασθαι) in time as much as is possible is necessary to him who occupies himself with philosophical problems. He should not restrict himself to studying the arguments of *Plato* and *Pythagoras* but, even more, what "famous old people—who were nearer to Truth—taught in their mysteries and sages" (cp. H. Ch. Puech, *Numenius d'Apamée*, in *Mélanges Bidez* II, Bruxelles, 1934, p. 745-787). The reference to the *veteres theologi* in par. 296 should be seen in this connexion.

*Numenius* undoubtedly derived much from *Plato* for the description of *Pythagoras'* doctrine. The usual description of *Pythagoras'* doctrine in Antiquity must owe as much to *Plato*'s system as *Plato* actually owed to *Pythagoras*. (The same applies to the influence of the *Stoicks* on what they present as the doctrine of *Heraclitus*; cf. *Moreau*, *o.c.*, p. 158). However, this influence of *Plato* on *Numenius* is not yet a reason for calling *Numenius* a *Platonist*, as *Zeller* did on the example of *Jamblichus* and *Proclus*.

AIT PYTHAGORAN It has been said above (p. 43) that *Calcidius* mentions numbers as the essence of things, and the monad with the dyad as the principles of these numbers. Furthermore, in par. 39, discussing the diagram of numbers in *Tim.* 35E, where the figure 1 is at the top, he identifies the monad with God, saying: *nullam dico aptiorem esse figuram quam est haec, in qua singularitas cacumini superinposita summitatem atque arcem obtinere consideratur, ut per eam velut emissaculum quoddam tamquam e sinu fontis perennis providae intellegentiae quasi quidam largus amnis effluat, ipsaque singularitas mens sive intellegentia vel ipse deus opifex intellegatur esse*. It is quite clear that all these texts have a Pythagorean origin; *Switalski* (*o.c.*, p. 42) already noticed this with regard to par. 53-55, the content of which he, too, derived from *Numenius*. The termin-

ology also shows features which are known to be Numenian (*ad* par. 268, p. 30). Switalski (*l.c.*) sees this influence of Numenius also in the fact that in par. 55 Calcidius, touching upon the doctrine of the Jews, denotes it with the words *doctrina sectae sanctioris*. These words suit Numenius, who had a greater esteem for the Jewish doctrine than the Christian Calcidius who himself would not have introduced here this comparison<sup>1)</sup>). Moreover, in a similar passage in par. 300 concerning the two world-souls, Calcidius again draws support from the doctrine of the Jews. All these passages are mutually connected and evidently derived from Numenius.

In the fragments of Numenius himself one also finds the monad and the dyad as the principles of things, there connected with the doctrine of the threefold godhead (already met with in Calcidius, see *ad* par. 268, p. 30): Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* XI 17, p. 536D (Leemans, fr. 20): 'Ο θεὸς ὁ μὲν πρῶτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὁν ἔστιν ἀπλοῦς διὰ τὸ ἑαυτῷ συγγενόμενος διόλου μή ποτε εἶναι διαιρετός· ὁ θεὸς μέντοι ὁ δεύτερος καὶ τρίτος ἔστιν εἰς· συμφερόμενος δὲ τῇ ὅλῃ δυάδι οὕσῃ ἐνοῦς μὲν αὐτήν, σχίζεται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς.

It is frequently said that Pythagoras taught this doctrine of the monad and the dyad, but one wonders how far its application, as defended here, is derived from other philosophers, especially Plato. In this connexion Zeller (*o.c.*, III 2, p. 129) remarks: "Den alten Pythagoreern hatten in dieser Beziehung die Zahlen und die Elemente der Zahlen genügt; die neuen führen sie selbst auf höhere Ursachen zurück. Auch sie zwar sehen als die allgemeinsten Prinzipien die Einheit und die Zweihheit, welche letztere, nach dem Vor-

1) Switalski observes that Calcidius uses the words *iuxta effigiem* without any coherence. In my opinion, in this text is an unexpected example of Numenius' method of talking about Jewish data, combining them with those from other sources. Numenius presents the Jews as maintaining that, after making the sensible world, God created the human body by taking earth and moulding it after the example (*iuxta effigiem*) of the sensible world. Here he clearly has in mind the parallelism between macrocosmos and microcosmos, probably thinking that in this way one can explain *Gen.* I 26: ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὄμοιωσιν. This interpretation is justified by what follows. Numenius says: God took man's life from the stars (*vitam vero eidem ex convexis accersisse caelestibus*), but afterwards breathed into him the rational soul (*postque intimis eius inspirationem proprio flatu intimasse, inspirationem hanc dei consilium animae rationemque significans*); just like he represents God as taking life from the stars, he lets Him mould the body after the example of the cosmos—a clear combination of Platonic and biblical data. It is typical of Calcidius that he copied this interpretation without introducing the Christian point of view.

gang der alten Akademie, die unbestimmte Zweiheit genannt wird. Aber ist schon dieses, wie Moderatus selbst anerkennt, streng genommen ein Hinausgehen über die ursprünglich pythagoreische Lehre, so erweitern sich ihuen überdiess jene beiden Begriffe zu metaphysischen Kategorien von der allgemeinsten Bedeutung. Mit dem Namen der Einheit soll der Grund alles Guten, aller Vollkommenheit und Ordnung, alles dauernden und unveränderlichen Seins bezeichnet werden, mit dem der Zweiheit der Grund aller Unvollkommenheit und Schlechtigkeit, aller Unordnung und alles Wechsels: jene wird der Gottheit, dem Geiste, der Form, diese der Materie, als der Wurzel alles Übels, gleichgesetzt. And further on: "Von Plato haben unsere Pythagoreer auch ihren Begriff der Materie entlehnt". This Platonic influence can also be traced in the formulation by *Calcidius* (*Numenius*), saying: "Pythagoras calls the godhead the monad". In *Aëtius Plac.* I 7, 18 we read: Πυθαγορας τῶν ἀρχῶν τὴν μονάδα θεὸν καὶ τάγαθόν, i.e., Pythagoras called the monad God! These seemingly parallel texts betray an entirely different train of thoughts: the monad is God—God is the monad. (For Plato's doctrine see W. v. d. Wielen, *De Ideegetallen van Plato*, Amsterdam, 1941; C. J. de Vogel, *Problems concerning later Platonism*, in *Mnem.* 1949, p. 197-215. See also the quotation from Simplicius, above, p. 43). QUAM DUITATEM *Numenius* broaches the subject whether matter was generated or not. He distinguishes between matter in an unarranged state and matter in an ordered state. In an unarranged state it is *aequaeva deo*. Thus, *Numenius* belongs to the philosophers who took the secondary matter (i.e., the chaos) of the *Timaeus* as a concrete thing. Before God ordered the world, there was a disorderly matter, a chaos. Whether this is a 'before' of time does not appear from *Numenius*. Atticus is much clearer; with *Loemans* we may refer to Proclus, in *Tim.* I 283, 27D: τὸ μὲν πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον (*Tim.* 30A) εἶναι ἀγένητον, τὸν δὲ κόσμον ἀπὸ χρόνου γενητόν; especially clear is Plut., *De an. procr.* 1014A-B: βέλτιστον οὖν Πλάτωνι πειθομένους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι λέγειν . . . τὴν δ' οὐσίαν καὶ ὅλην, ἐξ ἣς γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην ἀλλ' ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν κύριην καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν ἐμπαρασχεῖν. οὐ γάρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ἡ γένεσις ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μηδὲ ίκανῶς ἔχοντος . . . ἀκοσμία γαρ ἦν τὰ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως. See further: *Apuleius*, p. 91, 12, *Thomas*; *Albinus*, p. 109 *Hermann*; *Bäumker*, o.c., p. 143 ss. HOC EST For the terminology, cf. 300,

II.24; 322, 8-9. **AQUAEVUM DEO** So, alongside God, matter exists from all eternity. Calcidius adopts this standpoint. Another Christian, *viz.*, Hermogenes, agrees with him as appears from Tertullian, *Adv. Hermog.* 4, 4: *materiam parem deo infert*, which is much the same as the *aequaevum deo* in the quotation from Numenius. **SED NON NULLOS** In Pythagoreism there existed alongside each other a dualistic and a monistic theory. According to Numenius, the adherents of the latter misunderstood the *vim sententiae* (*i.e.*, the theory that matter was generated). This monistic view is known from elsewhere. Diog. Laërtius states that Alexander Polyhistor found it in some Pythagorean memoirs. This theory teaches 'Αρχὴν μὲν ἀπάντων μονάδα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος ἀριστον δυάδα, ὡς ἀν ὑλην τῇ μονάδι αἰτίᾳ ὄντι ὑποστήναι (VIII 25. As Festugière, *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* IV, p. 37, n. 37, rightly observes, such texts as Sextus Emp., *Adv. Math.* X 281: τινὲς δ' ἀπὸ ἔνος σημείου τὸ σῶμα φασι συνίστασθαι should not be quoted). This monistic theory seems to have been wide-spread. In addition to the passages quoted Leemans cites a fragment of Philolaus (Diels, *Fragn. der Vorsocr.*, fr. 8, I 312) and texts of Eudorus and Moderatus (Simplicius, *In Phys.* 181, 17 and 231, 5). Bäumker (*o.c.*, p. 395) shows that Nicomachus drew the conclusion that unity (*μονάς*) should not only be called form but, to some extent, also matter; it is also ἀρσενόθηλυς (Festugière, *o.c.*, p. 43: "La monade ἀρσενόθηλυς"). The whole of his chapter III, which bears the title "L'un transcendant à la duade matière" gives important texts) and θεός καὶ ὑλη δέ πως as Zeller (*o.c.*, p. 130, n. 4) quotes from Nicomachus. **NON RECTE** This monistic theory is in conflict with the old thesis—frequently repeated by Calcidius—that there is no room for a coming-to-be or perishing as such; so no dyad can arise from a monad. "This is clear even to a man with little understanding". Once again, one is reminded of the fact that Calcidius rejects the doctrine of the Jews that matter was created, but follows Numenius and all other Greek philosophers. **DENIQUE STOICOS** For the doctrine of the Stoics see 321, 15 and 322, 11-12. **CUMQUE ILLI** The statement of the Stoia attacked by Numenius (Pythagoras) runs as follows: What is infinite by nature cannot be ordered. The statement is rather unusual. Cleonides (*S.V.F.* II 534), however, writes this: οὐ μὴν ἀπειρός γε, ἀλλὰ πεπερασμένος ἔστιν (ό κόσμος), ὡς τοῦτο δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ὑπὸ φύσεως αὐτὸν διοικεῖσθαι. 'Απείρου μὲν γάρ οὐδενὸς φύσιν εἶναι δυνατόν. δεῖ γάρ κατακρατεῖν

τὴν φύσιν οὐτινός ἔστιν (*Circul. doctr.* I cp. 1, p. 1 *Bake*). What Cleomedes means is this: "Nature must dominate (in a way, embrace) that of which it is the nature; what is infinite cannot be embraced. Hence there is no nature of something infinite". This conclusion is also expressed by Numenius. But he does not speak of 'what is infinite', but of 'what is infinite by nature'. This is not really different, but one may ask whether Numenius (or *Calcidius*) did not think of a text like that of Cleomedes and take the term 'nature' in a different sense.

The argument ascribed by Numenius to Pythagoras (*solius hanc dei fore virtutem*) is similar to that of the Jews in paragraph 278. There the question was about a creation out of nothing, without pre-existing matter; whereas all other things—even nature itself—receive matter from something else, God does not receive matter from anywhere. Could Numenius here derive his argument from a Jewish-Christian source? Anyhow, this kind of argument cannot have impressed the Stoics greatly, for it is based on the supposition that God is transcendent with respect to nature (*ut qui sit omni virtute potentior*). *Calcidius* himself observed (322, 17-19) that the *Stoa* is incapable of such a thought. *ET A QUO* Cp. the statement of the Jews just quoted where it is said that nature receives matter from God; here it receives power from him.

[296] Thus Pythagoras also thinks, Numenius says, that matter is fluid and without qualities; in his opinion it is not what it is according to the Stoics, *viz.*, something intermediate between good and evil, which they call 'indifferent', but, on the contrary, absolutely harmful. For to him, as to Plato, God is the principle and cause of all good, matter of all evil. However, that which proceeds from form and matter is indifferent: so not matter but the world being a mixture of the goodness of form and the badness of matter is indifferent. Not without reason do the old theologians think it to have been generated out of Providence and necessity.

IGITUR PYTHAGORAS Numenius ascribes the idea of the chaos to Pythagoras: hence *igitur*. Plato held this too: hence *quoque*. *Fluidam* is the typical word for the condition of matter. Leemans refers to another text of Numenius: ποταμὸς γάρ ή ὑλη ῥοώδης καὶ ὀξύρροπος (fr. 12). One may also quote from *Macrobius, In Somn. Scip.*:

... *silvestrem tumultum*, *id est*, ὥλην *influentem* (*test.* 47, p. 107, 14-15); and also: *materialis influxio* . . . *Haec est autem hyle* (*ib.*, p. 108, 14-15). Further, fr. 17: εἰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα ῥεῖ (*ib.*, p. 163, 13); fr. 27: οὐν ὑπὲρ νεώς ἐπὶ θαλάττης, τῆς ὥλης. It is a frequent metaphor in *Calcidius* (see par. 353). For the Pythagoreans the following quotation will do: οἱ ἀπὸ . . . Πυθαγόρου τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν . . . τὴν ὥλην (*Aet.*, *Plac.* I 8, 2 = *Xenocrates*, fr. 28 *Heinze*). Leemans is correct in observing that this text points to the antiquity of this metaphor. As already observed, one needs only to think of Plato's secondary matter. *SINE QUALITATE* Aristotle, Plato, Pythagoras and the Stoa agree on this point (see *ad 312, 10*, p. 75). How is *noxia* to be combined with this? Chrysippus bases the indifference of matter on the lack of quality of matter, as we shall see. *NEC TAMEN* Chrysippus (*Plut.*, *De comm. notit.* 1076 C-D) teaches: οὐ γάρ ή γ' ὥλη τὸ κακὸν ἐξ ἔαυτῆς παρέσχηκεν. ἀποιος γάρ ἐστι καὶ πάσας ὅσας δέχεται διαφορὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ κινοῦντος αὐτὴν . . . ξσχε. Perhaps Numenius reacts against these words, according to Leemans. The latter adds: *Materiam fontem esse malorem iam veteres Pythagorei adserunt* (*Dox. Gr.* 302), *quibus consentiunt omnes Platonici et Pythagorici recentiores*. With the stress on the contrasts *deus-silva*, *bonum-malum* this theory, obviously, fits into that of Pythagoras. Numenius explicitly formulated this. *UT ETIAM PLATONI VIDETUR* The *locus classicus* is, of course, the text on the bad world-soul in the *Laws*, to which Numenius is soon to refer (326, 12 ss.; cp. 328, 19). Moreover, there was to him already a hint in ἀνάγκη (*necessitas*); *Calcidius* spoke of *rīgor necessitatis* (301, 3). In par. 298-299 Numenius studies the condition of matter, referring to the *Timaeus*. Aristotle emphatically takes τὸ κακοποιὸν away from matter, which implies that he ascribed the other opinion to Plato, as Numenius does here. It is confirmed by *Met.* 988 a 14-15: τὴν τοῦ εῦ καὶ τοῦ κακῶς αἰτίαν τοῖς στοιχείοις (i.e., τὸ ἐν καὶ ή δυάς) ἀπέδωκεν ἐκατέροις ἐκατέραν. *AT VERO* Suddenly *species* appears here instead of *deus*. This fits in with the doctrine of the Stoa, although it is also found in the comment on Aristotle: *Speciem laudat ut summi dei similem divinitatem* (318, 4-5), a text which reminded us of Numenius. *Species* is νοῦς, a term which Numenius applies to the godhead, also the highest God. (Cp. *Procl.*, *In Tim.* III, 103, 28 (Leemans, *test.* 25), where there is question of the first, second and third νοῦς, evidently a pointing to the three phases of the godhead. Here Numenius differs from *Calcidius*, who (par.

176, see *ad par. 268*) speaks of the second God as νοῦς and thus seems to favour Plotinus, who beyond the νοῦς postulates a higher supranoëtic God). NON ERGO Matter is bad, the *species* is good. This sounds like Plato's speculation on the good, but it recalls above all what *Calcidius* says in *par. 176* (cp. *ad par. 268*, p. 30) about the *providentia* or νοῦς, the second God, who, as seen just now, is connected with the *species*: *Est autem intelligibilis essentia aemulae bonitatis propter indefessam ad summum deum conversionem estque ei ex illo bonitatis haustus, quo tam ipsa ornatur quam cetera quae ipso auctore honestantur.* Since *Numenius* speaks about the *speciei bonitas*, it is certain that also in the passage quoted—a passage from a paragraph full of reminiscences of *Numenius*—the term *bonitas* is due to him. DENIQUE EX The appeal to 'the wise men of the past' is, obviously, important in *Numenius'* doctrine (see p. 105). *Leemans* mentions *Moses*, *Orpheus*, *Pythagoras*, *Pherecydes* and *Homer*. But if names are to be listed at all, that of *Hesiod* should certainly be added. However, although *Leemans'* names are to be included among these *veteres theologi*, a more general statement is to be preferred. It could be worded in the way this was done by *Plutarch*, *Puech*, *o.c.*, p. 771: παμπάλαιος . . . ἐκ θεολόγων καὶ νομοθετῶν . . . δόξα . . . οὐκ ἐν λόγοις μόνον οὐδὲ φήμαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τε τελεταῖς ἐν τε θυσίαις καὶ βαρβάροις καὶ Ἐλλησι πολλαχοῦ περιφερομένη (*De Iside* 369 B). In all these systems *Numenius* found the dualism expressed, in his conviction, by *Plato's* words ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ.

[297] So the *Stoics* and *Pythagoras* agree that matter is shapeless and without quality, but, according to *Pythagoras*, it is also evil, while, according to the *Stoics*, it is neither good nor evil. And when on their further journey, so to say, they meet with evil and are asked: "where does evil come from?", they indicate some perversity as its source. However, they yet fail to explain the origin of this 'perversity' itself, because, according to them, there are two principles of things, *viz.*, God and matter, God being, in their opinion, the highest and supereminent Good, whereas matter is, according to them, neither good nor evil. *Pythagoras*, on the other hand, is not afraid to side with truth, although this compels him to make assertions which arouse astonishment and clash with the opinions of people. For he says that the existence of Providence is necessarily connected with

evil, because it co-exists with matter which is affected with evil. Now if the world was made out of matter, it was certainly made out of some evil nature existing of old. This is why Numenius praises Heraclitus for blaming Homer, because the latter wanted the extinction and destruction of the evil in life and did not understand that, in doing so, he wanted the destruction of the world, because in that case the source of evil, *viz.*, matter, would be destroyed. Plato is praised by Numenius for assuming the existence of two world-souls, a beneficent one and an evil one, *viz.*, matter. Although the latter is moved to an *fro* in a disorderly fashion, it must yet, because it is moved by a force of its own and from within, have a life of its own and be moved by a soul, in the same way as this is the case with all things moved by themselves. Matter is also the maker and protector of the passive part of the soul in which there is something corporeal and mortal and similar to a body, as the rational part of the soul has its maker in reason and in God. Now this world was made out of God and matter.

SILVAM IGITUR Calcidius again formulates the theory of the Stoas. This *nec bonam nec malam* is also rejected by Tertullian as the doctrine of Hermogenes. He connects it with Hermogenes' qualification of matter as *nec corporalem nec incorporalem*, which is also found in Calcidius (cp. par. 319-320). Tertullian says: *Nam sicut nec corporalem nec incorporalem infers materiam, ita nec bonam nec malam adlegas* (p. 56, 18-20 Wsz., cp. *Vig. Christ.* 9 (1955) p. 132). These qualifications are, of course, a further explanation of *informis et sine qualitate* (ἀποιος). DEHINC TAMQUAM The wording of the text is uncertain but not its meaning. In a remarkably vivacious style Calcidius explains the Stoic answer to the question: What then is the origin of evil? They ascribe it to some 'perversity', but, when asked the origin of this 'perversity', they have no answer. And with good reason, for they only know two principles, *viz.*, God and matter (see par. 289 ss.) neither of which is evil. In par. 298 Numenius returns to this 'perversity'. SED PYTHAGORAS Pythagoras is said to offer a better solution which, however, is in conflict with current opinions. He says that, if Providence exists, evil by nature must exist too. Calcidius (less probably Numenius) abbreviated the argument which, if completed, would have been: *propterea quod providentia existente silva sit necesse est et eadem sit malitia praedita*. In its actual form the reason looks like a *petitio*

*principii*. This Pythagorean theory is also in Aulus Gellius, who quotes the following from Chrysippus' Περὶ προνοίας, book IV: 'nihil est prorsus istis' inquit 'insubidius, qui opinantur bona esse potuisse, si non essent ibidem mala. Nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter sese et quasi mutuo adverso quaeque fulta nisu consistere; nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero . . . Proinde' inquit 'homines stulti cur non hoc etiam desiderant, ut veritas sit et non sit mendacium? Namque itidem sunt bona et mala, felicitas et infortunitas, dolor et voluptas. Alterum enim ex altero, sicuti Plato (Phaed. 3 p. 60B) ait, verticibus inter se contrariis deligatum est; si tuleris unum, abstuleris utrumque' (Noct. Att. VII (VI) 1, I, p. 281-282 Hos.). The same argument is mentioned by Plotinus in his treatise πόθεν τὰ κακά; as an utterance of Socrates in one of Plato's dialogues. This probably refers to the much quoted passage in the *Theaetetus*, 176B: τὰ γὰρ κακὰ εἰναι ἀνάγκη, ἐπείπερ τούναντίον τι δεῖ εἰναι τῷ ἀγαθῷ (*Enn.* I 8, 6, 16 Bréhier). PROPTEREAQUE NUMENIUS This remark of Heraclitus is in Aristotle, *Eud.* 1235 a 25 ss.: οἱ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία φίλα, καὶ 'Ηράκλειτος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ ποιήσαντι 'ώς ἔρις ἔχ τε θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο' <sup>1)</sup> οὐ γὰρ ἀν εἰναι ἀρμονίαν μὴ ὅντος ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος, οὐδὲ τὰ ζῷα ἀνευ θήλεος καὶ ἀρρενος ἐναντίων ὅντων. Cp. Plut., *De Is. et Osir.* 48, 370D; Simpl., *In Arist. Cat.* 412 Kalbfleisch; see G. S. Kirk, *Heraclitus, The Cosmic Fragments*, Cambridge, 1954, p. 242 ss.; see also Bäumker, o.c., p. 145-146. PLATONEMQUE The passage of Plato is well-known: *Leges*, X 896E: μίαν ἡ πλείους; πλείους· ἐγὼ οὐπέρ σφῶν ἀποχρινοῦμαι. δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τάναντία δυναμένης ἔξεργάζεσθαι. *Calcidius* refers to it in par. 300. SCILICET SILVAM Theiler prefers to read *silvae*. Although this seems reasonable, at first sight, the accusative *silvam* must be preserved, since what follows: *quae . . . necesse est* can only refer to *silvam*, not to *silvae animam*. *Calcidius* (or already *Numenius*) says that there are two world-souls, a beneficent and an evil one. He only describes the latter; but the former is defined as the *ratio ac deus* by what follows. Had *Calcidius* been explicit, he would have written: *unam beneficentissimam, scilicet deum, malignam alteram*, in which case one would automatically supply *scilicet silvam*. The final observation of this section: *Porro ex deo et silva factus est iste mundus* goes well with this. Moreover, in this

1) Leemans refers to *Od.* 13, 46 but Aristotle quotes *Iliad* 18, 107 literally.

train of thought there is some kind of identity between *silva*, *silva animata* and *anima silvae*, as was already observed by R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch*, 1916, p. 87. **QUAE LICET** All self-motion proceeds from a soul. Leemans rightly refers to Plato, *Tim.* 30A and *Phaedr.* 245E, to Plut., *De an. procr.* 1014C and *Quaest. Plat.* 1003A, and to Atticus, *ap. Procl. In Tim.* I 382, 3-4D: *εἰ δὲ ἀτάκτος ἡ κίνησις, ἀπὸ ἀτάκτου ψυχῆς.* See also *ad par.* 300-301 (p. 123). **QUAE QUIDEM** The doctrine underlying this statement is that there are two souls in the macrocosmos, a good one (= *ratio ac deus*) and an evil one (= *silva*). In the microcosmos, *i.e.* man, the rational part of the soul corresponds with this *ratio ac deus* from which it draws its origin, whereas the part which is subject to the *passiones* corresponds with and springs from matter. The latter is understood to be that part of the soul which, according to Plato (*Tim.* 69D, cp. also 42D), created by the lower gods, was added by them to the rational part. It is considered to be the source of *ira* and *cupiditas* which elsewhere (par. 232-233) Calcidius calls *vitirosae partes animi*.

It is generally known that Numenius did not speak of two parts of the soul but of two different souls, in both the world and man. One must, therefore, assume that Calcidius modified Numenius' doctrine in order to make it fit in with his own concept of the human soul. He believed the soul to be a unity. Hence he substituted two parts of the human soul for the two souls mentioned by Numenius. On one occasion (293, 20) he even speaks of a *pars patibilis rationabilis animae*. This, at first sight, surprising expression is easily explained from his former discussion on the soul in par. 53-54. Considering the human soul as a unity, he calls it rational *a parte potiori*, in exactly the same way as, at the beginning of par. 54, he calls the world-soul *rationabilis*. This he asserts to consist of a purely rational and a 'material' part, the *anima stirpea*.

[298] So, according to Plato, the world received its good things from the munificence of God as a father; evil clung to it through the evilness of matter, its mother. And thus we understand why the Stoics vainly put the blame on a certain 'perversity' when they say that things happen by virtue of the stars. Now the stars are bodies (*viz.*, heavenly fires), and of all bodies matter is the foster-mother, so that also the unhappy confusion caused by the movement of the stars seems to originate from matter,

in which there is much instability, blind impetuosity, change and arbitrary recklessness.

Therefore, if God has improved matter, as Plato says in the *Timaeus*, and ordered from a state of being tossed about in great confusion, it is evident that this confused instability of matter was the result of some chance and unlucky fate and not of the beneficial plans of Providence. That is why, according to Pythagoras, the soul of matter is not devoid of substance (a non-entity), as most people thought, and why it resists Providence, always ready to thwart its plans through the power of its perversity.

Now, Providence is the work and the activity of God, whereas blind and casual arbitrariness comes from matter. Hence it is clear that, according to Pythagoras, the mass of the universe came from a cooperation between God and matter, or between Providence and chance; and further that, after matter had received its adornment, it became the mother of corporeal and generated gods. Its condition is good to a high degree, though not entirely, since the evilness inherent in its nature could not be removed throughout.

IGITUR IUXTA PLATONEM The sentence opens with *igitur* because it explains *unam beneficentissimam, malignam alteram*; it confirms the explanation (p. 113) which led us to maintain the reading *silvam* of the MSS; compare par. 330, where Calcidius discusses *Tim.* 50D, a passage, in which Plato uses this comparison himself. Leemans mentions another source, the *Politicus* 273B-C: *παρὰ μὲν γάρ τοῦ συνθέντος πάντα καλὰ κέκτηται, παρὰ δὲ τῆς ἐμπροσθεν ἔξεως δσα χαλεπὰ καὶ ἀδικα.* He also refers to Origen *Contra Cels.* IV 65 (355, 16). Of course, Calcidius has in mind *Tim.* 30A, to which he refers below. QUA RATIONE From the clause *cum . . . dicantur* it seems that, to the Stoics, the 'perversity' mentioned is produced by the movement of the stars. This is confirmed by a passage in the treatise on fate: *Unde ergo mala? Motu stellarum causarum. Sed ipse motus unde?* (par. 174). This is precisely the same thought met with in par. 297. Numenius shows that, since the stars themselves consist of matter, it is quite useless to appeal to their perversity without indicating its basis.

The doctrine ascribed here by Numenius (or Calcidius) to the Stoia is remarkable. There are, indeed, a few other data which show a certain similarity to it, but I know of no real parallel texts.

Leemans refers to par. 292, where, he says, Calcidius translates διαστροφή (which, indeed, may be rendered by *perversitas*) with *perversio*. However, in par. 292 one reads *conversio* rather than *perversio*. Probably Leemans has in mind par. 165, where Calcidius speaks of the causes of error by which man comes to evil. By nature, he says, man strives after what is good; only through an error about what is good he comes to aspire after evil. He continues: *Est erroris causa multiplex. prima, quam Stoici duplicem perversiōem vocant. haec autem nascitur tam ex rebus ipsis quam ex divulgatione famae.* However much this term is like the one under discussion, the texts in which they occur refer to entirely different things. In par. 165 there is question of the cause of evil acts, which is found in human behaviour itself, whereas in par. 297-298 there is question of evil in general. the cause of which is found in a thing beyond human reach, *viz.*, the motion of stars.

Fabricius refers to Aulus Gellius who, again (cp. p. 113), cites Chrysippus' Περὶ προνοίας. The cause of (evidently moral) evil is found in some *scaevitas* in the spirit of some people which impels them to sin. In this way Chrysippus tries to combine the imputability of human actions with the theory on the domination of fate. The similarity between this text and Calcidius' par. 165 does not go beyond the fact that both the *perversio* and the *scaevitas* fulfil the part of a *deus ex machina*<sup>1</sup>). Apart from this, the *perversitas* under discussion is something quite by itself. OMNIUM QUIPPE For *nutrix*, cp. *Tim* 49A and 52D. EX SILVA Matter is the nurse of all disorder. What was said above of Numenius' style is particularly relevant in the present passage. For *praesumptio*, cp. 349, 14, p. 184. ITAQUE SI In connexion with the subordinate clause (*ut ... Plato*) Borghorst observes: *quippe e quibus (sc. verbis) luce clarius elucet Chalcidium, ut solent compilatores, ea transscripsisse*

1) The complete text may confirm this: *Quamquam ita sit, inquit (sc. Chrysippus), ut ratione quadam necessaria et principali coacta atque conexa sint fato omnia ingenia, tamen ipsa mentium nostrarum proinde sunt fato obnoxia, ut proprietas eorum est ipsa et qualitas. Nam si sunt per naturam primitus salubriter utiliterque facta, omnem illam vim qua de fato extrinsecus ingruit inoffensius tractabilius transmittunt. Sin vero sunt aspera et inscita et ruda nullisque artium bonarum adminiculis fulta, etiamsi parvo sive nullo fatalis incommodi conflictu urgeantur, sua tamen scaevitate et voluntario impetu in assidua delicta et in errores se ruunt. Idque ipsum ut ea ratione fiat, naturalis illa et necessaria rerum consequentia efficit, quae fatum vocatur. Est enim genere ipso quasi fatale et consequens, ut mala ingenia peccatis et erroribus non vacent.* (VII (VI) 2 I p. 284 Hos.). Fabricius says: *scaevitas i.e. σκαιότης*.

*non considerantem, quomodo illa temperando redderet idonea ad suum propositum* (o.c., p. 37). It is evident that *Calcidius* here translates *Numenius* literally, otherwise he would have realized that the clause was out of place in a commentary on the *Timaeus* itself. A similar phrase occurs in the treatise on fate, where he also followed *Numenius* closely, as will be shewn in the introduction to the edition by *Waszink-Jensen*: *Quae cuncta manifestius in Timaeo digerit* (205, 3). In the present text *Numenius* refers to *Tim.* 30A: οὗτω δὴ πᾶν δσον ἦν ὄρατὸν παραλαβόν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸν ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. For a moment one wonders what exactly *Numenius* wants to demonstrate. This is shewn by what follows: from the fact that God halts disorder and creates order, it is clear that disorder did not proceed from the divine principle, *viz.*, Providence. Hence another principle in self-motion must exist, and therefore animated (so *anima silvae neque sine ulla substantia est*). In other words, animated matter actually exists, not a mere Aristotelian δύναμις (cp. *Leemans*).

The idea that matter opposes Providence is (as *Leemans* (o.c., p. 95) observes) also found in *Porphyry*, *De antro Nymph.* 5, p. 59 *Nauck*: . . . τὸ ἀργὸν καὶ ἀντίτυπον πρὸς τὸ εἰδός. But the *Laws* of *Plato* are a more obvious source, for the evil soul postulated by *Plato* there is quite naturally interpreted as the soul of matter, thus leading to *Numenius*' concept (cp. *Plut.*, *De an. procr.* 1014D-E, where *Leges X* (896D ss.) is quoted). Finally, the *itaque* is not entirely conclusive here, but rather leads back to the argument, interrupted by the digression on the doctrine of the *Stoa*. **EX PROVIDENTIAE CONSULTIS SALUBRIBUS** In the comment on par. 270 reference was made to these words. The same holds for *et adversatur providentiae consulta eius in pugnare gestiens malitiae suae viribus*. The present passage is proof that these expressions were actually used by *Numenius*. **MALITIAE SUAE VIRIBUS** If I am not mistaken, *Numenius* did not consider this *malitia* to consist exclusively in the disorderliness of matter: *vires* rather points to the concept of a will present in matter or rather in its soul. This opposes the regulating activity of Providence and strives, at all costs, to maintain the original disorder. Here is an unmistakable influence of Oriental dualism. **SED PROVIDENTIA** Two powers have come to light: a beneficent one, Providence, and an evil one, the soul of matter. *Numenius* now comes to the final statement that this Providence is God's activity, whereas the disorderliness stems from

matter, the latter statement being, of course, a repetition. And he concludes: it is clear that, according to Pythagoras, everything came into being by the cooperation between God and matter, or, in other words, between Providence and chance. This conclusion reminds one of *necessitatis intellegentiaeque coetu* in par. 270, which translates *Tim.* 48A ἐξ ἀνάγκης τε καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως and, in a second quotation almost immediately following, is modified by *providentia* instead of *intellegentia* (cp. also 325, 15 and 328, 9-10). Calcidius did so under the influence of Numenius (p. 34). **SED POSTQUAM** After contrasting the principles, Calcidius explains the behaviour of matter once Providence begins to act. Matter, just now termed *corporum nutrix*, becomes the mother of what Calcidius calls *corporei et nativi dei*. With this he undoubtedly means the material world as it is ordered, that is, the cosmos in the strictest sense of the word. For this remarkable terminology, one may, with Leemans, refer to *Tim.* 40D where there is question of τὰ περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὄρατῶν καὶ γεννητῶν εἰρημένα (cp. 43D) and to Euseb., *Praef. Ev.* XV 22, p. 825D: θεούς ὄρατούς, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀστέρας. **FORTUNAM VERO** From *corporei et nativi dei* one might surmise that matter lost entirely its character of disorderliness and resistance to the ordering activity of Providence. This, however, is not the case; the *naturale vitium* of matter never disappears entirely. Providence can only drive it back as much as possible. That evil cannot be eliminated is implied by Plato, *Tim.* 30A: βουληθεὶς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὸς μὲν πάντα, φλαῦρον δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι καὶ τὰ δύναμις μὲν, and in the ή δυνατόν of 53B; in 48A he says: τὰ πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τῷ βέλτιστον ἀγειν and in 69B: δσας τε καὶ δηγη δυνατὸν ἦν ἀνάλογα καὶ σύμμετρα εἶναι. This idea is found in many places. Leemans quotes Plutarch, *De Is. et Osir.* 48, p. 37B; *De an. procr.* 1015B and C. In this context the image found in *Laws* X (896D s.) should, again, be borne in mind. This passage is the *fons et principium* of all statements where Plato discusses the evil soul which can never be ordered entirely.—In par. 299 Calcidius discusses the mutual relation between matter and Providence.

Since *silvae anima* is almost the equivalent of *silva*, *silvae anima neque est sine ulla substantia* (327, 7) is practically *silva non est sine ulla substantia*. Thus it becomes diametrically opposed to the doctrine of Aristotle, as referred in par. 288 (319, 24): . . . *silva, quam ait ex natura nullam habere substantiam.*

[299] So, by His miraculous power, God adorned matter and, in every way, corrected its faults, without, however, destroying them entirely, thus preventing complete destruction of the nature of matter. Yet He did not allow them to grow and expand far and wide, but preserving its nature, capable of changing from a troublesome to a favourable state, He totally changed its condition, adorning and decorating it by joining order with disorder, measure with measurelessness, and adornment with ugliness.

Finally, Numenius says—and rightly so—that things which have come into being without defects are found nowhere, in neither the actions of man nor nature, in neither the bodies of animals nor trees, plants or fruit, not in the air nor in water, not even in the firmament, since everywhere something of a lower order is, as a kind of contamination, mixed up with Providence. And when, then, he wants to show and, as it were, bring to light an image of naked matter, he says that first all bodies, which in the womb of matter exchange and cause alteration, should be taken away one by one. Secondly we should contemplate in our mind that which has been made void by this removal: this he calls matter or necessity. From this and from God, in his opinion, the structure of the world came into being, God acting with persuasion, necessity obeying Him. This is what Pythagoras asserts about the principles of things.

DEUS ITAQUE It is only now (cp. the comment on par. 298: *sed postquam silvae ornatus accesserit*), that Numenius (or Calcidius, if he abbreviated Numenius) mentions the author of this 'adornment'. Once more his verbosity should be noted. For *non interficiens*, cp. what in par. 297 he took from Heraclitus. UT MANENTE NATURA *Ut* seems to be a rendering of Greek ὡς with participle (ὡς μενούσης φύσεως). INLUSTRANDO ATQUE ORNANDO terms often used by Calcidius. NON IN ARTIBUS HOMINUM, NON IN NATURA, NON ... Leemans: *Eiusmodi enumerationes Numenio minime displicuisse videntur. Aeris series and aquae tractus* are poetical denotations of air and water (cp. *tractus fontium*, 307, 13). So is *piaculum*, denoting 'expiation' as well as 'that which requires expiation', 'sin'; hence our translation 'contamination'. IDEMQUE NUDAM In order to grasp matter it is necessary, first, "to think away all bodies (i.e., the 'corporeal forms', cp. the comment on par. 274, p. 48), which in the womb of the *silva* are always

changing from one to another", and then "to contemplate the empty *residuum*, left over by this process of abstraction (*egestio*)". This method is precisely the one indicated in par. 274 by Calcidius for the understanding of matter. Particularly welcome is the explicit mention of Numenius (*Idemque*, referring to *Numenius* in the preceding sentence), which makes it certain we have the genuine doctrine of Numenius both here and in par. 274 (see also p. 50). This strongly confirms the thesis that, in his treatise on matter, Calcidius constantly follows Numenius. In the comment on par. 274 it has been pointed out that this approach to the knowledge of matter has features present in Aristotle and even in Plato. Plato speaks about the interchanging of bodies; Aristotle knows the method of *ἀφαιρεσίς* (see also Albinus, *Epit.* X 5). Still, *animo considerare* which occurs again and again is from Numenius. In 312, 12 it is even unexpectedly (cp. *ad loc.*, p. 76). **DEO PERSUADENTE, NECESSITATE OBSECUNDANTE** The verb *persuadere* fits well into Numenius' doctrine. It was also used by Calcidius in par. 270: *ut vi persuadeat vimque inroget persuadentem; hoc est ut persuasio vim et vis adhibeat persuasionem. Obsecundare* is rather surprising. In the preceding paragraph matter was said to resist the plans of Providence: *adversatur providentiae consulta eius inpugnare gestiens malitiae suae viribus*. These statements on the behaviour of matter seem to be contradictory. Calcidius' treatment of the relationship between God and matter showed a similar contradiction. In par. 270 he writes about matter: *nec adversum exornationem suam resistentem sed ita victimam ut maiestati opificis libens cedat paratque eius sapientiae*, and: *oportuit silvam ei morigeram parentemque subdi*. On the other hand, he speaks about a *rigor necessitatis* (303, 3). The difference between Calcidius and Numenius is that the former stresses the pliability, the latter the recalcitrance of matter.

This state of affairs can be explained in two ways: 1. Calcidius copied the real contradiction of Numenius' system. But since he tries to free matter from disorder and evilness (see par. 301), pliability was stressed rather than recalcitrance. 2. Since in Calcidius' rendering of Numenius *obsecundante* is the only word implying submissiveness, this word may be an interpolation. Due to his concept of matter Calcidius was compelled to assume some sort of submissiveness, not found in his source. **HAEC EST PYTHAGORAE DE ORIGINIBUS ADSEVERATIO** See the similar endings of the reports on Aristotle and the Stoics: *Haec Aristotelis de silva sententia* (319, 20)

and *Haec Stoici de silva deque initiosis rerum . . .* (323, 15-16). But here *Calcidius* adds no explanation, as he did previously.

This passage on Pythagoras, actually copied from *Numenius*, occupies a central place in *Calcidius'* treatise. Meanwhile, the manifold ramifications of the relationship between *Numenius* and *Calcidius* can only be described and understood after a comment on par. 300-301.

(d) The opinion of Plato

(α) One interpretation

[300] Plato's opinion on this subject remains to be discussed. His disciples are found to interpret it differently. There are those who say that Plato considered matter to be made, but they rely more on words than on reality. Others say that it had no origin but possesses a soul, since Plato said that before its adornment it fluctuated in an unsteady and disorderly motion, while intrinsic motion is proper to living *<and, therefore, animated>* things. And that is why, also elsewhere, he frequently said that there are two world-souls, an evil one sprung from matter and a good one drawing its origin from God. Since there are good and evil things, the good ones are bestowed upon the world by the good soul, the evil ones by the soul of matter. For *<it is clear that such a soul of matter really exists, because>* divine wisdom and the intellect of the divine Maker persuaded matter in a severe and effective way to behave patiently with regard to its adornment and decoration, and a patient behaviour can only be imposed on animated and living beings.

The Jews agree with these authors, saying that God gave man a soul through divine inspiration—this they call reason and rational soul—but that He gave the mute animals living in the fields an irrational soul derived from matter, when the living and animated creatures had, at His command, come from the womb of the earth; the serpent who enticed the first human being into the snares of his evil advice must have belonged to the latter.

SUPEREST IPSA After Aristotle, the Stoics and Pythagoras follows Plato. However, the present discussion of Plato's opinion is quite different from the three preceding ones. This, after all,

was to be expected, for the establishment and interpretation of Plato's opinion is the real subject of the treatise *De silva*, the commentary on what Plato's *Timaeus* says about matter. Therefore, the two subsequent paragraphs (300-301) can be considered as either forming part of the historical section or introducing the systematic one. Anyhow, if the transitional character of these paragraphs is duly taken into account, the division actually made is of minor importance. QUAM DIVERSE The standpoints mentioned here may be summed up as follows:

- 1) matter was made
- 2) matter was not made
  - a) matter is animated
  - b) matter is not animated.

QUIPPE ALII The question who these *alii* are can only be answered by a considering the whole paragraph. This contains the standpoint of Numenius, formulated somewhat differently, confirmed by the doctrine of the Jews. At the beginning of Numenius' record of the doctrine of Pythagoras (324, 11-15), reference is made to authors who accept an origin of matter, *viz.*, the 'monistic school' of Pythagorism. No doubt the same are meant here. This is confirmed by the text itself, for *verba quaedam potius quam rem secuti* in the present passage (328, 14) is only a different wording for *vim sententiae non recte assecuti* (324, 12). In both cases it is said that this group of philosophers misunderstands the thesis that matter was generated. ALII VERO The doctrine of the other *alii* is identical with that of Numenius. Again, the existence of the evil soul of matter is inferred from its disorderly motion, and, once more, there is a reference to Plato's *Laws*, or rather to his frequent teaching on this subject. The construction of the phrase *Existentibus* . . . is somewhat intricate, since Calcidius says too much at once. Hence the conjunction *cum* received a pregnant meaning, which must be translated with a paraphrase.

In general the 'Numenian' ideas are set forth, but the argument reaches a statement which, though fitting in with what precedes, is not in the Numenius' passage, *viz.*, 'If God, in treating matter, was using persuasion, matter must necessarily have a soul, for only animated beings can be persuaded'. The term *persuadere* reminds one of Numenius, so does *cultui atque exornationi*. For the connexion between *severe* and *persuadere*, see p. 120. So one may

assume that in the present passage *Calcidius* did not add an argument of himself but only borrowed from *Numenius*. **QUIBUS HEBRAEI** Attention should be given to this quotation of the opinion of the Jews, for elsewhere (par. 53-55, p. 17) *Calcidius* cites the Jews for a similar question concerning the nature of the soul. Since the influence of *Numenius* was undeniable there, this new instance, again, confirms that we still have to do with the same author.

Here, on the authority of the Jews distinction is made between the human soul and the soul of animals. In par. 54-55, on the same authority, the existence of two souls in man is defended. These two theories are in fact identical, for the first human soul of par. 53-54 is the same as the *anima rationabilis ex inspiratione divina* in the present passage, whereas the second furnishes man with the *vitales vigores, qui sunt communes hominibus et bestiis, stirpibus etiam*. This same theory on a double soul in man occurs in par. 209 with the addition that the soul of the animals is in the blood. *Numenius* certainly derived these *Hebraica* from *Philo* who expounded a similar theory (cp. *Switalski, o.c.*, p. 42 ss., and the works by *Rüsche* quoted in the survey (p. 21)). We already saw how *Numenius* fitted these *Hebraica* into his own theory (p. 106, note 1). It is true that there are divergences from *Philo*, who rejected that the soul which is essentially blood originated *ex silva(e anima)*; to him matter possesses no soul. However, *quam rationem et animam rationabilem adpellant* may still refer to *Philo*.—The serpent of Paradise illustrates the evilness rather than the irrational nature of this soul. This passage refers to *Gen. 2, 7*: *καὶ ἐπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἀνθρωπὸν χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεψύσθησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοιὴν ζωῆς καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἀνθρωπὸς εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν*; *I, 24*: *καὶ εἰπεν ὁ θεὸς Ἐξαγαγέτω ἡ γῆ ψυχὴν ζῶσαν κατὰ γένος, τετράποδα, κτλ.*; *3, 1*: *Ο δὲ ὄφις ἦν φρονιμώτατος πάντων τῶν θηρίων, κτλ.*

The examination of par. 300 has shewn that it is full of *Numenian*. Their wording, however, is slightly different from that of the preceding paragraphs which were a direct translation by *Calcidius* of *Numenius* himself. Its interpretation of *Plato's* doctrine is ascribed to one of the great schools of *auditores Platonis*. This means that in *Numenian* terms *Calcidius* reproduced the theory of a definite group of *Platonists*. It is evident again how far-reaching the influence of *Numenius* was on *Calcidius*. But it had its limits. In the next paragraph *Calcidius* rejects *Numenius' view* that matter has a soul of itself.

## (β) The other interpretation

[301] There are also who think that, according to Plato, this disorderly and confused motion is not present in matter but in the materials and bodies alone which are called 'principles and elements of the world'. For if matter is without form or order, it is, of course, by nature without motion, and not only without motion but also without change, for in this case matter will not change but the bodies in which the qualities are present. Since it is without motion, it is then also without a soul.

Moreover, the evilness <which matter is generally assumed to possess> consists, according to these Platonists, in lack of goodness, as is also the case with shapelessness, helplessness and measurelessness<, the essence of which only consists in lack of form, *etc.*>. And so it happens that, by adding a negation to the names of virtues, their opposites are indicated, as, for instance, *imprudence* *injustice* and *inexperience*. And this is the dissension among the Platonic philosophers.

NEC DESUNT QUI PUTENT Those who find the source of the disorderly motion of matter in matter itself, particularly in its evil soul, are opposed by others who see the source of this disorderliness not in matter but in the bodies that enter into it, *viz.*, the so called elements, which *Calcidius* often calls *materiae* (p. 42). How this theory must be understood will appear in par. 352, where *Calcidius* himself will defend it. QUIPPE SI The argument is this: "if matter has neither form nor order, it has neither motion nor change". Evidently this is based on the idea that matter is a purely negative essence from which every predicate should be taken away. Starting from the idea that *inmobilis* is a rendering of  $\alpha\kappa\iota\nu\eta\tau\omega\zeta$ , which means both 'immovable' and 'motionless', the term is translated by 'without motion'. This translation seems to fit better into the present context. However, in the comment on par. 329, immobility will also appear to be said about matter. MALITIAM PORRO The evilness which, in the opinion of the authors discussed, is directly connected with matter resides in its disorderly motion. Therefore, after the previous statements the question what is the nature of this evilness of matter must come up. If it is true that there is no motion in matter, this evilness cannot exist in disorderly motion either. The answer is quite in line with what precedes: evilness is something

essentially negative; it is no more than the absence of goodness. PROPTEREAQUE VIRTUTIBUS An argument from language is added here. By *orationis pars negativa* Calcidius means the prefix *in-*. *Contra* means 'the opposite', so *contra quam virtutes* must mean 'the opposite of virtues'.

In explaining this theory in par. 352 Calcidius compares matter with stagnant water into which pebbles are thrown. The water is the image of matter by itself, the pebbles are the bodies coming into matter. Matter by itself was neither in motion nor in rest (*neque stabat neque movebatur*); the bodies caused the (disorderly) motion. Therefore, this motion is not proper to matter but a *motus alienus*. One may also ask whether Calcidius, agreeing with the first part of the Platonics' theory of par. 301, also accepts their views on the evilness of matter, for he does not mention the subject any more. His silence would be difficult to understand had he not agreed. Moreover, in the explanation of the doctrine of Aristotle (319, 14-16) the idea that evil is something negative was in the background as self-evident.

HAEC . . . EST DISSENSIO PLATONICORUM PHILOSOPHORUM The important question is: who are the *Platonici philosophi* followed by Calcidius? Steinheimer at once answers too hastily: Plotinus. Calcidius, he says (o.c., p. 40), evidently follows an authority, later than Numenius and, moreover, the theory that evil is the absence of good is proper to Plotinus: *Enn.* III 2, 5: δλως δὲ κακὸν ἔλειψιν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θετέον. Steinheimer might also have referred to *Enn.* I 8, 3, which contains a parallel with the examples of Calcidius: "Ηδη γὰρ ἐν τις εἰς ἔννοιαν ἡκοι αὐτοῦ οἶον ἀμετρίαν εἶναι πρὸς μέτρον καὶ ἀπειρον πρὸς πέρας καὶ ἀνείδεον πρὸς εἰδοποιητικὸν, κτλ. On the other hand, Borghorst thinks that par. 300 and 301 are still derived from Numenius. His argument (o.c., p. 37) is based on data from par. 300 only, a section which, indeed, is wholly Numenian (the evidence is, in fact, much stronger than Borghorst suggests). However, we think it improbable that Calcidius found the opinion which clearly deviates from the concept of matter held by Numenius, in Numenius himself. At any rate, nothing in the present text points in this direction. One should assume rather that, at the end of the entire dissertation, Calcidius expounds and accepts an opinion which is opposed to Numenius.

But what about Plotinus? Can he be taken as the source of Calcidius? If this were possible, the problem of Calcidius would come

in an entirely new light. Plotinus, not Numenius, would be the last source used here by Calcidius. The doctrine of evil as something purely negative is, indeed, Plotinian, but the rest of the concept shows little of Plotinus. To mention only one detail, the latter asks how evilness of matter can be combined with its lack of quality; *Enn.* I 8, 10: "Αποιος δὲ οὐσα πῶς κακή; Nothing of the kind is found in Calcidius. Nor is, on the other hand, Calcidius' theory of the two phases in matter (first half of par. 301) found in Plotinus. These considerations would not carry much weight, if the theory concerning evil as something negative would be proper to Plotinus. But it is found already before him, namely in an author mentioned by Calcidius himself, Origen. As if it were the most common thing on earth the latter says: *Certum namque est malum esse bono carere* (*De princ.* II 9, 2, p. 166, 1-2 K.)<sup>1</sup>). As noted on p. 91, this theory could be inferred from *Physics*, 192 a 14 ss. Anyhow, one is not obliged to regard Plotinus as Calcidius' authority on the sole ground of an agreement between them on this particular issue.

Does the rest of par. 301 bring us closer to the source of this theory, *viz.*, the differentiation between matter by itself and matter in disorderly motion? If I am not mistaken, Hermogenes taught a similar theory, for Tertullian reproaches him for ascribing to matter a *inconditus et confusus et turbulentus motus*, like the movement of boiling water in a kettle, and, on the other hand, for calling matter equilibrious (*aequalis momenti habens motum*) and *neque ad bonum neque ad malum vergens*<sup>2</sup>). Is this what Tertullian saw as an inconsistency really inconsistent, or rather a twofold way of looking at matter, *viz.*, as matter by itself and as matter in disorder

1) To Origen evil is ethical evil, which is a voluntary turning away from good. Accordingly, he does not believe matter to be evil. See Hal Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis. Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus*, Berlin u. Leipzig, 1932, p. 107 ss. To Calcidius this evil is ontological evil, but his examples clarify that his concept is derived from the idea of moral evil. In this respect, he is again closer to Plotinus about whose concept of evil Carl Andresen (*Logos und Nomos. Die Polemik des Kelsos wider das Christentum*, Berlin, 1955, p. 71, n. 65) says: "Mit Recht macht Wilhelm Thömme in seiner Übersetzung der Konfessionen (Zürich) S. 433 A. 1 zu S. 180 darauf aufmerksam, dass auch die Lösung Plotins, das Böse als *privatio boni* zu definieren, an einer gleichen Vermengung des Ontischen und des Ethischen leidet; zur Sache R. Jolivet. *Le Problème du mal d'après S. Augustin*, Paris, 1936".

2) *Adv. Hermog.* 41, 1, p. 60, 16-22 Wsz.: *Revertor ad motum, ut ubique te lubricum ostendam. 'Inconditus et confusus et turbulentus fuit materiae motus'; sic enim et ollae undique ebullientis similitudinem opponis. Et*

after receiving the elements? If the latter be true, it would be a theory much like the one Calcidius ascribes to a group of Platonists; Hermogenes too was a Platonist. This interpretation of Hermogenes provides a solution of another problem which has often occupied the interpreters of Tertullian, *viz.*, how these two different assertions of Hermogenes in Tertullian should be explained (Art. 'Hermogenes' in Herzog-Hauck, *Realencyklopädie* 7 (3. ed. 1899) p. 757; cp. Waszink, *Tertullian, The Treatise against Hermogenes*, p. 7, 95). The differences, however, between Hermogenes and Calcidius should not be overlooked. To the former matter by itself is neither good nor evil, while its evilness consists in the disorderliness after receiving the elements. To the latter matter as such is evil. If the interpretation offered here is correct, the distinction between two phases in matter was made before 207 A.D., the year when the *Adversus Hermogenem* (Waszink, *o.c.*, p. 13) was published and—what is equally important—at least at the same time as Numenius.

In conclusion, the authors of par. 301 were not necessarily posterior to those of par. 300. The group of Platonists who deviate in one respect from their colleagues, *viz.*, in regarding the disorderly motion of matter as not inherent in matter itself, must also have other views on the evilness of matter. Calcidius adopts their opinion, thereby deviating from Numenius. Nevertheless although Calcidius rejects Numenius in this important question, the two authors remain closely connected. Calcidius' deviation is restricted to theoretical issues. In practice he speaks about matter in much the same way as Numenius. This attitude of Calcidius underlies his remarkable assertions concerning the submissiveness and the recalcitrance of matter (p. 120). In Calcidius' opinion matter is less refractory than in the fragments of Numenius. It is the natural consequence of the view expressed in the present passage, that matter as such has no disorderly motion. The conclusion, therefore, is that, in spite of his close adherence to the doctrine of Numenius, Calcidius preserved a certain independence and was not the *homo unius libri* which he is often said to be. But he could be reproached in the same way as, about a century earlier, Tertullian adressed Hermogenes:

*quonodo alibi alius a te adfirmatur? Cum enim vis materiam nec bonam nec malam inducere. 'Igitur', inquis, 'subiacens materia aequalis momenti habens motum neque ad bonum neque ad malum plurimum vergit.* Connected with this is Tertullian's observation that Hermogenes says, at one time, that matter is evil (*malam esse materiam*, p. 27, 9-10 Wsz.) and, at another, like here, that it is neither good nor evil (cp. p. 56, 19-20 Wsz.).

*eamque (sc. materiam) adicis sectari in formitatem, dehinc alibi desiderare componi a deo (Adv. Hermog. 42, 1, p. 62, 11-12 Wsz.).*

In his theoretical considerations Calcidius tries to take away from matter all evilness and recalcitrance against the activity of Providence. This attempt must perhaps be seen as a reaction against the extreme dualism of Numenius. In par. 252 he says about matter: *neque stabat neque movebatur*. But when he—in practice—is speaking about the relationship between matter and God, he comes nearer to Numenius and leaves room for the idea of chaos, so prominent in Numenius' system. Thus, even where he deviates from the theory in his source, he follows this source in practical issues.

In many other points he followed his author unconditionally, especially his view on the cognoscibility of matter and on the activity of God. This leads to the conclusion that Numenius was Calcidius' main authority, and that the influence of the Platonists of paragraph 301 must be regarded as secondary. This Numenian influence extends itself even to the explanation on the doctrines of others, such as Aristotle. And it is for all these reasons, that Calcidius' work has these strong Numenian features.

b) *Systematic part*

α) The principles in general

αα) Two ways of arguing

[302] We shall now consider which of these theories is, in our opinion, the best, the best suited to the search of truth, and most worthy of so great an author's wisdom.

Whenever a problem is proposed, two kinds of argument are possible. The first establishes what is later on the ground of what precedes; this is the method proper to syllogism, in which (Calc.: 'for') the things assumed, also called elements, precede the conclusion. The second gradually proceeds from what is later to the disquisition of what is before; and this kind of argument is called *resolutio*. Since there is question of the first principles here, that is of things which existed before everything else, we must use here the method of *resolutio*.

It is an established fact to everyone, whether a philosopher or not, that there are senses and intellect in us, and that these

two are not identical, and, consequently, that because they are different themselves, their effects are also different. Therefore, there must be things which can be perceived by the intellect and the senses. Thus there exist sensible and intelligible things. Intelligible things are such as are perceived by the intellect by means of a rational investigation, sensible things are such as are perceived by means of a non-rational view (*opinio*), which results in an uncertain opinion (*opinio*). The former exist from eternity without beginning, the latter are temporary and begin in time. These, from our standpoint, are primary, but in essence secondary, while the intelligible things are primary in essence, but secondary from our standpoint. Therefore, when a man in his argument ascends from the things which, seen from our standpoint, are primary to those which, from our standpoint, are secondary, he uses *resolutio*, for starting from things that are unreal but rather images of real things, he arrives at things which are the principle and cause of things that have a real existence.

**NOS TAMEN** From the comparatives it is evident that *Calcidius* only speaks of the paragraphs 300 and 301, that is, of the two interpretations of *Plato*, not of the theories on matter discussed before. In this way, the paragraphs 300 and 301 are clearly given an outstanding position; once again, they constitute a transition. The influence of *Numenius* on them is amply discussed on p. 127.

**EST IGITUR PROPOSITARUM QUAESTIONUM DUPLEX PROBATIO** In order to understand the turn in *Calcidius'* argument, it should be observed that he is approaching a subject which he evidently wants to study thoroughly. He discusses the principles in general and next matter, but before touching the actual subject, he examines the tools to be used, namely the different ways of arguing. There are two methods: syllogism and *resolutio*. The syllogism starts from what was before in order to arrive at what is later; the *resolutio* starts from what is later in order to trace what was before. Now, because principles are implied, *i.e.*, things that are prior to anything else, there can only be question of *resolutio*. The meaning of 'what is later' and 'what was before' forms the subject of this paragraph. *Calcidius* might have declared: "by 'what is later' are meant the sensible things, by 'what was before' the intelligible, for, although, from our standpoint, the sensible things are primary and the intelligible secondary, the situation is just the reverse".

However, Calcidius wants to treat the question more thoroughly, incidentally proving that sensible and intelligible things do exist.

**SYLLOGISMUS - RESOLUTIO** The term *resolutio* is abnormal; beside 'syllogism', one expects 'induction' (cp. Arist., *Topica* 105 a 10; for συλλογισμός also *Anal. Priora* 24 b 18. Fabricius observes: "Analytica per ἐπαγωγήν sive inductionem probatio". Switalski (o.c., p. 26, note) refers to *Eth. Nicom.* VI 3 (συλλογισμός and ἐπαγωγή), but notes: "Die *resolutio* des Chalcidius ist aber, wie c. 303 und 304 zeigen, nicht sowohl die ἐπαγωγή des Aristoteles, als vielmehr die διαίρεσις (*compositio* c. 304 = συναγωγή) des Plato". However, the διαίρεσις of Plato is not, like the *resolutio* in Calcidius, a regression from what is perceptible by the senses to the intelligible. In this respect the *resolutio* is much like the ἐπαγωγή, Aristotle's induction, but this is the only point of agreement, as will become clearer below.

**QUAE ELEMENTA VOCANTUR** Of course, the principles are meant, which are assumed to exist (*acceptationes*). The use of *elementa* may have been suggested by *Physics* 184 a 23: τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ, from which, in fact, Calcidius derives his argument. For the typical use of *remedium*, see the introduction to Calcidius' commentary (par. I, p. II).

**CERTUM EST** The argument runs as follows: the senses and the intellect are two different things; therefore, the sensible and the intellectual perceptions (*effectus*) are different as well and, consequently, the things perceived sensibly or intellectually differ: finally, therefore, sensible and intellectual things exist. A well-known passage of the *Timaeus* (51D-E) demonstrates the existence of the forms on the ground of the difference between νοῦς and δόξα ἀληθής. Calcidius comments on this text in par. 340-342. The same argument also occurs in Albinus (IX 4); it is a theme which Middle Platonism elaborated in various ways. In Calcidius it is not meant as a proof for the existence of the forms, but an argument in which he opposes the *sensilia* to the *intelligibilia*.

**ET INTELLEGIBILIA** The definition of these two concepts is based on *Tim.* 28A, where Plato defines τὸ δν and τὸ γιγνόμενον: τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν... τὸ δ' αῦ δόξη μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν (cp. 28C). The present phrase may indeed be regarded as a translation of the Greek. The twice occurring *opinio* translates δόξη . . . δοξαστόν. Only αἰσθήσις is left untranslated. For *rationabili indagine*, cp. 365, 11-12, where Calcidius comments upon *Tim.* 51D referred to: *intellegens fidem rerum rationis habet indagine comprehensam*; (*rationis indago* seems

to be the translation of λόγος). Similar formulations in: Apuleius, *De dogm. Plat.*, I 6: *At altera opinione sensibili et inrationabili aestimanda est* (Ed. Thomas, p. 88, 6-7); Albinus IV 8: τὸν μὲν νοητὸν κόσμον κρίνει νόησις μετὰ λόγου, τουτέστιν οὐκ ἄνευ λόγου, τὸν δὲ αἰσθητὸν ὁ δοξαστικὸς λόγος οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως. Clearly this was a central theme in Middle Platonism. ILLA QUIDEM To state that in this thoroughly Platonic context Calcidius framed his argument in an Aristotelian manner might be surprising. But evidently Calcidius' argument is based on *Physics* 184 a 16 ss.: πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γάρ ταῦτα ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον. Ὅστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίγνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα. διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα δεῖ προιέναι· τὸ γάρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἔστι· πολλὰ γαρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. πέπονθε δὲ ταῦτο τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον. Attention should be paid to διαιροῦσι ταῦτα, i.e., "for those who use διαίρεσις". This διαιρεῖν was, undoubtedly in Calcidius' mind, when he called his second kind of argument *resolutio*. Elsewhere (333, 10) he also uses *dissolutio*, which is still nearer to the Greek term. The close connexion with this passage from Aristotle is confirmed by the *initia causaeque*, which are the translation of τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ. However, Aristotle's διαιρεῖν and the *resolutio* or *dissolutio* of Calcidius do not mean the same. Like the terms τὸ καθόλου and τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα, διαιρεῖν seems to have a special meaning, found nowhere else (cp. Ross *ad loc.*); the exact sense of *resolutio* must be found in its application.

ββ) Matter is found by means of *resolutio*

[303] Everything perceived by the senses is near to us, *viz.*, fire, air, earth and water, but the things composed of these elements are nearer, and nearer still are our own bodies. In our bodies there is something contiguous and solid, visible and warm. Now, nothing is contiguous and solid without earth nor is anything visible and warm without fire; so within us there are both earth and fire. There is also something like breath, because

breath is found in the veins, which are also called arteries, and also something damp, and humidity cannot exist without water nor breath without air. But if all these things are parts of a body, there must also, as we said above, exist a reality of which these things are parts, *viz.*, the body of the universe.

So in this body of the universe there are fire, earth, the other materials and, finally, their harmonious composition consisting of forms and qualities: of fire, its lustre, levity, colour and shape; of earth, its dryness, weight and shape. Likewise the materials between fire and earth should have definite, natural qualities. If, by means of our intellect, we wish to take away these qualities and quantities, these shapes and figures, and then consider what keeps all these things inseparably together and contains them, we shall find that there is nothing else than that what we are looking for, *i.e.*, matter, and herewith we have found the material principle. This then is one of the two possible methods of arguing, called *resolutio*.

The explanation of the present section must begin at the end. The proper act of *resolutio* is expressed by *Si ergo has qualitates et quantitates . . . volemus ratione animi separare, tum deliberare, quid sit illud . . .*, which words remind one of the passages about the cognoscibility of matter: *hoc est ut universis corporibus, quae intra gremium silvae varie varia formantur mutua ex alio in aliud resolutione singillatim ademptis solum ipsum vacuum sinum speculatione mentis imagineris* (305, 10-13); . . . *ipsum illud, quod ex egestione vacuatum est, animo considerari iubet* (328, 6-8); and the short reference to it in: *At vero qui . . . sine consortio corporum solam per semet ipsam mente intuentur* (312, 10-12). Cp. *Denique si mentis consideratione volumus ei haec adimere* (338, 1-2) and *sinceram silvam, quae concursu variorum corporum tegitur, ab eorundem corporum permixtione sollertia mentis distinguere* (351, 5-7). *Quae . . . modo separare animo videbamur a silva* (332, 19-20). This *resolutio* is the mental process mentioned already several times as mainly derived from the  $\delta\varphi\alpha\iota\pi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  of Aristotle but containing also a Numenian element in *animo considerare*. The combination of  $\delta\varphi\alpha\iota\pi\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  and *animo considerare* got its name from the former (see *ad* par. 299, p. 50. In par. 274 the same term *resolutio* was used for the corresponding process in reality).

This leads to a remarkable discovery. The *resolutio* is not a type

of logical argument at all. An argument proves that a thing is, whereas the *resolutio* shows what a thing is. And, indeed, re-reading the passage in which Calcidius applies the *resolutio* (322, 9 ss.), it is quite obvious that no argument is involved. The *genus probationis* which one would expect here, turns up in par. 317-318. It is the argument which, on the ground of an analysis of change, concludes to a permanent matter underlying the change. This is, moreover, an implicit confirmation that in the present text something else is meant, even though at the end Calcidius affirms: *et hoc quidem est unum duarum probationum genus*.

In this *resolutio* Calcidius gives his own interpretation of the words of Aristotle: ἀπὸ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν εἰς τὰ γνωριμώτερα τῇ φύσει. It is a thinking rather than a reasoning from what is later to what was before. In Calcidius' opinion this *resolutio* was already used by Plato himself (p. 182). And for this he could have cited Albinus, who in his Προλεγόμενα τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας wrote: τῷ ἀφαίρεσεως πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν ἔκχρηται ἐν Τιμολῷ, τηρῶν καὶ εὑρίσκων τὴν ὅλην ἐκ τῆς ἀφαίρεσεως πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν (Plato, Ed. Hermann, VI, p. 222).

The rest of the section was written by Calcidius in order to reach a point where the *resolutio* could be applied. The manner, in which he did so, is curious. Instead of taking the sensible world with its qualities and forms as evidence, he argues to the existence of a body of the universe, starting from the human body. In the first phrase Calcidius, speaking about things which are 'nearest to us', creates the impression—and perhaps he had it himself—that he is applying the *resolutio*. Instead, he elaborates an argument from the microcosmos to the macrocosmos which seems to come from another context, *viz.*, with a philosophical discussion on the existence of the world as one whole. In Calcidius' context this is out of place.—The doctrine of the macrocosmos—microcosmos occurs also elsewhere in Calcidius' commentary. In par. 202 after contending that the human body consists of water, air, earth and fire because of its properties, he continues: *Unde opinor hominem mundum brevem a veteribus adpellatum*. The passage *Est igitur in corporibus nostris contiguum quiddam, etc.*, (311, 15 ss.) certainly depends on Plato, *Tim.* 31B: χωρισθὲν δὲ πυρὸς οὐδὲν ἀν ποτε ὄρατὸν γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ἀπτὸν ἀνευ τινὸς στερεοῦ, στερεὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀνευ γῆς. The same argument occurs in Calcidius, par. 243, where the human body is discussed as microcosmos. For *inseparabiliter*, cp. 322, 1 and the comment p. 151.

γγ) The Maker and the exemplar are discovered by  
means of *compositio*

[304] Let us now consider the other form of argument called *compositio*, for *compositio* follows *resolutio* as union follows separation. Let us give back to matter the things, *viz.*, genus, quality and form which our thoughts have separated from it just now, and let us restore them, as it were, to their places, doing so not in a disorderly and arbitrary fashion but elegantly and in an orderly manner. Now order cannot exist without harmony; harmony is the companion of analogy, to analogy is coupled reason, reason is found to be inseparable from providence, and providence is not without intellect nor intellect without mind. Thus God's mind modulated, ordered and adorned the whole body of the world. So, finally, the divine principle, *i.e.*, the Maker is found. The Maker, again, works and adorns everything according to the rational power and the majesty of His works. His works, however, are His concepts which the Greeks call ideas. Now the ideas are the exemplars of all natural things. And thus, in the third place, the exemplary principle is found. In conclusion, matter is found by means of the law and method of analysis (*dissolutio*); God, the Maker, Himself by means of the laws of composition (*compositio*) and the exemplar by God's works.

NUNC ILLUD ALIUD *sc. genus probationis*. In par. 302 this second method of reasoning is called *syllogismus*; here it is given the name *compositio*. In Calcidius' eyes the two terms are equivalent.

The present paragraph can be divided in two parts. First Calcidius explains the term *compositio*; after that, beginning with the words *Ordo autem*, he gives an argument. According to Calcidius, *compositio* is the process of mentally re-building the world, just as *resolutio* was that of analysing it. Describing the process of *compositio*, Calcidius comes to speak about order; this order is the starting-point of a real argument.

If I am not mistaken, Calcidius was lead to these concepts of *resolutio* and *compositio* by a text such as that in Albinus X 5. Describing the second method of ἀνάλυσις, Albinus says that it is an ascending from what is later to what was earlier (Calcidius' *resolutio*), and that after this analysis one arrives συνθετικῶς τρόπῳ

at what was sought, *Epit.* V 5: Τὸ δὲ δεύτερον εἰδος τῆς ἀναλύσεως τοιοῦτόν τι ἔστιν· ὑποτίθεσθαι δεῖ τὸ ζητούμενον, καὶ θεωρεῖν τίνα ἔστι πρότερα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδεικνύειν ἀπὸ τῶν ὑστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ πρότερα ἀνιόντα, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ διολογούμενον, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἀρξάμενοι ἐπὶ τὸ ζητούμενον κατελευσόμεθα συνθετικῷ τρόπῳ. *Calcidius* has identified the Aristotelian ἀφαίρεσις with this Albinian ἀνάλυσις and συλλογισμός with συνθητικὸς τρόπος. This last identification explains *Calcidius'* translation *compositio* (σύνθεσις) as an equivalent of *syllogismus*.

These concepts of *resolutio* and *compositio* reveal a certain lack in *Calcidius'* abstract thinking. Limited by the visual presentation of the mental process, his terminology is bound, not to say, dominated by the descriptive activity of analysis and synthesis. For *separare animo* see the quotations on p. 132. Evidently the *resolutio* occupies a central place in *Calcidius'* thought. *CUM CULTU ET ORDINE* reminds one of *congrua et moderata concretione* in par. 303 (332, 15). *ORDO AUTEM* Here begins the argument. It is the well-known reasoning *ab ordine ad ordinatorem*, but given in great detail. The conclusion: "and so the mind of God has ordered everything" would have been more correct in this way: "and so a mind has ordered everything, and this mind cannot be but the mind of God". *INVENTA ERGO EST DEMUM OPIFICIS DIVINA ORIGO* Cp. 332, 14: *Inventa igitur est origo silvestris*. Both times also the term *origo*. See also 333, 8-9. *OPERATUR PORRO OPIFEX* *Calcidius* argues from the Maker to the exemplar. Whereas above the form was striking, here the content of the argument is remarkable. "The Maker makes everything in accordance with His rational power and the majesty of His works. His works are the concepts which the Greeks called *ideas*". The ideas are looked upon as the thoughts of God (cp. A. N. M. Rich, *Mnem.*, 1954, p. 123-132). More striking still is the concept of 'works of God', to which are attributed rational power and majesty. The term *opera dei* makes one think of the creation; *Calcidius* also knows this idiom: *Et mundus sensilis opus dei est* (89, 20). But at another place, where he is not specially thinking of the creation, he says: *Porro optimum dei opus est id quod intellegit* (292, 20). This brings us close to the present text. An explanation of this fairly surprising turn in *Calcidius'* argument is found in the following words of *Albinus* (X 3): ἐαυτὸν ἀν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ νοήματα δεῖ νοεῖν (sc. δ. θεός) καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ ιδέα ὑπάρχει. Evidently, *Calcidius* saw something

important in this *opera dei*, a kind of technical term. To us it rather disturbs the argument.

Calcidius maintains the idea of God creating while looking at the ideas, although, at the same time, these ideas are His thoughts. The supposition that Albinus influenced Calcidius is confirmed by the fact that the former also looks upon the ideas as God's thoughts. In par. 339 Calcidius almost literally renders Albinus' ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἴδεα ὡς μὲν πρὸς θεὸν νόησις αὐτοῦ (*Epit.* IX 1; cp. II 2; IX 1-3).

In par. 330 (354, 28-355, 1) one reads: . . . *idean, quae intellectus dei est aeternus aeterni* (cp. 363, 7 and 366, 13). With this should, again, be connected the passage on Providence in par. 176. This second stage in the godhead (cp. *ad par.* 268) is not called Providence, because He foresees future events and understands them, but *quia proprium divinae mentis intellegere, qui est proprius mentis actus et est mens dei aeterna. Est igitur mens dei de intellegendo aeternus actus*. So there is question here of *mens dei* (cp. 333, 3) which is an *aeternus actus*. *Providentia* is God in so far as He thinks Himself. But this is identical with the idea which is *intellectus dei aeternus aeterni*. Hence the terms *ideae* and *providentia* stand for the same reality. But Calcidius fails to explain how this identity should be imagined. **IGITUR SILVAM** The conclusion is remarkable for more than one reason. First, for the term *dissolutio* instead of *resolutio*, which, maybe, is influence of the διαρροῦσι in *Physics* 184 a 22-23 (see p. 131). Secondly, Calcidius seems to imply that there are three ways of arguing, for he states: "by means of *dissolutio* we found matter, by *compositio* the Maker and *ex operibus dei opificis* the exemplar", as though *ex operibus* were a special way of reasoning. One would have expected: "by *resolutio* we found matter, by *syllogismus* the Maker and the exemplar", but the use of the term *compositio* evidently excludes the reconstruction: "by *compositio* we arrive at the Maker and the exemplar". This confirms our opinion concerning the meaning of *compositio*, i.e., that it is used not for a real argument but rather for an introductory mental process. Now Calcidius does not use such an introduction when investigating the third principle, *viz.*, the exemplar. Hence he was compelled to add something like *ex operibus porro . . .* to the words *iuxta compositionis vero praecepta ipsum opificem deum*.

## 88) The principles

[305] And because all these are principles, we must, all over again, discuss the principles. Now a principle is, first of all, a limit after which comes everything beginning from that limit. And because every principle, being an origin, precedes the coming into existence of things, it must be simple, without quality, and permanent. If the principle is not simple, it will be the same as the things proceeding from its substance. Thus the principle would not differ from the rest, even if one assumed priority in time, for the thing coming after the principle also exists from a certain time; but it is quite impossible that there should be no difference. So the origin of things is simple. Nor has it any quality, for if a quality is ascribed to it, it will, I think, be something composed of matter and quality, for everything possessing a quality has such a nature. Thus the principle is without quality.

ET QUONIAM Calcidius attempts to treat the problem thoroughly. "The question is about principles, so one should first consider their requirements. Then one can see whether the so-called elements (fire, water, etc.) are principles. It is evident that they are not, but God, matter and the examples are". This is the content of the argument in par. 305-307. This train of thought has something illogical. First, the realities found are principles and, afterwards, they have still to be found. Calcidius probably regarded this argument as a confirmation of the preceding one. EST IGITUR INITIUM This definition of *initium*, especially striking on account of the term *limes*, is wholly explained from Aristotle: *Primus . . . post quem sunt cuncta* from *Met.* 1013 a 17-19: πασῶν μὲν οὖν κοινὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν τὸ πρῶτον εἶναι δύνειν ἢ ἔστιν ἢ γίγνεται ἢ γιγνώσκεται (cp. 1012 b 34). *limes* is the translation of τὸ πέρας: ἢ μὲν γάρ ἀρχὴ πέρας τι (ib., 1022 a 12). SIMPLICEM, SINE QUALITATE, PERPETUAM Calcidius mentions three distinguishing features of matter; the first two are discussed in par. 305, the last in par. 306. SI SIMPLEX NON ERIT The argument is: "If the principles are not simple, the only distinction between principles and 'the rest' (*cetera*) is not more than one of priority and posteriority. This is not really an essential distinction and, therefore, impossible". NEC HABET QUALITATEM The concept of simplicity implies being without quality. The division into paragraphs, at first sight un-

fortunate, is quite correct. It would be incorrect to treat each of the three characteristics of the principles in a separate chapter: the first two are intimately connected.

[306] The eternity of a principle is proved in the following way. If it were not eternal, it must have existed from a definite time; if so, the cause of its existence must necessarily precede the origin of the principles, and so there is something preceding the principle. But that a principle should precede another principle is a foolish thought, so the principle of things is eternal. It is also immortal, for if it is perishable, it will have no possibility of perishing, since it cannot be dissolved into something simple nor into something composite. It cannot be dissolved into something simple, because the principles alone are simple; hence the principle would be dissolved into what it is itself, and in this way there would be a restoration rather than destruction. But the principle cannot dissolve into something composite either, for in that case it will be kept in existence by the composite things themselves, and so there will be no question of a dissolution, for everything composite consists of the very combination of simple things. Nor is a dissolution into nothing possible, for there cannot be anything that is nothing. At any rate, if, as Plato says, the principle perishes, it will not come to new life through anything else nor will anything else arise from it. Thus we find that the principle of things is immortal.

**AETERNUM QUOQUE** From the argument itself, Calcidius appears to take *aeternus* in the sense of 'not having become', 'without a beginning' (ἀγένητος). As in par. 305 he connected *simplex* with *sine qualitate*, he now connects *inmortalis* with *aeternus* (*inmortalis* = ἀθάνατος or ἀφθαρτος: cp. the text from the *Phaedrus* quoted below).

**NAM SI NON AETERNUM** Again a *argumentatio per absurdum* as in par. 305: "We should be obliged to assume the existence of the principle of a principle". The same idea is found in Aristotle, *Physics* 189 a 30: ἔσται γάρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς. *Met.* 1000 b 26: ὥστε συμβαίνει τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐτέρας ἀρχὰς εἶναι προτέρας, τούτῳ δ' ἀδύνατον (cp. Basilius, *In Hexaëm.* 16D: Ἀρχὴν δὲ ἀρχῆς ἐπινοεῖν παντελῶς καταγέλαστον). **NAM SI OCCIDUA** This argument, too, has a typically Aristotelian flavour. As regards its form, Calcidius omits a negation in the first part of the dilemma. Fabricius observes:

*acciendum est ac si scripsisset: non in simplex.* Something similar is found in *Physics* I 6, where Aristotle argues that there can be neither one nor an infinite number of principles; explaining this he says: μίαν (sc. ἀρχὴν) μὲν γάρ οὐχ οἶλόν τε, δτι οὐχ ἐν τὰ ἐναντία, ἀπείρους δ' ὅτι . . . (189 a 12-13). Here the negation is missing in the second part (ἀπείρους δ'). Calcidius does the same in 341, 13 (. . . neque . . . est in terra nec iam in aqua; in terra quidem, . . .) and 362, 12-15 (Atque ut animam neque animatam dicimus neque exanimem - animatam quidem ideo . . ., exanimem vero quia . . .). The argument is by no means simple. The point is that with principles there can be no question of dissolution into something simple or composite, nor into nothing. Dissolution into something simple is impossible, because in that case one would have to speak of restoration rather than destruction (cp. 90, 16-17, where a *iactura* actually is a *recreatio*; see also par. 118 *ex.*). In fact, simplicity is one of the characteristics of any principle, so that a dissolution into something simple would mean a return to itself. This excludes destruction. Moreover, dissolution into something composite is equally impossible, for this would not mean destruction but composition, since the principles are kept together in composite things. As in the first case 'dissolutio' would be *recreari*, so in the second it would be *contineri* or a *conexio*. Finally, the third possibility, *viz.*, a dissolution into nothing, is to be rejected, by Calcidius, on the basis of the well-known Aristotelic argument (cp. par. 283). CERTE, UT AIT PLATO Calcidius refers to *Phaedrus* 245D: ἀρχῆς γάρ δὴ ἀπολομένης οὔτε αὐτή ποτε ἔχ του οὔτε δλλο ἔξ ἐκείνης γενήσεται. This text occurs in a passage on the immortality of the soul, where Plato speculates on the concept ἀρχή: ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον. ἔξ ἀρχῆς γάρ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ γιγνόμενον γίγνεσθαι, αὐτὴν δὲ μηδ' ἔξ ἐνός· εἰ γάρ ἔχ του ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἀρχὴ γίγνοιτο. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγένητόν ἔστι, καὶ ἀδιάφθαρτον αὐτὸν ἀνάγκη είναι. Various themes of this text are used by Calcidius: ἀρχὴ = *initium*; ἀγένητος - ἀδιάφθαρτος = *aeternus* - *immortalis*. Yet his argument differs plainly from Plato's and rather shows Aristotelic features. It is a Platonic concept but elaborated *modo Aristotelico*. This Aristotelic treatment becomes still more evident when elsewhere Calcidius is seen to translate Plato's text, showing himself well acquainted with its wording: *Initium porro sine ortu, quando quae gignuntur ex initio creatur, ipsum porro ex nullo initio. Nam si ex aliquo, initium non erit initium, quando cuncta quae gignuntur ex initio sint oportet. Et quia caret generatione, caret etiam*

*morte. quippe initio sepulto neque ipsum ex aliquo reparabitur nec quicquam ex eo* (125, 5-12). The same text from the *Phaedrus* is also used by Albinus in his chapter on the immortality of the soul: ἀρχὴ δὲ ἀγένητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον (XXV 4). However, for the rest he does not come nearer to the text of *Calcidius*.

εε) The real principles

[307] Now that we have explained what a principle is and of what kind it is, the next step is to see whether fire or earth or one of the other so-called elements is a principle. In my opinion, none of them can be said to be so, for not one of them is simple. They are bodies composed of various materials and natures. And from what has been said it is clear that a principle must be simple.

After discussing this point, it has to be proved that there are two principles of things, one opposed to the other, for this is the opinion not only of Plato but also of the earlier philosophers who agree on this point without exception. Some of them take heat and cold as principles, others humidity and drought, others find it in concord and discord or in unity and multiplicity, and in equality and inequality, as Pythagoras did—they all agree on the contrast between the principles but disagree whether these are eternal or temporal, incorporeal or corporeal; and one of them is presented as something active, the other as something passive. It is also necessary that principles do not arise from something else nor from one another; on the other hand, everything must derive its being from them.

What we indicated just now as 'something active' is God, and what as 'something passive' is bodily matter. But because the active principle, when in action, looks at an exemplar, the necessity of a third principle is thus stated, and so there are three principles, *viz.*, God, matter and the exemplar. God is the first moving active principle; matter is that from which, as the primary source, everything that comes into being arises.

QUIA IGITUR, *Calcidius* studies whether the so-called elements, water, earth, *etc.*, are real principles. He must, of course, state that they are not, the reason being that these so-called elements are not simple. Although this is clear, the explanation of this non-simplicity

is noteworthy. One should expect: "Since they are composed of nature (matter) and qualities", but Calcidius says: *ex diversis materiis naturisque concreta sunt corpora*. He probably wishes to convey that fire, earth, etc., as they exist in the world never consist of mere fire, etc., but are mixed with other materials (*naturae* is equivalent to *materiae*, cp. 334, 17-18: *ex simplicium naturarum conexione*, where *naturae* also clearly means *elementa, materiae*; cp. p. 42). Pure materials are only found in the world of ideas, cp. 302, 18: *ignis purus et intelligibilis ceteraque sincerae substantiae*). HIS ITA DIGESTIS The argument takes an unexpected turn. The question to be answered is: what then are these principles? Calcidius might have continued: "Witness all philosophers, there are two principles, fundamentally opposed to each other. Different philosophers found this opposition in different materials and powers", etc. This is the actual content of the argument, but Calcidius gives the impression that he produces another proof for this thesis; he says: *His ita digestis demonstrandum est duo esse initia rerum*. This demonstration is no more than a reference to the *consensus doctorum*. The curious structure of the argument is best understood, if seen against the background of the source from which it was derived, viz., Aristotle. ET HAEC CONTRARIA One of the fundamental theses in the system of Aristotle is the opposition of the principles; πάντες δὴ τάναντία ἀρχάς ποιοῦσιν, he says in *Physics* 188 a 19, referring to the unanimous doctrine of the earlier philosophers. Calcidius not only follows him but, on close inspection, only paraphrases or even translates Aristotle. The latter says: πάντες γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς ὑπ' αὐτῶν καλουμένας ἀρχάς, καίπερ δὲν λόγου τιθέντες, ὅμως τάναντία λέγουσιν, ὡσπερ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας ἀναγκασθέντες. διαφέρουσι δ' ἀλλήλων τῷ τοὺς μὲν πρότερα τοὺς δ' ὕστερα λαμβάνειν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν γνωριμώτερα κατὰ τὸν λόγον τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν (οἱ μὲν γὰρ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, οἱ δὲ ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ἔτεροι δὲ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἡ νεῦκος καὶ φιλίαν αἰτίας τίθενται τῆς γενέσεως (188 b 27 ss.). Most of the contrasts enumerated by Calcidius occur in this text; those still wanting are found further on: καὶ ἔοικε παλαιὰ εἶναι καὶ αὕτη ἡ δόξα, δτι τὸ ἐν καὶ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, πλὴν οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἀρχαῖοι τὰ δύο μὲν ποιεῖν τὸ δὲ ἐν πάσχειν, τῶν δὲ ὕστερων τινὲς τούναντίον τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ δὲ δύο πάσχειν φασὶ μᾶλλον (189 b 11 ss.). Aristotle observes: δτι μὲν οὖν ἐναντίας δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς εἶναι, φανερόν (189 a 9-10). Calcidius says: *Quorum omnium sententiae de contra-*

*rietate initiorum concinunt*, but Aristotle already pointed out some differences. Then *Calcidius* copies word for word a few lines from the beginning of Aristotle's historical treatise;

OPORET PORRO INITIA NEC EX ALIIS ULLIS  
REBUS ORIGINEM TRAHERE NEC EX SE  
INVICEM CONSTARE, QUIN POTIUS OMNIA  
EX ISDEM SUBSTANTIAM MUTUARI.      δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς μήτε  
έξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μήτε  
έξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων  
πάντα (188 a 27-28).

The manner in which the source is used is remarkable. *Calcidius* seems to be so absorbed by the *consensus doctorum* that he forgets the rest of the argument provided by Aristotle. The phrase *quorum alterum, etc.*, must be connected, not with what immediately precedes but with the statement that, according to all ancient philosophers, there are two opposed principles. The contrast *faciens - patiens* (see p. 35) is also in Aristotle; for the Stoics it is even the principal contrast. It was much worked upon by other authors and so it proves a very fertile idea (Philo, *De opif. mundi* 2, 8 (I, p. 2, 18-19 Coh.): ἔγνω δὴ (sc. Μωυσῆς) ὅτι ἀναγκαιότατόν ἔστι ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αἰτίον τὸ δὲ παθητόν. *Basilius*, *In Hexaëm.*, p. 148 Giet: 'Ἐπει ἀποχρινέσθωσαν ἡμῖν, πῶς ἀλλήλοις συνέτυχον ἡ τε δραστικὴ τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις καὶ ἡ παθητικὴ φύσις τῆς ὥλης). QUOD IGITUR Without further introduction *Calcidius* establishes that the *faciens* is God and the *patiens* matter, as above simply substituting *mens dei* for *mens*; and he continues: "but there must still be a third principle". The proposition is, indeed, surprising after the statement concerning the contrasting character of only two principles. *Calcidius* may have felt safe because of Aristotle, who states in 189 b 16-18: τὸ μὲν οὖν τρία φάσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι ἐκ τε τούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων ἄλλων ἐπισκοποῦσι δόξειν ἀν ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον, ὡσπερ εἴπομεν, τὸ δὲ πλείω τρίων οὐκέτι. But the latter refers to a different trias, viz., ὥλη, στέρησις, μορφή. However, it is not due to Aristotle that *Calcidius* adds this third principle here, but to Plato, whose doctrine emphatically requires an exemplary cause. In *Calcidius*' summary, however, it is obvious that this third principle did not fit into the discussion. Here *Calcidius* explains only the first two principles: God and matter. In the description of the former the Aristotelian substructure of the argument comes again to the surface, when God is said to be the *origo primaria moliens et posita in actu*, i.e., the first Mover and τὸ ἐνεργεία δν.

*Calcidius* fails to give the exemplary principle the central place

which it has in Plato's system. According to Plato, the ideas are discovered first, then matter and, finally, God as the one who brings the connexion between these two powers (cp. Bäumker, *o.c.*, p. 114). In Calcidius the ideas are scarcely more than an addition mentioned for the sake of completeness. They are by no means an integrating part. If their occurrence in his system presenting itself as Platonic had not been absolutely necessary, the ideas would have been omitted. In par. 304 the same thing occurred: here, too, the argument in favour of the existence of ideas had the character of a Platonic addition in a thoroughly Aristotelian treatise.—*Deus et silva et exemplum*. The list of the three principles of Plato is quite frequent, *e.g.*, Aët. I 3, 21: Πλάτων... τρεῖς ἀρχαί, τὸν θεὸν τὴν ὕλην τὴν ἴδεαν. See Bäumker, *o.c.*, p. 114, note 2.

The end of the introduction to Calcidius' treatise on matter is in sight. The whole dialectical apparatus has evidently been derived from Peripatetic sources; naturally one is led to think of Adrastus (cp. p. 92). Calcidius had considerable difficulties in handling these Peripatetic arguments and concepts. He handled them in a manner quite his own.

β) Calcidius' own treatise on matter  
 αα) Its name and variability

[308] Now at last we are going to discuss matter, which Pythagoreans, Platonists and Stoics unanimously consider to be the origin of things. It has, however, received its name from the pupils of Plato. Plato himself never used the name of matter (ὕλη), but a great number of other names in order to explain its nature, since he wanted to quicken in us somehow a concept of it, on the basis of either its own nature or the affections and emotions of our souls. On the basis of its own nature he calls it 'the first matter', something 'resembling a soft yielding matter into which seals are pressed', 'the receptacle of things', and occasionally 'mother' or 'nurse of all generation'. He starts from the affections of those hearing about it, when he says that it is 'something to be grasped by means of bastard concept' and 'palpable without being noticed by those touching it'.

All authors mentioned above agree that matter is wholly variable and convertible, but they give different explanations of its conversion and mutability. Some of them think that matter

changes and assumes qualities by its own nature, because the result of alteration is only a change of quality, which quality, in their opinion, is nothing else than matter in a different state. We, on the other hand, do not agree that matter and quality are the same, for one of them is, as it were, the underlying material, the other an accident to that material. And this proves that matter is passive, for it is due to change that it assumes different qualities.

**NUNC IAM DE SILVA TRACTABITUR** After discussing the principles in general, *Calcidius* finally comes to matter itself. Pythagoreans, Platonists and Stoics agree on both the existence of matter and its mutability, although they disagree on the meaning of the latter. The terminology of matter differed considerably. **PYTHAGOREI, PLATONICI, STOICI** The doctrines of the different schools have already been discussed. The absence of Aristotle is remarkable; the explanation is found in what follows. **NOMEN VERO** The name *silva* = *ὕλη* for matter was invented by Aristotle. Due to his influence the term *ὕλη* had soon become generally accepted. So *Calcidius* can say that the name comes from the *auditores Platonis*; after all, Aristotle was an *auditor Platonis* himself. If I am not mistaken, *Calcidius* already included him among the *Platonici* in the preceding phrase. In par. 273 (304, 4-7) he says: *Quam modo matrem, alias nutriculam, interdum totius generationis gremium, non numquam locum adpellat (sc. Plato), quamque iuniores hylen, nos silvam vocamus. Plato, iuniores and nos, all clearly form one group.* Since, on the one hand, the term *ὕλη* reminds one strongly of Aristotle and, on the other hand, his name is strikingly absent from the list of philosophers, *Calcidius* must indeed have reckoned Aristotle among *Platonici*. Hence he saw the relation between *Plato* and Aristotle in a different way than we do. And this explains why he mixed Aristotelian elements in his, officially, Platonic treatise. An indication of this attitude occurs in par. 283 (312, 17-19) where he says about Aristotle: *Cuius sententia cum sit praeclera et nobilis et ad Platonici dogmatis considerationem satis adcommodata, non otiose praetereunda est.* This attitude, moreover, is in complete agreement with the common practice of Middle Platonism, except for such 'strict' Platonists as *Atticus*. In order to achieve a complete reconstruction of *Plato's* system, Middle Platonists elaborate their accounts of *Plato's* statements with a number of Peripatetic

tenets. Indeed they regarded the latter as in perfect agreement with Plato's own doctrine and, therefore, as a perfectly justified supplement to what they believed Plato had not treated in detail (and what, in fact, he had not treated at all), in particular logics. They never seem to have realized for a moment that, in doing so, they enlarged Plato's doctrine with *corpora aliena* (cp. A.-J. Festugière, *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, II 341 ss. and J. H. Waszink, *Der Platonismus und die altchristliche Gedankenwelt*, in *Entretiens Fonction Hardt*, III, Genève, 1955, p. 146-147). Hence Calcidius must have looked upon the *Timaeus* commentary by the Peripatetic Adrastus as a primarily 'Platonic' book, and, for that reason, may have used it without scruple for his own commentary. **IPSE ENIM NUSQUAM** According to van Straaten (*Stud. Cath.* 27 (1952) p. 242) a text of Hermodorus transmitted by Simplicius (*In Phys.* 247, 30 ss.) would reveal that Plato already used the term ὕλη. However, the fact that Hermodorus used this term in order to explain Plato's doctrine, does not prove that Plato himself used it. Nor may this be concluded from the words of Aristotle in *Physics* (209 b 11-13): διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταῦτο φησιν εἰναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαιῷ· τὸ γάρ μεταληπτικὸν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐν καὶ ταῦτον. Since Aristotle cited the book in which Plato explains this doctrine, the meaning of his words can be ascertained. It appears that in the *Timaeus* Plato did not use ὕλη in the sense meant here. When he used it, it means 'subject-matter', material. After discussing the principles (not only the χώρα), he says: "now we have our material together"; *Tim.* 69A: "Οτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ νῦν οἷα τέκτοσιν ἡμῖν ὕλη παράκειται τὰ τῶν αἰτίων γένη διωλισμένα. Thus Aristotle explains Plato's doctrine with his own term which, to him, is synonymous with τὸ μεταληπτικόν. The quotation of Hermodorus, who indeed was one of Plato's immediate pupils, shows that the term ὕλη = 'matter' was accepted in the school of Plato at a very early date. **SED ALIIS MULTIS** Calcidius divides the names which Plato had given into two groups: 1) those based on the nature of matter, 2) those which 'are connected with the *passiones commotionesque animorum nostrorum*'—evidently he means 'names denoting the reaction of our mind on this reality', or names denoting how matter is known by us. In the first group are: *prima materia*; *simile quiddam mollis cedenisque materiae, in quam inprimuntur signacula; rerum receptaculum; mater; nutricula totius generationis*; in the second group: *adulterino quodam intellectu recordandum; contiguum sine tangentium sensu*. Calcidius' use of the

word 'names' of matter is rather curious; the term is taken in a very broad sense. For this reason perhaps he used the very rare word *nuncupamentum* (not found in Lewis and Short). The first denomination is *prima materia*. If Calcidius himself had not stated that Plato did not denote matter by *silva* (= ὄλη), one would have been inclined to see the words *prima materia* as a translation of πρώτη ὄλη. A clue to their actual meaning might be found in the two words *et item*. They are often used by Calcidius and always combine two ideas or words closely connected with each other: for instance, *unum et item multa* (335, 14), *fundi et item contrahi* (339, 19), *pictoria et item fictoria* (354, 6); cp. 91, 17; 121, 6-7; 144, 15; 201, 13; 230, 13; 238, 7; 261, 2 ss.; 263, 8; 266, 17; 279, 15; 357, 19; 367, 17. Probably *et item* is a translation of the Greek τε καὶ. Thus *prima materia* may be closely connected with *simile quiddam . . . signacula*. This last 'name' is rendering of ἔκμαγεῖον. In 351, 16-17 the translation of this Greek term is exactly the same. Now the word *materia* also occurs in the present description. Hence Calcidius can easily say: "Plato calls matter *materia*, i.e., the matter out of which everything was made", and than add himself: "and this is the first matter, the *prima materia*". Aristotle's term πρώτη ὄλη may well have prompted Calcidius to this addition although *prima materia* is not its translation but *silva*.—Some, not the best manuscripts, read *primo* instead of *prima*. If this is correct, Calcidius has not made the addition just discussed, and the two 'names' are even more closely connected, but this version can scarcely be accepted, since Calcidius uses the term *materia principalis* in another place (340, 13-14) where it is the same as *materia prima*. So *prima materia* was indeed a fixed term.

The other names offer fewer difficulties: *receptaculum* = ὑποδοχή (51A, cp. 49A); *mater* = μητήρ (51A, cp. 50D); *nutricula totius generationis*: in par. 273, where Calcidius gives a similar list of names for matter, he writes: *totius generationis gremium*, which is the translation of *Tim.* 49A: πάσης . . . γενέσεως ὑποδοχήν. Now Plato adds there οἷον τιθήνην which explains Calcidius' present formulation here. For τιθήνη also see *Tim.* 52D, 88D.

The two qualifications based on our grasp of matter are amply discussed by Calcidius in par. 345 ss., where he comments upon relevant passages of the *Timaeus*. For the entire series of names one may also refer to Albinus, VIII 2: Ταῦτην τοῖνυν ἔκμαγεῖόν τε καὶ πανδεχές καὶ τιθήνην καὶ μητέρα καὶ χώραν διομάζει καὶ ὑποκείμενον

ἀπτόν τε μετ' ἀναισθησίας καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ ληπτόν. By means of a quotation from Pseudo-Plutarch Fabricius demonstrates the influence of Plato's terminology: *A Platone habuit Aristoteles, quando docuit* ὅλην ἀποιον μὲν δον ἐπὶ τῇ ἴδιᾳ φύσει, δεξαμένην δὲ τῶν εἰδῶν οἷον τιθήνην καὶ ἔχμαγειον καὶ μητέρα γενέσθαι (Plut. Lib. I *De Placitis*, c. 9).

OMNIBUS VERO Pythagoreans, Platonists and Stoics agree that matter is entirely changeable, but they explain this fact differently. According to some, the variability of matter consists in the loss of its own nature (*ex propria ratione converti*); to them, change is receiving other qualities, which are only a certain shape and a certain aspect of matter, so that in reality matter and quality are identical. Calcidius takes his stand against this theory: *nobis autem nequaquam placet eandem silvam esse et qualitatem*. In his opinion, matter is like a foundation or a substratum, and quality is something added to it; the variability of matter consists in the fact that it accepts these qualities; hence it is *patibilis*. The authors meant here are the Stoics. In par. 311 he states: "If forms and qualities are contained in matter itself, as the Stoics think, (the concept of) matter is superfluous". (Also see par. 321 and 325). If, therefore, Calcidius opposes the Stoics, he follows the opinion of the others, *viz.*, the Pythagoreans and Platonists (including Aristotle).

Calcidius' explanation of the Stoic standpoint will partly be discussed in the comment on the *passibilitas* of matter (par. 309). Meanwhile, reference must be made to Sextus Emp., *Adv. Mathem.* X 312: ἐξ ἀποίου μὲν οὖν καὶ ἔνος σώματος τὴν τῶν ὅλων ὑπεστήσαντο γένεσιν οἱ Στωϊκοί· ἀρχὴ γάρ τῶν δητῶν κατ' αὐτούς ἔστι ή ἀποίος ὅλη καὶ δι' ὅλων τρεπτή, μεταβαλλούσης δὲ ταύτης γίγνεται τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα (S.V.F. II 309; cp. II 305). The Stoics, according to him, defend here one changing matter; its very change makes things come into existence. To Calcidius' own opinion, which is scarcely more than a *petitio principii*, a return will be made in par. 309. For the moment we refer to Plotinus, *Enn.* I 8, 10: Συμβεβηκός οὖν τὸ ποιόν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ· ή δὲ ὅλη οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον, καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός περὶ αὐτό (Steinheimer, o.c., p. 41). The fact that Calcidius gives little attention to the argument by Plotinus does not favour the supposition of his dependence upon Plotinus. Moreover, one may assume that the present criticism of the Stoic doctrine was a fairly general topic.

[309] Moreover, change takes place in matter but without matter undergoing any change itself; that what changes is the qualities present in it and contained by it. For, if matter itself changes, it must needs change into something else and so cease to be matter. Now this is certainly wrong, for just as wax, fashioned in different shapes, does not change itself but only in its shapes—in itself it remains what it is, for the shapes are not wax itself—so I think, it is right to call matter passive, since it changes in form and shape without abandoning anything of its nature.

The train of thought is clear: change does not affect matter itself, it is restricted to qualities. If matter could change at all, it would be matter no more. It is the same as with wax which, moulded into various shapes, remains wax; so matter assumes various forms but remains what it was. Because of this condition, matter is rightly called passive. The last two thoughts are muddled in *Calcidius*, so that the phrase *sic opinor* . . . is distorted. One might also say that *sic opinor* refers to the part of the sentence ending at *recedat*, not to the whole of it.

*Calcidius* particularly wishes to stress that *silva est patibilis*—else why the repetition? To *Steinheimer* believing *Calcidius* to be dependent upon *Plotinus*, who calls matter *ἀποθῆς*, this stress creates a difficulty. He sees *opinor* as a sign of uncertainty in *Calcidius*. I cannot agree with this interpretation. This verb indicates that the question is still under discussion. Moreover, whenever *Calcidius* uses *opinor*, he is generally quite sure of his point (cp. e.g., 309, 23; 319, 4). It cannot, therefore, be denied that *Calcidius* considers matter to be *patibilis*. In point of fact, this was already evident from the first section of his *De silva*, where matter is described as *eademque patibilis natura, quippe subiecta corpori principaliter, in qua qualitates et quantitates et omnia quae accidentum proveniunt. quae cum a natura propria non recedat, diversis tamen et contrariis speciebus eorum quae intra se recipit formisque variatur.* The agreement in terminology is striking: *sic opinor silvam quoque formis figurisque variatam, cum de sua condicione minime recedat, recte patibilem dici.* As already seen (on par. 268 p. 32), *Calcidius* closely agrees with *Plato*: matter is the *χώρα* which assumes everything without undergoing change in itself.

On the other hand, *patibilis* does not seem to fit into this concept of matter, for one might say as well that matter is not affected and,

therefore, entirely 'impassive'. And to stress the point still further, elsewhere Calcidius himself says: *Nam ipsa ex natura sua inpetibilis est nec ullam fert perpessionem* (375, 2-3; cp. *inpetibili felicitate* (106, 2-3); in 194, 25 he uses the term *inpatibilis*: *cum sit inmortale animal et inpatibile . . .*); and in par. 319 he explains: *quando passionem quoque ipsam, quae propria eius videtur, adimimus, ideo quod numquam ex propria condicione desciscat, sed aliis, id est corporibus intra eam perpetientibus, illa consors perpessionis putetur* (343, 19-22). With regard to this last text Steinheimer, of course, says: "So, according to Calcidius, matter is not *patibilis* after all and, therefore, he seems to agree with Plotinus". But this fails to explain Calcidius' repeated and explicit assertions that matter may be called *patibilis*. Steinheimer insists (o.c., p. 45) that this is an addition by Calcidius himself ("eigene Zutat"), but then the purpose of this addition must be explained which, from the standpoint of Plotinus, is quite impossible. The idea that Calcidius represents the period before Plotinus when the Platonists were still wavering between *patibilis* and *inpatibilis*, is much more plausible. Meanwhile, Steinheimer refers to a striking parallel of Calcidius' *quam quidem qualitatem nihilo minus esse* (sc. secundum Stoicos) *silvam in alio atque alio habitu* (337, 4-5) in Plotinus: Καὶ οἱ μὲν σώματα μόνον τὰ δύτα εἶναι θέμενοι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἐν τούτοις μίαν τε τὴν ὅλην λέγουσι καὶ τοῖς στοιχείοις ὑποβεβλῆσθαι καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα οἷον πάθη ταύτης καὶ πως ἔχουσαν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα εἶναι (II 4, 1). And he continues: Καὶ δὴ καὶ τολμῶσι καὶ μέχρι θεῶν αὐτὴν ἄγειν καὶ τέλος δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ὅλην ταύτην πως ἔχουσαν εἶναι. In the continuation of this text, not cited by Steinheimer, it is said that, according to the Stoics, even God is ὅλη πως ἔχουσα (Calcidius would say *silva in aliquo habitu*) and this, indeed, may be regarded as a parallel of par. 294: *propterea que factum ut opiniones incurrerent inpias, deum scilicet hoc esse, quod silva sit, vel etiam qualitatem inseparabilem deum silvae* (323, 19-22). See also *Enn.* VI 1, 27: 'Ο γὰρ θεὸς αὐτοῖς εὐπρεπείας ἔνεκεν ἐπεισάγεται παρά τε τῆς ὅλης ἔχων τὸ εἶναι καὶ σύνθετος καὶ ὑστερος, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλη πως ἔχουσα. None of these texts, however interesting as parallels, will ever prove a dependence of Calcidius upon Plotinus. Much more plausible, indeed, is the possibility of a dependence of both Plotinus and Calcidius upon a third person, Numenius. The latter strongly and continuously opposed the Stoics (par. 295-299). We suggested the possibility that the entire treatise on the Stoa (par. 289-294),

including par. 294, was borrowed from Numenius (p. 103). Anyhow, the latter appears to be the obvious common authority of both the present passage and the parallels occurring in Plotinus.

For the first part of the present paragraph (337, 11-14) Steinheimer refers to *Enn.* II 4, 6: ἔστιν εἶδος μεταβολὴ ἐξ εἴδους ἐτέρου. Μένει δὲ τὸ δεξάμενον τὸ εἴδους τοῦ γενομένου καὶ ἀποβαλόν θάτερον. This text occurs in an argument in favour of the existence of the *ūlē* by proving that something underlies the *σώματα*. But this is quite different from what Calcidius defends, *viz.*, that matter always remains unchanged and unaffected by the changing qualities. At *Quippe si ipsa mutabitur...* Steinheimer refers to *Enn.* III 6, 10: "Επειτα εἰ πάσχει ἡ ὄλη δεῖ τι ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐκ τοῦ πάθους ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος ἢ ἐτέρως διακεῖθαι ἢ πρὶν εἰσελθεῖν εἰς αὐτὴν τὸ πάθος. 'Επιούσης τοίνυν ἀλλῆς μετ' ἔκεινην ποιότητος οὐκέτι ὄλη ἔσται τὸ δεχόμενον, ἀλλὰ ποιὰ ὄλη. The argument is this: "If matter undergoes something, it must receive something, either this *πάθος* itself or a condition different from its former condition. Now if another quality is added, matter will no longer be matter alone but matter with a definite quality". Plotinus is here drawing another conclusion from an idea such as that given by Calcidius. Hence Plotinus cannot be a source of Calcidius; what is more, one cannot even speak of a real parallel. On the other hand, a convincing one is furnished by the other text cited in Steinheimer, *viz.*, *Enn.* III 6, 18: οὐ γάρ δύναται ἄλλο τι ἢ δ ἔστι γενέσθαι. This, however, is an Aristotelian idea: there can be no question of a coming into existence *secundum naturam* (cp. par. 284). The fundamental source of the present section remains *Tim.* 50B: 'Ο αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως. Ταῦτὸν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐσυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔξιταται δυνάμεως. Reference to it was already made in the comment on par. 268 (p. 32).—The example of wax is in *Tim.* 50E: δσοι τε ἐν τισιν τῶν μαλακῶν σχήματα ἀπομάττειν ἐπιχειροῦσι ... Albinus discusses this passage at length and adds ἐκ κήρου ἢ πηλοῦ (VIII 2). The comparison with gold in *Tim.* 50A-B has the same purpose as that with wax, which, in its turn, is used by Plotinus in *Enn.* III 6, 9.

### ββ) Matter without quality

[310] All these philosophers also declare unanimously that matter is without quality and without figure or form, not that it

could ever exist without them, but it does not possess them by itself; it accompanies rather than possesses them. If then we want mentally to take away from it these things without which it cannot exist, we are able to give it the possession of them all, not in reality but in possibility. There are, however, two kinds of possibility: one, as when we say that seed hides the full-grown body and, therefore, is the living being in possibility; another, as when we say that 'that which in itself has as yet not what it is going to be but can assume forms and qualities from outside' is in possibility that which it is not yet, as, for instance, a shapeless mass of bronze or wax before it receives a form by the artisan's work.

ETIAM HOC All philosophers concerned agree that matter is changeable; they also say that matter has neither qualities nor forms. However, in order to prevent misunderstanding, Calcidius adds at once that matter never occurs without qualities. He then tries to explain this by means of the concept of possibility.

The doctrine that matter is without any quality was quite common since Aristotle. In his summary of Plato's theory on the *ὕλη* (the Aristotelian term) Albinus says that it *αὐτὴν δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν ἀκμορφόν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀποιον καὶ ἀνείδεον* (Calcidius: *sine figura, sine qualitate, sine specie*), *ἀναματτομένην δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐκτυπουμένην καθάπερ ἐκμαγεῖον σχηματιζομένην ὑπὸ τούτων, μηδὲν ἔδιον σχῆμα ἔχουσαν μηδὲ ποιότητα* (VIII 2). The Stoics also accepted the *ἀποιος*, notwithstanding the fact that, in their view, matter is a body (*σῶμα*)<sup>1</sup>), and the qualities are more intimately connected with matter than in the opinion of the others; see par. 308 (for this common doctrine Steinheimer refers to *Enn.*, II 4, 14; I 8, 10; II 4, 8).

For the theory that matter is never without qualities, reference should, first of all, be made to Aristotle, e.g., *De gen. et corr.*, 320 b 17: *ἡ ὕλη, ἣν οὐδέποτ' ἀνευ πάθους οἶντος τε εἰναι οὐδὲ ἀνευ μορφῆς . . .* It is the well-known *ἀχώριστος*, already seen occasionally (*inseparabiliter* 322, 1; see the comment there). This idea, too, became

1) This is why Galen in *De qualitatibus incorporeis* attacks the Stoics. "Σῶμα", he says, "implies weight; therefore, if matter is a *σῶμα*, it is not simple. Moreover, every *σῶμα* is limited; therefore, if matter is a *σῶμα*, it also has shape, a *σχῆμα*". See *S.V.F.* II 323. Calcidius discusses this subject in detail in par. 318.

common property of the philosophers. Steinheimer refers to *Enn.* II 7, 2: οὐδαμοῦ ὥλη κενὴ ποιότητος, and II 4, 5: οὐδέποτε γάρ ἄνευ μορφῆς. Origen, *De princ.* II 1, 4 (V, p. 110, 4-6 K.) is elucidating: *Haec tamen materia quamvis, ut supra diximus, secundum propriam rationem sine qualitatibus sit, numquam tamen subsistere extra qualitates invenitur.* Calcidius' words in this section show a strong similarity to a passage of Origen, where the latter explains the doctrine of the Stoics. (That the Stoics held this theory, also follows from Calcidius' words.) This passage deserves more attention, because it follows that in which Origen lists the Stoic definitions of οὐσία, quoted in the comment on par. 289. His words are (*De orat.* 27, 8, Vol. II, p. 368, 1 ss. K.; *S.V.F.* II 318): *κατὰ τούτους δὲ (sc. Stoicos) ἡ οὐσία ἔστιν ἀποιός τε καὶ ἀπηγμάτιστος κατὰ τὸν ἔδιον λόγον*, and a little further on: οὐδὲ τινὸς γάρ τούτων κατὰ τὸν ἔδιον λόγον μετέχειν φασὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀεὶ δὲ τινὸς αὐτῶν ἀχώριστον εἰναι. And, as though confirming our suspicion of affinity, Origen continues: *παθητὴν δὲ οὐδὲν ἔχον καὶ ἐπιδεικτικὴν πασῶν τῶν τοῦ ποιοῦντος ἐνεργείων, ὡς ἀν ἐκεῖνο ποιῆ καὶ μεταβάλλῃ.* "Yet according to them it is *παθητή*", Origen says; Calcidius: *patibilis*. Since a considerable part of Origen's sources is found in Middle Platonism (cp. Hal Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis*, p. 129), the idea that Calcidius depended on Middle Platonism in general and on Numenius in particular finds here a new confirmation. DENIQUE SI Matter being affected with qualities, but having no quality as such, Calcidius now studies the question of the relationship between matter as such and its qualities. Matter possesses qualities in possibility (*possibilitate*). Calcidius expresses himself in an awkward, not to say clumsy manner. Instead of speaking of 'matter as such', he seems to think that its existence must be proved. It looks as though he is again applying his *resolutio* (cp. 332, 9: *si ergo has qualitates . . . volemus ratione animi separare*; the *volumus* has a parallel in the *volumus* of the present passage). This undeniable clumsiness is due to the fact that his sources provided him with only a restricted number of arguments which he used as much as possible, not seldom in contexts where they are entirely out of place. Steinheimer quotes a good parallel from *Enn.* II 4, 4: *εἰ γάρ τῷ νῷ ἀφέλοις τὴν ποικιλίαν καὶ τὰς μορφὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ νοήματα, τὸ πρὸ τούτων ἀμορφὸν καὶ ἀδριστὸν . . .*

POSSIBILITAS AUTEM Calcidius distinguishes in the same way as Aristotle what is called by the commentators a *potentia activa* from

a *potentia passiva* (cp. E. J. Dijksterhuis, *De Mechanisering van het Wereldbeeld*, Amsterdam, 1950, p. 21). For Aristotle see, for instance, *Met.* 1019 a 15 ss., 1046 a 6 ss. (Bäumker, *o.c.*, p. 223-224). Plotinus writes a complete treatise *περὶ τοῦ δύναμει καὶ ἐνέργεια* (*Enn.* II 5), in which he distinguishes between *τὸ δύναμει* and *ἡ δύναμις*, that which is potentially and potentiality itself (cp. Bäumker, *o.c.*, p. 407). Calcidius has nothing like this. The slight similarity between the arguments of these two authors is a matter of course, but Plotinus gives a penetrating analysis of all relevant problems, whereas Calcidius only refers to a generally-known distinction. It is also noteworthy that Calcidius is so absorbed in this problem of the *possibilitas* that he forgets to say, which kind of possibility actually belongs to matter. Obviously, this is the passive possibility, as appears from the example of wax in the previous paragraph. Aristotle has frequently connected the concept of *δύναμις* with matter: *De an.* 412 a 9: *ἔστι δ' ἡ . . . ψλη δύναμις*; for other passages see Bäumker (*o.c.*, p. 224, n. 4). Finally, Calcidius seems to refer to the same discussion of potentiality in par. 107: *vel cum idem Plato silvam esse dicit in nulla substantia, propterea quod nulla silvestria habeant ullam perfectionem. dum enim sunt adhuc silvestria, informia sunt ac sine ordine ac specie, ut saxa: quorum tamen est naturalis possibilitas, ut accedente artificio simulacrum fiat vel quid aliud huius modi. quod vero sola possibilitate et sine effectu videtur esse, minime est, utpote carens perfectione. Verum haec disputatio, quia nihil pertinet ad naturalem tractatum, cum sit rationalis, differetur* (175, 1-10). Once more, it is evident that matter has a *potentia passiva*.

### γγ) Refutation of the Stoa

[311] Therefore, if forms and qualities are enclosed in matter, as the Stoics think, a regulating activity of the Maker is superfluous; but in my conviction, there must be a moulder of matter, as the Stoics themselves affirm. Hence the Maker impresses shapes into matter as into shapeless bronze or wax, and thus He must exist because the doctrine requires it.

QUARE The conjunction here is by no means self-evident. It seems to be the result of this reasoning: matter has been shewn to possess a passive potentiality as to forms and qualities. Hence (*quare*) there must also be an active principle imparting these forms and

qualities. But if matter is said to enclose them in itself, such an active principle automatically becomes superfluous. *UT STOICIS VIDETUR* At last Calcidius mentions his opponents by name. He will do so again in par. 321: *Quam quidem receptaculum eorum appellat, quia non ex gremio silvae generatae species florescunt, ut putant Stoici, sed extrinsecus obveniunt ut in cera signacula* (also see par. 325). In both cases his criticism of the Stoia is the same as in par. 308, but the form is different. Steinheimer quotes *Enn.* II 4, 7: *εἰ οὖν πρότερον ἀνάγκη τὸν δημιουργὸν εἶναι, τί ἔδει τὰ εἰδη κατὰ σμικρὰ ἐν τῇ ὄλη εἶναι.* However, Plotinus' argument is the very opposite of Calcidius'. Plotinus says: "If we are to accept the existence of a demiurge, why, then, those *εἰδη κατὰ σμικρά* in matter?" This expression is, if I am not mistaken, a rendering of the Stoic term *λόγοι σπερματικοί*. The argument of Calcidius is this: "If matter has all these qualities by itself, why then are we to assume a Maker?"—"But the existence of a Maker is necessary, as the Stoics themselves admit, so the doctrine requires a Maker who confers a form upon matter, by itself shapeless". Steinheimer quotes *Enn.* II 5, 3: *τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει βούλεται ἔτερου ἐπελθόντος εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγεσθαι.* Can this still be called a parallel? Both Calcidius and Plotinus attack the Stoic doctrine, but each in his own way. For instance, Plotinus says: *δὸς γὰρ θεὸς αὐτοῖς εὐπρεπεῖας ἔνεκεν ἐπεισάγεται* (*Enn.* VI 1, 27, cited p. 149). Calcidius says: *ipso etiam Stoici sanciunt (opificem)*. The details of the arguments are strongly in favour of a relationship, but not of a dependence of Calcidius on Plotinus. A common source seems to be the obvious solution and this once more makes one think of Numenius. The difference between these two authors who use the same material is striking indeed. Calcidius gives the impression of being bound to his sources; Plotinus moulded his data into an original synthesis.

### δδ) Matter eternal and unlimited

[312] There exists a similar unanimity about the eternity of matter, for they think that it is everlasting because it is the summit and origin of things. But there is no unanimity at all on the question whether it is limited (that is, circumscribed). <In reality the point is clear;> for what is, circumscribed must necessarily have a definite size: now size belongs to a line, a plane or a body, and all these things have their own shape,

whether they are two- or three-dimensional. Now form is a kind of quality; therefore, if matter is limited, it will have a quality and a form by itself. But it has clearly been shewn that matter has neither form nor quality; therefore, it is infinite and entirely unlimited, not in the sense of extending immensely, vastly and unsurpassably, but unlimited as things that can be circumscribed by a limit but have not yet been limited mentally. And in the same way as we say that it is without quality or form, it is also unlimited in the sense that, before its adornment and as long as it is still matter, it is not actually circumscribed by a limit.

**NIHILO MINUS** The third point unanimously accepted by philosophers is the eternity of matter, *i.e.*, illimitability in time. They are, however, not unanimous on illimitability in space. Yet the existence of illimitability in space is self-evident (Calcidius omits this point in his argument,) for limitability means shape, and shape means quality. Therefore, if matter is limited, it would have this quality of itself. Now principles have no quality whatever (par. 305), so matter must be unlimited, in the sense not of 'being extended infinitely', but of 'not yet limited before its moulding', which means that it is limitable.—For *perpetuum*, cp. 333, 17.

**ARX ET ORIGO** Calcidius is fond of such phrases: *fons et initium* (125, 5), *exordium et fons* (97, 7); see also 91, 17-18; 91, 20; 91, 22-23 etc. They will be listed in the edition Waszink-Jensen.

**MAGNITUDO AUTEM** Steinheimer refers to *Enn.* II 4, 8: μέγεθός τε εἰ ἔχει, ἀνάγκη καὶ σχῆμα ἔχειν. **QUAE INFORMIS** Here Steinheimer quotes *Enn.* II 4, 6: ἡ δὲ (sc. ὥλη) κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀόριστον, δτι μὴ εἴδος and II 4, 15: 'Ανάγκη τοίνυν τὴν ὥλην τὸ ἀπειρον εἶναι. These texts cannot be regarded as parallels. The latter is quite different from what Calcidius says, as is already evident from the article τὸ before ἀπειρον: to Plotinus matter is infinity itself. On the other hand, a most important parallel is furnished by the text of Galen (see p. 151), where the identity of the philosophers who think matter limited, comes to light. Once more, they are the Stoics, who regard matter as a *σῶμα* (cp. par. 289) and hence as something limited. Now Galen argues: εἰ δὲ πεπερασμένην εἶναι φασι (sc. οἱ Στωϊκοί) καὶ πέρασι κεχρημένην, καὶ σχῆμα δῆλον ὡς ἐκέκτητο, ἀτοπον γάρ ἔστι ίδιοις περαινόμενον σῶμα πέρασι μὴ μετὰ σχήματος πάντως ὑπάρχειν, εἰ καὶ μὴ συννοοῦτο τοῦτ' αὐτῷ καθ' ὑπό-

θεσιν<sup>1)</sup>· ὡστε εἰ περὶ ὅλην ἣν ταῦθ’ ἀπερ ἔφην πάντα, ταῦτα δ’ ἔστι, καθάπερ αὐτοὶ φασι, σώματα, οὔτε ἀποιος ἣν δηλαδὴ οὔτε ἀπλῆ (S.V.F. II 323). Here the whole problem is expounded adequately. Meanwhile, Steinheimer could have cited much better parallels from Plotinus, for instance, *Enn.* II 4, 1: διδόσαι δὲ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῇ ἀποιον αὐτὸ σῶμα λέγοντες· καὶ μέγεθος δέ. Both Plotinus and Calcidius argue against the Stoic. But the manner in which they do so is quite different and nothing points to a dependence one way or another.

INFINITA PORRO “Not infinity in the sense of infinite extension”, as Calcidius is quick to declare. He follows Aristotle: *De gen. et corr.* 318 a 20: κατ’ ἐνέργειαν μὲν γάρ οὐδέν ἔστιν ἀπειρον, who, moreover, contrasts this with a potential infinity in the sense of infinite divisibility (δυνάμει δ’ ἐπὶ τὴν διαιρέσιν, *ib.*; about this see the comment on par. 315, p. 159). In this point, however, Calcidius does not follow him, nor does he distinguish between actual and potential infinity as did Aristotle in *Physics* 206 b 14-15, where ‘potentially infinite’ is equivalent to ‘inexhaustible’. He only says that matter is unlimited in the sense of ‘not yet limited’, ‘potentially limited’ not ‘potentially unlimited’. All this amounts to “matter is unlimited in the sense that as such it has no limitations; it is not yet *vallata*”. And because a ‘matter as such’ does not exist in reality, he adds *mentis consideratione*—it is as though he just adds: “this is no more than an activity of the abstracting intellect” (see in par. 310: *mentis consideratione*, cp. p. 152). That this is really what Calcidius means to say is proved by the striking parallel a little further on: *velut nondum ante exornationem dumque adhuc silva est fine circumdatam*. A similar idea is in Aristotle, *Physics* 204 a 5-6: δ πεφυκός ἔχειν μὴ ἔχει διέξοδον ἢ πέρας. In imitation of Aristotle, Plotinus also rejects an existence of the actual infinity. Steinheimer rightly refers to *Enn.* II 4, 7: εἰ οὕτως ἀπειρον, ὡς ἀδιεξίτητον, ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τοιοῦτον τι ἐν τοῖς οὖσι . . . The ἀδιεξίτητον reminds one of *insuperabiliter porrecta*.

In *non ut quae inmense* Calcidius opposes such opinions as given by Apuleius: *infinitam vero idcirco quod ei sit interminata magnitudo, nam quod infinitum est, indistinctam magnitudinis habet finem atque ideo, cum vidiuata sit fine, in finibilis recte dici potest* (*De dogm. Platonis* I 5, p. 87, 6-10 Thomas). Calcidius’ *infinita* has the same

1) “Even though one may exclude this from one’s thought”, i.e., “though one can consider it separate from this”. Galen must have in mind the kind of abstraction which Calcidius uses again and again.

meaning as *finibilis*. Hermogenes called matter *infinita*; but Tertullian's refutation of this statement reveals no special relationship, except for the distinction between infinity in time and infinity in space (*Adv. Hermog.* 38, 1, p. 58, 10 ss. Wsz.).

ee) Matter without increase or decrease

[313] "Matter is neither liable to increase nor to decrease", they say.—Rightly so, because this would mean that something could come into existence out of nothing or perish into nothing, both of which are impossible. That which increases grows by addition of size, and, apart from matter, there is, in my conviction, nothing from which such an increase could be derived or into which 'that which flows away from matter', matter thus being emptied, can be received (lit.: diminished).

This passage may be summarized as follows: "matter cannot become larger or smaller, because it is itself the basis of every increase and the terminus of every decrease". Calcidius' argument concerning increase may be formulated in this way:

- 1 a *Quod augetur, accessu magnitudinis crescit.*
- b *Praeter ipsam silvam nihil est, ex quo fiat accessio.*
- c *Ergo: silva ipsa si augetur, ex nihilo fit accessio.*
- 2 a = 1 c
- b *Sed ex nihilo non aliquid subsistere potest (et igitur nulla inde accessio venire potest).*
- c *Ergo: silva augeri non potest.*

With regard to decrease, Calcidius uses a similar argument but expresses himself somewhat inaccurately. He intends to say: "decrease occurs by the recession of size, but nothing can recede into anything else but matter; so matter itself cannot decrease". A more correct formulation would have been: *vel in quod id, quod ex silva (eam inaniens) defluit, defluere potest*. The thesis underlying this argument is Aristotelian, as was shewn in the comment on par. 283 (p. 77). Here too Steinheimer quotes Plotinus saying: οὐ γάρ παντελής τοῦ μεταβάλλοντος ἡ φθορά· ἡ ἔσται τις οὐσία εἰς τὸ μὴ δύν ἀπολλουμένη· οὐδέ τὸ γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ παντελῶς μὴ δύντος εἰς τὸ δύν ἐλήλυθεν (*Enn.* II 4, 6). But this thesis was so generally accepted that its occurrence in two authors has no particular

force of argument. (The other text quoted by Steinheimer (II 4, 9) shows some verbal similarity to the corresponding passage in *Calcidius*, but refers to quite a different question, *viz.*, the relation between matter and quantity).

Needless to say that the problem, raised in this as well as in the two subsequent sections originated in Stoic circles, for it bears upon typically material qualities. According to the Stoics, matter is a body, something material. The very words of *Calcidius* show that no real dissension existed on the point that matter neither increases nor decreases. Hence the *Stoa* must also have agreed. This conclusion is confirmed by the sources: *Stobaeus, Ecl. I 133, 6* W. (Arii Did., *fr. Phys. 20* Diels; *S.V.F. II 317*): Χρυσίππου Στωϊκοῦ. Τῶν κατὰ ποιότητα ὑφισταμένων πρώτην ὅλην· ταύτην δὲ ἀτδίον, οὔτε αὔξησιν οὔτε μείωσιν ὑπομένουσαν, and *S.V.F. I 87*: Ζήνωνος. Ούσιαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ὅλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν ἀτδίον καὶ οὔτε πλείω γινομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω, and *ib.* (*ex Diog. Laërt., VII 150*): ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν ὅλων οὔτε πλείων οὔτε ἐλάττων γίνεται.

### ζζ) Matter neither expands nor shrinks

[314] There are who think that matter expands and shrinks. But a thing cannot expand (lit.: 'flow out') without humidity nor shrink without contracting. Neither of these lacks quality, and matter has none. Hence matter does not expand as something liquid nor shrink as something contractible.

SUNT QUI Fabricius rightly notes where the divergence of opinions lies: *Stoicorum haec opinio*. *Calcidius* refers to the same doctrine, namely that there are contracting and expansive forces in the universe, the result of which is a process by which matter grows thinner and denser (cp. Bäumker, *o.c.*, p. 351, 369). Steinheimer quotes *ENN. II 4, 9*, but Plotinus discusses a different problem. He also refers to *ENN. II 4, 8*, where Plotinus says that matter is neither solid nor aery (οὐ πυκνὸν οὐχ ἀραιόν). This is a very different question from the one treated by *Calcidius*, that matter is liable to expansion or shrinking. Steinheimer attached more significance to the wording of the two passages than to their real meaning and content.

## γη) Matter divisible?

[315] There are also who believe that matter is infinitely divisible. But whatever is divided (lit.: 'cut') will be composite, not simple, and in a definite place; this is a quality of quantity; hence matter will not be divisible, for it lacks both quantity and quality, though it accompanies them. But if, considering that bodies with quality and quantity, which are contained by it, can be divided, we say that matter itself can be divided together with these bodies, this will not be an unreasonable or an inconvenient presumption.

SUNT ITEM QUI PUTENT INFINITAE SECTIONIS PATIBILEM SILVAM

By 'potentially infinite' (see *ad* par. 312, p. 136) Aristotle meant to say that everything material is infinitely divisible. The problems arising from this are treated by him in *De gen. et corr.* 316 a 14 ss. The Stoa defended this theory, for, to them, matter is a σῶμα: cp. par. 292 *dividuam et usque quaque mutabilem* (321, 17); see Stobaeus, *Ecl.* I 142, 2 W. (*S.V.F.* II 482): Χρύσιππος ἔφασκε τὰ σώματα εἰς ἀπειρον τέμνεσθαι καὶ τὰ τοῖς σώμασι προσεοικότα, οἷον ἐπιφάνειαν. Diog. Laërt., VII 150: καὶ παθητὴ δέ ἐστιν (sc. ἡ οὐσία) ὡς ὁ αὐτός φησιν (sc. Apollodorus ἐν τῇ φυσικῇ). εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἀτρεπτος οὐκ ἂν τὰ γινόμενα ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐγίνετο. ἔνθεν κάκολουθεῖν ὡς ἡ τε τομὴ εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστιν. . . See also *S.V.F.* II as far as 491.—To the passage of Calcidius Steinheimer compares *Enn.* III 6, 12, where Plotinus wonders: ἀλλ' ὅταν διαιρεθῇ τι σῶμα, πῶς οὐ καὶ αὐτὴ (sc. ἡ μέλη) διήρηται; καὶ πεπονθότος ἔκεινου τῷ διηρῆσθαι, πῶς οὐ καὶ αὐτὴ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ παθήματι πέπονθεν; This, indeed, is the question under discussion here, but the answers to it as given by Calcidius and Plotinus are very different. The former says: "There can be no question of a real division of matter, yet we say that matter is divided when the bodies contained in it are divided", but Plotinus maintains: "Η τι καλύνει τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ καὶ φθεῖται λεγόντας· πῶς φθαρέντος τοῦ σώματος οὐκ ἔφθαρται; In other words, "if we say this, we might as well contend that matter perishes when the body perishes". And he continues: "Ετι λεκτέον τοσόνδε γάρ εἰναι καὶ μέγεθος εἰναι, τῷ δὲ μὴ μεγέθει οὐδὲ τῷ μεγέθους πάθη ἐγγίγνεσθαι καὶ δλως δὴ τῷ μὴ σώματι μήδε τὰ σώματος πάθη ἐγγίγνεσθαι· διστε δσοι παθητὴν ποιοῦσι καὶ σῶμα συγχωρείτωσαν αὐτὴν εἰναι. Thus: "a thing which is not a body does not have the πάθη of a body either; anything

which is *παθητόν* must be a body". So Plotinus simply persists in what Calcidius puts forward as a premise but omits to carry through to its logical conclusion. This striking parallel reveals the points of view of the two authors to the question whether matter is passive. Plotinus is radical: *Ὥλη ἀπαθής ἔστιν* (this is also stressed in the text just quoted: *παθητός = σῶμα*). Calcidius also knows that in reality matter is not liable to *πάθη* (*in�etibilis*), yet he believes one may say that *silva patibilis est* (cp. *ad par.* 309, p. 148). Steinheimer only saw the similarity in the presentation of the problem, not the difference in the solutions. However, this last issue is decisive; everything points to a stage before Plotinus. Calcidius really hesitates between two thoughts, whereas Plotinus makes a clear choice.

Now the interesting fact is that one finds a similar attitude to a similar question in Numenius. The latter answers the question whether the soul is tridimensional in this way: "it is not such by itself, but κατὰ συμβεβηκός, that is, because of the body in which it is": *τῇ ψυχῇ καθ' ἔαυτὴν μὲν πρόσεστι τὸ ἀδιάστατον, κατὰ συμβεβηκός δὲ τῷ ἐν ὦ ἔστι διαστατῷ ὅντι συνθεωρεῖται καὶ αὐτὴ τριχῇ διαστατή* (Nemesius, *Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου*, p. 69, Matth.; Leemans, *test.* 29). (The term *συνθεωρεῖται* reminds one of *tingamus* and *prae-sumptio* in Calcidius). This parallel is highly important: in one case there is a concession to the tendency to make matter corporeal, in the other a similar concession to making the soul corporeal. Both are the results of the same line of thought. If it is borne in mind that Numenius certainly was one of Calcidius' main authorities, the conclusion is imperative: Calcidius' standpoint in this question was inspired by Numenius.—Hermogenes also thought matter *dispartibilis* (Tertullian, *Adv. Hermog.* 39). In Tertullian the argument fits into a different type of discussion, but its presence shows that the problem was a common one in Middle Platonism.—Some particulars: *comitetur* (340, 8), cp. 337, 24-338, 1. *Præsumptio* (340, 11), cp. 305, 7 and 345, 5 (p. 174).

#### θθ) Summarizing conclusion

[316] Thus our opinion that matter is not fire, earth, water or air, but a primary material and the deepest foundation of corporeal things is correct. By itself it has no quality, form, quantity nor figure, but all these are connected with it by the power of

the Maker in order that both the whole body (*i.e.*, the universe) and every separate thing have their perfection, and all things have their variety in common.

RECTA EST Calcidius now draws his conclusion from what has been said before. He repeats par. 307: *arbitror quippe non recte horum quid initium putari. haec enim omnia minime simplicia.* This thesis has now been proved to be correct. MATERIAM PRINCIPALEM Cp. *primam materiam* (336, 16; see Zeller, II 320, n. 2). ET CORPORIS PRIMAM SUBIECTIONEM Cp. 299, 16 *subiecta corpori principaliter*; 306, 20; 341, 2; 342, 13; 345, 17-18; 361, 5-6, 12. The statement that neither earth, nor fire, *etc.*, are real principles is based on *Tim.* 51A: *μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γῆν μήτε ἀέρα μήτε πῦρ μήτε ὕδωρ* (cp. 358, 27). As parallel texts may be quoted the passage of Apuleius already cited above: *non ignem neque aquam nec aliud de principiis . . .* and Albinus' *Epit.* X 8; Albinus asserts that God is not a *σῶμα*: if God were a *σῶμα*, He would be corporeal and so be fire or earth, *etc.*; but, Albinus says, *ἐκαστόν γε τούτων οὐκ ἀρχικόν*: these do not possess the character of *ἀρχή*. To Calcidius water, earth, air or fire are not principles: the principle is an elementary matter, the first foundation of all that is material. This is his conclusion in par. 316. But realizing that he simply presupposed the existence of this *materia principialis*, he must still prove it. This is now done *modo Aristotelico*, that is, by means of an analysis of change (cp p. 133).

#### ii) Matter the general substratum of things

[317a] It is easily proved that matter is really the tinder and the deepest foundation of all that is corporeal, namely from the change of the elements into one another and from the unstable alterations of qualities.

QUOD VERO In the light of the explanation just given the introductory phrase might be translated in this way: "That such a *prima subiectio* really exists, appears from . . ."; *sit* would then have the meaning of *existat*. Although this would render the meaning of the following passage (par. 317-318), yet *silva* must be supplied as the subject of *sit*, in other words, *sit* must be a copulative verb. Calcidius has said: "Matter is not water, *etc.*, but *prima subiectio*";

and he continues: "That it really is *prima subiectio* is evident from . . .". This formulation suggests that the existence of matter is taken as an established fact, and that here only light is shed on one of its aspects, just as in the preceding sections. But from the content it is evident that what is given is an actual proof for the existence of matter. Both the formulation of the introduction and the place of the argument suggest that Calcidius did not realize at all or insufficiently the purpose of the argument. One might say that feeling the necessity of a discussion on this subject, he inserted an argument already promised but not given in par. 302.

Some details: **FOMES** As tinder is the material to catch fire, so matter is the material to receive the elements, fire, water, *etc.* (see Fabricius, *ad loc.*); elsewhere Calcidius uses *fomenta generationis* (61, 15, cp. 348, 13). For the combination *fomes et prima subiectio* see 338, 19 (p. 155), where Calcidius' partiality for such phrases is noted. **EX ELEMENTORUM IN SE CONVERSIONE MUTUA** Further on (342, 12) one reads *in illa corporum mutua permutatione*. This text reminds one of 305, 11: *mutua ex alio in aliud resolutione*; in both cases the same phenomenon is discussed, on which Calcidius founded his *resolutio* in par. 274, 299 and 304, and which now serves as a basis for an Aristotelian argument. Meanwhile, it will become clear that he considered it to occur already in Plato (see *ad* 346, 23, p. 177). The term *inconstanti* is also found in 345, 1-2: *ob inconstan-tem eorum mutuamque ex alio in aliud conversionem*, which is an evident parallel of the present passage. The instability of change in qualities is stressed by the author in order to show that matter by itself has not a single quality.

[317b] Now earth has two qualities of its own, *viz.*, cold and drought.—Let us now pretend that earth can partly change into another element.—In water, too, we find two qualities, *viz.*, humidity and cold. The quality proper to earth is drought, that to water humidity, whereas the nature of cold is common to both. So, when earth flows out and is partially changed into water, drought will change into humidity; but cold, which is common to both elements, remains in its own state, for it is no longer in earth and not yet in water: not in earth because what changes ceases to be earth, but not in water either because, while the change and transition are taking place, it is as yet not wholly and perfectly changed to the new state, *i.e.*, it has not yet come

to the nature of water. The only possible conclusion is that cold must be somewhere else, for it cannot exist without a subject. Now reason affirms that this something can only be matter.

[318] Air, we continue, has two qualities, *viz.*, warmth and humidity. It appeared that two qualities are also found in water, *viz.*, humidity and cold. Here again there will be qualities which appear to be contrary, *viz.*, cold in water and warmth in air; but humidity is common to both. So, when water changes into vapour and, during this change, that which has evaporated is absorbed and maintained by air, then, I think, cold changes into warmth, but the common humidity remains, not, however, in the womb of air nor in that of water. Yet it must be somewhere: hence it must be in matter. In the same way, fire has two qualities, *viz.*, drought and warmth; air, however, as we saw just now, has warmth and humidity, so these too have a common quality, warmth. The characteristic quality of fire is drought, that of air humidity. When, therefore, air becomes fire and partly changes into the nature of fire, humidity changes into drought, but warmth, their common quality, will not remain in fire nor in air, yet it cannot be nowhere. Hence it will remain in matter. From all this it is evident that in this mutual change of bodies one discovers that matter is the oldest and deepest foundation, like soft wax, in which imprints are made, or a common womb of everything generated.

The argument strongly reminds one of a passage from Aristotle's *De gen. et corr.* The most important common trait is the attribution of twofold fundamental qualities to the four elements; 330 b 3 ss.: τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦρ θερμὸν καὶ ξηρόν, ὁ δὲ ἀήρ θερμὸν καὶ ύγρόν (οἷον ἀτμὶς γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ), τὸ δὲ ύδωρ ψυχρὸν καὶ ύγρόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν. Moreover, there is the common idea that in each case one of the two qualities is more characteristic of that element: οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς γε τέτταρα δητα ἐνὸς ἔκαστον ἔστι, γῆ μὲν ξηροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ψυχροῦ, ύδωρ δὲ ψυχροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ύγροῦ, ἀήρ δὲ ύγροῦ μᾶλλον ἢ θερμοῦ, πῦρ δὲ θερμοῦ μᾶλλον ἢ ξηροῦ. Aristotle shows how all elements change into one another; 331 a 12 ss.: δτι μὲν οὖν ἀπαντα πέφυκεν εἰς ἀλληλα μεταβάλλειν, φανερόν. ἡ γὰρ γένεσις εἰς ἐναντία καὶ ἐξ ἐναντίων, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν πρὸς ἀλληλα διὰ τὸ τὰς διαφορὰς ἐναντίας εἶναι· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀμφότεραι ἐναντίαι, οἷον πυρὶ καὶ ύδατι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ξηρόν καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δὲ ύγρόν καὶ ψυχρόν), τοῖς

δ' ή ἐτέρα μόνον, οἷον ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι (τὸ μὲν γάρ ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, τὸ δὲ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν). ὡστε καθόλου μὲν φανερόν, διτὶ πᾶν ἐκ παντὸς γίνεσθαι πέφυκεν, ηδη δὲ καθ' ἔκαστον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἴδειν πῶς· ἀπαντά μὲν γάρ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἔσται, διοίσει δὲ τῷ θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον καὶ τῷ ῥάον καὶ χαλεπώτερον· δσα μὲν γάρ ἔχει σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλληλα, ταχεῖα τούτων ἡ μετάβασις, δσα δὲ μὴ ἔχει, βραδεῖα, διὰ τὸ ῥάον εἰναι τὸ ἐν ἡ τὰ πολλὰ μεταβάλλειν, οἷον ἐκ πυρὸς μὲν ἔσται ἀήρ θατέρου μεταβάλλοντος (τὸ μὲν γάρ ἦν θερμὸν καὶ ἔηρόν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ὡστε ἀν κρατηθῆ τὸ ἔηρόν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἀήρ ἔσται). πάλιν δὲ ἐξ ἀέρος ὕδωρ, ἐὰν κρατηθῆ τὸ θερμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ (τὸ μὲν γάρ ἦν θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν, τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρόν, ὡστε μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ὕδωρ ἔσται). τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐξ ὕδατος γῆ καὶ ἐκ γῆς πῦρ· ἔχει γάρ ἀμφω πρὸς ἀμφω σύμβολα· τὸ μὲν γάρ ὕδωρ ὑγρὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἔηρόν, ὡστε κρατηθέντος τοῦ ὑγροῦ γῆ ἔσται. καὶ πάλιν ἐπει τὸ μὲν πῦρ ἔηρόν καὶ θερμόν, ἡ δὲ γῆ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἔηρόν, ἐὰν φθαρῇ τὸ ψυχρόν, πῦρ ἔσται ἐκ γῆς. Nobody fails to see the connection of this text with the argument of *Calcidius*. Yet there are also differences. Aristotle wishes to prove something different from *Calcidius*: the former stresses that everything changes into everything, whereas the latter proves that underneath this change there exists matter. One may say that *Calcidius* has added an idea found elsewhere in Aristotle: διτὶ δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι (*Physics* 190 a 14; cp. the comment on par. 284). But there is more in *Calcidius*. He does not just say: "there must be something underlying this change" but repeats again and again: "cold, etc., must be somewhere" or "it cannot be nowhere". In this he joins Plato himself. This, again, shows, how closely Plato and Aristotle are connected in his eye.

The explanation of details is facilitated by the fact that the same thought occurs throughout this passage. *aliquatenus* (341, 10; 342, 8) = *ex aliqua parte* (341, 5). *in terra quidem* (341, 13): as in 334, 14 (*in simplex*, cp. p. 139), the negation is missing; *esse in terra* means 'to be earth' in the same way as *in nulla substantia esse* (175, 2) means 'not to be a substance' (cp. *in substantia positum*, 203, 23; 264, 23). Or should *in terra* be deleted? In this case its presence may be explained by the twofold *in terra* in the preceding line. *resoluta* (341, 24-25) reminds one of *resolutione* in 305, 12, etc.; for *vapores*, see οἷον ἀτμὶς γάρ ὁ ἀήρ in the text of Aristotle just quoted (330 b 4) *OPINOR* (342, 1) The same is used elsewhere, when it was, in fact, borrowed from others (cp. 309, 23; 311, 8;

337, 18). *in naturam ignis* (342, 8): cp. *in aquae materiam* (341, 17; cp. p. 124). The observation at the beginning of par. 317 (—Let us . . .—), seems to refer to the well-known question whether all elements change into one another or an exception must be made for the element of earth (cp. p. 180).

Already in par. 302-304 (*resolutio—syllogismus*) the Platonic line of thought was weak: matter being the dominating concept, the ideas were no more than accessories. In the present argument on the existence of matter, the Aristotelian trend is again strong. Nevertheless, *Calcidius* remains convinced that he is actually interpreting the doctrine of *Plato*. Still, in several places the influence of *Numenius* is visible from whom, as it seems, *Calcidius*' concept of matter was derived. The Aristotelian part of the argument may have reached *Calcidius* through *Numenius*. This is almost certain in the case of the *resolutio* (cp. p. 132) and might well be true for his concept of the relation between the doctrines of *Plato* and *Aristotle*. However, *Albinus* should not be forgotten either, as will be evident from what follows. Nor should *Adrastus* remain unmentioned, for it is just possible that he too contributed to *Calcidius*' work (see *ad* par. 383-388).

### xx) Matter neither corporeal nor incorporeal

[319] After discussing these problems, we have now to consider whether matter is a body. In my opinion, we cannot simply call it either a body or something incorporeal, but we must say that it is potentially both corporeal and incorporeal. [1] What is properly called body is composed of matter and quality; but matter does not consist of matter and quality; therefore, it is not a body. [2] Next, no body is without quality; but matter by itself is without quality; therefore, it is not a body. [3] Moreover, all bodies have a shape; but matter by itself is shapeless; therefore, it is not a body. [4] Then, every body is defined and limited; but matter is indefinite and unlimited; therefore, it is not a body. [5] Moreover, we can place all kinds of body in categories. Thus we call a body 'essence', because, at different moments, it can sustain opposed qualities, one of which must necessarily be found in it. We call it 'quantity', when it has length, width and thickness. We also say that it has 'quality'. Comparing it with another body, we say that it is larger, smaller

or alike, which comparison the Greeks call  $\pi\rho\circ\varsigma\tau\iota$ ; for what is larger cannot be conceived without being compared with what is smaller, nor what is alike without comparison with something else which is alike; and in this way we also derive the other qualifications (of bodies) from the categories. But we take away all this from matter, even its passivity seemingly proper to it; and we do so, because matter never loses its own condition but only gives the impression of undergoing things, when other things, *viz.*, bodies, undergo them within matter. In short, its passivity is such that it does not change into something else; but, since it takes up things liable to change, it is incorrectly thought to undergo something. <Therefore, it is not a body.› [6] Finally, just as God, the first operating and creating principle, is not a genus nor subject to any genus, likewise the first passive principle, matter, the other origin of things, is neither a genus nor subject to any genus. And hence, because it is a principle, we cannot think of anything earlier. [7] This being so, a body is perceived by the senses, but matter is not perceived by the senses; therefore, matter will not be a body. [8] And also matter is something simple and not composite, but a body is not simple and is composite; therefore matter is not corporeal.

[320] But I say that it is not incorporeal either, [1] for whatever is incorporeal cannot undergo anything corporeal and can never become a body; but matter, provided with qualities, quantities and figures, and decorated with every adornment, became body and world by the action and operation of the Maker; therefore, it is not incorporeal either. [2] Next, if it is a body, it can be perceived by the senses; but it cannot be perceived by the senses; therefore, it is not a body. But if it is incorporeal, its nature is intelligible; but it is not intelligible; therefore, it is not incorporeal. Hence it is correct that we call it simply and, in accordance with its nature, neither corporeal nor incorporeal, but potentially both a body and not a body.

QUIBUS ITA DECURSIS Calcidius broaches the question of the real foundation of all the preceding problems, *viz.*, the question whether matter is a body. The Stoa answered in the affirmative; their doctrine on matter hinges on it. But Calcidius disagrees. To him matter is not a body, but at once he adds "nor is it incorporeal". What is it then? "It is potentially both corporeal and

incorporeal". The first part of this assertion is also found in Aristotle. In *De gen. et corr.*, the book from which the greater part of the preceding sections was borrowed, he says: πρῶτον μὲν τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἀρχή, δεύτερον δ' αἱ ἐναντιώσεις (329 a 32-33). (For matter as the first principle see p. 143.) But Aristotle is silent on potential incorporeality. Calcidius, denying the actual incorporeality, affirms that it is potentially incorporeal.

The thesis that matter is neither corporeal nor incorporeal is not original. A strong similarity with Calcidius' thesis is in Albinus, *Epit.* VIII 3: τοιαύτη δ' οὖσα (sc. ἡ ὄλη) οὔτε σῶμα ἀν εἴη οὔτε ἀσώματον, δυνάμει δὲ σῶμα. (The addition of δυνάμει ἀσώματον would make the resemblance perfect.) Next, Apuleius wrote: *sed neque corpoream nec sane incorpoream concedit esse* (*De dogm. Plat.* I 5 p. 87, 10-11 Thomas). Finally, about the doctrine of Hermogenes Tertullian states: *Prima, inquit, facie videtur nobis incorporalis esse materia, exquisita autem ratione recta invenitur neque corporalis neque incorporalis* (*Adv. Hermog.* 35, 2, p. 54, 19-20 Wsz.). All this gives the impression that the doctrine under discussion was fairly common in Middle Platonism (cp. J. H. Waszink, *Vig. Christ.* 9 (1955), p. 132).

The typical feature of Calcidius' theory is that matter is potentially incorporeal. This statement should probably be connected with his former ones concerning a twofold matter, a so-called *silva corporea* and a *silva intelligibilis* (see *ad 301, 1* and *302, 15-17*, p. 43). Just as the *silva corporea* is potentially corporeal, so the *silva intelligibilis* is potentially incorporeal (=intelligible). This point will be discussed below.

Plotinus again gives a clear and emphatic answer: "matter is incorporeal" (*Enn.* II 4, 9: ἀσώματος δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄλη). As elsewhere Steinheimer tries to minimize the difference between Plotinus and Calcidius: "Plotin begnügt sich damit nachzuweisen, dass sie nicht körperlich sei. Diesem Nachweis widmet auch Chalcidius das umfangreiche Kapitel 319, wogegen der Beweis, dass sie nicht unkörperlich sei, kurz in c. 320 abgetan wird. Hat nun auch Plotin sich nicht mit denselben Worten darüber ausgesprochen, so ist doch ein Widerspruch zu seiner Lehre hierin nicht erhalten, da er jede Realität der Materie verneint, ihr aber die Möglichkeit alles zu werden einräumt" (o.c., p. 45). Yet, even if it were true that there is no contrast between the two standpoints—Steinheimer rather simplifies the problem—the fact remains that because of the differ-

ent formulations a dependence of Calcidius on Plotinus is, indeed, far less likely than Steinheimer presumes. The former treats this question in the same way as is done by some Middle Platonic authors. Hence we rather think of a dependence on this school. Moreover, Albinus, who comes nearest to Calcidius in formulation, also provides material points of agreement with Calcidius, *e.g.*, *Epit.* X, where the attributes of another principle, *viz.*, God, are discussed. Another point of agreement is mentioned in the discussion of Calcidius' *resolutio* (par. 274, p. 50).

QUIPPE QUOD Calcidius proceeds by demonstrating that matter is not a body. The first three arguments are not very impressive:

1) Body is matter and quality; matter is not matter and quality; matter is not a body. — Once the qualities as explained by Calcidius in 337, 6-8 (p. 137) are accepted, this argument is conclusive. It should be compared with what Albinus (X 7) produces in order to prove the incorporality of God: εἰ γὰρ σῶμα ὁ θεός, ἐξ ὕλης ἀν εἴη καὶ εἴδους· διὰ τὸ πᾶν σῶμα συνδύασμά τι εἶναι ἔχ τε ὕλης καὶ τοῦ σὸν αὐτῇ εἴδους . . . ἀποπον δὲ τὸν θεὸν ἐξ ὕλης εἶναι καὶ εἴδους· οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἀπλοῦς οὐδὲ ἀρχικός· ὅστε ἀσώματος ἀν εἴη ὁ θεός. Steinheimer quotes Plotinus, *Enn.* III 6, 7: "Ἐστι μὲν οὖν ἀσώματος, ἐπείπερ τὸ σῶμα ὑστερὸν καὶ σύνθετον, καὶ αὐτῇ μετ' ὅλλου ποιεῖ σῶμα, but there is a fundamental difference. Calcidius does not maintain that matter is incorporeal. The line of thought is, indeed, the same but, by itself, does not favour a dependence of Calcidius on Plotinus.

2) No body is without quality; matter is without quality; matter is not a body. — This reasoning is the same as the preceding one, only the form has been changed: instead of "body is always matter and quality" Calcidius starts from the major "body is never without quality". Steinheimer refers correctly to *Enn.* II, 4, 8: Καὶ ὅτι μὲν μὴ σῶμα, εἴπερ ἀποιος, δῆλον· ἡ ποιότητα ἔξει. Undoubtedly, in various forms this argument had often been used against the Stoic. Actually all present arguments of Calcidius are based upon the principle of the simplicity of matter.

3) All bodies have shape; matter has no shape; matter is not a body. — Usually Calcidius takes quality and shape together. Here they are taken separately, probably in order to make the series of arguments more impressive. Geometrical figures, as everyone knows, have a very important place in Plato's philosophy; it may be for this reason too that they are used here. Steinheimer

mentions *Enn.* II 4, 13: "Η τε ἴδιότης τῆς ὕλης οὐ μορφή. Such parallels, however, are no proof for a dependence.

4) All bodies are finite and limited; matter is infinite and unlimited; matter is not a body. — In par. 312 Calcidius discussed whether matter is limited. The limitation of all bodies is a well-known point in the doctrine of Aristotle (cp. p. 136). The text quoted by Steinheimer (*Enn.* III 6, 16: ἐν δὲ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐδὲ τὸ οὐκ ἀφωρισμένον· οὐ γάρ σῶμα) is not relevant.

5) All bodies can be classified under the categories; but matter can not; matter is not a body. — The fifth argument is here reduced to its simple proportions. Calcidius greatly elaborated the *maior* and *minor* but failed to give an explicit conclusion. The formulation of his argument has some remarkable details. One can follow him when saying: *dicimus corpus essentiam*; but when he continues: *idem hoc dicimus quantitatem*, one would add *habere* rather than *esse*. What he wants to say is, of course: "we say that a body has a definite size". The categories will be fully discussed in par. 336.

The elaboration of the *minor* "we deny matter all categorical qualifications" leads to an old problem. But what then about *passio*, since, to Calcidius, matter is *patibilis*? The solution is that there is no real *pati*, but matter may be called 'passive' in so far as change of qualities occurs. (See the remarks on p. 148-149; also p. 159-160 on *secabilis*). In this way Calcidius may say: "we even take away from matter its seemingly own *passio* (we call it 'passive'), because we think that it never relinquishes its proper condition". Calcidius' conclusion clearly presupposes the *passio silvae*. He persistently speaks of *passio silvae* and *patibilis* in spite of the fact that, strictly speaking, this is incorrect; and he says so himself.

6) The reasoning which follows now is more difficult. Calcidius wants to say: like God, the other principle, *viz.*, matter, is not a genus nor belongs to any genus. In other words, a principle is a thing that cannot be classified at all and, for that reason, cannot be said to belong to the genus 'body'. So matter is not a body. One may also say: If matter is assigned to the genus 'body', we suppose that there existed something prior to matter. In conformity with this Calcidius adds: "And since it is a principle, therefore, we should not think of anything prior".

The assertion that matter *neque genus est neque ulti subiacet*

*generi* recalls a text of Albinus, stating that God οὗτε γένος ἔστιν οὗτε εἶδος οὗτε διαφορά. — εἶδος and διαφορά fall under (*subiacent*) the γένος and, therefore, are understood in the statement *neque ulli subiacet generi*. And now one also understands why the argument opens with: like God, matter is . . . This reference to the divine principle finds its explanation in Albinus, whose speculations about God Calcidius had constantly in mind here.

7) A body is perceptible by the senses; matter is not perceptible by the senses; matter is not a body. — This argument is quite clear; with Steinheimer one may refer to *Enn.* II 4, 12: αἰρετὴ οὖσα οὐ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν . . . δτι μήδε σῶμα. Still, the words *Quae cum ita sint* present a problem. What has this argument, which is quite sufficient in itself to do with the previous one? If I am not mistaken, Calcidius saw the *minor* in the latter (matter is a principle) as a philosophical premise to the present *minor*.

8) Matter is simple; a body is not simple; matter is not a body. — At last the principle argument turns up. Albinus said: οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ἀπλοῦς οὗτε ἀρχικός. See p. 168. Steinheimer also refers to Plotinus, *Enn.* II 4, 8: Δεῖ δὲ αὐτὴν μὴ σύνθετον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῆς φύσει. However, such parallels can never prove a dependence.

The following arguments are meant to prove the second part of the thesis, that matter is not incorporeal either.

1) What is incorporeal can never become corporeal; matter can become corporeal; matter is not incorporeal. — The language of Calcidius is over-stressed: *omni cultu convenustata*, cp. *pulchritudinis ac venustatis* (378, 2). For *effectu opificis*, cp. *deus, qui primitus operatur ac facit* (343, 25), *opifex igitur silvae . . .* (338, 15) etc.

2) If matter is incorporeal, it is intelligible; matter is not intelligible; matter is not incorporeal. — As a confirmation Calcidius repeats the seventh argument of the preceding section. How he can speak of both a *silva intelligibilis* and a *silva corporea* has been explained (p. 43). The question how 'not intelligible' matter can nevertheless be known will be answered in par. 345 ss. Calcidius concludes his series of arguments by stating his thesis once more.

As has been observed, a few parallel texts are found in some Middle-Platonic authors, but none of them defends the interesting doctrine of 'what is potentially incorporeal'. After Calcidius this was done by Simplicius (*In Phys.* 229, 11 ss.) who in other details too shows a great similarity with the present section. Among other

things, Simplicius proves that matter is not a body, saying that this theory was also held by Plotinus. He fully elaborates this thesis and, like Calcidius, concludes again and again: so matter is not a body. He continues: ἡ ὥλη πᾶς ἀν εἴη δυνάμει ἀσώματος τοῦ; ἀνάγκη δὲ τοῦτο, εἰπερ καὶ ἀσώματων εἰδῶν ἔστι ἡ ὥλη ὑποδεκτική. εἰ δὲ ἀσώματος οὐσία δυνάμει λέγεται, ίστεον δτι καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον οὐχ ὡς ὠρισμένη τις φύσις, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀπόφρασις τοῦ σώματος λέγεται. By these last words Simplicius also tries to explain ἀσώματος, which is not done by Calcidius. However, the striking similarity between the speculations of Calcidius and those of Simplicius naturally suggests that both authors were dealing with some *locus communis* from the Peripatetic School. Although this does not necessarily mean that Calcidius borrowed from an Aristotelian, the possibility should not be dismissed *a priori*, since elsewhere Calcidius derived so much from Adrastus. (His Aristotelian passages are collected by Borghorst, *o.c.*, p. 33 ss.) On the other hand, he may just as well have found this Aristotelian passage in a Platonic author (cp. p. 144).

With this Calcidius' own treatise on matter has come to its end. In many places his arguments show an undeniably Aristotelian character. Like many other Middle Platonists, he owes his dialectical material to the Peripatos. With many other Platonists he regarded Aristotle's works as a both adequate and complete commentary on the works of his great teacher and predecessor. Obviously many ideas of master and pupil were muddled up.—Calcidius was a fierce opponent to the Stoa; the climax of his opposition is in par. 319.—The similarity between Calcidius and Plotinus is consequent upon the fact that both studied the same subjects; a dependence of Calcidius on Plotinus is out of the question. Calcidius' philosophy reflects a stage of Platonic thinking prior to the *Enneades*. His standpoint in the question whether matter is *patibilis* is typical of this stage; it holds the middle path between two opinions.—Numenius was Calcidius' principal source. He set himself to attack the Stoa violently. The Aristotelian features are typical of Middle Platonism in general; and Calcidius may well have borrowed these from Numenius. Still, an influence of Albinus must be taken into account. Calcidius' wavering as to the questions whether matter is passive and divisible has a remarkable parallel in Numenius' attitude towards the question whether the soul is tridimensional. By themselves matter is neither passive nor divisible, the soul not

tridimensional. But they can be said to be so because of what comes to them.

### 3. VERIFYING PARAPHRASE

What follows is a continuous commentary on the remaining text of the *Timaeus*. It was written evidently as a confirmation to the theories proposed earlier. Hence the references to the previous paragraphs must necessarily be numerous. Since the development of the subject-matter is bound to the *Timaeus*, it is less systematic than the previous part. A certain main division can, however, be drawn up in this way: a) discussion of the characteristics of matter; it is  $\alpha$ ) without quality,  $\beta$ ) without motion; b) the reason why matter lacks quality; c) the origin of the characteristics, *i.e.*, the *species*; d) matter in itself; e) matter with reference to Providence.—In between occasional passages do not fit into this scheme; they are to be regarded as digressions inspired by Plato's text.

#### a) *Characteristics of matter*

##### $\alpha$ ) Matter without form and quality

[321] Since our penetrating dissertation has exhausted what we intended to discuss in accordance with the authoritative doctrine of Plato, a return must now be made to the commentary of the text of his dialogue. Now Plato says: "How are we to consider its power and its nature?" By 'power' he understands the ability to assume a certain outward appearance, for matter possesses outward appearance, changing qualities and quantities, not actually but potentially, as is clear from their unstable and mutual change into one another. By 'nature' he means its essence, and rightly he speaks of 'considering', for it is impossible to judge about the real essence of matter with some insight acquired by either the senses or the intellect. It is as a vision in a dream: the more we want to grasp the vision, the sooner it slips away. "In my opinion", Plato says, "matter is, like a nurse, the recipient of all that comes into existence". All that comes into existence must necessarily exist from a definite point in time: therefore, mortal things are likenesses and images of the immortal and really existing things, but they obtain their existence and

reveal themselves in matter, thus producing in us the idea of matter. Plato calls matter their 'recipient', because the forms do not come forth from the womb of matter, as the Stoics think, but rather come to it from outside, like an impression in wax. And he calls it 'nurse', because it carries on its own shoulders, as it were, the offspring of another, for it offers them only support.

IUXTA PLATONICI DOGMATIS AUCTORITATEM In par. 119, also the transition to a new part, Calcidius writes: *Mundi totius perfectionem . . . praeteriti operis textu secrevimus Platonicis dogmatibus inhaerentes*. See the comment on *auditores Platonis* (336, 10). ORATIONIS Cp. 346, 1; see also Galen, *Compendium*, p. 34, 17 (Ed. K. and W.); Calcidius returns to the dialogue at the point where he left it in par. 273. AIT ERGO Calcidius evidently follows the version  $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu'$  οὐν ἔχον δύναμιν καὶ φύσιν αὐτὸν ὑποληπτέον; in the Budé-edition: κατὰ φύσιν (49A). VIM NUNC ADPELLAT In par. 310 Calcidius spoke about a twofold *possibilitas*, his translation of the Aristotelian term δύναμις; now he explains the same calling it *vis*. It is, in his opinion, the aptitude to adopt all forms, and, therefore, the passive possibility (*non effectu sed possibilitate*). For the term *opportunitas*, cp. 309, 17: *opportunitatem suscipiendi ordinis*; and the comment (p. 63); especially 376, 14: *potentiam opportunitatemque formarum recipiendarum*, where *opportunitas* and *potentia* are equivalent. Alongside these terms, also one finds *capacitate* (356, 15). Calcidius does his best to minimize the active character of the term *vis*. The same tendency is seen in his interpretation of *cupiditas* (*silvae*): *cupiditatem vero negat esse talem, qualis est animalium. Sed ut, cum quid coeptum atque inchoatum est, dicitur perfectionem desiderare, sic, opinor, etiam silva speciem cupiditatem* (319, 1-4). Meanwhile, these texts show how difficult it is to maintain consistently the concept of pure potentiality. VULTUS Cp. 355, 18-19; 363, 4. OB INCONSTANTEM Cp. 341, 2-3; 305, 11; 328, 5-6; 346, 23-24; 348, 11-12. For *inconstantem*, cp. 341, 3 (p. 162); one reads: *nulla . . . certa et stabilis proprietas* in the translation of *Tim. 49B* (346, 21). NATURAM VERO Cp. 299, 17 *mundi sensilis explanaturus omnem substantiam*. By *substantia* Calcidius evidently means 'essence'; cp. 92, 18-19: *Docet nos substantiam sive, ut Cicero dicit, essentiam . . .*; 348, 26: *nam essentia quidem alicuius rei substantia est*. For the different meanings of this term see the comment to par. 344 (p. 221). RECTEQUE ETIAM PUTANDUM Calcidius

clearly wishes to say: "Matter cannot be grasped distinctly by either the senses or the intellect" (cp. 346, 9-11; 359, 7 ss.; 371, 1-2). This is discussed extensively in par. 345 ss. The verb *praesumere* is used repeatedly; 315, 12: *praesumpta eorum existentia*; 330, 20: *quae inrationabili opinione praesumuntur*; also see 370, 19. The corresponding noun *praesumptio* also occurs; 305, 7: *obscura quadam... praesumptio*; 340, 10-11: *non... abhorrens a ratione vel inconveniens praesumptio*; also 378, 9. The verb *praesumere* with its fairly wide meaning should here be translated by 'to grasp', 'to acquire the knowledge of'. This knowledge may be of a different character: *vel ex sensu cognita vel ex ratione intellecta*. The Greek equivalent πρόληψις is already mentioned (p. 49). **QUIPPE UT SOMNIUM** In *Tim.* 52B Plato compares the concept of the χώρα with a vision seen in a dream. Although the comparison differs, this passage in Plato suggested the comparison to Calcidius. **OPINOR, INQUIT** *Tim.* 49A: τοιάνδε μάλιστα πάσης είναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχήν αὐτὴν οἷον τιθῆνται. Fabricius thought that Calcidius read οἴμαι instead of είναι. But *opinor* must be taken as a rendering of τοιάνδε μάλιστα. **OMNIA QUAE GIGNUNTUR** As above, Calcidius explains *ipsa verba Platonis*. Wrobel apparently failed to see that the words *omnia quae gignuntur* are a quotation. They give Calcidius the opportunity for remarking on the temporal limitation of things. "Everything that comes into existence necessarily exists from a definite point in time, hence these things are mortal<sup>1)</sup> and images of the immortal things possessing the real existence. These images acquire an existence of their own in matter, and thus produce in us the idea of matter".

This approach to matter is considerably more Platonic than usual in Calcidius. The idea of the eternal image prevails. The representation needs something in which it is represented (as a projected image is seen upon the screen). So far matter was traced by analysis of change, and even though finally the Platonic idea of 'space' crops up for a moment, the approach was quite Aristotelian.

**SIMULACRA ET IMAGINES** In 299, 10 divine Providence makes the world *ad exemplum et similitudinem intelligibilis mundi*. Here a divine Maker is not mentioned. **ACCIPIUNT AUTEM SUBSTANTIAM** This assertion admits a twofold interpretation: 1) the images receive a substratum (ὑποκείμενον) or 2) they receive their existence,

1) *Sunt ergo mortalia* may be either a scribal error (a kind of homoioteleuton) or one of Calcidius' many contractions for *sunt ergo mortalia; et mortalia sunt...*

their being in matter. These concepts are not far apart, but nevertheless different. In par. 307 it was said of the principles: *omnia ex isdem substantiam mutuari* (336, 1). *Substantia* here must be given the second meaning; the present text perhaps has the same sense; cp. 354, 15-16: *in hac (sc. silva) quippe species dissolubiles substantiam sortiuntur*. For the different meanings of *substantia* see *ad* par. 344 (p. 221). **QUIA NON EX GREMIO** The stress is on *ex*. Matter is *totius generationis gremium* (304, 5), but the *species* do not proceed from this womb, they are in it (cp. 304, 7; 351, 14 ss.; 354, 20). **UT IN CERA SIGNACULA** Cp. 336, 16-17; 338, 10; 342, 13-14, and the translation of *Tim.* 50B in 351, 15-17. **NUTRICULAM VERO** Matter carries the qualities derived from elsewhere as a nurse carries somebody else's child; **QUIPPE NIHIL** Cp. 299, 16; 306, 20; 340, 14; 342, 13.

[322] Then Plato continues: "And what is said of it is indeed true, but, as it seems, has to be said more distinctly", for what is said in accordance with truth is not, for that reason, automatically said distinctly and clearly. There are indeed many correct but obscure expositions. Now obscurity may rise from the purpose of the speaker, as will happen occasionally, from a deficiency in the hearer or from the nature of the matter under discussion. It is due to the author, when he intentionally disguises his subject, as Heraclitus and Aristotle did, or when his treatment of the subject is defective. It is due to the hearer, when either unheard of and unusual things are said or the listener is too slow-witted. And, finally, it is due to the subject itself, when it is such as that which we are discussing now, *viz.*, when it is of such a nature that it can be perceived by neither the senses nor the mind, since it is without any form, quality and limit. But Timaeus, who speaks here, is not an incompetent speaker, nor are his listeners slow of mind; so there only remains the possibility that the subject itself is difficult and obscure. In fact there exists nothing more difficult to explain than matter, and thus it is why everything said about its nature, although said in full agreement with truth, is not expressed clearly and distinctly. Finally, Plato mentions the cause of this difficulty when saying: "It is, however, so much more perplexing, because the mind's eye necessarily becomes confused in advance and uncertain of both fire and the other materials, wondering why water is better called and thought water than

earth, since there is no certain and stable quality in the bodies denoting the nature proper to everything". He takes up the question from the issue of the mutual change of the elements into one another.

DEINDE PROSEQUITUR *Tim.* 49A: εἰρηται μὲν οὖν τὰληθές, δεῖ δὲ ἐναργέστερον εἰπεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ. ORATIONES Cp. 344, 23. NASCITUR QUIPPE Calcidius takes the opportunity to make a digression on obscurity. Many such digressions are found in this part of his book, giving the impression that he wishes to elaborate this part and to add new material. Obscurity, he says, may arise from three sources. First from the author; here again there are two possibilities, intentional obscurity and obscurity resulting from incapacity. He gives two instances of intentional obscurity: Heraclitus and Aristotle. It is a well-known fact that in Antiquity Heraclitus was considered to be obscure (cp. Überweg-Prächter, *Die Geschichte der Philosophie* I, Berlin, 1926<sup>12</sup>, p. 55). The mention of Aristotle in this connexion, as Fabricius notes, goes back, without doubt, to the story told by Aulus Gellius in *Noctes Atticae* XX 5. Alexander wrote the following letter to Aristotle: "You were wrong to publish your ἀχροατικοὶ λόγοι; for now there is no longer any difference between those who were your pupils and those who were not". Aristotle is said to have replied that his lectures were both published and unpublished, since they could be understood only by those who had been his hearers; hence the opinion that Aristotle purposely expressed himself obscurely. Galen, *Compendium* Ib (p. 34, Kr. and W.) speaks about the *constricto et obscuro sermone Aristotelis*. Fabricius quotes some texts of Cicero showing some similarity with Calcidius' text. In *De fin.* II 5 Cicero states, that there are two occasions when one is allowed to speak and be misunderstood: *si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, cognomento qui σκοτεινὸς perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit; aut quum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis* (cp. *Acad. Prior.* II 3). On the matter of obscurity, Plato's *Timaeus* seems to have been as famous as Heraclitus. At the beginning of his commentary Calcidius noticed that obscurity was not a question of *imbecillitas sermonis* but arose out of the subject (69, 13-14). The other two sources of obscurity are easily understood without comment. UT NEQUE Cp. 345, 3-5 (p. 174). *utpote carens forma, sine qualitate, sine fine*, cp. 356, 11-12.

SED NEQUE TIMAEUS The obscurity not being the fault of speaker or listeners (Socrates, Critias and Hermocrates, cp. par. 6), the subject-matter itself must be the cause.

EST TAMEN ARDUUM EO MAGIS,  
QUOD PRAECONFUNDI MENTIS  
ACIEM NECESSE EST ET AESTUA-  
RE TAM DE IGNI QUAM DE CETE-  
RIS MATERIIS, QUI MAGIS AQUAM  
IURE AQUAM DICI PUTARIQUE  
OPORTEAT QUAM TERRAM, CUM  
NULLA SIT CERTA ET STABILIS  
PROPRIETAS CORPORUM, QUAE  
CUIUSQUE INDICET NATURALEM  
GERMANITATEM.

χαλεπὸν δὲ ἄλλως τε καὶ διότι προα-  
πορηθῆναι περὶ πυρὸς καὶ τῶν μετὰ  
πυρὸς ἀναγκαῖον τούτου χάριν· τού-  
των γάρ εἰπεῖν ἔκαστον ὅποιον ὄν-  
τως ὕδωρ χρὴ λέγειν μᾶλλον ή πῦρ,  
καὶ ὅποιον ὄτιον μᾶλλον ή καὶ ἀπαν-  
τα καθ' ἔκαστόν τε, οὕτως ὥστε τινὲς  
πιστῷ καὶ βεβαίῳ χρήσασθαι λόγῳ,  
χαλεπόν. Πῶς οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' αὐτὸν καὶ  
πῆ καὶ τί περὶ αὐτῶν εἰκότως διαπο-  
ρηθέντες ἀν λέγοιμεν; (49 A-B).

Up to τούτων γάρ the translation is literal; *praeconfundi* renders προαπορηθῆναι. A creature of habit, *Calcidius* again uses synonyms: *praeconfundi . . . et aestuare; dici putarique*. Further on, he renders Plato's words according to their general sense alone. Thus he speaks of *certa et stabilis proprietas*, where Plato said πιστῷ καὶ βεβαίῳ λόγῳ. **RECIPROCA DE ALIO IN ALIUD ELEMENTORUM CONVERSIONE** This *conversio ex alio in aliud* is repeatedly mentioned by *Calcidius*: see *ad 341, 2*. From this reference it is evident that, with his *resolutio* of undeniably Aristotelian character (cp. p. 131), *Calcidius* imagines that he stands firmly on Platonic ground.

[323] “To begin with water, which”, Plato says, “we mentioned just now: when it congeals to ice, it appears to us at least as a stone and a body with the solidity of earth and not fluid at all”. Accurately and carefully he says ‘appears’, for water, when it congeals and becomes earth, does not persevere in its own nature—for water is wet,—but its substratum, matter, assumes an opposed nature, dryness, and becomes earth by change, and because its appearance suddenly changes and its state becomes different, it ‘appears’ as something which it was not before.

However, Plato speaks of water congealing to stone *<and not to earth>*, because in icy and cold regions water, which has long been solid, does change into stone: it is called crystal by the Alpine tribes in the Raetian mountains. There is also a town in Asia Minor, Tripolis, which is filled with steam of immense

heat. Poured into various forms, it solidifies and is made into the shapes of grapes and other fruit. How these things happen he tells in what follows.

PRINCIPIO UT *Tim.* 49B: πρῶτον μέν, δὸς νῦν ὄνδωρ ὀνομάκαμεν, πηγνύμενον ὡς δοκοῦμεν λίθους καὶ γῆν γιγνόμενον ὄρῶμεν. With *cuius modo fecimus mentionem* Calcidius appears to translate δὸς νῦν ὄνδωρ ὀνομάκαμεν. With these words Plato, however, intended: "what just now we still called water". According to Fabricius, *apparet* is meant to be the translation of ὡς δοκοῦμεν. It is probably more correct to say that it translates ὡς δοκοῦμεν . . . ὄρῶμεν; in Plato's text ὡς δοκοῦμεν is, of course, to be connected with πηγνύμενον; Calcidius apparently has not seen this. *minimeque fusile* is a typical Calcidian elaboration. ACRITER ET NIMIUM VIGILANTER Upon the doubtful interpretation of *apparet* Calcidius bases a reflection intended to confirm his theory on matter. The explanation of *apparet* is curious. One expects the reason for this verb immediately after *quippe*, in the first part of the period. But, in fact, this part gives something which is not the reason. This, actually follows later on in the second part. Consequently, *quippe* refers to this. The second part, however, begins with *sed quod*, which *quod* must be a causal conjunction, in the text handed down. The difficulty would vanish if *quod* was not a conjunction but a relative pronoun. And Calcidius apparently meant this. The immediately following *ea quae* must be a marginal gloss, come into the text, because someone either wished to warn the reader that *quod* should not be read as a conjunction but as referring to matter (*quod subiaceat*), or wrongly read it as a conjunction, thus missing a subject for *subiaceat*. Once *ea quae* is removed, *quod subiaceat* obtains the same function as *aqua* in the first part of the period. Calcidius' words may then be paraphrased as follows: Plato accurately says 'has the appearance of', for in the process of change, on the one hand, water becomes earth, and thereby disappears; but the matter underlying it remains and can be said 'to have the appearance of' another element. NON IN SUA NATURA PERSEVERANS This in opposition to matter, which is always *in propria natura perseverans* (337, 17, cp. p. 150). SIQUIDEM EST HUMIDA As appears from the interpretation above, this is the explanation of the words *non in sua natura perseverans*. SED AQUAM IN SAXUM The important word is *saxum*. One wonders why Plato speaks of water congealing to stone and not to earth or why

stone at all, since he says *λίθους καὶ γῆν*. Calcidius believes Plato to be speaking of a well-known phenomenon whereby water appears to change into stone. CRYSTALLUS The belief that crystal comes from ice and snow is found in several places, for instance, Seneca, *Nat. Q.* III 25; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* XXXVII 2, 9, followed by Isidorus, *Etym.* XVI 13—while in *Silvae* I 2, 126 Statius states *raraque longaevis nivibus crystalla gelari*. Aulus Gellius says that in one of Aristotle's works there is: *solidius latiusque concretam esse eam* (*sc. aquam*), *quam Graeci χρύσταλλον appellant* (*Noct. Att.*, XIX 5, 5). One notes that in almost all these texts the Greeks are mentioned as those who gave the name. Κρύσταλλος was thought to be derived from χρύσος (ice), as Hermolaos observes (Pliny, *loc. cit.*, cp. ed. L. G. F. Franzius, Leipzig, 1788, tom. X, p. 20). Calcidius, however, disagrees: he states that it is called chrystral by the Alpine tribes in the Raetian mountains. The Alps are mentioned in this connection by Pliny and Isidore but not the Raetian mountains. These differences indicate another source, where Calcidius may also have found the second phenomenon, *viz.*, the petrifying of boiling steam in Tripolis. Similar phenomena are also mentioned by Pliny (XXXI 2, 20), but he describes them quite differently. *quae* supposes an antecedent *aqua*. The concept *aqua* dominates the entire passage, for there is question of water changing into stone. *missa in formulas* may be an indication of some kind of industry. DICTURUS ERIT Calcidius probably refers to the text of Plato which he discusses more fully in par. 325.

[324] Plato continues his discussion, and having said that water changed and became earth, he now states that finally “this same water, when evaporated to smoke, mixes with the rarity of air, and that air, in its turn, burns and changes into fire”. Next he shows that the coming into existence of the elements and their change from one into another is performed in a cycle in which “fire gives up its own subtlety and assumes the conditions of air. This, again, first condenses and accumulates in mists and clouds, and then, after the mass (of the cloud) has been desolved and become liquid, flows away in rains. From water again come solidity and stones”.

Thus according to this cycle earth, too, appears to change into other elements; for, if earth alone does not change, eventually

everything will become earth, since all other things will change into it, and earth itself will not change into anything else. But because proof is provided by visual observation, and earth has never been seen to change into water or any other element, Plato abstained and shrank from the assertion that earth changes, lest he would seem to come into conflict with the senses.

**NUNC EXEQUITUR** Plato's text runs as follows: *τηγόμενον δὲ καὶ διακρινόμενον αὖ ταύτὸν τοῦτο πνεῦμα καὶ ἀέρα, συγκαυθέντα δὲ ἀέρα πῦρ, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ συγκριθὲν καὶ κατασβεσθὲν εἰς ίδεαν τε ἀπιόντα αὔθις ἀέρος πῦρ, καὶ πάλιν ἀέρα συνιόντα καὶ πυκνούμενον νέφος καὶ ὄμιχλην, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἔτι μᾶλλον συμπιλουμένων ρέον ὕδωρ, ἐξ ὕδατος δὲ γῆν καὶ λίθους αὔθις* (49C). Calcidius' wording of this paragraph is quite different from that of the 'official' translation (61, 5 ss.), but both are a correct rendering of Plato's thought. **GYRIS ET ANFRACTIBUS** In the commentary this typically Calcidian combination is frequently found: 123, 16; 170, 22. These terms belong especially to astronomy: cp. 170, 22; 128, 18; 132, 17; 167, 25-26; 180, 19; 182, 9-10; 187, 9, 18; 207, 5; 273, 13. In his translation Calcidius appears to suggest a complete circular course between the elements; hence he concludes: *igitur secundum hanc orbitam rationemque circuitus* (again a doublet). He was bound to give this point much attention, for no one reading Plato's text carefully could fail to see that the cycle was incomplete. "But", Calcidius says, "this does not mean that Plato did not assume a complete cycle: in the present passage he only wished to avoid a conflict with our common experience, which does not know a change of earth into something else. That the cycle must be complete is evident from the fact, that otherwise everything would finally become earth". Once again Calcidius explains Plato's doctrine in an Aristotelian sense, so much so that he even contradicts Plato, for from *Tim.* 54B-D it is clear that, for the latter, earth cannot change, because the geometrical figure of the element of earth cannot change into the figure of other elements (cp. Galen, *Compendium* Xb: *Deinde postea tria (horum) elementorum inter se commutari exposuit, terram autem in statu suo firmam et inmutatam perseverare* (Ed. Kr. and W., p. 60). This is confirmed by Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* 332 a 27-30: *ἀνάγκη τοίνυν ἷ ἀεὶ μένοντα καὶ ἀμετάβλητα εἰς διληλητα, ἷ μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ ἷ ἀπαντα, ἷ τὰ μὲν τὰ δ' οὕτως, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαῖῳ Πλάτων* ζεγραψεν. Aristotle rejects this, putting forward his own view,

shared evidently by Calcidius: ὡστε φανερὸν δτι κύκλω τε ἔσται ἡ γένεσις τοῖς ἀπλοῖς σώμασι (*ib.*, 331 b 2-3). The argument given by Calcidius may also be found in *De gen. et corr.* 332 b 5 *ss.*, where Aristotle states that there cannot be a ἀρχή among the elements, because in the end everything would be either fire or earth, *etc.* Aristotle also appeals to experience to support his thesis; *ib.*, 331 a 7-9: 'Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται πρότερον, δτι τοῖς ἀπλοῖς σώμασι ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἡ γένεσις, ἀμα δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν φαίνεται γιγνόμενη'; *ib.*, 331 b 24-25: ὁμολογούμενη δὲ καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς γένεσις. Calcidius, on the other hand, states that, appealing to the same experience, Plato rejected the complete cycle. But as has been noted, he did so because of the geometrical figure of earth.

[325] Plato, however, goes deeper into this mutual change of the elements, saying: "And if the materials thus lend to each other, in some kind of cycle, the kindling forces of generation and do not persevere in the same form, how can a certain idea of them be formed, free of all doubt? Surely none". Just so; for let us image that this fire (*i.e.*, of our sensible world) is pure fire unmixed with another element, as Heraclitus thinks, or pure water, as Thales believes, or pure air, as Anaximenes presumes; "if", he says, "we take these things to be always the same and immutable, we shall get muddled in many inextricable errors". Hence one ought not to agree easily with regard to such natures, nor at once take for certain, what seems to be no more than a probability. So what can guard us from error? The following argument can: that there is essence and also quality, and that these two are different. Essence is the substance of a thing, quality that which comes to and appears in things, having a substance. When now we observe, as always whenever we look closely into that part of nature (*viz.*, the elements), and see that a part of it departs from itself and changes into another material, *e.g.*, fire, we shall not denote this material, as something stable and unchanging, with a definite pronoun, such as 'this' or 'that'—for these pronouns denote an essence—but, in denoting them, we shall use rather that pronoun proper to quality, not 'this' but 'such', not 'that' but 'of this or that nature'. For with fire the change undergone is not loss of essence but of quality. When fire becomes air, it changes into a different or opposite material, for it is certain that the essence in itself has nothing opposed to

itself: rather opposite things are turning round the same essence. Thus the change and variation affect not the essence but the quality, in which both variety and opposition are found. It is the same with the other elements; none has an essence of its own, and we always use the demonstrative pronouns referring to essence rather than those relating to quality by sheer force of habit. These four bodies are in a perpetual and ceaseless flux; they change by variation before they are given a name, like a mountain stream driven on by some irresistible force.

SUMPSIT TAMEN At the end of par. 323 Calcidius remarks that Plato has yet to enter into the details of this question. These are now discussed. His actual words are: "He has, however, taken in hand something else in order to . . .". DE MUTUA ELEMENTORUM EX ALIO IN ALIUD CONVERSIONE Cp. 346, 23-24: *Initium quaestio[n]is adripit ex reciproca de alio in aliud elementorum conversione*, which refers to those passages where he discusses the way leading to knowledge and in so doing assumes that this way was already indicated by Plato in the present passage. AIT ENIM *Tim.* 49C: *κύκλον τε οὕτω διαδίδοντα εἰς δλληγλα, ως φαίνεται, τὴν γένεσιν.* Calcidius' translation is fairly accurate: *κύκλον* = *circuitu*; *τὴν γένεσιν* is—in a way typical of Calcidius—rendered by *vires fomentaque generationis*. *Mutuari* may be taken as a translation of *διαδίδοντα*, though, properly speaking, it means 'to borrow from'. Here, however, this is impossible because of the words *invicem sibi*. By *vires fomentaque generationis* Calcidius must intend matter, for the elements, in a way, pass this on to each other. *Vires* recalls 344, 24, where *vis* is the equivalent of *possibilitas* or *potentia*. When in par. 353 (376, 16-19) it is said that there are many possibilities in matter, the explanation of the plural *vires* is therefore given. For *fomentum* one may think of *fomes* (341, 1), which has also become a plural under the influence of *vires*. The rest of the translation is a somewhat free adaptation. Plato says: *Οὕτω δὴ τούτων οὐδέποτε τῶν αὐτῶν ἔχαστων φανταζομένων, ποῖον αὐτῶν ὡς δὲ δτιοῦν τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ δλλο παγίως δισχυριζόμενος οὐκ αἰσχυνεῖται τις ἔχατόν; οὐκ ἔστιν.* Calcidius does not, like Plato, combine the first part (*κύκλον τε . . . γένεσιν*) with what precedes but with what follows. MERITO. FINGAMUS ENIM These words of Calcidius are only an elaboration of the quotation from Plato just given. "Who will not feel ashamed when he asserts that anything whatsoever is such and nothing else

and when he sees, at the same time, that it has been changed into something else?" So Plato says that of the things perceived by us not one is properly speaking permanent and always the same. Calcidius amplifies this idea thus: "Let us assume that this our fire (*i.e.*, perceptible by our senses) is really something permanent, (he actually says: "that this our fire is pure and without mixture of any element"), as Heraclitus says, or water, as Thales, or air, as Anaximenes says, how can we then avoid getting entangled in numerous inextricable problems. For then we should assume that this our fire, *etc.*, is always the same and invariable". In this case fire, water and air, as we know them, would have the properties which are characteristic of the ideas. Evidently Calcidius is thinking of the ideas here, hence the words: *sincerum et sine ullius materiae permixtione*. The ideal fire, *etc.*, is pure (*Ignis...purus et ceterae sincerae intellegibilesque substantiae* (302, 20-21)), whereas the four *materiae*, *i.e.*, the four elements as we know them, are not pure but blended; they are called fire, *etc.*, after the element which predominates in the mixture: *quattuor...materias..., quae concretione mutua ex maioris atque obtinentis materiae vocabulo cognominatae sunt* (302, 4-6). This last text also shows that *materia* in Calcidius means 'element' (cp. p. 42). This is also clear from *in aliam materiam* and *in diversam contrariamve materiam* in this same paragraph (348, 30; 349, 8). Needless to say that the rendering of Heraclitus' teaching: *esse hunc ignem sincerum et sine ullius materiae permixtione* is an anachronism. QUID EST Calcidius gives the solution In so doing he anticipates Plato's text he translates in par. 326. For the use of the pronouns this section is, therefore, referred to. QUONIAM EST ESSENTIA The theory formulated by Calcidius is once more that of the real difference between essence and quality. As previously (par. 308, 311, 321) he is attacking the Stoics. The identity of *essentia* with *substantia* has already been mentioned *ad* par. 321 (p. 173). PROVENIT Cp. 299, 17: *in qua qualitates... proveniunt*; 314, 1: *provenit ut convalescat*; 320, 22: *in quo proveniunt rerum sensibilium commutationes*. SI OBSERVEMUS Here Plato's text should be compared (49D):  $\delta\epsilon\lambda\delta\ \delta\chi\alpha\theta\varpi\omega\mu\epsilon\eta$ . UT PUTA IGREM  $\omega\zeta\ \pi\tau\delta\pi$ . The mood of the whole of this phrase suggests that it is the translation of a potential Greek clause: *si observemus... non monstramus... sed utamur...* NEQUE ENIM IGNIS If fire changes, there is no loss of essence (which would be the case, if fire were the essence of everything) but only of quality. ET NOS

**PRAESUMIMUS** “In discussing these things the idiom is incorrect, for demonstrative pronouns are used without further reflection”. This ‘use without further reflection’ is the rendering of *praesumere*, so the meaning of this verb here is quite different from that found in most other places (see *ad* 345, 5, p. 174), but it has a parallel in *ut libet exagitata praesumptio* (327, 2). **SEMPER ENIM** Finally, *Calcidius* compares the constant change of the elements with an ever flowing river. This comparison was undoubtedly inspired by *Plato*, for in his description of the union of soul and body the latter says about the *περίοδοι* of the soul: *Αἱ δὲ εἰς ποταμὸν ἐνδεθεῖσαι πολὺν οὐτ' ἔχρατουν οὐτ' ἔχρατοῦντο* (*Tim.* 43A). *Calcidius* translates this with: *circuitus porro, ut torrenti rapido defluoque obligati*, and as an explanation he adds: *Torrentem vocat silvam corpoream, propterea quod fluere non desinat neque umquam maneat in certa et in stabili constantia nec teneatur* (244, 13 ss.). *Circuitus* is also used by *Calcidius* in 348, 13; also see *torrens* in 349, 19; *fluunt* 349, 17; *certa et stabili* reminds one of *certa et stabilis* in 346, 21, cp. 348, 16; see also par. 353). **PRIUSQUE EX** Cp. *Tim.* 50B: *ἀ γε μεταξὺ τιθεμένου μεταπίπτει*, which in *Calcidius’* translation becomes: *mox et inter ipsa verba responsionis migrante* (350, 17).

[326] “Hence”, he says, “this fire, which, as it were exuding, dissolves into the airstream, since it is unstable and variable, and has no constant nature, should be regarded not as fire but as something fiery, nor should water, which through evaporation turns into air, be called a liquid but something wet, and so on”. And he continues: “But that in which all these things seem to originate and finally to be dissolved and in which, by destruction, they change into different forms, *viz.*, matter, this alone can be denoted by a definite pronoun, and of this alone ‘this’ or ‘that’ can correctly be said”. Indeed, this alone can always be denoted with a definite name, since, without quality or form, it does not undergo any change into opposed qualities or other forms, and always remains the same. In order to dispel any possible shades of doubt, he uses a clear and distinct example. He pictures “an artisan fashioning without interruption shapes from the very same gold”, now a pyramid, and suddenly from that an octahedron, then, quicker than thought, an icosahedron, a cube, triangles, quadrangles, a hemicycle and a cycle. “If then someone should pick out a certain figure and ask what it is, then”, so he

states, "the answer should be, 'gold', because, if the answer is, 'a pyramid', this figure would immediately and by the answer itself change into something else, and the person who gave the answer lie". In the same way, it is not said of fire which has the shape of a pyramid that it is fire, but that it is either a fiery part of matter or a fiery quality; similarly of air not that it is an octahedron but 'vaporous' matter, and water and earth not an icosahedron and a cube, but, for the former, liquid, and for the latter, earthly solidity of matter.

ITAQUE, INQUIT With a somewhat flowery style and not very literally Calcidius translates *Tim.* 49D: *ἀεὶ δὲ καθορῶμεν ἄλλοτε ἄλλη γιγνόμενον, ὡς πῦρ, μὴ τοῦτο ἄλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκάστοτε προσαγορεύειν πῦρ, μηδὲ ὄδωρ τοῦτο ἄλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀεί.* SIMILITER CETERA Calcidius gives no further explanation; he has already done this in par. 325. For Plato says: *μηδὲ ἄλλο ποτὲ μηδὲν ὡς τινα ἔχον βεβαιότητα, δσα δεικνύντες τῷ ῥήματι τῷ τὸ δε καὶ τοῦτο προσχρώμενοι δηλοῦν ἡγούμεθά τι· φεύγει γάρ οὐχ ὑπομένον τὴν τοῦ τὸ δε καὶ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν τοῦ δὲν καὶ πᾶσαν δση μόνιμα ὡς δντα αὐτὰ ἐνδεικνυται φάσις.* 'Αλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἔκαστα μὴ λέγειν, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἀεὶ περιφερόμενον δμοιον ἐκάστου πέρι καὶ συμπάντων οὗτα καλεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ πῦρ τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοιοῦτον, καὶ ἀπαν δσονπερ ἀν ἔχη γένεσιν. ET EXEQUITUR *Tim.* 49E: *ἐν δὲ ἐγγιγνόμενα ἀεὶ ἔκαστα αὐτῶν φαντάζεται καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπόλλυται, μόνον ἐκεῖνο αῦ προσαγορεύειν τῷ τε τοῦτο καὶ τῷ τὸ δε προσχρωμένους δνόματι.* NEC ... PATITUR See *ad* 343, 18 ss. (p. 169). SEMPER EADEM MANET Cp. par. 329 (p. 190). NATURALIS OBSCURITAS Cp. 359, 9: *propter silvae naturales tenebras.* Later on, Calcidius compares the grasping of matter with the perception of darkness (369, 17 ss., p. 224). IUBET CONCIPERE ANIMO ET INFINGERE COGITATIONE Again a doublet. Calcidius renders the following words of Plato: "Ετι δὲ σαφέστερον αὐτοῦ πέρι προθυμητέον αῦθις είπειν. Εἰ γάρ πάντα τις σχήματα πλάσας ἔχ χρυσοῦ μηδὲν μεταπλάττων παύοιτο ἔκαστα εἰς ἀπαντα, δεικνύντος δή τινος αὐτῶν ἐν καὶ ἐρομένου τί ποτ' ἔστι, μακρῷ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀσφαλέστατον είπειν δτι χρυσός, τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον δσα τε ἄλλα σχήματα ἐνεγίγνετο, μηδέποτε λέγειν ταῦτα ὡς δντα, ἀ γε μεταξὺ τιθεμένου μεταπίπτει, ἀλλ' ἔὰν ἄρα καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἐθέλη δέχεσθαι τινος, ἀγαπᾶν (50A-B). Mentioning 'different forms', Calcidius digresses, evidently recalling the figures which Plato assignes (53D ss.) to the four elements: fire = pyramid, air =

octahedron, water = icosahedron, earth = cube. He adds more figures, beginning with the triangles, evidently because Plato says:  $\tauὸ δὲ τρίγωνον δσα τε δὲλλα σχήματα$ . At the end of the quotation he applies this text to the problem under discussion: a piece of gold, which at a given moment looks like a pyramid, is not designated a pyramid, but gold (in the shape of a pyramid). Thus one should not speak of fire, but of a fiery (= pyramidoid) form of matter or of a fiery quality (of matter); the correct formulation would have been 'matter in fiery quality'. Nor should one speak of an octahedron but of a 'breathlike (*spirabilis* = octahedral) matter', and further, of the 'liquid and earthly solidity of matter' (*terrenae soliditatis corpus*). Calcidius might also have said simply *umecta et terrena silva* (cp. 374, 14-15, p. 233; *umectatam modo, modo ignitam*), but *soliditas* denotes the special character of water and earth as opposed to that of air and fire, *viz.*, solidity.

[327] And now one should not think that what Plato here discusses is merely a choice of appropriate terms. On the contrary, he does his best to accustom us, through our acuteness of mind, to the practice of detaching pure matter, covered up by a variety of materials, from the confusion of those bodies. For he states: "Exactly the same condition, hard to explain, occurs in the nature which assumes all the forms of the materials, for it does not in the least depart from its own condition; indeed it receives all things, without appropriating a single form from them". The bodies, therefore, are shaped, but matter is shapeless. "And", he says, "although what is accepted within its womb is formed"—in keeping with what was said above: 'what is accepted', for this was called 'receptacle' of all bodies—, it itself remains without form and is used as a soft, plastic material, in which various imprints are made". It is evident that there are certain soft materials which, yielding to the impressions of different seals, take up and retain the imprints a long time, as when someone stamps wax, lead or silver all over. Like matter, the wax itself will be without form but have innumerable forms arising not out of itself but from elsewhere. With good reason, therefore, and rightly the nature of a soft and plastic material is compared to corporeal matter stamped all over with the forms of bodies.

SOLLERTIA MENTIS DISTINGUERE Again the *resolutio* is meant. See 305, 13: *speculatione mentis*; 312, 11-12, and the parallel places mentioned *ad loc.* (p. 50 and 132). AIT ENIM *Tim.* 50B: 'Ο αὐτὸς δὴ λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς τὰ πάντα δεχομένης σώματα φύσεως. Ταῦτὸν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ προσρητέον. (This short phrase is not translated by Calcidius) ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτῆς τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔξισταται δυνάμεως—δέχεται τε γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ πάντα καὶ μορφὴν οὐδεμίαν ποτὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὅμοιαν εἴληφεν οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῆ. In this text Calcidius found the correct description of Plato's concept of matter. He referred to it already in the first section of this treatise and returned to it again and again (see the comment on par. 268, p. 32). CUMQUE INTRA GREMIUM The words *eadem...trahit*, which, except for the parenthetic clause, also occur in the translation proper, are a rendering of the words ἐκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει παντὶ κεῖται (*Tim.* 50C); the first name of matter was also derived from it in par. 308 (336, 15-18, p. 146): *ex natura quidem propria primam materiam nuncupans et item simile quiddam mollis cedentisque materiae, in quam inprimuntur signacula* (cp. 353, 14-15, p. 190; 354, 4, p. 191). Another name mentioned was *receptaculum*; Calcidius draws attention to this in his translation *quae recipiuntur*, see par. 321 (345, 13), and the comment on p. 175). The term *usus*, too, asks for comment (351, 16 and 23). One would expect Calcidius merely to state: "matter is like a soft material"; instead he says: "the *usus silvae* is similar to a soft material". One might be inclined to translate this by "the employment of matter is the same as that of a soft material", thus indicating God as the one who employs matter. However, a different solution is offered by the last phrase of the paragraph, where Calcidius once more says the unexpected "a soft material is like matter" rather than: "Matter is like a soft material". Now, since Calcidius states here: "the *natura* of a soft material is like the *usus silvae*", one is given the impression that, alongside *usus silvae*, *natura silvae* might have been used as well, and that, therefore, *usus* should to some extent be taken as the equivalent of *natura*. One may think of the following development of meaning: 'use', 'usefulness', 'useful nature', 'nature'.

The general content of this section, namely that matter is unchangeable in itself but assumes various forms, occurs repeatedly, e.g., 342, 11-15; (compare: *Ex quo perspicuum est* with *Perspicuum est* in 351, 18 and 345, 13-18, p. 175). See also Albinus, *Epit.* VIII 2, who also treats about the subsequent comparisons.

[328] Plato has also spoken of wax in the *Theaetetus*, when discussing the causes of the different strength of memory in men, namely the stronger and weaker memories. He said that in the minds of men there is a faculty very much like wax, which makes some people keen of comprehension and quick of learning but soon forgetful; it makes others slow of learning but of good memory, and others, again, so gifted that they are both quick to learn and slow to forget. For those in whom this wax-like faculty, which, he says, Homer called τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, is more liquid and thin, learn easily but they soon lose what they have learned, since the impressions disappear because of the extreme softness of the wax. On the other hand, if the wax of the mind is rather solid, it scarcely receives the forms impressed unto it, but once this has been done, it retains those forms laboriously impressed a long time, because they are printed into a hard material. The third case is one of divine blessing, namely when the wax-like material is so compact that it neither rejects the forms nor opposes the impression of what is stamped on, and yet it does not receive them in so unstable a foundation that the impressions are vague and invisible.

SED DE CERA This section is a typically Calcidian digression. Plato's text (*Theaetetus* 194C-E) runs: "Οταν μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ μετρίως ὡργασμένος ἦ, τὰ ίόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαίνομενα, εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, δ ἔφη "Ομηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ δόμοιότητα (= *cerae similitudo*, 352, 10-11, 17), τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἴκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, ἐπειτα μνήμονες (the third group of Calcidius) . . . "Οταν τὸν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ, δ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἦ δταν κοπρῶδες καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἦ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἦ σκληρόν, ὃν μὲν ὑγρόν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γίγνονται (the first group), ὃν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντία (the second group).

### β) Matter without motion

[329] Because he has made it clear that matter is without form and without quality, he now takes upon himself to show that it is also without motion, saying "it is moved and formed by things penetrating into it" of various characters, since of itself

it has no more motion than it has form, but that "it is moved and formed in different ways by *species* having forms". Therefore, matter always remains in such a condition. The prototype, too, *viz.*, the idea which exists of everything that has come into being, always remains true to its own nature. In the same way God, the Maker, remains eternally. But the images of the prototypes which present themselves to matter are not permanent, for they change constantly and unceasingly in a perpetual succession of dying and being born on account of the inevitable necessity of a certain nature. Hence Plato says that matter "is set to receive the images of things". His use of 'set' is excellent, for by nature it is motionless but moved by the coming and going of the *species* which enter and confer a form upon it; and in its turn it moves these *species*, as Plato will show further on. Although, therefore, it is always the same and unchangeable, he rightly states: "yet, because of the coming together of multiform *species*, it seems to assume various forms. But the *species* which present themselves to matter, dissolve and perish in it, are images of the eternal and immortal *species*"—*viz.*, of those which we call ideas—"and they are formed by them in some wonderful way", namely after the image of the exemplar mentioned. "In a wonderful way", because it is difficult and inexplicable to imagine how a true image is formed from the pure ideas in things which come into being, whether this happens as with the imprints in soft materials, as we discussed previously, or as when the outlines are conveyed from an example to suitable materials, as is done in painting and sculpture.

NUNC QUONIAM Calcidius indicates the division now being used, for the fact that matter lacks both form and quality has indeed been the subject from par. 321 onwards. INMOBILEM QUOQUE In par. 301 *inmobilis* was translated by 'without motion'. In the context it was the most obvious translation, and there was room indeed for the assumption that the Greek original had  $\alpha\kappa\iota\nu\eta\tau\omega\varsigma$ . However, the translation 'immovable' is also in accordance with the theory of Calcidius, even though a little further on he says (*silva*) *movetur* (353, 17). For with motion it is the same as with all affections of matter: by itself it is not open to them, but motions and changes do occur in it, and in so far he can say: *silva movetur*, *silva mutatur*, *variatur* (299, 20). Nevertheless, when Calcidius puts *silva mutatur*

alongside *silva immutabilis est*, *silva movetur* alongside *silva immobilis est*, and, what actually includes everything, *silva patibilis est* alongside *silva inpetibilis est*, one wonders whether all these are only seeming contradictions. The answer must be in the negative: it seems that what here comes to light is *Calcidius'* incongruous presentation of matter, which he found in Aristotle.

In connexion with *Tim.* 50C, *κινούμενόν τε καὶ διασχηματίζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιόντων, φαίνεται δὲ δι' ἔκεινα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοιον*, *Calcidius* poses the question whether matter has motion. In the course of the translation he observes that with motion it is the same as with forms: matter, having nothing of itself, does not have motion either; it "remains unmoved by itself". He now goes further into the meaning of this 'remaining'. *MANET ERGO* Matter remains. *Calcidius* has been hammering on this point from the first section (299, 18). As for the other principles, they also remain: *Archetypum manet, deus opifex manet*. So the three principles (par. 304, 307) are of a permanent nature. The source of change then lies in the images of the prototypes: for they are incessantly coming and going. The reason given, *ob inexcusabilem naturae cuiusdam necessitatem*. This is the only explanation *Calcidius* can give. Probably he is thinking of the Platonic concept of *ἀνάγκη* (cp. 299, 14 and 301, 18). With *naturae cuiusdam* he seems to introduce a fourth principle, about which nothing further is heard (cp. 354, 19 and 23; also see *ad* par. 352, p. 193 and 237). The method of expression here is well-known: **IN TALI FORTUNA ET CONDICIONE** the *Calcidian* doublet. **ARCHETYPUM** Cp. 303, 3. **MANET IN SUBSTANTIA PROPRIA** Cp. 299, 18: *cum a natura propria non recedat (silva) IDEA* See *ad* line 23. **QUAM OB REM** *Calcidius* returns once more to the text *ἔκμαγεῖον γὰρ φύσει πάντι κεῖται*, paying special attention to the verb *κεῖται*. For the rest of the translation, cp. 351, 12-17, p. 187. **ET EASDEM INVICEM MOVET SPECIES** *Calcidius* refers to *Tim.* 52E: *κινουμένην δ' αὖ πάλιν ἔκεινα σείειν*, which words he explains in par. 352: as stagnant water is set into motion by the throwing of a pebble, and, in its turn, moves the pebble, so matter is set in motion by the *species*, and, in its turn, moves the *species*. It is remarkable how after all this *Calcidius* can maintain that matter is without motion. **RECTE ITAQUE** For the combination *immobilis - immutabilis*, cp. the comment on par. 301 (p. 124). **VIDETUR TAMEN** *Tim.* 50C: *φαίνεται δὲ δι' ἔκεινα ἄλλοτε ἄλλοιον· τὰ δὲ εἰσιόντα καὶ ἔξιόντα τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ μιμήματα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ' αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον*

καὶ θαυμαστόν. COETUM Cp. 360, 2; 375, 1. QUAS IDEAS VOCAMUS Cp. 303, 1; 304, 12; 308, 17 (Philo); 333, 7-8; 354, 2, 18, 28; 359, 8; 367, 25; 370, 21; 373, 22. IUXTA MEMORATI VIDELICET EXEMPLI CONSIGNATIONEM; these words are a reminder that the images resemble the exemplars 'referred to' (cp. *memoratae species*, 354, 25). MIRO AUTEM MODO Calcidius explains the words *miro modo* by stating that it is virtually impossible to imagine how these images come into being. He mentions two possibilities of presenting these things. The first (the imprint in a soft material) is clearly derived from Plato's text; the second refers to a painter or sculptor, imitating or copying an example, who conveys the outlines of this example to his material, a canvas or a stone. Calcidius may have been thinking of Plato's Demiurge, who creates the world looking at the ideas (*Tim.* 29A). This passage is in 333, 5 ss.; 336, 3-4, and particularly in par. 338; also cp. 300, 13-14. As for the mode of expression, it should be noted that *difficile est mente concipere* may be used but not *inexplicabile est mente concipere*. In the translation I have, therefore, taken *inexplicabile* separately. It seems that Calcidius has fallen victim to his predilection for doublets. SICUT SUPRA DICTUM EST refers to 351, 15-17 and also to 353, 14-15.

[330] Therefore, Plato defers the treatment of this subject for the moment, in order to take it up in due course, and he enlightens the mind by representing the matter in such a way that three kinds [*genera*] are seen.—He now takes 'kinds' in a figurative sense using it to denote first substances, for neither matter nor the example are kinds. "They are", he says, "first that which comes into existence and originates"—viz., the generated *species* which originates in matter and dissolves in it—"secondly that in which it originates"—this 'in which' is matter itself, for fleeting *species* acquire their being in this—"and, thirdly, that to which originating things owe their likeness", viz., the idea which is the exemplar of all things produced by nature, namely those things which are enclosed by matter as in a womb and which are said to be the images of the exemplars. Next he clarifies the problem by a manifest example, for he compares that which receives the *species* to a 'mother', matter of course—for matter receives the *species* offered by nature; that from which the image is derived to a 'father', namely the idea—for the *species* mentioned owe their likeness to the idea; and

that which originates from these two to a 'child', *viz.*, the generated *species*—for this stands between the really existing nature which is constant and always the same, *i.e.*, the idea, the eternal intellect of the eternal God, and that nature which indeed is but not always the same, *viz.*, matter; for matter by itself is not among the things that are, because it is eternal. Therefore, that which stands between these two natures is not really existing. Since it is the image of what really exists, it seems to exist to some extent; but since it is not permanent and undergoes change, it does not exist in reality, as the exemplars do; for these indeed enjoy true and unchangeable existence. Hence there are the three following realities: that which always is, that which always is not and that which is not always. It is not surprising, that one example is found to differ in some respect from the other, because a comparison is made on account of a likeness, and likeness is a combination of similarity and dissimilarity. Therefore, if in such matter one finds a similarity, be it only a superficial one, one ought to grasp it for the sake of the clarification of the intellect.

QUARE DIFFERT In the previous paragraph the problem of the relation between the ideas and their images came up for a moment; from this it is clear that, according to Calcidius, the problem is a particularly difficult one. "It is for this reason", he now states, "that Plato momentarily puts this question off in order to return to it in due time (51C, par. 337); presently he restricts himself to giving a preliminary survey and elucidating comparison". AD PRAESENS 'Εν δ' οὖν τῷ παρόντι (50C). DISTINGUIT INTELLECTUM *Distinguere* here means 'to elucidate'; '*intellectus* = 'concept'; cp. *intellectus dei* (333, 8; 354, 28), 'the concepts of God'. So literally he says: "he elucidates our intellect by ordering our thoughts". These words seem to be a paraphrase of Plato's χρὴ... διανοηθῆναι (50C). TRIA GENERA Plato: γένη... τριτά (50C). Calcidius promptly remarks that *genera* should not be taken in a technical sense here and adds this explanation: "matter and example are not *genera*". About the third principle, *viz.*, God, he has already said: *neque genus est neque ulli subiacet generi* (343, 26). *Genera* should be taken here in the sense of 'first substances'. The argument runs as follows: *genus* is above *species*; on account of this 'being above', principles may also be indicated by this term, for principles are above every-

thing. It is in this way that *genera* becomes equivalent to *ἀρχαί*. This is why Fabriicius refers to Timaeus Locrensis 7 (97E): *ἀρχαὶ μὲν ὅν τῶν γεννωμένων ὡς μὲν ἵποκείμενον ἢ ὅλα, ὡς δὲ λόγος μορφᾶς τὸ εἴδος*. Cp. W. Théiler, *Die Vorberichtigung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin, 1930, p. 7. ILLUD QUIDEM τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον (50D), see *ad* 304, 15 (p. 48) and 361, 13 ss. (p. 204). GENERATA VIDELICET SPECIES Cp. *generatae species* (345, 14; 354, 26) QUAE IN SILVA Cp. 353, 20-22: *at vero quae obveniunt silvae species et in ea dissolvuntur ac pereunt*; see also 353, 10-12. ITEM ILLUD *Tim.* 50D: τὸ δ' ἐν φύσει γίγνεται. SUBSTANTIAM SORTIUNTUR Cp. 345, 11: *accipiunt autem substantiam in silva* and 336, 1. This text confirms the supposition, that in the text quoted *substantia* means 'existence', for *sortiuntur substantiam* here is a paraphrase of *in quo gignuntur*. TERTIUM PRAETEREA Plato: τὸ δ' οὐδεν *ἀφομοιώμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον* (50D). Again a doublet: *trahit mutuaturque*, as further on *quadam comparatione atque exemplo*. QUAS NATURA PROGENUIT Here *natura* again comes upon the scene as a *dea ex machina*. Calcidius has already spoken of *inexcusabilis naturae cuiusdam necessitas* and will speak of *a natura proditas species*. As observed already (p. 190), he stealthily introduces a fourth principle; this introduction is in itself a proof of the impossibility to explain the changes of things by means of the 'official' three principles, each of which is said to remain (*manet*). DEINDE EVIDENTI *Tim.* 50D: Καὶ δὴ καὶ προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον μητρί, τὸ δ' οὐδεν πατρί, τὴν δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων φύσιν ἐκγόνῳ. The words *quod percipit* and *illud vero ex quo* should also be taken as translations. MATRI, VIDELICET SILVAE The continuation of the case of *matri* in *silvae* is of interest; equally *patri*, *hoc est ideae* and *proli*, *generatae scilicet speciei*; also in *id est silvam* a little further on. For *memoratae species*, see *memorati exempli* (353, 25). EST ENIM Cp. 353, 7: *Archetypum quoque exemplum manet in substantia propria*; also see the passages *ad* 353, 23, p. 191; especially 333, 8: *Opera eius vero intellectus eius sunt, qui a Graecis ideae vocantur*. ET INTER EAM NATURAM Calcidius asserts the very opposite of what he had said earlier: *cum eadem sit semper*. Besides, in 355, 9 he will say of matter that it is that *quod semper non est*, which again contradicts *quae quidem est* in the present text. Yet, probably these statements were not regarded as contradictory, because Calcidius himself believed to be justified in qualifying matter as both *patibilis* and *inpetibilis*. As he had said *silva variatur, movetur* (par. 329), he here

says: *quae est quidem, sed non eadem semper*; on the other hand, the phrase *cum eadem sit semper* is in keeping with *quae cum a propria natura non recedat*. The two statements can be combined in the assertion that matter is always the same, but that its 'being' is a potential one, and that, in so far, it is right to say: *quod semper non est*. For matter always remains what it is (*semper non est*), but, on account of the addition of qualities 'from without', it may also be said that it is (*quae est quidem*). Doubts have already been expressed concerning the question whether Calcidius' opinion contains a seeming rather than a real contradiction (cp. p. 190). **QUIPPE HAEC . . ., CUM SIT AETERNA** He explains the preceding words thus: 'of itself matter is nothing of all that is seen in it and which actually exists and which, therefore, gives it an ever changing appearance (*non eadem semper*), because it is eternal (*quae est quidem*)'. So both the context and the manuscripts compel one to accept the reading *sit* and not with the old editions *sint*. **ERGO QUOD** He speaks of the images which continually change into one another, and thus show that, unlike the exemplars, they are not really existent. **ILLA QUIDEM** Cp. 353, 22: *aeternarum atque inmortalium specierum simulacra*. **ERUNT IGITUR TRIA HAEC: QUOD SEMPER EST** (*i.e.*, ideas), **ITEM QUOD SEMPER NON EST** (*i.e.*, matter), **DEINDE QUOD NON SEMPER EST** (*i.e.*, images). Thus ideas and matter have *semper* in common. **NEC VERO** Referring to the comparison made by Plato about the relation father-mother-child, Calcidius notes that finally every comparison comes to a full stop but should not, however, be despised on this account. In *exempla exemplis* the two notions of a comparison are indicated.

### b) *Why matter without quality*

[331] He next states: "It is impossible that a single aspect, containing all forms and features, displays the appearance of the universe, everywhere so richly variegated, unless a basic, formless womb of corporeal things underlies them all, just as in pictures a first coat of neutral tint carries the light of the colours". Plato gives the reasons why matter is necessarily without quality. When a work has to be made which in every respect lacks nothing in pure and perfect beauty, an example after which it is made should be at hand and then not only a very good, not to say excellent maker, but also a material from which that work has

to be made. Matter is suitable, if it is pliable and can be moulded. This will be so, if it is pure and without any quality, for if it has a quality of its own, this will be an obstacle to other qualities, and, in particular, if various and manifold qualities have to be impressed upon it, not only manifold qualities, but even all forms and figures. Therefore, since matter embraces all figures, all colours and all other qualities, yet none of itself, Plato rightly calls it first 'without form', then 'without any figure', and sometimes 'without quality', not in the sense that it once possessed and lost them, but that it could have had them, because it is endowed with the faculty to receive lustre and adornment. Similarly, a stone which has not yet received form through the activity of an artist but can receive it is called 'formless'.

DEINDE AIT *Tim.* 50D: νοῆσαι τε ὡς οὐκ ἀν ἀλλως, ἐκτυπώματος ἔσεσθαι μέλλοντος ἵδεν ποικίλου πάσας ποικιλίας, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ δὲν φέκτυπούμενον ἐνίσταται γένοιτ' ἀν παρεσκευασμένον εῦ, πλὴν ἀμορφον δὲν ἔκεινων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἵδεῶν δσας μέλλοι δέχεσθαι ποθεν. The translation is more to the spirit than to the letter. FACIES Cp. 358, II. VULTUS Cp. 344, 27; 363, 4. INFECTIO This term can mean 'colouring', cp. 214, 2 *infectio vultus et coloratio*, where Calcidius' liking for doublets helps the translation. Here, however, it should be taken in the more nominal sense of 'colour' or 'tint', although 'colourless tint' is, strictly speaking, a contradiction. Hence it is translated as 'neutral'. Calcidius read Plato's argument as follows: "if the world is one imprint (*una facies*), i.e., one matter formed on all sides, that matter must be formless by itself". If there were more than one matter, this argument would not be applicable; hence the emphasis on *una*. NUNC PRAESTAT Calcidius might have put briefly: "matter should be able to perform its function", but, since he is fond of starting a discussion *ab ovo*, a preamble explains what is generally necessary for the accomplishment of a work of perfect beauty. The requirements are an example, a very good maker and an appropriate material (*silva atque materies*; the real Calcidius! He does not say *materia*, since this term is too strongly associated with the meaning 'element'). Not until then does Calcidius mention what requirements matter should reach. It is noteworthy that the *exemplum* receives no further qualification, whereas the maker should be *optimus et praestantissimus*—in Plato Calcidius might have read that the example, too, should be sublime (*Tim.* 29A).

One wonders whether before or after *exemplum* an adjective is missing in the manuscripts. MATERIES, EX QUA Once again a concept of matter occurs which is different from that in the preceding paragraphs. There the concept of  $\chiώρα$  is found, the 'place into which things enter' (par. 317 s.; 322 ss.), whereas matter is here described as the material out of which things are made ( $\tauὸ$   $\epsilon\xi$  οὐ; see the comment on 299, 15, p. 31). The latter is, of course, the Aristotelian (and Stoic) concept, the former the Platonic. OPPORTUNITATEM FACULTATEMQUE Again a doublet. See the note *ad* 344, 26 (p. 173); for *facilitas*, cp. 301, 7 (p. 37). INFORMEM . . . MINIME FIGURATAM, SINE QUALITATE *Tim.* 50D:  $\delta\mu\sigma\varphi\sigma$  δν ἐκείνων ἀπασῶν τῶν ἰδεῶν; 50E: πάντων ἐκτὸς εἰδῶν. *Calcidius* evidently uses the triad:  $\alpha\nu\epsilon\delta\epsilon\sigma$ ,  $\delta\mu\sigma\varphi\sigma$ ,  $\alpha\pi\iota\sigma\iota\sigma$ , so often mentioned in Middle Platonism; cp. *Albinus, Epit.* VIII 2:  $\alpha\ut\eta\eta$  δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν  $\delta\mu\sigma\varphi\sigma$  τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ  $\alpha\pi\iota\sigma\iota\sigma$  καὶ  $\alpha\nu\epsilon\delta\epsilon\sigma$  (cp. 364, 11-12). NON QUO HABUERIT One more attempt to maintain the idea of a pure potentiality. CAPACITAS Cp. above the note on *opportunitas*.

[332] He concludes that all that must take up forms well and aptly, should be formless and free from everything it is going to take up, *i.e.*, it should be without figure, colour, odour and the other qualities belonging to a body. "For", he states, "if the recipient is like one of the things it takes up within itself, then, if afterwards something occurs to it which is unlike those things to which it is like, then, I think, there will be a discord between its own aspect and that of the body entering, and so it will express no similarity at all". He is trying to express this: if matter or the substance of everything is water, as with Thales, it will certainly have the qualities belonging to its nature, which never leave it; but if it, to some extent, must relinquish its own nature and become fire, it will certainly assume again the qualities of fire. Humidity and fire are opposed qualities, since humidity and cold are proper to the one, drought and warmth to the other. Therefore, he states, these diverse and opposed things will not allow the qualities of the other to express themselves properly, because heat fights cold and drought ultimately destroys humidity. To quote another example, if something is white, *e.g.*, white-lead, and must be changed into another colour, either a diverse one, such as red or yellow, or an opposed one, such as

black, then the whiteness will not allow the new colours to remain full but, by mixing itself, adulterate them.

ET CONCLUDIT *Tim.* 50E: "Ομοιον γὰρ ὃν τῶν ἐπεισιόντων τινὶ τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας τά τε τῆς τὸ παράπαν ὅλης φύσεως ὅπότ' ἔλθοι δεχόμενον κακῶς ἀν ἀφομοιοῦ, τὴν αὐτοῦ παρεμφαῖνον δύψιν. Διὸ καὶ πάντων ἔκτὸς εἰδῶν εἰναι χρεών τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένη. DISSIMILE is a general term for τὰ τῆς ἐναντίας τά τε τῆς τὸ παράπαν ὅλης φύσεως. In the next paragraph, *Calcidius* distinguishes between *contrarium* and *diversum*, and gives a full explanation of these terms. SILVA SIVE SUBSTANTIA In such a theory as that of *Thales*, matter should be called 'substance', as was done by the *Stoa* (321, 8 ss., p. 96 s.). Elsewhere *Calcidius* states that it is *inter nullam et aliquam substantiam* (359, 4-5, p. 200); he even gives this as the translation of *Plato's* text. THALES Cp. 348, 19, p. 183. HAEC ERGO, INQUIT This is not a translation but a free rendering of *Plato's* train of thought, as frequently given by *Calcidius*, even in the translation proper. *Pallor* translates χλωρότης.

[333] What is the meaning, someone may ask, of this division into diverse and opposed colours? Such things as are most distant from one another, though within the same genus, are opposed, as, for example, white and black, which belong to the one genus of colours. But within this genus these two are the most apart,—nearest to white is what is called yellow, further away red, still further dark blue, and furthest black. Thus white and black are not called diverse but opposed, because the distance between them is greatest. Thus opposed things are, in fact, greatly separated from one another, yet they are not quite alien, for their genus makes them, as it were, related to each other and this genus, as is said already, is colour. Things, however, which are called diverse are entirely distant from each other by nature, such as whiteness and sweetness, blackness and odour: the first items in each group belong to the genus 'colour', the others to the *genera* 'juice' and 'vapour', and, for that reason, they are perceived by different senses.

Therefore, in order that matter, underlying all this, can show these aspects in their genuine and unadulterated form, it must have no quality of itself.

In this paragraph Calcidius again reveals his liking for digressions. His writing is far from lucid. In fact he uses two different meanings of the term 'diverse' without saying so, and probably without realizing it. He begins with the difference between 'diverse' and 'opposite' colours, discussed in par. 332. He explains what are 'opposite' colours, the implication being that the other colours are only 'diverse'. However, when he explains the term 'diverse', he asserts that 'diverse' is that which does not belong to the same genus at all. Clearly Calcidius does not realize that, if this is the only meaning of the term 'diverse', there could be no question of 'diverse colours'. Meanwhile, one can understand how Calcidius arrived at this interpretation. In the text already quoted Plato puts  $\tau\alpha\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \acute{e}n\alpha\nti\alpha\varsigma$  ( $\phi\acute{u}se\omega\varsigma$ ) against  $\tau\alpha\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \tau\bar{o}\ \pi\alpha\bar{r}\alpha\pi\alpha\varsigma$   $\ddot{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\varsigma\ \phi\acute{u}se\omega\varsigma$ , *i.e.*, *contraria* against things which are totally different.

In this section the Aristotelian influence is most apparent, as is always when there is question of distinctions and argumentations. For example, the introduction of the concept *genus* is clearly Aristotelian. The same is true for the definition of *contraria*: ἐναντία λέγεται . . . τὰ πλεῖστον διαφέροντα τῶν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (Met. 1018 a 25; in 1057 b 8 Aristotle also quotes the opposition 'white - black'). The two concepts of *diversa* are also in Aristotle, Met. 1018 a 12: Διάφορα δὲ λέγεται ὅσ' ἔτερά ἔστι τὸ αὐτό τι ὄντα, μὴ μόνον ἀριθμῷ, ἀλλ' ἡ εἰδεὶ ἡ γένει ἡ ἀναλογία. ἔτι δὲ ὄντερον τὸ γένος, καὶ τὰ ἐναντία, καὶ ὅσα ἔχει ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὴν ἔτερότητα. (cp. Cat. 6 a 17; Eth. Nic. 1108 b 33). ET ITEM See *ad* 336, 16 (p. 146). UT  
IGITUR For a moment *Calcidius* returns to the subject itself, then passes on to the illustration given by *Plato*. INTERPOLATAS  
Cp. 357, 17.

[334a] This same, which he asserts in general, he now intends to prove in particular with various examples: "The makers of scented ointments do not wish that the material which they perfume has scent of its own, so that it can receive the scents unmixed and pure. Also the silversmiths, wishing to impress shapes upon shapeless silver, first smooth the surface so that the pure forms of the figures can be printed in the soft and pliant material. In the same way", he states, "that which is to receive the forms of all figures should be prepared pure and without quality".

*Tim. 50E-51A*: καθάπερ περὶ τὰ ἀλείμματα ὅπόσα εὐώδη τέχνη μηχανῶνται πρῶτον τοῦτ' αὐτὸν ὑπάρχον, ποιοῦσιν δτι μάλιστα ἀώδη τὰ δεξόμενα ὑγρὰ τὰς δσμάς· δσοι τε ἐν τισιν τῶν μαλακῶν σχῆματα ἀπομάττειν ἐπιχειροῦσι, τὸ παράπαν σχῆμα οὐδὲν ἔνδηλον ὑπάρχειν ἔωσι, προομαλύναντες δὲ δτι λειότατον ἀπεργάζονται. Ταῦτὸν οὖν καὶ τῷ τὰ τῶν πάντων ἀεί τε ὄντων κατὰ πᾶν ἑαυτοῦ πολλάκις ἀφομοιώματα καλῶς μέλλοντι δέχεσθαι πάντων ἔκτος αὐτῷ προσήκει πεφυκέναι τῶν εἰδῶν.

[334b] By "the living being come into existence, born and visible" he indicates the sensible world. He calls matter its 'mother' and 'the receptacle of the bodies' for the reason given above, but *he adds* "that it cannot truly be looked upon as earth, water, fire or air", since these are bodies, but that which comprises all these things is "an invisible *species* and a formless capacity, which is between nothing and something in a wonderful and incomprehensible way, not quite perceptible by either the senses or the intellect".

**FACTUM VERO** Strictly speaking a new paragraph should begin at this point; at any rate, some confusion may arise, if it is not realized that Calcidius interprets the following part of the text of Plato, *viz.*, *Tim. 51A*: Διὸ δὴ τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὥρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν μήτε γῆν μήτε ἀέρα μήτε πῦρ μήτε ὕδωρ λέγωμεν . . . He translates the first words: *Ideoque facti generati visibilis animalis matrem* (64, 14). Wrobel has wrongly printed *matremque* as Plato's words and not *Factum* . . . As for the translation, the following observations are to be made: 1) because of the absence of the article in Latin, Calcidius was obliged to add something like *animal*. 2) *Factum generatumque* seems to be another Calcidian doublet. Perhaps the author indirectly reveals his Christianity; in the Council of Nicaea, presided over by Ossius, γεννηθέντα οὐ ποιηθέντα was added to the *Credo*, and these terms were frequently used together. 3) καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ remains untranslated but is commented upon by the words: *vult intellegi sensilem mundum*. **OB RATIONEM SUPRA DICTAM** Cp. 345, 13; 351, 12 ss., p. 175 and 187. There is only question of *receptaculum*, but *mater* and *receptaculum* belong together, as appears from the imagery in 345, 14: *quia non ex gremio silvae*. **NEQUE TERRAM** Cp. 340, 12-13, p. 161. **HAEC QUIPPE** Plato's text: ἀλλ' ἀνόρατον εἰδός τι καὶ ἀμορφον, πανδεχές,

μεταλαμβάνον δὲ ἀπορώτατά πη τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαλωτότατον αὐτὸν λέγοντες οὐ ψευσόμεθα (51A-B). That *Calcidius* speaks, somewhat surprisingly, of matter as a *species*, is explained by *Plato's* εἰδός τι. Clearly he takes πανδεχές as a noun and ἀμορφόν as its adjective. For the rest of the Greek text he gives an interpretation rather than a translation. **NEC PLANE SENSIBILEM** See par. 345. **NEC PLANE INTELLEGIBILEM** See par. 346-347 (cp. 345, 3-5; 346, 9-11). **INTER NULLAM ET ALIQUAM SUBSTANTIAM** These words are *Calcidius'* own interpretation; they remind one of such pronouncements as *quod semper non est* and *quae est quidem sed non eadem semper* (355, 9-10; 355, 1-2, p. 193-194).

[335] These problems he discussed more fully in the *Parmenides* where he inquired into how far the existing things share a likeness with the ideas. This is a difficult question because of the obscurity inherent in matter. Matter not only evades perception of the senses but also investigation of reason and scrutiny of the intellect. For, if the investigation attempts to consider matter by itself and without the accompaniment of the bodies which it takes in, it seems to be almost nothing; whereas, if matter is taken together with these bodies, it does not show its proper nature, and then is something lying between the senses and the intellect, neither wholly sensible nor quite intellectual, but something which must be known by a mental activity of such a nature that he who touches it feels nothing, and he who mentally elaborates its concept "seems to have penetrated it by a kind of bastard reasoning. Therefore, the only means to reach matter is by regarding fire as a part of it that has become fiery, water as a part that has become liquid", and the rest in the same manner.

**HAEC OPEROSIUS IN PARMENIDE** On the basis of these words one would presume that *Plato's* *Parmenides* discusses the intricate process of the knowledge of matter. This is not so, nor is it likely that *Calcidius* thought so. *Haec* should be regarded as equivalent to *talia*, *viz.*, "similar difficult things". *Calcidius* reveals this meaning by the words *cum quaereret . . . similitudinem*. The ideas expressed herein come from the following passage (*Parm.* 132D): ἀλλ', ὃ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὡδε ἔχειν. τὰ μὲν εἰδη ταῦτα, ὃσπερ παραδείγματα, ἔσταναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα

τούτοις ἔοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὅμοιώτατα· καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. *Calcidius* also referred to the *Parmenides* in par. 272 in connexion with the question as to the number of ideas. PROPTER SILVAE NATURALES TENEBRAS Cp. 346, 8-10, where the various causes of obscurity are discussed. He states that obscurity arises because matter cannot be known through either the senses or the intellect. This is exactly what he now discusses. All passages about the intelligibility of matter may be recalled (305, 7 ss., see p. 50). A text from Tertullian's *Adv. Hermog.* (28, 1, p. 45, 20-21 Wsz.) may also be of interest: *quia etsi tenebras volet in substantia fuisse materiae.* NIHIL ESSE PROPEMODUM Cp. 359, 4: *inter nullam et aliquam substantiam;* 355, 9-10: *quod semper non est.* UT QUI CONTIGERIT EAM NIHIL SENTIAT These words are apparently the translation of *Tim.* 52B: *μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτόν;* in par. 345 a somewhat different one is given: *ipsam sine tangentis sensu tangi.* That *Calcidius* had Plato's text before him is evident from the words which follow immediately *adulterina quadam ratione.* These are the translation of the subsequent words of the *Timaeus*. For the two formulas, see the comments on par. 345-347 (pp. 221-228). SOLUM ERGO REMEDIUM *Tim.* 51B: *Καθ' ὅσον δ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δυνατὸν ἐφικνεῖσθαι τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ, τηδ' ἀν τις ὀρθότατα λέγοι· πῦρ μὲν ἐκάστοτε αὐτοῦ τὸ πεπυρωμένον μέρος φαίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ὑγρανθὲν ὕδωρ, γῆν τε καὶ ἀέρα καθ' ὅσον ἀν μιμήματα τούτων δέχηται.* For *remedium* see *ad* par. 1 (p. 11).

The next question is: but what then is matter? Everything existing can be classified in the categories. What is the relation of matter to the categories?

[336] Now, in how far does the nature of matter comprise all ten *genera* (categories)? I believe, it is 'essence' when, by entering it, the forms have made it appear to be something, for instance, a man or a house or one or another of the animals, trees or plants. It is 'quality' when, by being heated or coloured, it assumes some quality; 'quantity' when it is changed by the increase or decrease of bodies; 'πρός τι' (relation) when, in some form or appearance, its magnitude or exiguity is compared to the magnitude of something else; 'where' when it is limited and receives shape, for then it is thought to be in a place; 'when' when the rotation of the world has made it grow in time; 'location'

when it is arrayed among the primary bodies, called elements,—the earth, according to our computations, being situated in the centre of the cosmos and fire above, occupying all high places everywhere; 'possession' when we say that the world has not only a soul but also a reason and an intellect; 'action' when matter moves the forms within itself; 'passion' when, in its turn, it is moved by the moving forms.

QUATENUS Igitur In *Cat.* 1 b 25 ss. Aristotle enumerates the categories. Calcidius keeps the same sequence but interchanges quality and quantity; in par. 319 he completely conforms to Aristotle's order: Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἔκαστον ἡτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἡ ποσὸν ἡ ποιὸν ἡ πρός τι ἡ ποῦ ἡ ποτὲ ἡ κεῖσθαι ἡ ἔχειν ἡ ποιεῖν ἡ πάσχειν. Εστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἀνθρωπος, ἵππος· κτλ. When the way in which Calcidius brings matter under the ten categories is seen, it appears to be, as Fabricius says: *non actu tamen illa silvae insunt sed potentia*, or *non effectu sed possibilitate* (338, 2-3; 344, 27-345, 1). Just previously, *viz.*, in par. 319, Calcidius observed that, unlike all corporeal things, matter cannot possibly be brought *sub categoricam adpellationem*. As to the category of *passio* he observed that, though this, too, should be 'detracted' from matter, matter, nevertheless, is thought to share it, because it is shared by the bodies present in it. Now the same reasoning is applied to all ten categories.

Some particulars: The term *genera* for the categories occurs more frequently. Zeller (II 2, p. 49, note) observes that, besides the title *κατηγορίαι* (which may be genuine, though there is no certain proof), one also finds Περὶ τῶν δέκα γενῶν, Περὶ τῶν γενῶν τοῦ δυτος, *Κατηγορίαι* ἡτοι περὶ τῶν δέκα γενικωτάτων γενῶν. The term *essentia* is discussed fully by Calcidius in par. 226, where he also uses *substantia* (cp. 345, 2, p. 173). For *coetu*, cp. 353, 19-20 *ob specierum multiformium coetum*, where *coetus* translates δι' ἔχεινων, which itself refers to ὑπὸ τῶν εἰσιθντῶν. This last word provides the explanation of the present use of *coetus*. For *esse ac videri*, cp. 71, 2: *Ex quo adparet hoc opus illis propemodum solis elaboratum esse ac videri, qui . . .* (cp. p. 11). *vel hominem vel equum*, the very examples quoted by Aristotle. Calcidius elaborates further; cp. 327, 27 ss.: *non in artibus hominum, non in natura, non in corporibus animalium, nec vero in arboribus aut stirpibus*. POSITIO This category is often denoted by *situs*, cp. Tertullian, *Adv. Hermog.* 38, 1, p. 58, 4

Wsz. *De situ materiae*. HABERE . . . FACERE . . . PATI Usually nouns are found here: *habitus*, *actio*, *passio* (cp. 343, 19). In the case of *habere*, Calcidius is lead into an error, since the Greek  $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\nu$  has the meaning here of  $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\nu$  with an adverb, 'to be in a certain condition', so that the correct translation would have been *se habere*; Aristotle states:  $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\nu\ \delta\epsilon\ \mathcal{o}\mathcal{e}\nu\ \mathfrak{n}\pi\delta\epsilon\delta\epsilon\tau\mathfrak{a}\iota$ ,  $\mathfrak{w}\pi\lambda\iota\sigma\tau\mathfrak{a}\iota$  (*ib.*); Calcidius' mistake is due to the fact that this comment is open to both explanations.

Calcidius' handling of the category  $\pi\mathfrak{o}\iota\epsilon\nu$  asks for attention. The question arises how matter, this merely potential being, can be said to act. Moreover, although elsewhere the bodies are always the real subject, here matter itself is involved: *cum eadem silva intra se movet species*. How can this be said of matter? Calcidius has already given the answer earlier, *viz.*, 353, 17 (p. 190): *et easdem invicem movet species* (cp. 376, 9, p. 236). What was noted there (p. 190), also holds here: a pure potentiality of matter cannot be maintained throughout, because it leads to many contradictions.

It has been shewn (p. 169) that in par. 319 Calcidius expressed himself inaccurately; of matter it can be said: *essentia est*, but not that it is a quantity. The probable reason for this formulation is that the Greek text has  $\pi\mathfrak{o}\mathfrak{s}\mathfrak{o}\nu\ \epsilon\mathfrak{s}\mathfrak{t}\mathfrak{u}$  etc., in which Calcidius changed the adjectives into substantives.

Finally, an observation made by Albinus is of importance (*Epit.* VI 10):  $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \mu\epsilon\nu\ \tau\alpha\varsigma\ \delta\epsilon\kappa\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\tau\gamma\gamma\mathfrak{o}\iota\alpha\varsigma\ \epsilon\nu\ \tau\mathfrak{w}\ \Pi\alpha\mathfrak{r}\mu\mathfrak{e}\nu\mathfrak{i}\delta\mathfrak{h}\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\nu\ \mathfrak{h}\mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{l}\mathfrak{l}\mathfrak{o}\iota\varsigma\ \mathfrak{n}\pi\delta\epsilon\mathfrak{e}\mathfrak{\xi}\mathfrak{e}$ . Concerning this R. E. Witt (*Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism*, Cambridge, 1937, p. 3) says: "Incidentally this is an excellent illustration of a tendency, which we shall be constantly encountering, to expound the Platonic philosophy in terms of later systems". Perhaps it is even more correct to say that Aristotle's works were not unfrequently regarded as expressing more systematically Plato's ideas than Plato's works themselves. However, one needs not assume that, because of its markedly Aristotelian character, this text must have come from a Peripatetic source.

### c) *The species*

[337] Then Plato continues: "Is there a fire which is set apart and out of reach?" Only now he begins to discuss these things. He wishes to show that the fire perceived by us is the

image of the intelligible fire just mentioned and that, in the same way, our earth is an image of an intelligible earth, as also the other forms; that, in short, everything which we see is the image of other invisible forms, and that the latter, in their turn, are the exemplars of the former. We must, therefore, state briefly what is to be said of the exemplar. When discussing matter, we said that it is the primary foundation of the coming into existence of all natural things, so now the exemplar should be said the primary form. Every material is an object for an artisan, as bronze is for the sculptor, and wood for the shipwright. But these are not primary objects, since they are the products of other techniques, *viz.*, bronze of mining, wood of hewing and pruning. Ultimately, the earth underlies all this, matter underlies the earth, but under matter there lies nothing. Therefore, matter is rightly called the 'first foundation'. In the same way a double form can be seen in the exemplar of things: the form by which matter is decorated, and, alongside it, that form after the image of which the form conferred upon matter is made. The form impressed in matter is the second form, the first is the one after the image of which the second has been made.

DEINDE PROGREDITUR *Tim.* 51B: *ἀρα ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ δὲ φ' ἔαυτοῦ* . . .; *Calcidius* referred to this in 354, 7: *Quare differt ad praesens tractatum hunc suo reservans loco ac tempori* (p. 192). QUOD INTELLEGIBILIS The idea set forth by *Plato* is indeed, as *Calcidius* states: "In the intelligible world there must be fire, water, *etc.*, just as in the sensible world". We already referred to the remarkable passage in *Simplicius* (*In Phys.* 31, 18 *ss.*, p. 33-34) where this theory is traced back to *Empedocles*. For the description of *Plato's* standpoint, the text from the *Parmenides* mentioned above (p. 200) is important.

In par. 272 *Calcidius* already writes about the intelligible fire; he even proves it to be composed of two principles. ATQUE UT DE SILVA This is the main theme of the treatise on the *species* which follows: 'its condition is the same as that of matter'. For *esse eam principaliter subiectum* and further on *principalis subiectio*, cp. 340, 13-14: *materiam principalem et corporis primam subiectionem* and the comment to that passage on p. 161. OMNIS QUIPPE MATERIA Cp. 310, 3 *ss.*, p. 65. EODEM Igitur modo The influence of *Aristotelism* on the terminology (*species secunda*, *species prima*) is

unmistakable. However, since Aristotle's doctrine on the  $\epsilon\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$  had been adopted by Middle Platonism with one important modification—for Aristotle accepted only one  $\epsilon\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$ —, one cannot state dogmatically that here *Calcidius* uses a Peripatetic source. The present text serves as a further illustration of the statement made by *Kraus* and *Walzer* in the text quoted above, *viz.*, that various authors have combined the doctrines of the two philosophers by adding the Aristotelian *forma* to the Platonic *idea* (*o.c.*, p. 9).

[338a] This will, in fact, become clearer, if considered with the aid of a comparison. Just as there is one form of ivory in the statue of the Capitoline Juppiter, and another, fashioned by the artist Apollonius in his spirit, to which he directed his mind when executing the ivory—and of these two forms the latter is prior to the former—, so also the form which has adorned matter is second in dignity, whereas the other, after which the second form was made, is the primary one, which is now under discussion.

SED NIMIRUM This passage illustrates the preceding discussion and should be detached from what follows. The division of the paragraphs is inexact, as is obvious from the sequel. One may compare *Seneca*, *Epf.* 58, 20-21 with the passage translated: *Quatum locum habebit  $\epsilon\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$ . Quid sit hoc  $\epsilon\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$ , attendas oportet et Platoni imputes, non mihi, hanc rerum difficultatem. Nulla est autem sine difficultate subtilitas. Paulo ante pictoris imagine utebar. Ille cum reddere Vergilium coloribus vellet, ipsum intuebatur. Idea erat Vergilii facies, futuri operis exemplar. Ex hac quod artifex trahit et operi suo imposuit,  $\epsilon\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$  est. Quid intersit, quaeris? Alterum exemplar est, alterum forma ab exemplari sumpta et operi imposta. Habet aliquam faciem exemplar ipsum quod intuens opifex statuam figuravit: haec idea est. Etiam nunc, si aliam desideras distinctionem,  $\epsilon\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$  in opere est, idea extra opus, nec tantum extra opus est, sed ante opus.* What *Seneca* calls  $\epsilon\lambda\delta\omega\varsigma$  is here the *species secunda*; the *idea* is the *exemplar*. In *Seneca*'s comparison this *exemplar* can be seen: it is *Vergil*'s face; in that quoted by *Calcidius* the *exemplum* cannot, hence *haurire animo*; the differences, however, are irrelevant to the actual comparison. (In 94, 4 ss. *Calcidius* combines these two images: *num speciem intellegibilis mundi, ad cuius similitudinem formas mente conceptas ad corpora transferebat*. This is surprising, to say the least, in an author who already sees the *intellegibilis mundus*

as the *intellectus dei*.) Seneca's last remark *ante opus* recalls *anti-quior* in 361, 23. Behind these comparisons is, no doubt, the image of Plato's Demiurge who fashions the world with an eye to the eternal things.

On this example Borghorst (o.c., p. 35) observes: *cum neque de Apollonio artifice neque de hac statua quidquam certe traditum sit, non temerarium est conicere utrumque satis incognitum*. He suggests too that Calcidius may have romanized an example about the statue of Zeus by Phidias. Switalski (o.c., p. 3, n. 1) states: "Eher gegen eine Bekanntschaft mit Rom scheint die Erwähnung der elfenbeinernen Statue des Juppiter Capitolinus zu sprechen". One could accept the first suggestion, but the latter conclusion is historically unsound. *speciem eboris polire*, a proleptic accusative like *viam munire*.

[338b] Of matter we also said that it is without quality. In the same way we shall say that the primary form has no quality, and yet it is not deprived of it: for everything having quality must have quality in itself, but the primary form has no quality—it is indeed without a nature in which quality can rest. Thus it has no quality *<but yet it is not deprived of quality>*, for one can only speak of privation, if a thing has not what it should have. But as one cannot speak of an intrepid stone, because a stone by nature cannot be afraid of anything, so it cannot be said of the primary form that it is deprived of quality, because, on the one hand, its nature is alien to quality and, on the other hand, it is itself the cause that other things are endowed with quality. And just as of the soul cannot be said to be animated nor inanimate—not animated, because the soul does not need protection of another soul, not inanimate, because it itself causes life in other living beings—, so one looks upon matter as neither material nor deprived of matter: it is not called material, because matter does not need other matter, and not deprived of matter, because all material things are what they are through it [339a] And therefore, one must think of the primary form in just the same way, that is, one regards it as neither endowed with nor deprived of quality.

It was also said of matter that it is without form *<; likewise, it will be said that the primary form was not formed>* but is not without form either. Everything that has been formed must be

composed of that which shares in the form and that which can be shared; as, for instance, a statue. That which shares is the bronze, that which is shared is the imprinted form; but the form is simple, not composite. Therefore the form is said to be neither formed nor without form, for, through it, all other things formed have a form.

In the translation some changes and additions are included which, in our conviction, are required by the context. First the division in paragraphs: it is clear to the reader that there are two parallel arguments, both beginning in the same way: *Rursum silvam dicebamus* (362, 1) and *Rursum silva dicebatur* (362, 21). The current division into paragraphs is inadequate, for the first sentence of par. 339 is actually the conclusion of the first argument. Moreover, in the manuscript tradition, the second argument contains some assertions which are patently absurd. The parallelism of the two arguments enables one to restore the original text.

To begin with a small detail of text criticism. The first *dicebamus* is immediately followed by another. Calcidius states that the form neither has nor lacks qualities. He has still to discuss this, hence the second *dicebamus* should be rejected, and *dicemus* of the best manuscripts accepted. **RURSUM SILVAM** As for the content, again matter is the starting-point of the argument but scarcely more. Of matter he implies that it is without quality (*inops qualitatis*), but of form that it is neither with nor without quality, which is a very different thing. The real parallel with this assertion about form is found in 362, 15: *sic silvam quoque neque silvestrem putamus nec silva carere*. The argument is as follows: "if a thing is to be endowed with qualities, then, as the words themselves say, there are two things: something in which the qualities are and the qualities themselves. In the case of forms (the ideas) there is no such thing. Therefore, they are not endowed with quality. No more can be a question of their being deprived of qualities (Switalski rightly saw that this link was left out in the transmission of the text (o.c., p. 104)), for this means that the form should have them but actually has not. But this is not the case", Calcidius continues with two illustrations. "A stone cannot be called intrepid, because this adjective is not applicable to it, nor can the *species* be said to be endowed with quality, because this has nothing to do with *species*." It looks as if Calcidius realizes suddenly that his last statement

is inaccurate, and adds: "and because it is itself the cause of every quality". This addition makes it clear that the meaning of 'having nothing to do with it' is quite different from that used of the intrepid stone and that the comparison is not apt. Had Calcidius left out this example he might have said more briefly: "Here there can be no question of a privation of quality, because the form itself is the cause of every quality". The following illustration makes it perfectly plain: "a soul cannot be said to be animated, in other words, that it is endowed with another soul, nor can it be said inanimate, for ultimately it is the cause of the existence of everything animated. No more can matter be said to be material (endowed with matter) or to be deprived of matter; nor can form be said to be endowed with qualities or to be deprived of it". This thesis (*neque qualitate praedita neque sine qualitate*) reminds one of Albinus' statement about God: "Αρρητος δ' ἔστι καὶ νῷ μόνῳ ληπτός, ὡς εἴρηται, ἐπεὶ οὔτε γένος ἔστιν οὔτε εἶδος οὔτε διαφορά, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ συμβέβηκέ τι αὐτῷ οὔτε κακόν (οὐ γάρ θέμις τοῦτο είπεν), οὔτε ἀγαθόν (κατὰ μετοχὴν γάρ τινος ἔσται οὗτος καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθότητος), οὔτε ἀδιάφορον (οὐδὲ γάρ τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν αὐτοῦ), οὔτε ποιόν (οὐ γάρ ποιωθέν ἔστι καὶ ὑπὸ ποιότητος τοιωτόν ἀποτελεσμένον), οὕτε δὲ ποιόν (οὐ γάρ ἔστερηται τοῦ ποιὸν εἶναι ἐπιβάλλοντάς τινος αὐτῷ ποιοῦ) (X. 4; see par. 319). The agreement is perfect. Albinus' words about the divine principle are applied by Calcidius to the principle of form. The second example put forward by Calcidius, that the soul cannot be said to be either animated or deprived of a soul, is also found in Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 2: ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄψυχον καὶ τὸ ἔμψυχον λέγειν τὴν ψυχήν (cp. Tertullian, *De anima*, ch. 6, 1, ed. Waszink, p. 132). **RURSUM SILVA NON DICEBATUR** After discussing quality, Calcidius now discusses form. The version of the manuscripts runs: *Rursum silva dicebatur informis sed nec informis*. This is, first of all, a flagrant contradiction, and, moreover, untrue; for matter was called *informis* and nothing else. The editions have altered the text somewhat and read: *Rursum silva non dicebatur formata sed nec informis*. This correction plays down the contradiction, but still does not agree with Calcidius' previous teaching; secondly, the change is not supported by manuscript evidence; thirdly, it does not solve several other problems in this passage. The solution of this textproblem is given by the study of the text as a whole. To begin with the most obvious mistake, by way of conclusion, the last sentence runs: "matter is said neither formed

nor without form, for all that has been formed owes its form to it". It is evident that it is not matter which is the formative principle but the *species*, the form. Moreover, one may also refer to the parallel passage in the first argument: "form cannot be said to be without quality, for it is itself the cause of things having quality". Thus in 363, 2 *species* should be read instead of *silva*. The way to the solution is now open. If in 363, 2 the *species* is mentioned in a conclusion, it must have received previous attention. The argument, as it stands, is entirely about the *silva*. The beginning is correct, namely that, as in the first argument, Calcidius starts from matter. The question then arises: Where does Calcidius pass from matter to form? There can surely be no doubt about this: as in the first argument, this transition must have been made almost immediately, actually in the first phrase, which is incomprehensible as transmitted by the manuscripts. Owing to the parallel argument of the first reasoning, the text can be restored with reasonable certainty. Above Calcidius said: *Rursum silvam dicebamus esse inopem qualitatis, dicemus etiam principalem speciem neque qualitate praeditam neque sine qualitate.* He must have stated in a passive tense: *Rursum silva dicebatur informis*, *< dicetur etiam principalis species non formata>*, *sed nec informis*, a fact evident from the conclusion just mentioned: *propterea igitur species negatur esse formata, nec vero minime est formata*.

Finally, the present text still poses a third problem, namely the meaning of *quae res* in 363, 1. One would like to combine it with *impressa forma*, but why then *quae res* and not simply *quae*? Besides, *simplex et incomposita* are adjectives specific to principles, and, as one saw, the *impressae formae* do not belong to them. In the restored text Calcidius argues that the *species* cannot have been formed, for 'formed' presupposes composition. One expects him to say that the *species* is not composed but *simplex* and *incomposita*, and to read: *sed species est simplex et incomposita*. Since the words *quae res* and *sed species* are abbreviated in the manuscripts the corruption is easily explained paleographically. Its genesis, one suggests, was as follows: In 362, 21 the transition to *species* must have fallen out by a kind of homoioteleuton. Owing to this, an early reader, no longer understanding the abbreviation of *sed species* in 363, 1, changed it into *quae res*. And in agreement with that he changed the later *species* into *silva*. For to him, how

could there suddenly be question of *species*, when the whole argument seemed to refer to the *silva*.

Some details: **EX PARTICIPANTI ET EX PARTICIPABILI** A translation of the Aristotelian term τὸ μετέχον and τὸ μετεχόμενον (cp. *Met.* 990 b 30-991 a 3). **VULTUS** Cp. 344, 27; 355, 18-19. **ANIMATAM . . . EXANIMEM** (362, 13-14) Cp. the comment on 334, 15, p. 139.

Calcidius repeatedly refers in the present treatise to his discussion of the *silva*. In both passages reminiscences of Albinus' treatise about God can be heard, especially in that about the *species*. Perhaps one may conclude that Calcidius' reflections on matter were inspired by Albinus' discussion of the third principle, God (*Epit.* X). Probably he first applied Albinus' argument to the *species* and then to the *silva*. The evidence of Albinus' influence upon Calcidius is seen in the following text.

[339b] Therefore, to state it graphically, from our standpoint the primary form is the first intelligible thing because we have an intellect; from God's standpoint it is the perfect thought (idea) of God; from the standpoint of matter it is the measure of bodily and material things; considered in itself it is an un-bodily substance and the cause of all things deriving their likeness from it; seen from the cosmos it is the eternal exemplar of all that nature has produced; and to formulate it in a few words, the primary form, which is the idea, is defined as an immaterial substance, without colour or figure, intangible, but to be grasped by the intellect and the cause of all that owes its likeness to it.

Of the two descriptions mentioned the elaborate one corresponds entirely with that given by Albinus in *Epit.* IX 1. In the following survey the order found in Albinus is adapted to that given by Calcidius. The more extensive Latin text is the result of Calcidius' liking for elaboration.

EST IGITUR PRINCIPALIS SPECIES,	(1) ἔστι δὲ ἡ ἴδεα
UT CUM ALIQUA DICATUR EFFIGIE:	
IUXTA NOS QUIDEM,	(3) ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς
QUI INTELLECTUS CONPOTES SUMUS,	νοητὸν πρῶτον
PRIMUM INTELLEGIBILE,	
IUXTA DEUM VERO	(2) ὡς μὲν πρὸς θεὸν

INTELLECTUS PERFECTUS DEI, νόησις αὐτοῦ  
 IUXTA SILVAM MODUS MENSURAQUE (4) ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὕλην μέτρον  
 RERUM CORPOREALIUM ATQUE  
 SILVESTRUM,  
 IUXTA IPSAM VERO SPECIEM (6) ὡς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν  
 INCORPOREA SUBSTANTIA CAUSAQUE ἐξεταζομένη οὐσία  
 EORUM OMNIUM, QUAE EX EA  
 SIMILITUDINEM  
 MUTUANTUR,  
 IUXTA MUNDUM VERO EXEMPLUM (5) ὡς δὲ πρὸς τὸν αἰσθητὸν  
 SEMPITERNUM OMNIUM, QUAE NATURA κόσμον παράδειγμα  
 PROGENUIT.

*conceptum* is opposed to *cum aliqua effigie*; *primum intelligibile* is Plato's *πρῶτον νοητόν*. For *perfectus intellectus dei*, cp. 333, 7 and the comment p. 136. *causaque eorum omnium*: *Calcidius* repeats this in the shorter formulation. Of course, the *species secundae* are meant. *SINE TACTU, INTELLECTU TAMEN* This in opposition to the cognoscibility of matter (see par. 345-347). For other passages about the idea see *ad* 353, 23 (p. 191).

[340] Plato himself explains that the *species* exists from eternity when he says: "If insight and true opinion are two things, they must exist by themselves, perceptible by the intellect rather than the senses; but if, as some people think, true opinion differs in no way from insight, then all that is perceived by the senses of the body must be regarded as certain. But I think one must say that they are two things, because they differ greatly: for the one becomes known to us by instruction, the other by persuasion; the one always in connection with true argumentation, the other without any argumentation at all. Moreover, the one cannot be shaken by persuasion, whereas the other is always wavering, uncertain and open to refutation; and, furthermore, true opinion is shared by everyone, whereas insight is possessed by God and a few very well-chosen men".

Plato makes a fourfold distinction between insight and opinion when he teaches that 1) one of them, *viz.*, insight, is produced by instruction, the other by mere persuasion; 2) one is connected with true arguments, the other without any examination by reason; 3) one of them cannot be shaken by persuasion; 4) one,

*i.e.*, opinion, is shared by all, while insight is the property of God and a very small number of select men alone.

If the difference between insight and opinion is so great, there must also be a great difference between the things pertaining to them; these are the intelligible genus and that which allows for opinion. Therefore, Plato rightly says: "there is one *species* all by itself, without origin or end, receiving nothing into itself and entering nothing, invisible and imperceptible". This is the *species* of the insight, called 'idea', and hence it is exemplar. But, this time, he does not doubt—as he did earlier—that he does not presume in vain the existence of this intelligible form, the images of which are sensible, and that, perhaps, it is no longer a question of mere words.

[341] Nor does he hesitate to explain this by means of syllogistic arguments. Taking care, on the one hand, not to leave anything unexamined, and, on the other, not to add a flow of irrelevant words to a treatise already profuse in itself, he removes all doubt with a brief syllogistic argument, and thus arrives methodically at a syllogism. This syllogism runs as follows: between the man who has insight and the man who has a true opinion, there is the difference that he who has insight has a certainty about things which he has learned from investigation based on reason. Reason, once confirmed, becomes insight, and science and wisdom are connected with the latter. Therefore, because he knows what he understands, the man with insight will not change his opinion through verisimilar persuasions, and, a man endowed with knowledge, he can give an account of what he understands. On the other hand, he who has a true opinion can give no reason for it, because he relies solely upon a mental fashion, without reasoning or discipline, and occasionally, a wavering and doubting man, he will change his opinion through false persuasion, because no solid argument supports him. Plato expresses it in this syllogism: "If insight and true opinion are the same, then all that is perceived by means of the body is certain and will be undoubtedly true; but if true opinion is inferior to insight these will not be the same but rather two different things, and then the things perceived by the senses and those by the intellect will also differ. And if the things perceived by the senses and those by the intellect are different, then it is

necessary that intelligible forms should exist, which are called ideas. Not everything that is perceived by the body is true and certain; therefore, the ideas do exist.

As these two paragraphs belong together, they must be studied as a whole so that the structure of the entire passage becomes clear. At first sight it looks as though Calcidius is harping on the same theme and his argument makes no progress, but this is not true. Calcidius begins with a translation of *Tim.* 51D up to the end of 51E, where Plato enumerates four differences between *νοῦς* and *δόξα*. He only examines the last part bearing upon the fourfold distinction. He continues the translation, and with Plato asserts that there must exist *species intelligibiles*. At this stage he returns to the syllogism, the first part of the translated text, and paraphrases it together with the preceding introduction in Plato (51C). In the form of a syllogism this paraphrase repeats the text quoted at the beginning of par. 340. QUOD VERO HAEC SIT EX AETERNITATE These introductory words are misleading, for the reader might suppose that Plato intends to discuss the eternity of the ideas. Instead the conclusion is: *sunt igitur ideae*. Thus what is demonstrated here is the existence not the eternity of the ideas. The existence of the ideas has, in fact, not yet been proved. After the preceding reflections the reader may be inclined to forget this, and, Calcidius, no doubt, did not realize it himself at the beginning of this paragraph. A similar state of affairs is found in the treatise about matter, where the actual proof of the existence of matter was only furnished towards the end, in par. 317. Here too Calcidius began as if he intended to discuss a property of matter. The parallel is too striking to be accidental. The fact that he discusses the eternity of the ideas first is probably due to 1) the eternity of the ideas came to his mind once he had mentioned their simplicity (and with it their being deprived of all qualities); for, as he expounded in par. 305-307, the principles are simple, without quality, and eternal; 2) Plato's words in 52A: ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον. SI INTELLECTUS *Tim.* 51D-E: Εἰ μὲν νοῦς καὶ δόξα ἀληθής ἐστον δύο γένη, παντάπασιν εἰναι καθ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἀναίσθητα ὑφ' ἡμῶν εἰδη, νοούμενα μόνον· εἰ δ', ὡς τισιν φαίνεται, δόξα ἀληθής νοῦ διαφέρει τὸ μηδέν, πάνθ' ὅπόσ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ σώματος αἰσθανόμεθα θετέον βεβαιώτατο. Δύο δὴ λεκτέον ἔχεινω, διότι χωρὶς γεγόνατον ἀνομοίως τε ἔχετον. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν διὰ διδαχῆς, τὸ δ' ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἡμῶν ἐγγίγνεται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ μετ'

ἀληθιοῦς λόγου, τὸ δὲ ἀλογον· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀκίνητον πειθοῦ, τὸ δὲ μετα-  
πειστόν· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀν-  
θρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. INTELLECTU POTIUS QUAM SENSIBUS  
ADSEQUENDA Cp. 308, II (p. 60); 310, 13 (p. 67); 366, 20 (p.  
217). QUADRIFARIAM DIVIDIT As already noted, Calcidius only  
discusses the last part of Plato's text—a discussion which is little  
more than a different wording of the text. QUOD SI HORUM Cal-  
cidius draws the conclusion: "there exist a *genus intelligibile* and a  
*genus opinabile*". He follows it up with the relevant text of Plato:  
Τούτων δὲ οὐτως ἔχοντων (Calcidius has said this more extensively  
in *Quod si* ...) ὅμολογητέον ἐν μὲν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ ταῦτα εἰδος ἔχον,  
ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὔτε εἰς ἔαυτο εἰδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἀλοθεν  
οὔτε αὐτὸ εἰς ἄλλο ποι ίόν, ἀδρατον δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἀναίσθητον. Then he  
gives a further explanation: *intellectus species, quae idea dicitur, est: igitur exemplum*. Finally he notes that Plato doubts no longer,  
as previously (ἄρα ἔστιν τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἔαυτοῦ). From here on he  
appears to paraphrase Plato's text once again, for *ne forte* ...  
*quam verba* is almost a literal translation of 51C: ἀλλὰ μάτην ἐκάσ-  
τοτε εἶναι τι φαμεν εἰδος ἐκάστου νοητόν, τὸ δ' οὐδὲν ἀρ' ἦν πλὴν λόγος  
(for *praesumatur*, see 345, 5, p. 174). Thus, re-reading the text  
he comes to the part already translated in the first part of this  
section. ID TAMEN IPSUM The structure of these paragraphs sug-  
gests a repetition of the previous paragraph. But, whereas in the  
latter there was at first the question of the preamble of the ar-  
gument, Calcidius now submits the argument itself to a closer  
examination, ending in the formulation of the syllogism. QUIPPE  
CAVENS Calcidius still follows Plato's text: οὔτε οὖν δὴ τὸ παρὸν  
ἀκριτον καὶ ἀδίκαστον ἀφέντα ἀξιον φάναι διισχυριζόμενον ἔχειν οὐτως,  
οὔτ' ἐπὶ λόγου μήκει πάρεργον ἄλλο μῆκος ἐπεμβλητέον (51C). SYL-  
LOGISTICIS COMPENDIIS By a short cut (Plato: διὰ βραχέων),  
Calcidius states, Plato arrives methodically (*ductu et via*) at the  
syllogism itself. These *compendia syllogistica* are constituted by  
what is said in *Etenim* ... *sustentat*. The chief content of par. 240  
is repeated once again. CONFIRMATA PORRO RATIO FIT INTELLECTUS  
Reasoning, the argument receives its confirmation in the under-  
standing (*intellectum adpellat* ... 'motum animi comprehendentem' (366,  
5)), and thus it becomes intelligence or insight; to this insight  
belongs *scientia* (= ἐπιστήμη) also called *sapientia*. For *eademque*,  
cp. 299, 16. ITAQUE PLATO Calcidius finally formulates the  
text with which he began. He changes the order of Plato's text

and amplifies it slightly. A similar argument is found in par. 302: *Certum est siquidem apud omnes . . . esse in nobis sensus, esse etiam intellectum et haec esse non eadem sibi: etc.* The antithesis *scientia - opinio* occurs frequently: 124, 1; 172, 11 ss. (translation of *Tim.* 37B-C); 244, 8; in 201, 22 ss. the concept of *sapientia* is found. Evidently the argument had become a *locus communis* to such an extent that its occurrence in Albinus (*Epit.* IX 4, see *ad* par. 302) hardly carries any weight in the question of dependence of Calcidius on Albinus.

After the rather cumbersome treatment of the subject in par. 240-241 one is somewhat surprised to read in the first sentence of par. 242 that "the previous compact discussion necessitates a further elaboration". The study of par. 242, however, reveals that Calcidius has read something else into Plato's words, not yet discussed, and this is the reason why he wishes to go further into the question.

[342] What has been compressed within the narrow compass of a syllogism requires elaboration. By 'insight' Plato understands the comprehending activity of the mind. In most of his other books, most clearly the *Republic*, he compares this with opinion. He divides insight into 'knowledge' and 'memory'; he divides opinion similarly into 'belief' and 'fancy', connecting each of these four concepts with the things pertaining to it: knowledge with the lofty things perceived only by wisdom, such as God and His thoughts which are called ideas; memory with things requiring deliberation, *i.e.*, such things as are required by artificial laws and theories; belief with the sensible things, those which are perceived by the eyes, the ears and the other senses; and fancy with the imaginary and fictitious things, bodies shaped after the example of real figures but not perfect and alive.

All these things by themselves, he states, "are perceived rather by the intellect than by the senses", because none of the four is within the reach of the senses but one distinguishes between knowledge and opinion and the rest by means of the mind.

SED, OPINOR, EXPLANARI The passage poses the question what exactly Calcidius intended to prove by this exposition. He states that it explains what precedes, but one cannot help wondering, what he is actually explaining. One may suppose that this para-

graph is another of his favourites, and that he inserts it here as a quasi-explanation of what precedes, but this is not the case. He really wishes to explain (a part of) Plato's text at this point, a text which, for the most part, he misunderstands. The actual wording of this paragraph must be considered first. INTELLECTUM ADPELLAT Calcidius tries to say that by *intellectus* the act of understanding is meant: *νοῦς* is here *νόησις*. IN POLITIA Two passages are of importance at this stage, *viz.*, 533D, where Plato gives the fourfold distinction quoted here, and 509D ss., where the object of the four 'ways of knowing' is stated. The latter has not been mentioned by Switalski (*o.c.*, p. 100). SECAT ENIM Ἀρέσκει γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δεύτεραν δὲ διάνοιαν, τρίτην δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην· καὶ συναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν, συναμφότερα δ' ἐκεῖνα νόησιν. I believe that this last word suggested to Calcidius his remark about *intellectus* above.

In this quotation *recordatio* translates διάνοια, *aestimatio* εἰκασία. Calcidius' idiom, especially *recordatio*, is peculiar. As has been seen already, Plato in 509D mentions the objects of the four ways of knowing, beginning with the last. The εἰκασία has for its object the εἰκόνες, *i.e.*, shadows, reflections in water, *etc.*; Calcidius states: *aestimationem (adcommodat) fictis commenticiisque et imaginariis rebus, quae iuxta veros simulata vultus corpora tamen perfecta et viva non sunt*. Πίστις refers to that of which the εἰκόνες are reflections, namely, animals, plants and all created things; Calcidius: *credulitatem porro sensibilibus* ... Plato describes in detail the objects of διάνοια, on which the partner in the discussion finally notes: μανθάνω ... ὅτι τὰ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίκαις τε καὶ ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις (511B). Calcidius writes: *recordationem vero rebus deliberativis, hoc est iis quae praeceptis artificialibus et theorematibus percipiuntur*. The last way of knowing τελευτὴ εἰς εἰδή (511C). Calcidius gives as object: *deus et intellectus eius, quas ideas vocamus*; this is, of course, the Platonic idea which he has described in his own way (see the comment on 333, 6 and 363, 7). The conformity with Plato's text is striking and much nearer than with that of Albinus, *Epit.* VII 5, referred to by Switalski (*o.c.*, p. 100): ἀλλὰ δόξαν μὲν τῶν σωμάτων φησίν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τῶν πρώτων, διάνοιαν δὲ τῶν μαθημάτων. Τίθεται δὲ τὶ καὶ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν, τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν πίστιν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, τὴν δὲ εἰκασίαν τῶν εἰκόνων καὶ εἰδώλων. Albinus first makes a triple distinction, to which he is clearly lead by 511D: ὡς μεταξύ

τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ τὴν διάνοιαν οὖσαν, but he replaces νοῦς with ἐπιστήμην. In the last part, which is nearest to the text of *Calcidius*, he speaks of πίστις and εἰκασία but does not (explicitly) mention these two as a subdistinction of δόξα. *QUAE CUNCTA DICIT* “Of all this he says that by itself it can be perceived by the intellect rather than by the senses”. This surprising twist in the argument reveals what *Calcidius* is aiming at. He has obviously in mind the beginning of the quotation in par. 340: *Si intellectus itemque vera opinio duae res sunt, necesse est haec ipsa per semet esse intellectu potius quam sensibus adsequenda*; the verbal concordance is perfect. *Calcidius* meant *haec ipsa* to refer to *intellectus et vera opinio*, whereas for *Plato* these terms refer to the ideas. In the present section he first subdivides this *intellectus* and *opinio*, stating: “all these distinctions are things which are rather perceived by the intellect than by the senses: this is what *Plato* intended to say here”. The actual text runs as follows: *Quae cuncta dicit per semet esse intellectu potius quam sensibus adsequenda, quia nihil ex his quattuor sub sensus nostros venit, sed tam scientiam quam opinionem et ceteras mente discernimus*. When one appreciates how peculiar the content of the text becomes in this way, it is understandable why *Calcidius* wrote paragraph 342 as an explanation. Actually he himself did not understand the passage, though, generally speaking, he remained true to *Plato*’s thought.

[343] “But if, as it seems to some”, he says, “true opinion differs in nothing from insight”. Just so; for many groups of philosophers have certainly considered bodies to be the principles of things. Placing the intelligible genus, that is the ideas, almost before our eyes, *Plato* says that it is “an intelligible form, imperceptible for the senses, standing by itself, without origin or end, receiving nothing within itself nor passing over into anything else, invisible and impalpable, only perceptible for the attentively looking mind”. He adds: “and what comes in the second place is originated, perceptible by the senses, in need of support, appearing in a certain place and hence disappearing again through change and annihilation, knowable by the senses and the opinion”. Here he wishes to give an idea of the second *species*, which comes into being, when the artisan fashions the lines of a future work in his mind and, keeping the picture within him, fashions from this example that which he has set himself

to make. Of this he says: "that it appears in some place, and disappears from there through change and annihilation". Excellently said; for the demolition of a statue is always coupled with the destruction of its form, and the same holds good, when it is recalled and returns in the shape of another statue. 'Perceptible by the senses', he calls this form, because the form impressed into the work is seen by the eyes of the onlookers; 'knowable by opinion', because the maker's mind does not convey this form from a fixed example but draws it from his own mind to the best of his ability.

SIN VERO Calcidius dwells still briefly on *Tim.* 51D. MULTAE QUIPPE SECTAE The Stoics are certainly intended. With Fabricius one includes Democritus and Epicurus. CUMQUE INTELLEGIBILE Again Calcidius quotes *Tim.* 52A, a passage already given in par. 340. The translation is extensive, because at the end Calcidius also translates the words: τοῦτο δὲ νόησις εἴληχεν ἐπισκοπεῖν CONSEQUENTER ADDIT *Tim.* 52A: τὸ δὲ δύμανυμον δύμοιόν τε ἐκείνῳ δεύτερον, αἰσθητόν, γεννητόν, πεφορημένον δέι, γιγνόμενόν τε ἐν τινι τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολλύμενον, δόξῃ μετ' αἰσθήσεως περιληπτόν. INTELLEGIBILE GENUS Cp. 364, 18: *intellegibile genus* (p. 214). Evidently Calcidius takes *πεφορημένον* in the sense of 'supported' (*sustentabile*), not of 'moving'. CUM OPIFEX . . . LINEAMENTA Cp. 354, 4-6: *An ut cum de exemplo lineamenta, etc.* CONCIPIT ANIMO Cp. 361, 22: *hausit animo*; 304, 10-12: *intellegibilis . . . species, quam mundi opifex deus mente concepit.* EFFIGIE INTUS LOCATA Cp. 361, 24: *antiquior.* OPINIONE VERO NOSCENDUM From the way in which he expresses himself one concludes he is not thinking of the divine but of the human maker. He speaks of an artist who makes a statue after a conception he has formed—which for him, of course, is not a *certum exemplum*—a statue, which, therefore, is an object of *opinio*, not of *intellectus*. In other words, he has a particular kind of *species secundae*, viz., the human ones, in mind, and not the *species secundae* in general. The *secundae species* made by the divine *opifex* would be more correct. Evidently Calcidius' only concern is to put the 'second form' on a lower level. EX PROPRIA MENTE HAUSTAM Like 361, 22: *hausit animo*.

d) *Matter in itself*

Calcidius first spoke of the characteristics of matter. This led him to the first and the second *species*. Afterwards he returns to matter. *Tertium genus esse dicit loci*: he now discusses not the characteristics of matter but matter itself.

[344] "The third genus is that of place", according to Plato. I think that he called matter 'the third genus' on the ground of dignity. The second form, the one which comes into being, owes its existence to the primary form, being eternal, without an origin and denoted by the name 'idea'; matter, coming last, owes its existence to the form which has come into existence. He calls it 'place' because it is, as it were, a kind of space which takes up the images of the unbodyly and intelligible forms; 'always the same' because it either is without origin and end, or must be the place, the abode and, as it were, the receptacle of the corporeal forms. These are the limbs of the world which, in the opinion of almost everyone, is indissoluble and eternal: "therefore, it is immortal itself and a foundation to all that arises in its womb".

TERTIUM GENUS ESSE DICIT LOCI *Tim.* 52A: τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος ὃν τὸ τῆς χώρας. For the term *genus*, see *ad* 354, 10 (p. 192). That there must be a third principle besides the first and the second form was already said by Plato in 48E. Calcidius discussed this text in par. 273, where he also mentioned the term 'space'. **PUTO ENIM** The first part of this assertion (*Quippe . . .*) is self-evident, but the second (*Silva demum . . .*) is quite uncommon. By *substantia* probably 'existence' is meant. Calcidius then continues that matter cannot exist before the *species* come into it, for matter cannot exist without form; cp. 337, 22-23: *non quo sine his umquam esse possit*; see par. 349 especially. Thus the assertion that the '*imagines et simulacra vere existentium in silva substantiam accipiunt*' (345, 10-II and 336, 1) is in complete accordance with the statement that matter only exists through form. Matter gives existence to the *species* by providing them with a foundation, and the forms, in their turn, give existence to matter, because matter can only exist with form. Here is the Aristotelian theory that matter and form are no *entia quae* but *entia quibus*. **SINE ORTU ET AETERNA** Cp. 364, 20; 367, 3. **IDEAE** Cp. 353, 23 (p. 191). **AT VERO LOCUM**

Calcidius interprets the term *locus* as 'space' in full agreement with Plato's *χώρα*; that this is identical with *Ὥλη* is obvious to him. In Aristotle one reads (209 b 11-12): Διὸς καὶ Πλάτων τὴν Ὥλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταῦτα φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ. See 304, 5-6: *non numquam locum adpellat*; 373, 22-374, 1: *locum autem silvam*. Reference to Simplicius is apt, *In Phys.* 231, 37: οἶον χώρα τῶν γενητῶν τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν. The *αἰσθητά* are the *simulacra specierum incorporearum*. **SEMPER EANDEM** Matter is said to be 'always existing' either because it is without origin and end or because it is the foundation of an eternal world. This turn of the argument is not surprising if it is appreciated that Calcidius is explaining Plato's text: *αἰ (sempere eadem) φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον (vel quia sine generatione et in interitu) ἔδραν δὲ παρέχον δσα ἔχει γένεσιν πᾶσιν (vel quia necesse est eam locum stationemque...)*. **QUAE SUNT MEMBRA MUNDI** The qualification of the forms as 'limbs of the world' is obvious; forms give matter a figure: they are, to some extent for the world, what the limbs are for the body. When in *Tim.* 33B ss. Plato remarks that "the body of the world needs no limbs", he speaks about an entirely different thing. **MUNDI . . . INDISSOLUBILIS ET AETERNI** In par. 23 Calcidius discussed why the world, though created, can be eternal. This is possible, because its Creator God does not operate in time. The eternity of the world was the almost general opinion from the time of Aristotle. Such a theory clashed with Plato's statement that (the soul of) the cosmos came into being (*γενητός*). Plutarch and Atticus harmonized the two by taking *ἀγένητος* to refer to the mass of the world when still in disorderly motion and *γενητός* to the world as an orderly whole. **PROPE** was probably added by Calcidius with the Jews in mind. Those texts of Plato which seemed to point to another direction were interpreted in an Aristotelian sense. At *indissolubilis* Calcidius may have recalled *Tim.* 41A, where the Maker of everything tells the lower gods that the works of his hand cannot be dissolved save by his consent. But although all bound can be unbound, it would be the deed of a wicked man to dissolve what is beautiful and good: theoretical dissolubility goes with practical indissolubility. **IPSA ERGO INMORTALIS** After the interpretation of Plato's words their translation follows once more. In Calcidius the translation usually precedes the interpretation. Concerning the two last words the manuscripts vary. Wrobel conjectures *dat substantiam*: matter bestows 'existence' to the second forms, in the same way as seen

before (*silva demum ex nativa specie sumit substantiam*). However, if this reading were correct, one would expect *in suo gremio* instead of *in eiusdem gremio*. Most MSS read *datur substantia* which signifies: matter is given as a substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*) to the *species secundae*. Hence *substantia* has the following meanings: 1) *substantia* = *essentia* = *natura* (*οὐσία*), cp. 345, 2 (p. 173); 2) *substantia* = existence (*ὑπόστασις*), cp. 345, II; 368, 1 (p. 174 and 219); 3) *substantia* = substratum (*ὑποκείμενον*), cp. 368, 9. In the first case one speaks of the *substantia silvae*; in the second: matter gives existence to the *species* and *vice versa*, in the third: matter is the substratum of the *species*.

Par. 345-347 Calcidius now analyses the act of knowing with regard to matter. Since the order of being and the order of knowing run parallel in Calcidius' opinion, this analysis leads him to a better understanding of matter itself. The starting-point is Plato's text: *αὐτὸς δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτὸν λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ* (52B).

[345] Then he continues saying, with wonderful insight, that "matter is touched without the touching man perceiving it". Everything that is touched is sensible and an object of the senses, and thus everything that is touched must be perceived by sensible perception. How then can we say that a thing can be touched that is untouchable by nature?

Now consider the depth of intellect and the conciseness of words which express the suspicion of his mind on matter. No doubt, everything that has the semblance to another thing is known by means of its resemblance. Therefore, as the knowledge of something certain and definite is certain and definite, the suspicion concerning something uncertain and indefinite must be uncertain and indefinite. Therefore, since perception is the perception of certain and definite things, *viz.*, of things having form and quality, the knowledge of these things must be certain and definite. But matter is something indefinite, for by nature it is without a form and a figure. Hence the imagination is not by perception of it, and thus it is 'without perception'.

Yet there is some superficial contact but no real touch, and this with the bodies in it rather than with itself. When these are perceived, the feeling arises that matter itself is perceived, because it seems to be formed by the *species* it takes in, whereas, in reality it is formless. And thus the perception of the forms present in

matter is clear but that of matter itself, which underlies these forms, is obscure, and a co-perception rather than a perception. Therefore, since not matter itself is perceived but what is of matter, and since it only seems to be perceived together with the material things, there arises such an uncertain sense. And, consequently, it is well said that "matter is touched without being perceived by the man who touches it", for it is not really touched. It is exactly as when someone says that darkness is seen without being perceived, for the eyesight of one who sees darkness does not perceive in the same way as when he sees the usual coloured and bright things. On the contrary, there is an opposite effect; there are a loss and privation of all that the eyes see—for darkness is without colour and brightness of light; the eyesight cannot grasp any quality of darkness but it can suspect what is not rather than what is; and, seeing nothing, it thinks that it sees the very thing which it does not see, and it thinks that it sees something, whereas it does not see anything—what kind of seeing can there be in darkness? But, since the nature of the eye is to distinguish colours, I think that, trying to perceive that which is colourless, it has the suspicion of perceiving darkness. In this way matter too is tangible, because one gets the impression that it is touched, when that which is touched first of all comes within reach of the senses. However, contact with matter is accidental; it is untouchable itself, because it is perceived by neither the sense of touch nor the other senses.

The distinction of this long-winded paragraph is as follows: 1) Explanation of the question (368, 10-15); 2) Explanation of the first part of Plato's words: *sine sensu* (368, 15-369, 4); 3) Explanation of the second part: *ipsam tangi* (369, 4-16); 4) Comparison (369, 16-370, 1); 5) Conclusion (370, 1-6).

**I. DEINDE PROGREDIENS** The train of thought, which is somewhat intricate, is: Plato uses a wonderful expression, *viz.*, 'contact without perception'. Why is this wonderful? What is touched is sensible; so what is touched is susceptible of perception. And now Plato says: 'contact without perception'. Then there must be question of an exceptional kind of contact here. How can a thing, which by itself is intangible, be touched? (*contiguus* here means *is qui contingi potest*, cp. *Thes. L.L.* IV 698, 83-699, 9). After in-

dicating the way to a solution in the last question, Calcidius discusses Plato's formula stage by stage.

2. VIDE ALTITUDINEM "Look how pointedly Plato puts it and reveals his *suspicio* concerning matter". *Suspicio* is, as will appear later on (371, 2-3, p. 227), the technical term whereby Calcidius indicates the cognition of matter. To prove this, Calcidius begins from the statement that a semblance is known by means of that which it resembles. In par. 51 he calls it a Pythagorean theory: *Est porro Pythagoricum dogma similia non nisi a similibus suis comprehendendi* (par. 51 is perhaps Numenian, cp. p. 43). This statement is also found in Aristotle: γιγνώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον (*De an.* 404 b 26-27). Albinus too mentions the Pythagoreans as a source: ἡ γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον γνωρίζεται, ὡς τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις ἀρέσκει (*Epit.* XIV 2). For a short summary of the history of this theory see: A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et Vie Contemplative selon Platon*, Paris, 1936, p. 107-110; Überweg, o.c., p. 95). This principle is, in all probability, mostly understood in this sense: "things (e.g., fire) are known by means of corresponding things (for instance, fire, which is the essence of the intellect), whereas Calcidius says: "by means of a corresponding act of knowing". He argues: "certain things are known by means of a certain, uncertain things by means of an uncertain act of knowing".—He denotes this uncertain act by the term *suspicio*. Perception (*sensus*), however, is a certain act of knowing, because it has certain things as its objects. Therefore perception of matter is impossible, since matter is not a certain thing. Knowledge, therefore, of matter—Calcidius here uses *imaginatio*—is not perception. Hence Plato rightly says: *sine sensu*.

3. FIT TAMEN Yet there is something like touching, though without contact. How can this be? The solution given here runs parallel to that of the categories in their relation to matter: what is really touched is that which is in matter and in this way there arises a *suspicio* that matter itself is touched. There is a real *sensus* of the things present in matter, but a *con-sensus* of matter, in the literal sense of 'co-perceiving', and so Plato rightly says: *sine sensu tangitur*.

4. NON ENIM The touching of matter is the same as the seeing of darkness. There is no question of a real perception

here, yet we believe we see what actually we do not see. The translation of *nihilque videns id ipsum sibi videtur videre quod non videt* has been taken as meaning the same as the following *et videre se aliquid putat, cum nihil videat*. In this case *quod* is a relative pronoun. It may also be read in the sense of 'the fact that'. Then we ought to think that we see the very fact that we do not see. This interpretation does not appear to be very plausible. Tertullian sees it differently, *Adv. Hermog.* 28, 1 (45, 22-23 Wsz.): *Etiam homini tenebrae visibles sunt—hoc enim ipsum quod sunt tenebrae videtur—, nedium deo.* The use of the comparison with seeing darkness was suggested to Calcidius once he had spoken of the *silvae naturales tenebras* (359, 9-10, p. 201). This comparison of matter with darkness was again obvious because of the Aristotelian theory that ἐν... τῷ σκότῳ τὰ χρώματα χροὰν δυνάμει μὲν ἔχειν, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ μηδαμῶς (cp. Aët. *Plac.* I 15, 10), for in this way matter has qualities potentially but not in reality. The comparison is also found in Plotinus (*Enn.* II 4, 10): *Καὶ τάχα εἰς τοῦτο βλέπων ὁ Πλάτων νόθῳ λογισμῷ εἶπε ληπτήν εἶναι. Τίς οὖν ἡ ἀοριστία τῆς ψυχῆς; Ἄρα παντελὴς ἄγνοια ὡς ἀπουσία; Ἡ ἐν καταφάσει τινὶ τὸ ἀόριστον, καὶ οἶον ὁφθαλμῷ τὸ σκότος ὅλη ὃν παντὸς ὄρατος χρώματος, οὕτως οὖν καὶ ψυχὴ ἀφελοῦσα ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς οἶον φῶς τὸ λοιπὸν οὐκέτι ἔχουσα ὀρίσαι ὁμοιοῦται τῇ ὅψει τῇ ἐν σκότῳ ταύτον πως γινομένη τότε τῷ δ οἶον ὄρῳ* (cp. I 8, 9). On close examination, one realizes that in Plotinus the comparison is worked out in greater detail than in Calcidius. What darkness is for the eye, the *ὅλη* is for all colours; remove all colours and darkness alone remains. If, in this way, the mind takes away the forms of things, it keeps nothing of what is definite and has a form, and becomes like the eye gazing into darkness. Furthermore, Calcidius is speaking of sensual perception, whereas Plotinus of mental knowledge, due to the fact that he takes Plato's words *μετ' ἀναισθησίας ἀπτὸν λογισμῷ νόθῳ* as a whole. They are actually meant so, whereas Calcidius divides the passage into two, and interprets them as if they denote two different acts of cognition. In other words, Calcidius gives an interpretation as if the text reads a *καὶ* between the two. It is remarkable that this is found in Albinus, *Epit.* VIII 2: *Ταύτην (sc. τὴν ὅλην) τοίνυν ἔχμαγεῖον . . . καὶ ὑποκείμενον ἀπτόν τε μετ' ἀναισθησίας καὶ νόθῳ λογισμῷ ληπτόν.* Albinus, therefore, would appear to be Calcidius' source for this interpretation.

5. SIC Igitur This is now self-evident.

[346] And unsatisfied with this exact formulation, he added that matter can be perceived "by means of a sort of illegitimate or bastard thinking". Everyone knows that all children are natural, but both the Greeks and ourselves give a different name to the legitimate and the illegitimate. The legitimate the Greeks call *γνήσιοι*, the illegitimate *νόθοι*.

[347] . . . just as <consonants> without vowels are mute, but in combination with vowels contribute something and have a genuine sound. However, the assertion that matter is infinite and uncertain is certain. Hence Plato rightly believes that matter is perceived by means of illegitimate and false thinking, and by opinion rather than by insight, as its nature is perceived by a combination of right reasoning and of false and confused insight.

Thus these three essences are different and are discussed separately: the idea is the intelligible form, since it is grasped by pure insight; the temporal form can be perceived by opinion and hence it is 'opinable', but matter is comprehensible by neither insight nor opinion, because it cannot be perceived in any way by either the intellect or the senses, but it can be suspected —now suspicion is a kind of illegitimate or bastard thinking.

NEC CONTENTUS From the conclusion *Recte igitur notha . . .* (370, 16) and the one at the end of par. 347 it is clear that par. 346 and 347 belong together. This observation is useful when one begins to speculate what the lacuna must have contained. It is also very important for a correct understanding of the text that no comma is placed after *ratiocinatione* (370, 8), as does Wrobel following Fabricius; *opinabilem* is, in all probability, a rendering of the *ληπτόν* in Albinus, and so, to the author's reasoning, must have belonged to the quotation; otherwise Calcidius once again credits Plato with what he did not say, *viz.*, *silva est opinabilis* (*i.e.*, without the addition of *notha ratiocinatione*). Remarkable, too, is the use of the term *ratiocinatio* for *λογισμός*; however, in 371, 3 Calcidius also uses *ratio* as an equivalent; this has been translated by 'thinking'.

It is not easy to set down the train of thought in this passage, particularly because of the lacuna which occurs at the division between par. 346 and 347. Calcidius clearly explains the concept *nothus* (*notha et adulterina* is another doublet). First he narrates the origin of the metaphor: "They are all known as children but some

are called legitimate, others illegitimate. In exactly the same way distinction is made between legitimate and illegitimate *ratiocinationes*". Of course, Calcidius now explains in what this illegitimacy consists, but here the text is wanting; it begins again in the middle of the explanation. The obvious method is to reason backwards from the conclusion: *Recte igitur notha est . . .* (370, 16). Why is there a *ratiocinatio notha*? Because matter is perceived by a way of thinking that is a combination of *ratio recta* and *non rectus confususque intellectus*. One already grasps the metaphor Calcidius has in mind: as a bastard is the offspring of an illegitimate connexion, so an illegitimate connexion exists between *recta ratio* and *non rectus confususque intellectus* in the perception of matter. This leads to the meaning of *recta ratio*. Calcidius says this previously: *Oratio tamen de silva infinitam eam et incertam esse adserens certa est*. One can now guess what the lacuna contained: from *tamen* it is evident that the other element, *viz.*, the *non rectus confususque intellectus*, must have been discussed there. Calcidius no doubt observed that matter is not perceptible by means of the intellect but indirectly by means of the forms that are present in it, so that a vague idea can be obtained, just as the sound of consonants can only be perceived through the vowels.

To explain this in a more ordered fashion, one must presume that the lacuna was more extensive than is usually believed. Fabricius' enumeration of the content is too short and wrong: *Intercidit sententia qua Chalcidius rationes inter opinionem et rectam rationem intercedentes cum rationibus inter consonantes vocalesque extantibus comparavit*. Furthermore, the trend of thought is so compact that it leaves no room for a new section. The following reconstruction is put forward: After establishing that the Greeks call legitimate children *γνήτοι* and illegitimate ones *νέθοι*, Calcidius must have continued: "Illegitimate are the children born from an illegitimate connexion—he may also have spoken here of a *rectae et non rectae partis consortium*. Now, on the one hand, matter is perceived by means of a *non rectus et turbidus intellectus*, for it cannot be perceived in itself but only by means of the forms present in it, just as consonants are mute by themselves but make themselves heard in combination with vowels. On the other hand, there is a *certa ratio*, *viz.*, the statement that matter is unlimited and uncertain. Now the combination of this *certa ratio* and *non rectus et turbidus intellectus* constitutes a *notha ratiocinatio*". Thus the trend of the

argument has become clear; however, the established data are insufficient to allow of a Latin restoration of the text.

The comparison of the vowels and the consonants is also in Simplicius, *In Phys.* 523, 24 ss., when discussing the notion of 'space' he says: *καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι αὐτὸν νοῆσαι, εἰπερ δὲ ἄρα, μεθ' ἑτέρου ὀσπερ τοὺς τῶν ἀφῶνων καλουμένους φθόγγους· μετὰ γὰρ τοῦ α ὁ τοῦ β καὶ ὁ τοῦ γ δῆλος.* For *mixtae*, cp. *mixta generatio* in par. 269. *Oratio* is here equivalent with *ratio*. One wonders whether the latter should be in the text. **OPINIONE POTIUS QUAM INTELLECTU CERTO** The very opposite statement was made when there was a question of the ideas: *intellectu potius quam sensibus* (*sensus* and *opinio* belong together). The use of *opinio* in connexion with matter is noteworthy; this word evidently denotes everything that is not *intellectus certus*, and, therefore, includes what elsewhere is denoted by *suspicio*. Cp. *opinabilem* 370, 9, but also the end of par. 347: *silva porro neque intelligibile quid neque opinabile, quia neque intellectu neque sensu comprehendatur.* **PRAESUMATUR** Cp. 345, 5 (p. 174). **CONSORTIO** Cp. *intellegentiae necessitatisque . . . consortium* (300, 16).

Finally, Calcidius surveys the three *genera*, which before (354, 12) he had called *primae substantiae*:

1. <i>idea</i>	<i>puro intellectu comprehenditur</i>	<i>intelligibilis</i>
2. <i>species nativa</i>	<i>opinione perceptibilis</i>	<i>opinabilis</i>
3. <i>silva</i>	<i>neque intellectu neque sensu</i>	<i>suspicabilis</i>

It is clear that *suspicio* is indeed the typical kind of cognition by means of which matter is perceived, *viz.*, *notha ratiocinatio*, which is the *λογισμὸς νόθος* mentioned by Plato, and which Calcidius may have interpreted as Albinus. Naturally this passage of Plato has been subjected to many speculations; cp. the texts of Plotinus quoted before (p. 224).

The list of these three *primae substantiae*, *γένη* by Plato and *genera* by Calcidius, raises another question, namely their relationship with the three principles which are generally considered to be the principles of Plato's philosophy, discussed earlier by Calcidius. In the first list (God, matter, exemplar) a marked influence of a systematic interpretation of Plato's philosophy by the school of Aristotle is found. More than once there is an entirely unplatonic line of thought, especially in regard to the ideas (p. 143). Here Calcidius is obliged to follow Plato's thought closely. Plato does not

enumerate fully the principles but mentions only those which are important for the subject under discussion; therefore, the ideas come first, next the images, and then matter, whereas God is not mentioned at all. The images, the *species secundae*, depend on the *species primariae*, and cannot really belong to the principles. What occupied only a secondary place in Plato (the *species secundae*), becomes a real principle in Aristotle, *viz.*, the *ελδος*. On the other hand, what counts as a real principle in Plato, the *ιδέα*, is rejected by Aristotle as superfluous.

[348] He continues, penetrating more deeply into the argument which he has started, and says: "When, then, we concentrate our attention on it, we experience the same as when we are asleep. For we believe it necessary that everything which exists should be in some place and occupy some space". When considering the nature of matter, our uncertain and dark state of mind is compared by him to vain dream visions and to an opinion based on the senses. For when we see or touch a body, we cannot avoid perceiving it together with the attending space and place—indeed no body can be perceived without space or site. For this reason Plato says that we are so used to this customary and widespread opinion that, when considering intelligible things, we <automatically> think that they are in some place and in a certain site, just as the body of the world, which is situated in the space filled up by the mass of the world and occupies the place adorned by the forms of bodies perceived by us, namely matter. Since we see that space and place divide the parts of which it consists, we think that all that exists is similarly in definite spaces and places. And this is why, when someone says that there must be a substance without place and space, a substance existing 'neither on earth nor in heaven', we think that he talks of miraculous things and vain, mental fantasies. For a long time already, nay, from the beginning of our life, a prejudice has been formed in us that everything that exists is corporeal, and that nothing is deprived of an essence subject to the senses, because we trust our senses which are perceivers and, as it were, defenders of what is corporeal.

PERGIT ULTERIUS Plato's text runs: πρὸς δὲ δὴ καὶ διειροπολοῦμεν βλέποντες καὶ φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι που τὸ δὲ ἄπαν ἐν τινι τόπῳ καὶ

κατέχον χώραν τινά (52B). By these words Plato means: when “looking at matter, we get, as it were, into a state of dreaming (we are under a kind of narcosis) and think that all that exists must needs be in a place”. Likewise he will state: “nothing exists which is nowhere and, therefore, no reality exists by itself”, *i.e.*, no ideas. What did Calcidius read into this text? The words *insistitque probationi coeptae* show that, in his opinion, this text is the continuation of an argument. In Plato hardly any argument is found at this juncture: he makes a statement, *viz.*, that our customary representation of matter threatens to influence the whole of our thinking. Calcidius wrongly regarded this statement as an argument for the existence of matter. In translating it is already noticeable that Calcidius failed to understand Plato’s text correctly, for how can *putamus enim* be an explanation of what goes before? Whereas Plato states that the uncertain and dim perception of matter brings us into a state of dreaming or intoxication, so that we think, *etc.*, Calcidius remarks: “this perception is compared by Plato to vain dream-images and to an opinion arising from the senses”. Calcidius compares the perception with what in Plato is the result of it. The words *et opinioni* in particular show the confusion in his interpretation. Even in the rest, the meaning of the text is quite distorted: to put it briefly, Calcidius identifies the *intentio incerta et caligans* (= *suspicio*) with *vana somnia*, and these with the *opinio*. From the last identification one can understand better how in par. 347 he is able to use *opinio* as a way of knowing matter. **ETENIM CUM CORPUS** Calcidius now explains this *opinio*, and in so doing returns onto the right track: he shows that one cannot think of anything without connecting it with space: this is why the *res intellegibiles* are imagined to be in a place, and why it is surprising to hear that there is a reality which “does not exist either on earth or in heaven”. **Plato: τὸ δὲ μήτ’ ἐν γῇ μήτε που κατ’ οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἰναι (52B).** **LOCUS, REGIO, SEDES.** The same reality expressed in a different way. **MUNDANA MOLES** Cp. 303, 5; 311, 20; 327, 13. **Exornata**, the usual term: 300, 11; 306, 23; 309, 18, *etc.*

[349] And he concludes: “On account of this disfigurement and others of a kindred character, we do not even arrive at a suspicion and consideration of that real nature which exists and is, in fact, continuously awake; and all this owing to such dream visions”. By this ‘sleepless and wakeful nature’ he denotes

the intelligible and incorporeal principle which is always the same and ranks first among all things existing, without origin or end, unchangeable, without any communion with the sensible world, perceptible by the pure spirit, *viz.*, God and His thoughts, the intelligible and incorporeal forms. There are those who deny the existence of these forms, a denial due to their deep slumber. And when somebody wakes them up to a real and by no means somnolent consideration of the eternal and immortal things, they are indignant and take it ill, just as the prisoners in the *Republic* who are incarcerated in the eternal darkness of the cave, dim with dense shadows. But those who, although with great effort, rescue themselves from their deep ignorance arise from darkness to light and yearn for the clarity of knowledge and truth. They are not annoyed that men of outstanding culture distinguish between sensible and intelligible reality, and that they show their teaching that primary forms are the principles of things or that the exemplars are provided with real essence, for these are not made after the example of anything else, because there is nothing prior to the principles. But images of exemplars must, because they are made after exemplars, derive their existence from something else, just as the natural figure of Socrates is, in relation to a statue of him, as it were, its 'primary' form. An image, however, made by the artist's hand and fashioned in accordance with the primary form, will fall short of its definite perfection, if it has no matter—for a picture this is colours, for a statue, clay, bronze and other like materials. Thus, since the sensible forms are also images of the intelligible forms, as we have already often said, and since they derive their existence from the intelligible forms, not only their existence but also their likeness, they need, in my opinion, matter in order to arise in it and acquire existence in it.

ET CONCLUDIT *Tim.* 52B: Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφά καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀυτὸν καὶ ἀληθῶς φύσιν ὑπάρχουσαν ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνειρώξεως οὐδὲνατοὶ γιγνόμεθα ἐγερθέντες διοριζόμενοι τάληθες λέγειν. OB QUAM DEPRAVATIONEM Calcidius gives ταῦτα δὴ πάντα καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφά a causal meaning, thus making Plato say already what he actually states in ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀνειρώξεως. Plato really intended: "In this and kindred points". EXSOMNEM PERVIGI-  
LEMQUE NATURAM Another of the frequent doublets in this sec-

tion. The world of ideas is of course meant here. The definition given recalls 364, 19 ss. (p. 214) and 367, 2 ss. (= *Tim.* 52A, p. 218). For *genus* = 'principle', cp. 354, 9-12 with the comment (p. 192). **DEUM VIDELICET ET COGITATIONES EIUS** Whereas in the last sections Calcidius mentioned regularly the *species primariae*, etc., as the *genus intellegibile*, he now suddenly speaks of *deum et cogitationes eius*; one enters in that stage of the interpretation of Plato in which the ideas have become identified with the thoughts of God, and thus are considered the ideal reality. This identification represents Calcidius' own opinion; see 304, 10-12: *intellegibilis . . . species, quam mundi opifex deus mente concepit, eamque idean cognominavit Plato*, and other passages concerning the ideas, p. 191. *intellegibiles atque incorporeae species*, is, therefore, the explanation of *cogitationes eius*. **CONTEMPLATIONEM . . . MINIME SOPORATAM** Again there is the parallelism between the order of thinking and that of being. *Contemplatio minime soporata* corresponds to *natura pervigil*. Calcidius adopts the well-known comparison of the cave-dwellers from the *Republic* (514A ss.) and again affirms the existence of a *species archetypa* (cp. 303, 3; 353, 7; 373, 4) which, being a principle, owes its existence to itself. **IMAGINES VERO** This is a paraphrase of *Tim.* 52C: *ώς εἰκόνι μέν . . . SUBSTANTIAM MUTUENTUR* This is discussed in par. 344 but more elaborated here: the images (there called *species secundae*) on the one hand owe their existence to the primary forms, the ideas, but on the other hand need something in which they can subsist. ". . . without matter the image will fall short of a *certa perfectio*"; the formulation is somewhat strange, since *perfectio* refers to the formal principle alone. Further on Calcidius expresses more plainly: *in silva species substantiam sortiuntur*, in other words, they get a firm foundation in matter (see par. 344 with the comment, p. 221).—For the example of Socrates and his image see p. 205, where Seneca takes Vergil as an example. It is inaccurate to consider colours as matter, just as he does with bronze and clay; it would have been more exact to say 'paint'. **SICUT SAEPE DIXIMUS** Namely in all passages about the *species*, e.g., par. 273, 302, 304, 307, 337-339. In these sections Calcidius continuously repeats himself.

[350] Subsequently Plato brings his own authority into the question, saying: "My opinion is this: there are and there were, even before the adornment of the sensible world, these three

things: that which exists, space and generation". He states his opinion clearly, and rightly so; for none of the Ancients had thus far observed these three. Most of them thought that there exist only sensible things, as Empedocles; others, that there are only intelligible things, as Parmenides, but no one soever had conceived any idea of matter, as he said himself above. By 'that which exists' he wishes to denote the idea or the intelligible form, by 'space' matter, and by 'generation' the quantities and qualities and the other sensible shapes. He names 'that which exists', because it exists by itself and, at the same time, causes the existence of other things; 'space', because matter is the receptacle of bodies, qualities and the other sensible things; and 'generation', because these things do not remain for a long time in the same state, but are always succeeding one another.

DEINDE INTERPONIT *Tim.* 52D: Οὗτος μὲν οὖν δὴ παρὰ τῆς ἐμῆς ψήφου λογισθεὶς ἐν κεφαλαίω διδόσθω λόγος, ὃν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι, τρία τριχῆ, καὶ πρὸν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι. NULLUS QUIPPE VETERUM Cp. the translation of 48B in par. 272: *nemo usque adhuc dixerat.* EMEDOCLES, PARMENIDES See the comment on p. 73. The choice of Empedocles as the champion of the thesis that everything is sensible is probably due to the fact that this author first formulated the theory of the four elements. IDEAN SIVE INTELLEGIBILEM SPECIEM See 372, 13 (p. 231). CONFORMATIones Cp. 306, 1-2: *disceptent inter se de qualitatibus formaque eorum quae ibidem conformantur*; 353, 3 (translation of διασχηματιζόμενον). GENERATIONEM In 378, 21 Calcidius uses the term *genitura* and says: *genituram . . . adpellat ipsam formam et effigiem.* LOCUM Cp. 304, 6; 368, 2-4 with the comment (p. 219). RECEPΤACULUM Cp. 342, 15 (p. 163); 345, 13 (p. 175). NON DIU PERSEVERAT Cp. 367, 13 ss. The coming and going of these forms was constantly stressed by Calcidius, whereas of matter is said in 337, 17: *ipsa in propria natura perseverante*, and in 341, 12: *perseverat in statu proprio.* Here, too, familiar statements are frequently found.

[351] "Therefore", he says, "when the nurse of generation is now made wet, now fiery, and also assumes the forms of earth and air . . .". He calls matter 'the nurse of generation', because everything which comes into existence goes back to the primary materials and the primary materials are finally indebted to

matter, since matter is the nurse of them all and sustains them. "When it is now made wet, now fiery." Rightly said; not matter itself is made wet or fiery, or undergoes any alteration,—for matter is entirely immutable and does not relinquish its own nature,—but because it receives qualities and quantities of humidity and warmth, it is thought to become wet and fiery. Plato even explains this more clearly when he adds: "when it receives the forms of earth and air and undergoes the further affections inherent in these". With good reason he says this, for these qualities do not only become wet and warm, but also dry and cold and whatever of the kind comes to them. "Undergoing the affections inherent in it", because it receives a form and a figure in consequence of the occurrence of bodies possessing form, for of itself it is impassible and not susceptible to any affection.

IGITUR GENERATIONIS *Tim.* 52D: τὴν δὲ δὴ γενέσεως τιθήνη ὑγραινομένην καὶ πυρουμένην καὶ τὰς γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος μορφὰς δεχομένην. Calcidius quotes a part of the phrase, which he explains almost word for word. GENERATIONIS NUTRICULAM Cp. 345, 16-18 (p. 175). Everything existing can be reduced to the primary materials (water, earth, air and fire; for the term *materiae principales*, cp. p. 183, *ad* 348, 18), and these in their turn to matter. UMECTAM MODO, MODO IGNITAM Cp. 359, 20-22 (p. 200), where Calcidius quotes a kindred text. One is immediately confronted with the difficult subject of the affections of matter. One may speak of a *silva umectata*, like Plato, but at the same time the thesis *non ipsa silva umectatur* must be maintained. A full discussion of this question was given in the comment on par. 309 (pp. 148-149, cp. also pp. 159-160). The terminology is the selfsame found previously: *incommutabilis*, cp. 353, 19; *nec declinat a natura sua*, cp. 299, 18; *quae recipiat*, cp. 337, 9: *quae suscipiat*, and the term *receptaculum*; *umectari atque igniri putatur*, cp. 343, 22: *illa consors perpersionis putetur*. EXPLANAT EVIDENTIUS Plato: καὶ τὰς γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος μορφὰς δεχομένην, καὶ δσα ἄλλα τούτοις πάθη συνέπεται πάσχουσαν. PERPETIENTEM Cp. 343, 22. RATIONABILITER Calcidius explains the first part of the quotation: the qualities (one would rather have expected matter to be the subject of the phrase) not only become wet and warm but also dry and cold; that is why Plato also mentions earth and air. CETERAS PEDISSEQUAS The explanation is in

accord with that discussed in par. 309. **CONVENTU** This noun indicates the same as the *coetus* (353, 20 and 360, 2), the further combinations of the four elements. **INPETIBILIS** See *ad* par. 309 (p. 149).

This section, too, is almost word for word a repetition of the previous discussion (especially par. 309). The present passage confirms both the interpretation of and the objections to that discussion.

[352] Next Plato says: "Because of itself matter is neither provided with similar powers nor with balanced faculties, nothing is balanced in it". Now, eliminating as it were God the Maker, he considers matter twofold, *viz.*, before and after the qualities are received. Before sharing the qualities, matter was, in my opinion, neither at rest nor in motion but had a certain natural ability to receive rest and motion; after taking up the qualities, thus being decorated and made a perfect body by God, it assumed its tasks of motion and rest, in order to fulfil them at various moments. Thus in order to indicate the cause of its motion, he says that "motion originally arose in matter by the throwing in and the preponderance of the bodies, which lean now to one side now to the other, but that this motion was still unstable and like a stream", because unsteady matter, being depressed here and raised there, moved to and fro, and its whole capacity moved in an unbalanced and confused fashion. Thus it happened that most authors thought this disorderly motion to be in the interior of matter itself, proper to it and resulting from the nature, whereas, in fact, it is an impulse from outside; and, besides, they thought it to be animated and living. Thus the occurring motion was foreign, but its confused character and disorderliness came about in accordance with the nature of matter, supplying an unstable and trembling base, since of its own it lacked equal forces or balanced faculties, and since nothing equal in it could restrain the fluctuation and preponderance of the bodies. But as the surface of stagnant water is motionless, until an object of sufficient weight is dropped into it, then there is first only a beginning of motion, but next, when the whole element has got into motion, not only the mass of water is moved but, in its turn, it also moves that which has fallen into it and is the cause of motion, thus in the same way, matter is not only moved in

all kinds of ways when the bodies have caused the first motion, but in its turn it also moves the bodies which cause it.

DEINDE AIT *Tim.* 52E: διὰ δὲ τὸ μήθ' ὁμοίων δυνάμεων μήτε ἵσορρόπων ἐμπίμπλασθαι κατ' οὐδὲν αὐτῆς ἵσορροπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνωμάλως πάντη ταλαντουμένην σείεσθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἔκεινων αὐτήν. This text of Plato, which speaks of a 'filling up' of matter and of a 'fluctuation' as its result, leads Calcidius to make a distinction between matter before and after its 'filling up'. Matter is 'filled up' with qualities (later it will be seen how this is understood); but the author of this 'filling up' remains entirely in the dark; this process is considered to be prior to the intervention of God.

To begin with Calcidius' translation. It is divided into two: 375, 4-6 and 375, 15-18; actually it is more of a paraphrase than of a translation. According to Calcidius, Plato says that matter of itself (*privatim*) is unbalanced—this adverb is an addition by Calcidius. Explaining the first part of the translation, he says: **NUNC IAM VELUTI** Actually, God is not mentioned in the whole of this passage: the ideas were the highest principle; however, for him the ideas are the thoughts of God. What he actually intends to say is probably this (see also below): "we are now considering matter in the stage before the divine intervention". Cp. *ante mundi exorationem* 377, 19-20. **ET ANTE CONSORTIUM** This is the condition of matter merely by itself: *neque stabat neque movebatur*. The formula reminds one of *neque corpus neque incorporeum quiddam* in par. 319-320. And as *possibilitate corpus et idem possibilitate non corpus* was added to this, it may be stated: *possibilitate stans et possibilitate se movens*, for Calcidius speaks of a *naturalis opportunitas ad motus stationisque perceptionem*. From what follows one realizes that Calcidius imagines this as a motionless but easily movable mass: 'motionless' = *non movebatur*, 'easily movable' = *non stat*, that is, it is not a stable something. **NATURALIS OPPORTUNITAS** Cp. 344, 26 with the comment (p. 173). **POST QUALITATUM** The text should be studied closely. It does not say that matter comes to share the qualities of God, but rather that it was ordered by God after it had come to acquire qualities. This acquisition of qualities takes place before God's intervention, and, for that reason, its cause must remain unknown. Calcidius compares the 'dropping' of qualities into matter with the dropping of a pebble into stagnant water; later on vestiges of fire, water, etc. are dropped into matter;

therefore, the qualities here are the vestiges or traces of qualities. **SILVAE PRIMITUS** This is the rendering of ἀλλ' ἀνωμάλως πάντη ταλαντουμένην σείεσθαι μὲν ὑπ' ἔκεινων αὐτήν. In this way the first motion of matter arises, which by the nature of matter must be disorderly. **FLUCTUI SIMILEM** Cp. 377, 2 (p. 238): *veluti in euripo fluctuante. INORDINATUM MOTUM* Cp. 329, 12: *inordinatum illum et tumultuarium motum* (p. 124). Calcidius remarks that there were men who thought this disorderly motion arose from matter itself. He certainly has in mind Numenius, whose opinion is summed up in par. 297 (326, 15), whereas in par. 301 reference is made to the other Plato interpretation which squares with his own opinion. Thus on this point Calcidius departs from Numenius (see the comment, p. 127). **QUOD PRIVATIM** A literal quotation (cp. 375, 4-6). **SED UT STAGNIS** Calcidius gives an image which serves as an explanation of Plato's words: κινουμένην δ' αὐτὸν πάλιν ἔκεινα σείειν (52E). One is struck by the phrase *ex initio corporum sumpio motu*: "after deriving the motion from the beginning which is the bodies"; *corporum* must be an explicative genitive: the bodies are the beginning of motion. 'Bodies' replace what was hitherto denoted by 'qualities'. Calcidius explains 'bodies' further by speaking of *vestigia corporum*, 'vestiges of bodies'; see par. 354 (p. 241). **VERUM IPSA** (*sc. silva*) Cp. 353, 17: *et easdem invicem movet species* and 360, 16-17: *cum eadem silva intra se movet species*. In this parallel passage there is a question of *species* which is, of course, exactly the same as *qualitates*, *corpora* and *vestigia corporum* (cp. p. 203).

Thus the first motion arose in matter. It was a chaotic movement, caused by the 'dropping' of 'vestiges of bodies', 'qualities' or whatever they may be called into matter in the same way as a pebble is dropped into water. The addition that matter, in its turn, moves the qualities, has probably been made for the purpose of posing some kind of chain-reaction. It is found, of course, in other Platonists, *e.g.*, Albinus, *Epit.* XII 2: . . . ἀλόγως δὲ καὶ ἀμέτρως σείοντά τε τὴν ὕλην καὶ πρὸς τὰύτης σειόμενα (*sc.* τὰ στοιχεῖα). (Cp. XIII 3 Τούτοις οὖν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ ὕλη τυπωθεῖσα ἔχεινεῖτο μὲν τὸ πρῶτον τοῖς ἔχεσι ἀτάκτως, εἰτα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸς τάξιν ἤχθη. Calcidius says that this motion occurred before the ordering activity of God; but in Albinus these ἔχη are also the result of God's activity.) Thus, this author does not make the distinction between matter as such and matter in disorderly motion. Calcidius, on the other hand, has given chaos a distinctly separate place in the development of things. One

wonders who or what caused this motion or rather so-called dropping of the bodies. At the very moment of the first motion and the first phase of the bestowing of forms on matter, Calcidius leaves one in the dark, or rather introduces a new principle, as he did in 353, 13, 354, 19 and 23 (p. 190 and 193), where he suddenly introduced a *natura*. A hint of a distinction as made here may be found in *Adv. Hermog.* 41. Tertullian blames Hermogenes for, on the one hand, ascribing to matter a *inconditus et confusus et turbulentus motus*, and, on the other, stating that matter has a *motus aequalis momenti*, which he is said to have explained further by the words *moderatio et modestia et iustitia motionis neutram in partem inclinantis*. This comes very near to Calcidius. Perhaps Hermogenes made a similar distinction to Calcidius, and therefore Tertullian's reproach is not quite justified. (This may be the interpretation of these noteworthy Tertullian texts; cp. J. H. Waszink, *Vig. Christ.* 9 (1955), 133.) Once more Calcidius' doctrine takes one back to Middle Platonism.

[353] He indicates further that such a motion does not bear upon the coming into existence of things but only upon the change of the bodies, for he says: "owing to this stream, the confused materials were carried in different directions and separated from each other", *i.e.*, divided. Thus he clearly shows that matter has not one potentiality or ability for the reception of forms but various ones; for if matter has only one potentiality, it would always be the same thing, but now, because it changes into all qualities and figures, and becomes everything, it is necessary that its potentialities and abilities to various types of change should be understood beforehand.

Next he explains by a clear example what he means when he separates the four materials from each other, *viz.*, fire, earth and the others, and states that the cause of this separation is found in the fluctuating motion of matter, "just as in the cleaning of corn". We know, indeed, that of old there are certain, what the poets usually call 'weapons of Ceres', whereby that what is reaped is separated; the grains of corn are driven into one direction by moving and shaking, the chaff into another by throwing it up; "and what is light flies away, what is heavy remains". "In this way", he says, "these four first bodies are swayed to an fro, as in an eddying strait, and finally 'separated' according to kinds"; with 'strait' he means matter, with 'separation' the

special place allotted by divine Providence to every element. This regulation namely, takes place in order that the confusion and disorderliness arising from the coherence of various materials would not remain, as it had been before the ordering of the world. This, he says, was the condition of the world before the universe acquired splendour and beauty by matter's adornment.

TALEM PORRO MOTUM This first motion does not contribute to the coming to existence of anything; its purpose is the separation of the elements. *Calcidius* refers to *Plato's* words: Τὰ δὲ κινούμενα ἄλλα ἄλλοσε ἀεὶ φέρεσθαι διακρινόμενα (52E). He sticks to the image of *fluctus*. *QUO PACTO* *Calcidius* explains *in diversa*, and beginning with *Deinde* (line 19) discusses *discerni a se*. Since the motion of these elements moves in different directions, matter clearly has several potentialities. This statement may seem strong at first sight. One is inclined to think: "does not the cause of this variety rather lie in the forms, the qualities, otherwise called 'vestiges of bodies'?" It becomes more intelligible, however, when further on it is seen that these *vestigia corporum* are in reality nothing else than *potentiae rerum* (377, 17). Thus the *qualitates* mentioned by *Calcidius* become vaguer and vaguer. *DEINDE MANIFESTO* The example is a winnowing basket. *Plato*: ὅσπερ τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν πλοκάνων τε καὶ ὄργάνων τῶν περὶ τὴν τοῦ σίτου κάθαρσιν (52E). *ARMA CERALIA* *Verg.*, *Aen.* I 177-178: *tum Cererem corruptam undis Cerealiaque arma expedient*. *QUAE MISSA ERUNT* It is taken that originally there was *messa*: the whole context demands it. *ET LEVIA* *Plato*: σειόμενα καὶ ἀναλικνώμενα τὰ μὲν πυκνὰ καὶ βαρέα ἄλλῃ, τὰ δὲ μανὰ καὶ κοῦφα εἰς ἐτέραν ἔζει φερόμενα ἔδραν (53A). *SIC, INQUIT* *Plato*: τότε οὕτω τὰ τέτταρα γένη σειόμενα ὑπὸ τῆς δεξαμενῆς, κινουμένης αὐτῆς οἷον ὄργανου σεισμὸν παρέχοντος, τὰ μὲν ἀνομοιότατα πλεῖστον αὐτὰ ἀφ' αὐτῶν ὄρλειν, τὰ δὲ ὁμοιότατα μάλιστα εἰς ταῦτὸν συνωθεῖν, διὸ δὴ καὶ χώραν ταῦτα ἄλλα ἄλλην ἴσχειν. Henceforth *Calcidius* paraphrases rather than translates. *VELUT IN EURIPO* He translates the words οἷον ὄργανου σεισμὸν παρέχοντος in his own way. Instead of *Plato's* image he gives the one constantly in his mind, namely the stream (*fluctus*, here *euripus*). *GENERATIM SECERNUNTUR* This is the short rendering of τὰ μὲν ἀνομοιότατα. *EURIPUM QUIDEM* Εὔριπος is, in actual fact, the strait of Euboea with its eddying water, (cp. *Arist.*, *De mundo* 396 a 5; *Strabo* 403: περὶ τῆς παλιρροίας τοῦ Εὔριπου (Borghorst, o.c., p. 62))

and is, therefore, a very good image of matter in disorder. This term is found in Maximus of Tyre in a similar context: *πᾶν γὰρ σῶμα ἡεῖ καὶ φέρεται δέξεως, Εὐρίπου δίχην, ἄνω καὶ κάτω* (X 5c in the speech *Eἰ αἱ μαθήσεις ἀναμνήσεις*). The stream-image, found frequently throughout Greek philosophy, goes back very likely to Heraclitus' *πάντα ἡεῖ*. According to Aristotle, Plato followed Heraclitus in respect of his vision of sensible things: *αἰσθητῶν ἀεὶ ἡεόντων* (*Met.* 987 a 32). Albinus says: *παθητικὰ γὰρ τὰ σώματα καὶ φευστὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα* (*Epit.* XI 2, cp. I 2). Calcidius uses the same image in his comment on *Tim.* 43A, where Plato uses *ποταμός*. He says (244, 15-17): *Torrentem vocat silvam corpoream, propterea quod fluere non desinat neque umquam maneat in certa et in stabili constantia nec teneatur* (cp. *ad par.* 325 (349, 17-20, p. 184)). About the creation, that is to say the ordering of soul and body—a very important parallel to the ordering of the world, as will appear—he states: *fuisse enim semper tam animae quam corporis vim, nec deum ex iis quae non erant fecisse mundum, sed ea quae erant sine ordine ac modo ordinasse. Itaque potius ea quae existebant exornasse, quam generasse quae non erant. inordinatos quippe animi errores et agitationem fluctibus intellectu adsignato ex inordinata iactatione ad ordinem redigisse. corporis etiam motum instabilem salubri* (cp. 301, 2, p. 36) *moderataque agitatione frenasse* (95, 18-96, 1). **SECRETIONEM** refers to *secernuntur*. **DIVINA PROVIDENTIA** Separation implies some kind of ordering; that is why Providence is introduced, in perfect accord with *Tim.* 30A: *εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸν ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας* (see the quotation from Albinus, below). **SEPARATUS** Cp. 376, 13 and Tert., *Adv. Hermog.* 29, 6 (p. 48, 7) Wsz.): *eam (sc. terram) . . . quam deus cum caelo separavit. ANTE CONSTITUTIONEM MUNDI* Cp. 301, 24-25: *ex eo tempore, quod praecedit ortum generationemque mundi*, which referred to Plato's words: *πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως* (48B). In Albinus the same statements about matter in disorder are found and in a similar context: *ἢν (sc. ὄλη) ἀτάκτως καὶ πλημμελῶς κινουμένην πρὸ τῆς οὐρανοῦ γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας παραλαβών πρὸς τὴν ἀρίστην ἤγαγε τάξιν* (*Epit.* XII 2). **HANC AIT FORTUNAM** Everything discussed until now is prior to the *exornatio mundi* (what Calcidius called *constitutio mundi*), and also thus to the intervention of Providence or God. Meanwhile it is not easy to determine exactly where the activity of Providence begins. Calcidius mentioned Providence shortly before when speaking of the division of elements. This is

understandable because there is already a question of some ordering. EXORNATA PRIUSQUAM is the rendering of Plato's  $\pi\tau\acute{\imath}\nu\kappa\ \chi\alpha\iota\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\acute{a}\nu$  ἐξ αὐτῶν διακοσμηθέν γενέσθαι.

e) *Reference to Providence*

[354] "But when", he says, "it was his pleasure to order everything". Here he means the provident will of God, whom it pleased first "to continue the formation of fire, earth and water" not as they are now but "scanty vestiges of them". A vestige of fire is not as yet fire, and the vestiges of the other bodies are not as yet the bodies themselves: a vestige, to be sure, indicates the potentiality of a thing, not the thing itself; and much less the word 'vestige' signifies body. Hence matter was thus a vestige of body before the adornment of the world. "In that squalor and deformity", he states, "apparent in that in which divine Providence is wanting". Rightly so; for what can be beautiful or graceful that is deprived of divine attention? Therefore, since the elements were still orderless and confused, matter in that condition was not as yet a cosmos nor beautiful; these only came to it through its capacity of being ordered by Providence.

Hence there was the underlying matter with its natural capacity for receiving beauty and gracefulness, and also there were the potentialities or vestiges of the four bodies, which were still confused and not ordered. Now, when God wished, he arranged and ordered all this and, by means of figures and qualities, adorned this immortal being, which is the sensible world, in accordance with fixed and everlasting considerations. He further orders us to believe that all that is made is made excellent by God's mind and will, and he asserts that nothing is more in accord with truth than this belief.

SED UBI The entire text, which *Calcidius* quotes in parts, runs as follows: δτε δ' ἐπεχειρεῖτο κοσμεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν, πῦρ πρῶτον καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ἀέρα, ἔχνη μὲν ἔχοντα αὐτῶν ἀπττα, παντάπασι γε μὴν διακείμενα ὥσπερ εἰκός ἔχειν ἄπαν δταν ἀπῆ τινος θεός, οὕτω δὴ τότε πεφυκότα ταῦτα πρῶτον διεσχηματίσατο εἰδεσί τε καὶ ἀριθμοῖς (53A-B). DEI VOLUNTATEM A more personal approach than *providentia divina* (cp. par. 268, p. 29). CUI CUM PLACUSET The difficulty of this text lies in the verb: all manuscripts—also in the translation

proper (69, 1)—read *continuasse*. Rigaltius conjectures *concin-  
nasse*, because he naturally regarded *continuasse* as senseless. However there is no doubt that one must follow the manuscripts on this point; the meaning of the text, I believe, is this: “and first of all he continued the formation of fire, earth, *etc.*”, or “he completed the formation of fire, earth, *etc.*”; for *vestigia* of these bodies were already in existence. This is a good rendering of Plato’s: πῦρ πρῶτον καὶ ὕδωρ . . . διεσχηματίσατο: “he thoroughly formed fire, water, *etc.*”; and, like Plato, Calcidius adds as a correction: “that is to say, the vestiges of fire, water . . .”. **QUIPPE VESTI-  
GIUM** Again the Aristotelian concept of ‘potentiality’ comes up, and in this way Calcidius once more tries to combine Plato and Aristotle. **IN EO, INQUIT** This is again the idea of chaos; it is interesting to see how the ideas of potentiality and of chaos can belong together and even be one and the same thing. On the other hand, a tension arises between them, when in 377, 20 ss. there is first a question of *squalor ac deformitas*, and further on this same matter is said to be endowed *cum naturali opportunitate suscipienda pulchritudinis ac venustatis*. It has already been seen that Calcidius tried to find a solution for this ambiguity by distinguishing two stages in the development of matter, but one feels that he cannot actually maintain this distinction as already seen in the historical part (cp. *ad* par. 299 and 301, p. 120 and 127). The ultimate reason for this problem is, of course, that Calcidius wrongly interprets the image of chaos as a concrete thing, that is, as a real stage in the development of matter. **CUM NATURALI OPPORTUNITATE** See *ad* 344, 26 (p. 173). **POTENTIAE SEU VESTIGIA**. The two definitions of matter, the Aristotelian (‘potentiality’) and the Platonic (‘chaos’), in one breath. **CERTIS RATIONIBUS** Plato: εἰδεσι καὶ ἀριθμοῖς. **OMNIA PORRO** *Tim.* 53B: τὸ δὲ ἡ δυνατὸν ὡς κάλλιστα ἀριστά τε ἐξ οὐχ οὔτως ἔχόντων τὸν θεὸν αὐτὰ συνιστάναι, παρὰ πάντα ἡμῖν ὡς ἀεὶ τοῦτο λεγόμενον ὑπαρχέτω. **PRAESUMERE, PRAESUMPTIONE** The familiar terms, cp. 345, 5; the further terminology of this section also looks familiar.

A general survey of the theory about matter developed by Calcidius in the last paragraphs should now be sketched. Matter by itself is neither in motion nor in a state of stability, but it has a capacity to both. One may call this the logical approach to matter, in which Aristotle’s concept of potentiality prevails. Alongside,

one finds an approach by means of the representation of chaos. Calcidius imagines that the *corpora* are dropped into matter and, in this way, cause a disorderly motion. In this second approach a special stage in the development of matter is assumed. Next Calcidius explains these 'bodies' as *τχνη*, 'vestiges of bodies', or also as potentialities in which the logical approach returns. The subsequent stage of ordering is the work of divine Providence. The most remarkable point in the attitude of Calcidius is the continuous swaying, as it were, between Plato's concept of chaos and Aristotle's idea of potentiality. He believes he has found a way to combine these two fundamentally different concepts by making a distinction between two stages of matter. Even in this combination one notices his wavering, particularly in the second stage, for the concept of potentiality penetrates into the representation of chaos.

As for his reference to Providence, Calcidius, like Plato, has arrived at the point from which he started, for in the first part of Timaeus' speech (Calc. par. 8-267) τὰ διὰ νοῦ δεδημιουργημένα were discussed (cp. p. 23).

## CONCLUSION

Since *Calcidius* is first and foremost a commentator on *Plato*, a correct understanding of his theory on the central problem of Greek philosophy, matter, must begin with the relevant doctrine of *Plato* himself. Although, properly speaking, *Plato* had no idea of 'matter', he yet had a twofold concept of that which *Aristotle* called by this term. First, *Plato* thought of matter as empty space ( $\chi\omega\rho\alpha$ ). Most philosophers before him had attempted to detect the material from which the world was made by pointing to one or more elements. *Plato* went much further into this subject. From the constant change of these so-called elements he deduced their dependence upon a single, all-comprising reality, 'that in which everything is'. To him this was space. The prominence given to this category was the result of analyzing thought, though space belongs to the world of observation. Along with this, *Plato* represents matter as chaos. This concept was very old: the ordered world, the cosmos, inspired the idea of an earlier disorder, out of which order had to rise. Originally, therefore, the chaos is a product of anti-thetical thought. But gradually it captured the imagination and the philosophical concept was developed with details of the visionary and imaginary world. The relation between these two concepts of matter in *Plato* is probably as *Bäumker* suggested, namely that chaos should be taken as a practical illustration or image of space. Thus space and chaos are two terms representing the same reality.

*Plato's*  $\chi\omega\rho\alpha$  found its continuation in *Aristotle's*  $\delta\lambda\gamma$ . *Aristotle* was convinced of this; he himself gives the impression that *Plato* had already used  $\delta\lambda\gamma$  for the principle in question. In *Aristotle* this principle changes from space in which ( $\tau\delta\ \dot{\epsilon}\nu\ \delta\phi$ ) to 'materials out of which' ( $\tau\delta\ \dot{\epsilon}\xi\ \sigma\delta$ ). In elaborating this idea *Aristotle's* great discovery was the concept of potentiality: when everything comes forth from everything, there must be something underlying. This may become anything but by itself is not yet anything; it is mere potentiality ("Hypostasierung der Möglichkeit", *Bäumker*, p. 253). In the  $\delta\lambda\gamma$  the  $\chi\omega\rho\alpha$  lost its image-character and became a purely mental concept. In this way *Aristotle* gave free scope to his dialectical disposition and posed 'something which by itself is not real but may become everything'.

The doctrine of the Stoia is adequately expressed by  $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha\ \&\pi\sigma\iota\sigma\omega$ . Matter is corporeal, a  $\sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha$ . The Stoia does not go all the way with Aristotle; it refused to take matter to be potential in so far as it is corporeal. For the rest, it denies matter all definitiveness and all quality, hence  $\&\pi\sigma\iota\sigma\omega$ . The Stoic concept comes nearer to the world of imagination. In this theory the chaos may be taken as something perfectly real. It is in this chaos that Providence created order. Aristotle's doctrine had little room for the idea or rather image of chaos.

Calcidius moves away from the Stoia, attacking it at every turn. He rejects completely the corporeality of matter. Moreover, he tries to combine Plato's two concepts of matter in a remarkable way. Space and chaos are two different stages in the evolution of matter; the former is matter as such, the chaos matter put in disorderly motion by 'vestiges of bodies dropped' into it. The concept of space is elaborated in a markedly Aristotelian way. Space is identified with  $\mathfrak{O}\lambda\eta$ , with that which is merely potential. Meanwhile, Plato's idea of space appears occasionally. Thus from the very first paragraph of this commentary, the Calcidian *silva* has the character of both 'space in which' and 'matter out of which'. Retaining, occasionally, the Platonic *in qua*, Calcidius keeps, to some extent, free from the 'merely possible' which, in the long run, cannot be maintained.

Each of the three parts of the treatise reveals in its own way the author's approach to the subject. The introductory paraphrase is marked by a predominance of the concept of chaos, a concept which proves to be no more than a second stage in the evolution of matter. The idea of potentiality prevails in the theoretical part, which introduces a purely dialectic method of arguing borrowed from Aristotle. Calcidius looked up to him as the scholar who gave Plato's ideas a theoretical foundation. In this part he opposes the Stoics in particular. He regards their theory as a cheapening of the pure concept of matter and, for that reason, constantly defends matter as a mere potentiality. In the third part, a verifying paraphrase of Plato's text, the Platonic concept of matter as space is naturally prominent. The materialization of the concept of matter which set in after Aristotle found its strongest defender in the Stoia. With the aid of the new dialectics, Calcidius returned to Aristotle's matter. He did his utmost to take away everything definite from matter. Always 'dematerializing' it with Aristotle's potentiality, he

virtually made Plato into the real originator of the immaterial concept of matter. This idea became deeper in Plotinus who saw matter as the incorporeal background against which reality is set. After six centuries Plato's vision had returned once more in a subtle and discriminating thought.

Matter is not the sole topic in the *Calcidian De silva*. The two other principles of Platonic philosophy, God and the ideas, the latter identical with God's thoughts, are frequently discussed. But nowhere in this commentary are they moulded into a philosophic system. Calcidius studied matter, ideas and God, but they remain apart, and the author failed to see or at least to present them as the three principles of one universe. Typical is paragraph 329 where the threefold verb *manet* places the principles rigidly side by side and without mutual relationship. The one motion in this system comes from the images of the ideas, from that which, strictly speaking, does not exist. The images alone are the life-lines between these static principles. But no explanation is forthcoming as to how the connections are achieved nor how motion originates in matter. Alongside this system, if one may call it thus, of rational thinking, Calcidius presents another view equally important, built up from the world of imagination: the Demiurge creating the universe as the image of the everlasting reality and the result of his contemplation. The poverty of Calcidius' commentary becomes apparent when compared with the work of Plotinus. Both had the same material of Middle Platonism at their disposal. But the former did not go beyond filling a disorderly storehouse of knowledge where the latter built a new, harmonious and dynamic construction, a considerable advance in the development of ancient thought.

No single name can be put forward with certainty as the source of Calcidius' work and several must be ruled out. Plotinus cannot be considered and Calcidius' opposition to the Stoa excludes Posidonius. Thus the opinions of both Steinheimer and Switalski are discontenanced. Numenius, on the other hand, has come into the foreground after close scrutiny. The starting-point and basis of this discovery is a lengthy verbal quotation from which numerous threads led throughout the commentary. Two further weighty arguments appear. First, in his historical survey Calcidius left the

discussion of Numenius to the last, thus implying, as was his habit, a special esteem for this particular author. Secondly, his fierce opposition to the Stoa is consistent, step by step, with that of Numenius. Yet Calcidius did not follow Numenius in everything. He rejected his simple idea of matter as chaos. Instead he admits the two stages of matter as such and matter in disorderly motion, which is chaos. Calcidius states that here he follows other Platonists. One might think, at this juncture, of Albinus from whom Calcidius borrowed much material. For this particular instance, however, the commentary does not justify such an assumption. But it is more or less certain that Calcidius shrank from the over-stressed Eastern dualism of Numenius. The two stages in the development of matter, tempering this dualism, may well be the result of a more Western, not to say, Christian attitude, already detected in what Tertullian presents as the teaching of Hermogenes. Although this theoretical aversion to Numenius cannot be denied, in practice Calcidius follows him closely. Thus the overall character of Calcidius' commentary is determined by a markedly Numenian approach to different sources which the author himself seems to recall in his introduction.

The markedly Aristotelian character of several Calcidian passages appears to support Borghorst's arguments in favour of Adrastus as the main source, particularly since the extensive astronomical and mathematical discussions in the commentary were certainly taken from this author. Much of Aristotle's dialectic material, however, had long since been adopted by the Platonics. This fact alone explains sufficiently the *Aristotelica* in Calcidius. He may have found them in any of his other sources, Numenius, Albinus or one or another of the Middle Platonists whose name he does not mention; cp. also *infra*.

The study of text and sources of Calcidius' commentary leaves unanswered a final question: how did Calcidius acquire his actual Greek texts? An obvious reply is that he accompanied his bishop, Ossius, to the Near East and there gathered his material. Two main suppositions as to the form this took can be made: 1) Calcidius collected separate works of authors, such as Numenius, Albinus, Adrastus, Origen; 2) he found one text based already on a combination of these authors. The first supposition is rejected by most scholars. They do not believe Calcidius capable of compiling an original work. This judgment, however, based solely on the com-

mentary itself, is scarcely more than a *petitio principii*. Moreover, Calcidius seems to refer to a diversity of sources (see p. 13). According to the second, Calcidius translated a single Greek text and added some details for his Latin readers. Although the present author is not inclined to minimize Calcidius' own work, he cannot overlook the facts in favour of this supposition. Who then was the author of such a Greek text? He must have been a Platonist, an author of a commentary on the *Timaeus*, an admirer of the Aristotelian way of thinking and a follower of Numenius. The name of Porphyry comes naturally to the fore. He did, in fact, write a commentary on the *Timaeus*, and, moreover, a treatise Περὶ ὅλης, which could explain Calcidius' lengthy paragraph on this subject. He too studied the logics of Aristotle and wrote on the categories, providing a possible explanation for Calcidius' *Aristotelica* and his threefold digression on the categories (par. 226, 319, 336). And lastly, he was accused of transcribing Numenius which might account for the strong Numenian features of Calcidius' work (Proclus, *In Tim.* I 77, 22-24: ... ὁ φιλόσοφος Πορφύριος, δν καὶ θαυμάσειν ἀν τις, εἰ ἔτερα λέγοι τῆς Νουμηνίου παραδόσεως). But even if one accepts a Porphyrian commentary as the main source of Calcidius, the results of the foregoing study remain the same: Calcidius' commentary represents a pre-Plotinian stage in the evolution of Platonic thinking. If Porphyry did write a work upon which this Calcidian pre-Plotinian commentary is chiefly based, it must have been a compilation of the kind by no means unusual in Porphyry's work.

## SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES TO THE PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRINT

The present reprint offers an opportunity for drawing attention to the progress in the *Calcidius* study and for restating my viewpoint on the sources of *Calcidius' De silva* in the light of new data provided by this progress. A more up to date and fresh approach to its text may thus be welcome.

Research into *Calcidius'* work has developed considerably during the last five years. The name that stands out here is that of Professor J. H. Waszink whose monumental work <sup>1)</sup> must be seen as a lasting foundation for any study concerned with the subject. In addition to a critical apparatus, based upon an overwhelming number of manuscripts, it contains an exegetical apparatus revealing the author's extraordinary familiarity with the whole field of ancient philosophy. Moreover, the author's introduction to the text discusses alongside the problems of authorship, of the manuscripts and of the division of the work, that of the sources of *Calcidius*. Anyone studying this extensive account will appreciate not only the wealth of knowledge and the caution of this search but also that, in many places, Waszink touches upon the study here reprinted and completed <sup>2)</sup>. Before considering or discussing the questions raised on this point, the following must be stated. Although it is true that the results of my study were available to Waszink as a

<sup>1)</sup> *Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus*. In societatem operis coniuncto P. J. Jensen ed. J. H. Waszink, Londinii et Leidae, In aedibus instituti Warburgiani et E. J. Brill, 1962 (*Plato Latinus IV*). As this work is mainly by the hand of Prof. Waszink (see p. CLXXXI), especially those parts of interest here, I intend to refer to it under his name without any further additions or explanations.

<sup>2)</sup> A few articles have moreover appeared that are indirectly concerned with *Calcidius*, e.g., W. Theiler, *Einheit und unbegrenzte Zweiheit von Platon bis Plotin, in Isonomia. Studien zur Gleichheitsvorstellung im griechischen Denken*, Berlin, Akad. Verlag, 1964, pp. 89-109. The same author adds a note to his *Plotins Schriften*, vol. IIIb, p. 384 s., which bears upon the explanation of a passage in *Calcidius* c. 338, referring to a certain Apollonius who is said to have made an ivory statue of Jupiter Capitolinus. At an earlier date already both Theiler (*Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus*, Berlin-Zürich, Weidmann, 1964<sup>2</sup>, p. 17) and Borghorst (see p. 206) recorded their suspicion that this passage 'romanized' an earlier Greek text, speaking of the statue of Zeus by Phidias.

preparatory work, it is equally obvious that the latter would not have been written in the manner it actually was done without the continual guidance and support of him whose insight into the problems about and around the text by Calcidius is second to none. It is my pleasure to thank him once more for his supervision and assistance.

On the question of the sources of Calcidius' *De silva*, Waszink's opinion agrees, in general, with that defended by me. As his inquiry is concerned with the entire output of Calcidius, it is, obviously, more broadly based. In one point, however, it is also considerably more penetrating and profound, namely on the influence from Porphyry. Towards the end of my study the possibility was put forward, in general terms, that the latter was the principal and direct source of Calcidius. This had to be a Porphyry who was strongly Numenian or, in still more general words, strongly Middle-Platonic, revealing little or no influence of Plotinus<sup>1</sup>). Now Waszink presents a minute search as to the influence of Porphyry upon the whole of Calcidius' work<sup>2</sup>). In doing so he outlined more clearly the problems of the sources of the chapter *De silva*.

On the basis of the new data thus obtained and of a renewed study of the text on my part, I have arrived at the following concepts on this issue. The chapter *De silva* which consists of three portions (see p. 24)—an introductory paraphrase, an historico-systematic part and a verifying paraphrase—reveals a clear transition stage in cc. 300-301. In these chapters one finds oneself in the second portion, precisely on the dividing line between the historical and the systematical parts. That what precedes these chapters shows clear Numenian features. Starting from the passages immediately preceding (cc. 294-299), in which the teaching of Numenius is discussed in his own words, I was able to point out many places in the previous part (c. 268 ss.) of the commentary

1) In a review of my book E. Mensching (*Gnomon* 34 (1962), pp. 687-692) appears to have overlooked this explicit restriction. He maintains that my Porphyry-hypothesis is at variance with the part in which, against Steinheimer, I reject an influence of Plotinus upon Calcidius.—Both Waszink (o.c., p. XC s.) and H.-Ch. Puech (*ibid.*) admit that Porphyry, indeed, wrote works in which the influence of the Middle-Platonici was greater than that of Plotinus.

2) Waszink continues the search still further in the first volume of his *Studien zum Timaeus Kommentar des Calcidius*, Leiden, Brill, 1964, in which the first portion of Calcidius' commentary is scrutinized. Adrastus and Porphyry appear to be the principle sources.

that were formulated in the same or almost the same wording. One encounters a strongly dualistic doctrine about God and matter, the latter having a dynamic character, just as Numenius<sup>1)</sup> is known to have defended. The image of the chaos dominates in this first part of Calcidius' commentary.

The part after c. 301 presents a much less dynamic concept of matter in which the Aristotelian idea of the abstract  $\delta\lambda\eta$  dominates, this in its turn being the continuation of the  $\chi\omega\rho\alpha$  idea of Plato. It also contains a purely rational approach to matter, a struggling with the  $\alpha\pi\iota\omega\delta\tau\eta\varsigma$ , just as it is found in such philosophers as Albinus. The influence of Aristotle is also comparatively strong in the treatment of other problems.

As for the transition found in cc. 300-301: the former states that there are two ways among Plato's interpreters which merit the attention;—it should be borne in mind that the Plato interpretation is the subject matter. The first of these is given in c. 300; and it is clearly the one advocated by Numenius. Subsequently and as a confirmation of this interpretation reference is made to the doctrine of the *Hebraei* (see below). In the next chapter 301 Calcidius gives the second interpretation. This entails that in the chaos, *i.e.*, in the orderlessly moving matter, distinction is to be made between matter as such and its movement. Matter as such is without movement, in the same manner as it is equally without form or order. The orderless movement comes from the elements thrown into matter. (Plato, *Timaeus* 53A speaks of  $\iota\chi\psi\eta$ .)

Obviously, the question now arises what about the evil that, according to the opinion cited in c. 300, is inherent in matter (conceived in the sense of orderlessly moving matter). Calcidius answers: *Malitiam porro aiunt virtutis esse carentiam* (p. 303, 4 Wsz). This means being evil is, according to these authors, something negative. And thus, one may add, there is no reason whatsoever for not locating this evil into matter. The correctness of this

1) Numenius' name is often mentioned in this part of my treatise. Yet Mensching (*art. cit.*, p. 688) presents a peculiarly inaccurate picture, stating that, ultimately, I ascribe everything to Numenius. On several points of detail I can agree with the reviewer but on that of the 'sources' of Calcidius he, definitely, misrepresents the principal issues of my opinion (see also note 1, p. 249). Indeed, he has already confessed (see *Gnomon* 37 (1965), p. 33) that, actually, he gave very little attention to the part of my book which treats of Calcidius' doctrine. Yet, this part is, by far, the most important. With regret one must point out that such a manner of reviewing merits no admiration.

interpretation also results from the explanation: *ut informitatem*, etc., for *informitas* is 'the' characteristic of matter. Hence, Waszink (o.c., p. XLII and LXXXIX) is, to the best of my knowledge, mistaken in stating that Calcidius rejects the *malignitas silvae*, while in actual fact he defends in c. 352 s. the opinion given in c. 301, although without speaking of the *malignitas silvae*. It is true that he rejects the Numenian opinion of *malignitas silvae*, i.e., the doctrine that evil originates in the indiscriminately moving matter. But he does not reject matter as the source of evil. On the other hand, this interpretation confirms Waszink's belief that Porphyry was the source of Calcidius; for which see below.

It must be clear to any student of the subject that these chapters 300-301, especially the latter, are of the utmost importance for identifying the source(s) of Calcidius. For it is quite obvious that after the historical survey the author himself is speaking again. He indicates two ways of Plato interpretation; the first (c. 300) is that by Numenius, who had such a profound influence upon the first portion of the treatise *De silva*, the second (c. 301) is by an author or authors whose interpretation must be related to some chapters in the second portion (especially cc. 352-353). The immediate question therefore arises: Which interpreters had Calcidius in mind for this second way?

Waszink has indicated the way here to a new solution. Because of two texts by John Philoponus, *De aeternitate mundi* VI 14 and XIV 3, he believes to be able to establish that Calcidius, by distinguishing between matter as such and matter brought to orderless movement by the elements, follows in the footsteps of Porphyry<sup>1</sup>). One may see this hypothesis confirmed by the fact that the theory propounded in c. 301 is a further development of the Plato interpretation given in the preceding chapter. As the latter presents the concept of Numenius, Porphyry, who lived after him and showed interest in his concepts, seems to be a likely candidate for the former. And a further confirmation of the hypothesis lies in the content itself, viz., in the idea of matter being the source of evil. To the authors mentioned in chapter 301—and Calcidius, as said before, reckons

<sup>1</sup>) It is noteworthy that Proclus, like Calcidius (and Porphyry), distinguished between matter as such and its orderless movement; *De mal. subs.* X 35, 3-4 οὐ γάρ ἔστι η τε ὅλη καὶ τὸ πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως κινούμενον ταῦτον. But to him the source of evil is found in the latter rather than in the former. Cf. F. P. Hager, *Die Materie und das Böse im antiken Platonismus*, in *Museum Helveticum* 19 (1962), p. 97 ss.

himself among them—matter is evil in a negative sense: *virtutis carentia*. Yet from the examples cited by Calcidius (p. 303, 4-5 Wsz: *ut informatatem, inopiam, intemperantiam*) one must not think of this *virtutis carentia* as only moral evil. My appeal, therefore, to Origen (p. 126) in order to show that this doctrine existed before does not suffice. One should rather search in the direction of Plotinus. And *Enn.* III 8, 3 (see p. 125) offers a very suitable parallel. This *virtutis carentia* may well be seen as the translation of ἔλλειψις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, which is the definition of evil in *Enn.* III 2, 5 (see p. 125). Thus the text of Calcidius c. 301 could easily be understood in a Plotinian sense<sup>1</sup>.

Furthermore, it appears *a priori* likely that this Plotinian concept of matter came to Calcidius *via* Porphyry. This is not incompatible with the fact that we possess a text by Porphyry suggesting a slightly different idea of matter. In *Sent.* 20, namely, the *ὕλη* is characterized as ἀληθινὸν μὴ ὄν and ἔλλειψις παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος<sup>2</sup>). To Plotinus however it is a μὴ ὄν in the sense of ἔτερον τοῦ ὄντος, hence a relative not-being<sup>3</sup>); and it is ἔλλειψις τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ rather than παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος. Still, it is quite possible that elsewhere Porphyry used a formulation more similar to that of Plotinus. The Porphyry texts cited by Waszink from John Philoponus (p. 251) presuppose already a less negative concept of the *ὕλη*.

In the light of these considerations one may safely accept that in c. 301 Calcidius presents the opinion of Porphyry and hence that the latter was his direct source. And when later on (cc. 302 ss.) a concept of matter occurs that could well be derived from the same Porphyry together with several *Aristotelica* which, we know, had the same author's attention, the conclusion must be that these chapters (302 ss.) too had Porphyry as their principle source.

Waszink<sup>4</sup>) made an interesting discovery about one of these Aristotelian elements. It concerns the process of knowledge, called *resolutio* by Calcidius, which is clearly based upon the Aristotelian ἀφαίρεσις (see index, s.v. *resolutio*). This process is also mentioned in the first Homily on the *Hexaëmeron* by Basil the Great. He states there that, when during the search for the so-called *ὕλη*, one mentally takes away the properties of the things, the abstraction does not

1) On Plotinus' concept of matter see Hager, *art. cit.*, p. 85 ss.

2) See Waszink, *Studien*, p. 51, note 1.

3) See Hager, *art. cit.*, p. 86.

4) *Calcidius*, p. CIII, note 1.

lead to a ὅλη but to nothing. *In Hexaëm.* 21A: Εἰς οὐδὲν γὰρ καταλήξεις, ἐκάστην τῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὑπεξαιρεῖσθαι τῷ λόγῳ πειρώμενος. Waszink now draws the attention to a scholion to this text which reads: τούτῳ τῷ ἐπιχειρήματι ἔχρησατο Πορφύριος ἐν τοῖς περὶ ὅλης. Although this *resolutio* also occurs in Albinus and Numenius (see p. 50), the explicit quotation of Porphyry in the scholion renders the text exceptionally important and interesting; it strengthens the probability that Porphyry here was Calcidius' source<sup>1)</sup>.

For c. 300 and those preceding the following argument appears rather obvious. As this portion has a strong Numenian flavour and Porphyry is known to have been much influenced by Numenius (see p. 247), the former was also the principle direct source of this part of Calcidius' commentary. Waszink, indeed, accepts this view but makes an exception for the passage in which the doctrine of the *Hebraei* is cited as confirming the Numenian interpretation of Plato's doctrine. To him the manner in which this doctrine is discussed seems to be incompatible with Porphyry's attitude towards the Jews. And as Numenius is known to have been favourably inclined towards the Jews, these *Hebraica* fit well into a text by Numenius.

Waszink's interpretation, however, has a peculiar implication. For, in these circumstances, Calcidius would have taken the Numenian elements from Porphyry, except for these *Hebraica* which he took directly from Numenius. This is scarcely acceptable. If the latter, as they stand in Calcidius, cannot come from Porphyry and, consequently, must have been taken directly from Numenius, we must, I believe, also agree that the former, the *Numeniana*, were derived from Numenius himself, this means, we must regard Numenius to be the direct source of both the cc. 295-299 and the influence the *Numeniana* had upon the preceding portion of *De silva*.

There seems to be one difficulty against this supposition. It compels us to accept that Calcidius abolished here his customary method of never mentioning his immediate spokesman; for, in fact, Numenius' name occurs five times in the cc. 295-299. Waszink regards this feature as decisively against the acceptance

1) It is doubtful, however, whether one may take it that Porphyry, like Basil, believed the application of this *ἀφαίρεσις* 'to lead to nothing'. Strictly speaking the text only establishes that Porphyry also applied this technique (τούτῳ τῷ ἐπιχειρήματι). Even though a text such as *Sent.* 20 seems to suggest a similar conclusion, because of what has been said above great care should be taken against generalisation.

of Numenius as the direct source of these chapters<sup>1)</sup>. Still, this kind of reasoning is rather dangerous. Waszink himself is obliged to make an exception for Origen. There would have been a special cause for explicitly naming this immediate source, the fact namely that Calcidius was a Christian. But could there not have been an equally special reason for mentioning Numenius? In point of fact, his name occurs exclusively in the historical survey, notably in the discussion of the teaching of the Pythagoreans. Is one not allowed to suggest that, as so little was (and is) known of Pythagoras himself, Numenius was, at least to Calcidius, the Pythagorean *par excellence* and that, in this particular instance, he wished to cite his name in the same manner as he did earlier on those of Aristotle, Zeno and Chrysippus? Outside this historical passage, *i.e.*, in those places where Calcidius speaks for himself, the name of Numenius is notably absent. And this is at once noteworthy in c. 300. For here, immediately after discussing Numenius' doctrine (cc. 295-299), the same is again mentioned yet without a name.

Thus, to me, it does not seem to be so impossible that Numenius is the principal and direct source of the first portion of *De silva*; Porphyry can only be reasonably accepted as Calcidius' spokesman here when the *Hebraica* are his too. If the latter is not acceptable<sup>2)</sup>, one must suppose that in c. 301 Calcidius changes, so to speak, from the authority of Numenius to that of Porphyry. But no obvious reason for such an action has as yet been suggested. Still, whatever opinion one follows, in either it must be taken that in cc. 295-299 we are dealing with pure *Numeniana*<sup>3)</sup>.

Chapter 300 is not the only place where the doctrine of the Jews is quoted at the end of an historical survey and as a confirmation of a certain point of view. The same happens in c. 55. As it occurs here too in a Numenian context and, moreover, the problems in both cases show great similarity, it seems worthwhile considering the questions concerning this subject matter.

First of all the text of c. 55 (p. 103, 1-7 Wsz): *Quod quidem verum*

1) Further details in Waszink, *Studien*, p. 24-5.

2) The proof, for that matter, has still to be provided.

3) See Waszink, *Studien*, p. 25, note 2. See E. R. Dodds, *New Light on the Chaldaean Oracles*, in *The Harvard Theological Review* 54 (1961), p. 270.

4) On p. 106, note 1, it has been pointed out how different places of this text show traces of an elaboration by a Greek philosopher.

*esse testatur eminens quaedam doctrina sectae sanctioris et in comprehensione divinae rei prudentioris, quae perhibet deum absoluto illustratoque sensili mundo genus hominum instituentem corpus quidem eius parte humi sumpta iuxta hanc effigiem aedificasse formasseque, vitam vero eidem ex convexis accersisse caelestibus postque intimis eius inspirationem proprio flatu intimasse, inspirationem hanc dei consilium animae rationemque significans.*

This text is found at the end of a discourse on the origin of the (world) soul, in which, especially, Plato's well-known passage on the mixing of this soul (*Tim.* 35A) drew Calcidius' attention. In the chapters with which we are concerned here (cc. 29-31 and 54-55), he discusses the question of how to understand the indivisible and divisible *οὐσία* which the Demiurg uses at this mixing. According to one opinion the two *οὐσία* indicate the *species intellegibilis mundi* and matter. According to another the indivisible *οὐσία* stands for a *anima eminentior, quae nulli sit incorporationi obnoxia*, a higher kind of soul which, therefore, never has to descend into a body. With the divisible *οὐσία* is meant the *anima stirpeia* which contributes the powers of life to plants and animals<sup>1)</sup>. To confirm the correctness of the latter opinion reference is made to the doctrine of the Jews; the terms *vita* and *ratio* are here the core of the matter.

There are three obvious reasons for suspecting the influence of Numenius in this passage: a) Numenius himself speaks of two souls; b) the terminology is similar to that of Numenius; c) the confirming Jewish doctrine is brought in here as well as in c. 300 where Numenian teaching is patent.

One might object that there are also differences between the two passages. For in cc. 295-299, the obviously Numenian passage, and in c. 300, in which his opinion is, again, outlined and the Jewish doctrine cited in confirmation, the points at issue are the good and evil souls; the serpent, according to those *Hebraei*, illustrates this evil. In c. 55, however, the evil soul does not seem to come up for discussion; the *anima stirpeia*, here termed as *vita*, has not the character of an evil soul. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the text just quoted is followed by: *Et ratio dei deus est humanis rebus consulens, quae causa est hominibus bene beateque vivendi, si non concessum sibi munus summo a deo neglegant* (p. 103, 7-9 Wsz).

1) One thinks here, on the one hand, of the *νοῦς* of Plato, on the other of the *anima* as the principle of life.

No explanation is given for the origin of this *neglegere*, of this neglecting. Yet an opposition to the *ratio* principle is also patent in this text. And below it will become obvious that the seemingly quiet *anima stirpea* in c. 31 is suddenly given a restless character, precisely in the passage that strongly reminds one of Numenius.

According to those referred to in c. 31 as defending the doctrine of the dual soul, the Demiurg, taking that excellent soul, joined it with the *anima stirpea* to make, in this manner, a bodily creature gifted with reason, that could understand the wonders of the creation and glorify the Creator (see p. 79, 19-23 Wsz). But, the opponents say, how is it possible that a *anima stirpea* existed before there were any plants etc.? The answer is: the objection presupposes that there was a time when the *anima stirpea* did not exist but was later created by God. This is incorrect. For to create, indeed, means to order what was orderless rather than to make out of nothing<sup>1)</sup>. *Fuisse enim semper tam animae quam corporis vim nec deum ex his quae non erant fecisse mundum, sed ea quae erant sine ordine ac modo ordinasse* (p. 80, 20 - 81, 1 Wsz). Then *Calcidius* continues thus: *itaque potius ea quae existebant exornasse quam generasse quae non erant, inordinatos quippe animi errores et agitatem fluctibus similem intellectu assignato ex inordinata iactatione ad ordinem redigisse, corporis etiam motum instabilem salubri moderatione agitatione frenasse et eidem formam et figuram congruam et convenientem ornatum dedisse* (p. 81, 1-6 Wsz). This description strongly reminds one of the Numenian passage (see Waszink, *Calcidius*, p. XLIX). The *anima stirpea* has here obtained all the

1) The ease with which *Calcidius*, here and elsewhere, dismisses the *creatio ex nihilo* and accepts an eternal matter alongside God remains one of the great problems in his work. It is as though he totally failed to realize that this was a controversial issue of the first order between the official doctrine of the Christian Church on the one hand and a number of philosophers and heretics on the other. In this connection it may suffice to mention *Tertullian's* fierce opposition to the gnostic *Hermogenes* who came very near to the 'pagan' idea. *Calcidius'* attitude strikes one the more so, when it is borne in mind that even *Neo-Platonici* gradually developed a monism which, e.g., in *Proclus*, took the form of creationism. *In rem publ. I 37, 27 Kr. καὶ ἡ ὥλη παρῆκται θεόθεν ὡς ἀναγκαῖα τῷ κόσμῳ* (see *Hager, art. cit.*, p. 97). Our situation becomes still more astonishing since *R. Beutler, Art. Porphyrius*, P.W., XXII, Kol. 303, wrote that "P. scheint der (sonst christlichen) Ansicht einer Schöpfung aus dem Nichts nahezukommen" (see *Waszink, Studien*, p. 51, note 1). If then one has to accept an influence of *Porphyry* in *Calcidius*, and this seems to be the case, the work of the former must also have propounded a different opinion. In actual fact, earlier on we were brought to such a supposition (see p. 252).

features of the orderlessly moving *anima silvae* of Numenius. When, therefore, we observe how this idea is being confirmed by the teaching of the Jews, just as in c. 300, the obvious conclusion must be that we are dealing with a Numenian piece of writing. And, if one must accept that Porphyry could not have cited this teaching, the only way open is to infer that here too Calcidius took both the *Numeniana* and the *Hebraica* directly from Numenius.

There still is the article by Beutler<sup>1)</sup> which I failed to quote when discussing the cc. 295-299. He argues that these cc. 31, 54-55 were derived from Plutarch rather than from Numenius. Waszink rightly protested against this (*Calcidius*, p. L-LIII). To his criticism a few remarks may be added.

After having agreed with Beutler's statement that the teaching of these two philosophers show many points of contact, Waszink presses the matter of the divergences. To Numenius, he says, *silva* and *silvae anima* are the same, this being the reason why he does not distinguish between matter and its orderless movement. Plutarch, on the other hand, does so. To him matter as such is without quality ( $\alpha\piοτος$ ); it has no movement, since this is something of a soul. Hence the orderless movement of matter can only be explained through an (orderless) soul in matter; this soul also is the origin of the evil. Waszink's conclusion that, therefore, the doctrine of Numenius and Plutarch differ appears to be correct.

But now one may also ask: what is the relationship between Plutarch and Calcidius? The latter too, in c. 301 ss., distinguishes between matter as such and its orderless movement, thus dissociating himself from Numenius. Does he now follow Plutarch? The answer must be to the negative, for Plutarch seeks the source of evil in the orderless movement of matter, Calcidius however in matter itself (evil indeed is *virtutis carentia*). Nevertheless, it must be emphatically stressed that the departure from Numenius' teaching is not at all noticeable in the cc. 31 and 54-55. And Waszink is quite right in assuming an influence of Numenius, in this particular instance, rather than of Plutarch.

When, however, he states that the text *Fuisse enim semper tam animae quam corporis vim* is incompatible with Plutarch's teaching, because he defends a creation of the cosmos in time—in the sense that *fuisse . . . semper* would have no place in Plutarch—I feel this

1) *Numenius*, P.W. Suppl. VII, 1940, Kol. 664-678.

to be incorrect. To Plutarch the cosmos has, indeed, its origin in time, but the ἀκοσμία, the core of our text, has not. Waszink himself quotes (p. LI) an interesting parallel for the words *animaee et corporis vim*: *De Is. et Os.*, 49: Μεμειγμένη γάρ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἐναντίων, οὐ μὴν ἴσοσθενῶν δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίους τὸ κράτος ἐστίν· ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι, πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ πρὸς τὴν βελτίουν ἀεὶ διαμαχοῦσαν. Here one finds precisely that 'force of soul and body' which opposes the better principle.

One would rather prefer to see Calcidius' subsequent distinction between *animi errores* and *motus instabilis corporis*, both of which must be arranged and ordered, as unconformable with Plutarch. For every movement, to him, is something belonging to a soul. If, therefore, the *animi errores*—obviously identical with 'irregular movement'—are here discussed first, what then is the meaning of those *motus corporis*? *Motus* indeed is something of a soul. To Plutarch there is ἀκοσμία in the body before it is fashioned to order. But this consists of being without form and order; and there is no question here of movement. Only for the soul the ἀκοσμία lies in the orderless movement. Plutarch is most definite on this in *De animae procreatione in Timaeo* 1014B: ἀκοσμία γάρ ἦν τὰ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως. ἀκοσμία δ' οὐκ ἀσώματος οὐδ' ἀκίνητος οὐδ' ἀψυχος ἀλλ' ἀμορφον μὲν καὶ ἀσύστατον τὸ σωματικὸν ἐμπληκτὸν δὲ καὶ ἀλογον τὸ κινητικὸν ἔχουσα· τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἀναρμοστία ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔχούσης λόγον (ed. Hubert, p. 148, 13-18). Still, since in the text just quoted from *De Is. et Os.* Plutarch speaks of a δύναμις in the soul *and* in the body, one should be warned against asserting on too flimsy evidence that this or that does not fit into Porphyry's teaching. One may more safely defend that among philosophers supporting a strongly dualistic system, obviously, a great number of possibilities exists of agreement and similarity of expression<sup>1)</sup>. This does not alter the fact that Calcidius should here be judged as being dependent upon Numenius, though for other considerations explained above.

1) It has been said already that Calcidius follows a less dualistic theory in c. 301 ss. On p. 246 I suggested that he did so because of his Christian conviction. In view of his attitude towards the problem of creation this seems to be untenable. It should rather be ascribed to the influence of Porphyry.

Finally, Waszink asks himself whether perhaps the other interpretation of the indivisible and divisible *οὐσία*, cited by Calcidius, comes from Plutarch. In this concept the indivisible *οὐσία* stands for the *species intellegibilis mundi*, the indivisible *οὐσία* for matter<sup>1</sup>). To confirm this he quotes *De an. procr.* 1022E: *<τὸ μὲν ἀμέριστον καὶ ἀεὶ> κατὰ ταύτα ἔχον ὡς μορφὴν καὶ εἰδος, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνόμενον μεριστὸν ὡς ὑποδοχὴν καὶ ὄλην.* He overlooks, however, the article ὡς, for Plutarch himself states a few lines below: *οἱ δὲ σωματικὴν ἀξιοῦντες ὄλην συμμίγνυσθαι τῇ ἀμερίστῳ διαμαρτάνουσι* (1022F).

These remarks on details should not obscure the principal fact that I fully agree with Waszink's final conclusion<sup>2</sup>).

---

1) Waszink, *Calcidius*, p. LIII, line 26, read *dividua* instead of the slip *stirpea*.

2) I am grateful to Fr S. J. P. van Dijk, O.F.M., for the English translation of these notes.

## INDICES

### I. LIST OF QUOTATIONS FROM ANCIENT SOURCES

Only the most important passages have been included

#### AETIUS

*Placita* (ed. Diels, Dox. Gr.)

I 3, 5: 67  
 I 3, 18: 67  
 I 3, 20: 73  
 I 3, 21: 143  
 I 3, 25: 93  
 I 3, 27: 68  
 I 7, 18: 107  
 I 8, 2: 110  
 I 9, 2: 98  
 I 13, 3: 68  
 I 27, 6: 101  
 II 1, 7: 97

#### ALBINUS

*Epitome* (ed. Louis)

V 5: 135  
 VI 10: 203  
 VII 5: 216  
 VIII 2: 32, 146, 150, 151, 196, 224  
 VIII 3: 167  
 IX 1: 136, 210-211  
 X 3: 135  
 X 4: 208  
 X 5: 50  
 X 7: 168  
 XI 2: 239  
 XII 2: 236, 239  
 XIII 3: 44  
 XIV 3: 236  
 XIV 2: 223  
 XXV 4: 140  
*Prolegomena* (ed. Hermann)  
 XXVII: 133

#### APULEIUS

*De Dogm. Plat.* (ed. Thomas)

I 5: 156, 167  
 I 6: 131

#### ARIUS DIDYMUS

*Epitomes fr. phys.* (ed. Diels, Dox. Gr.)

fr. 20: 97, 101, 158  
 fr. 29: 101

#### ARISTOTELES

*Categ.* (ed. Minio Paluello)

I b 25 ss.: 202

*De anima* (ed. Biehl)

412 a 9: 153

*De gen. et corrupt.* (ed. Joachim)

318 a 20: 156  
 320 b 17: 151  
 324 b 18: 31  
 329 a 24 s.: 76  
 329 a 33: 91  
 330 b 4 ss.: 163  
 331 a 7 ss.: 181  
 331 b 2 s.: 181  
 331 b 24 s.: 182  
 332 a 27 ss.: 180  
 332 b 5 ss.: 181

*Eth. Eudem.* (ed. Susemihl)

1235 a 25 ss.: 113

*Metaph.* (ed. Jaeger)

983 b 18 ss.: 72  
 984 a 5 ss.: 73  
 985 b 14: 67  
 986 b 10 ss.: 73  
 988 a 14 s.: 110  
 1000 b 26: 138  
 1012 b 34 ss.: 56  
 1013 a 17 ss.: 137  
 1018 a 12 ss.: 198  
 1018 a 25 ss.: 198  
 1029 a 1 s.: 94  
 1029 a 16 ss.: 50  
 1069 b 32 ss.: 76  
 1070 b 18 ss.: 76

*Phys.* (ed. Ross)

184 a 16 ss.: 131  
 184 b 15 ss.: 67  
 188 a 27 s.: 142  
 188 b 27 ss.: 141  
 189 a 12 s.: 139  
 189 a 30: 138  
 189 b 16: 142  
 191 a 24 ss.: 77 ss.  
 191 b 5: 80

191 b 27: 81  
 192 a 3 ss.: 83 ss.  
 192 a 14: 91  
 192 a 16: 89  
 192 a 31: 31  
 203 a 22 s.: 67  
 204 a 5 s.: 156  
 209 b 11 ss.: 145, 220

## BASILIUS

*Homil. in Heraëm.* (ed. Giet)  
 16A: 56  
 16D: 138  
 33B: 142

CALCIDIUS (ed. Wrobel; only passages not belonging to the *De silva*)  
 p. 4, 16 ss.: 11  
 p. 73, 2 ss.: 12  
 p. 89, 1: 56  
 p. 94, 4 ss.: 205  
 p. 95, 18 ss.: 239  
 p. 100, 6 ss.: 16  
 p. 105, 11 ss.: 105  
 p. 106, 2 s.: 149  
 p. 119, 3 ss.: 16  
 p. 119, 17 s.: 17  
 p. 121, 14 s.: 43  
 p. 122, 22 ss.: 106  
 p. 123, 1 ss.: 17  
 p. 125, 5 ss.: 139 s.  
 p. 171, 18 ss.: 17  
 p. 173, 17 ss.: 55 s.  
 p. 175, 1 ss.: 92, 153  
 p. 175, 3 ss.: 92  
 p. 175, 8 ss.: 45  
 p. 184, 24 s.: 45  
 p. 184, 22 ss.: 18  
 p. 185, 12 s.: 42  
 p. 188, 11 s.: 31  
 p. 191, 12 ss.: 45  
 p. 191, 13 ss.: 19  
 p. 194, 25: 149  
 p. 195, 23 s.: 45  
 p. 195, 14 s.: 19  
 p. 212, 23: 36  
 p. 219, 4 ss.: 116  
 p. 225, 23 ss.: 29 s.  
 p. 226, 8 ss.: 111  
 p. 226, 10 s.: 89 s.  
 p. 227, 7 ss.: 36  
 p. 233, 6 ss.: 30  
 p. 243, 19 ss.: 68

p. 244, 13 ss.: 184  
 p. 244, 15 ss.: 239  
 p. 251, 20 ss.: 52  
 p. 254, 8 ss.: 52  
 p. 266, 6 s.: 52

## CICERO

*De fin. bon. et mal.* (ed. Reid)  
 II 5, 15: 176

## CLEOMEDES

*Circul. doct.* (ed. Bake)  
 I 1: 108 s.

## DIOGENES LAERTIUS (ed. Cobet)

VII 134: 35  
 VII 136: 100, 102  
 VII 139: 95  
 VII 140: 100  
 VII 150: 95, 96, 100, 158, 159  
 VIII 25: 108

## EUSEBIUS

*Praepar. Evang.* (ed. Mras)  
 XI 17: 106  
 XV 14: 94  
 XV 15: 101  
 XV 22: 118

## GALENUS

*Compend. Tim. Plat.* (ed. Kraus-Walzer)  
 p. 34, 7: 173  
 p. 35, 15: 176  
 p. 60, 8 ss.: 180  
*Histor. Philos.* (ed. Diels, Dox. Gr.)  
 18: 67

## GELLIUS

*Noct. Att.* (ed. Hosius)  
 VII (VI) 1: 113  
 VII (VI) 2: 116

## HIERONYMUS

*Adv. Rufin.* (ed. Migne)  
 III 39: 38

## HOMERUS

*Ilias*  
 XIV 201 (302): 72  
 XVIII 107: 113

## ISIDORUS OF SEVILLA

*Etymol.* (ed. Lindsay)  
 XIII 3, 1: 31

## MAXIMUS TYRIUS

*Philosophumena* (ed. Hobein)  
X 5 c: 239

## NEMESIUS

*De nat. hom.* (ed. Matthaei)  
2: 208

## NUMENIUS (ed. Leemans)

*test.* 29: 160  
*id.* 47: 110  
*fr.* 12: 109  
*id.* 17: 110  
*id.* 27: 110  
*id.* 30: 103-121

## ORIGENES

*De orat.* (ed. Koetschau)  
27, 8: 95, 152  
*De princip.* (ed. Koetschau)  
I 2, 3: 59  
II 1, 4: 63, 152  
II 3, 6: 59, 60  
II 9, 1: 60, 64  
IV 4, 6: 63  
IV 6, 33: 51

## PHILO (ed. Cohn-Wendland)

*De confus. ling.*  
34, 172: 62  
*De opif. mundi*  
2, 8: 142  
3, 15 ss.: 62  
46, 134: 62

## PLATO

*Leges*  
896E: 113  
*Parmenides*  
132D: 200  
*Phaedo*  
99B: 40  
*Phaedrus*  
245D: 139  
*Politicus*  
273B-C: 115  
297B: 36  
*Res publ.*  
509D: 216  
533D ss.: 216  
661E: 46

*Theaetetus*

176B: 113  
194C ss.: 188

*Timaeus* (only passages treated out of their context)

28A: 130  
28B: 15  
30A: 117, 118  
31B: 131  
35A: 37  
40D: 118  
47E ss.: 29 ss.  
64D: 38  
65B: 38  
68E s.: 40  
69A: 145

## PLOTINUS (ed. Bréhier)

I 8, 3: 125  
I 8, 10: 147  
II 4, 1: 149, 156  
II 4, 4: 152  
II 4, 5: 152  
II 4, 6: 150, 155, 157  
II 4, 7: 154, 156  
II 4, 8: 155, 168, 170  
II 4, 9: 167  
II 4, 10: 224  
II 4, 12: 170  
II 4, 13: 169  
II 4, 15: 155  
II 5, 3: 154  
II 7, 2: 152  
III 2, 5: 125  
III 6, 7: 168  
III 6, 10: 150  
III 6, 12: 159  
III 6, 16: 169  
III 6, 18: 150  
VI 1, 27: 149, 154

## PLUTARCHUS

*De an. procr.* (ed. Hubert)  
1014A-B: 107  
1015A: 54  
*De comm. not.* (ed. Pohlenz)  
1076C-D: 110  
*De Is. et Osir.* (ed. Nachstädt, etc.)  
369B: 111

## PORPHYRIUS

*De antro nymph.* (ed. Nauck)  
5: 117  
34: 46

## PROCLUS

*In Timaeum* (ed. Diehl)  
 I 77, 22 ss.: 247  
 I 283, 27 ss.: 107  
 I 381, 27: 114

## SCRIPTURA SACRA

*Genesis*

I, 1: 53, 73  
 I, 24: 123  
 2, 7: 123  
 3, 1: 123

*Proverbia*

I, 7: 56  
 8, 22 ss.: 57  
 9, 10: 56  
 16, 7: 56

*Ecclesiast.*

29, 21: 56

## SENECA

*De benef.* (ed. Préchac)

V 20, 2: 38

*Epistulae* (ed. Préchac)

58, 18: 44  
 58, 20: 205  
 59, 19: 44  
 65, 4: 40  
 65, 23: 94

## SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

*Adv. Mathem.* (ed. Mutschmann)

IX 11: 93  
 IX 362: 74  
 IX 363: 69  
 X 281: 108  
 X 312: 145  
 X 315-317: 74

## SIMPLICIUS

*In Arist. Phys.* (ed. Diels)

p. 25, 15 ss.: 93  
 p. 31, 18 ss.: 43 s.  
 p. 151, 6 ss.: 43  
 p. 227, 23: 100  
 p. 229, 11 ss.: 171  
 p. 320, 21 ss.: 32  
 p. 384, 29 ss.: 40

## STATIUS

*Silvae* (ed. Frère)

I 2, 126: 179

## STOIC. VET. FRAGM. (ed. von Arnim)

I 87: 158

I 94-96: 97

I 102: 100

II 32: 100

II 300: 95

II 304: 93

II 305: 147

II 307: 102

II 308: 102

II 309: 98, 147

II 310: 94

II 316: 95

II 317: 98, 158

II 318: 95, 152

II 323: 156

II 439 ss.: 98

II 482: 98, 159

II 483 ss.: 98, 159

II 528: 99, 101

II 534: 108

II 534 ss.: 97

II 913: 101

II 1028 ss.: 102

II 1047: 98, 101, 102

III 32: 97

III 33: 99

III 43: 97

III 522: 97, 100

III 523 ss.: 97

III 530 ss.: 98

## TERTULLIANUS

*Apolog.* (ed. Waltzing)

21: 98

*Adv. Hermog.* (ed. Waszink)

4, 4: 108

18, 1: 57

28, 1: 201

29, 6: 239

35, 2: 167

37, 1: 112

38, 1: 202

41, 1: 126

42, 1: 128

## THEOPHILUS

*Ad Autolyc.* (ed. Bardy)

II 10: 65

II 24: 65

## TIMAEUS LOCRENSIS

97E: 193

## XENOCRATES (ed. Heinze)

fr. 28: 110

## II. LIST OF AUTHORS

## I. ANCIENT AUTHORS

Adrastus 1, 8, 9, 13, 92, 143, 145, 165, 171, 246

Albinus 7, 32, 44, 48, 50 s., 107, 120, 130 ss., 140, 146, 150 s., 161, 165, 167 s., 170, 187, 196, 203, 208, 210, 215 s., 223 ss., 227, 236, 239, 246

Alexander Aphrodisias 7, 94, 101

Alexander Polyhistor 108

Anatolius 8

Anaxagoras 67

Anaximenes 25, 71 ss., 183

Aquila 54, 73

Atticus 107, 114, 144, 220

Chrysippus 96, 100, 110, 113, 116

Cicero 173, 176

Cleanthes 98

Crantor 1

Critias 11, 12, 14, 177

Democritus 67, 218

Diodorus 67 ss.

Empedocles 43, 68 ss., 232

Epicurus 69, 218

Eudorus 108

Gaius 7

Galen 48, 67, 151, 155 s., 173, 176

Heraclitus 71 ss., 105, 112 s., 119, 176, 183, 239

Hermocrates 12, 177

Hermogenes 57, 65, 108, 112, 126 s., 157, 160, 167, 237, 246

Hermolaus 179

Hesiod 111

Homer, 71 s., 111 s., 188

Isidorus of Sevilla 31, 179

Jamblichus 105

Leucippus 67, 69

Melissus 71 ss.

Moderatus 107 s.

Moses 53, 62, 111

Nemesius 160

Nicomachus 108

Numenius, *passim*

Origen 51, 54-66, 93, 95 s., 115, 126, 152, 246

Ossius 2, 13, 199, 246

Parmenides 71 ss., 232

Philo 20 ss., 30, 53, 61 s., 123, 142, 191

Philolaus 108

Pliny 179

Plotinus 32 s., 125 ss., 245

Plutarch 54, 94, 99, 107, 110 ss., 220  
ps. Plutarch 6, 147

Porphyry 7 ss., 38, 46, 117, 247

Posidonius 1, 6, 9, 97, 245

Pythagoras 9, 25, 38, 43, 69 ss., 103-122

Seneca 38, 40, 44, 94, 197, 205 s., 231

Symmachus 54, 61

Tertullian 52, 57 s., 65, 98, 108, 112, 126 s., 157, 160, 167, 201 s., 208, 224, 237, 246

Thales 25, 70 ss., 183, 197

Theo of Smyrna 6

Theophilus 65

Timaeus 12, 14, 17, 41 s., 193, 242

Xenophanes 71 ss.

Zeno 68 s., 96 ss.

## 2. MODERN AUTHORS

Andresen, C. 126

Bäumker, Cl. 5, 39 s., 47, 68, 82, 94 s., 98, 100, 107 s., 113, 143, 153, 158, 243

Borghorst, G. 4, 8 s., 105, 116, 125, 171, 206, 238, 246

de Clercq, V. C. 2, 6

Cornford, F. M. 2

Courcelle, P. 38

Dijksterhuis, E. J. 153

Evans, E. 58

Fabricius, J. 3, 54, 116, 130, 138, 147, 158, 162, 174, 176, 178, 193, 202, 218, 225 s.

Festugière, A. J., 108, 145, 223

Field, F. 54

Gercke, A. 3, 4, 6, 7

Gilson, E. 3, 31

Herzog-Hauck 127

Hiller, E. 6

Jacobus Antiquarius 2

Jolivet, R. 126

Jones, R. M. 4, 8, 114

Kirk, G. S. 113

Koch, H. 126, 152

Kraus, P. 205

Leemans, E.-A. 104-118, 160

Martin, H. 6, 39

Moreau, J. 95, 98, 100, 105

Mosheim, J. 53

Owen, G. E. L. 3

des Places, E. 19

Prächtler, K. 5, 176, 223

Puech, H.-Ch. 105, 111

Rich, A. 135

Rigaltius 241

Rivaud, A. 1

Rüsche, F. 21, 123

Schmekel, A. 8

Stallbaum, P. 39

Steinheimer, E. 4, 125, 148-160, 167 ss., 245

van Straaten, M. 145

Switalski, B. W. 2-10, 35, 53, 105 s., 123, 130, 206 s., 216, 245

Taylor, A. C. 2

Theiler, W. 113, 193

Thévenaz, P. 29

Vega, A. C. 2, 9

Verbeke, G. 99

de Vogel, C. J. 107

Waszink, J. H. 4, 22, 52 s., 57, 65, 117, 127 s., 145, 155, 167, 208, 237

van der Wielen, W. 43, 107

Wilpert, P. 3

Witt, R. E. 203

Wolfson, H. A. 20, 30

Wrobel, J. 3, 10, 41, 46, 50, 90 s., 174, 199, 220, 225

Zeller, E. 7, 76, 96, 106, 108, 161, 202

## III. LIST OF GREEK TERMS

ἀγένητος - γενητός (κόσμος) 220

ἀδιεξίτητος 156

ἀκίνητος 124, 189

ἀμφορφος 151, 196, 199 s.

ἀνάγκη 31 ss.

ἀνάλυσις 134 ss.

ἀναχωρήσασθαι (Numenius) 105

ἀνείδεος 151, 196

ἀπαθής 32, 148, 160

ἀποιος 93 ss., 112, 168, 196

ἀργός 54

ἀρσενόθηλος 108

ἀσώματος 59, 62

τὸ δυνάμει ἀσώματον 167, 171

ἀτομα 67

ἀφαίρεσις 50, 120, 133

ἀχώριστος 102, 133

γόμφοι 68

διαιρεσις 130 s.

διάνοια 216

διαστροφή 116

δύναμις 153, 173

τὸ δυνάμει ἀσώματον 167, 171

τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα 91, 167

εἶδος 90, 92, 205

ἀμυδρὸν εἶδος 49, 51

ἔνυλον εἶδος 47

εἰκασία 216

ἐκμαγεῖον 146, 187, 190

ἐναντία 86, 90, 141 ss.

ἐνέργεια 135

τὸ ἐνέργεια δν 142

ἐν φ (τὸ —) 95, 142

ἐξ οὗ (τὸ —) 95, 142

ἐπαγωγή 130

ἐπίνοια 97

ἐποπτεῖα 45  
 ζῶον μακάριον 99  
 ζῶον νοητόν 30  
 Ἱχνη 48, 236 ss.  
 κακοποιόν 85, 91, 110  
 κατηγορίαι 202  
 κόσμος νοητός 30, 62  
 κυρίως - κατὰ συμβεβηκός 80  
 λόγοι σπερματικοί 101 s., 154  
 λόγος σπερματικός 102  
 μέγα καὶ μικρόν 84  
 μεταληπτικόν 145  
 μετέχον - μετεχόμενον 210  
 μὴ δύν 84  
 μήτηρ 47, 148, 199  
 μίμημα 47, 201  
 μονάς - δυάς 105 ss.  
 μορφή 52, 142  
 Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων 53  
 νόθος (λογισμός) 221 ss.  
 νοῦς 30, 89, 110  
 νοῦς - δόξα 130, 213  
 δλον 100  
 οὐσία 95 ss., 221

παθητικός (ύλη) 31  
 παράδειγμα 44, 48, 62  
 πίστις 216  
 πνεῦμα 98  
 ποιοῦν - πάσχον 35, 94 s.  
 πρόληψις 49, 174  
 ριζώματα 74  
 στέρησις 142 ss.  
 στοιχεῖον 42  
 σῶμα 151, 156, 165 ss.  
 σῶμα ἀποιον 94, 244  
 τὸ δυνάμει σῶμα 91, 167  
 τέλος (= εἶδος) 90  
 τιθήνη 47, 146, 174  
 τόνος 98  
 ύλη  
 ὕλη - χώρα 31, 39, 145, 220, 241  
 ὕλη πρώτη 100, 146  
 ὕλη πρωτίστη 100  
 ὑποδοχή 31, 47, 146, 174, 199  
 ὑποκείμενον (πρῶτον) 31, 62, 95, 174,  
 193, 221  
 ὑπόστασις 221  
 χλωρότης 197

## IV. LIST OF LATIN TERMS

*Aestimatio* 216  
*aeternus* 138 ss.  
*anima* 123  
 anima mundi *tripartita* 30  
 anima sūvae 114, 117  
 anima stirpea 114  
*archetypus* 44, 62, 190  
*auditor(es) Platonis* 47, 76, 123  
  
*Beatum animal* 99  
  
*Capacitas*, see *silva*  
*carentia* 76 ss.  
*compositio* 130 ss.  
*condicio sine qua non* 40  
*conformatio* 52, 232  
*constitutio mundi* 15, 41, 70, 239  
*contemplatio epoptica* 19, 44 ss.  
*contemplatio naturalis* 19, 44 ss.  
*contiguus* 222  
*continuare* 240 s.

*continuatio (quasi —)* 67  
*contrarius - diversus* 197 s.  
*contraria*, see *évanthia*  
*corpus (silva)* 94 ss., 165 ss.  
*corpora = elementa* 42  
*corpora = species corporeae* 48  
*creatio ex nihilo* 65  
*credulitas* 216  
*crystallus* 179  
  
*Daemones* 15, 19, 22  
*deus opifex* 36 s., 48, 62, 105, 135, 170,  
 190, 218  
*disputatio epoptica* 41, 44 ss.  
*disputatio naturalis* 41, 44 ss.  
*dissolutio* 131  
*distinguere* 192  
*diversus - contrarius* 198  
*dominatio* 36  
  
*Effigies* 106, 211

*error* 37, 39  
*essentia* 96 ss., 173, 202  
*et item* 146  
*exemplum* 30, 143, 194  
*exiguitas* 67  
*exornatio* 99, 122  
    *exornatio mundi* 42, 55, 239  
*ex qua (ex quo)* 31 s., 95  
*euripus* 238 ss.  
  
*Facilitas* 37  
*fomenta generationis* 162  
*fomes* 162  
  
*Geminatio* 37, 155  
*genus* 33, 192, 218 s., 227  
*gremium generationis* 47, 175, 187  
  
*Iactatio silvae* 39, 45 s., 239  
*idea(e)* 47, 90, 135 s., 143, 191, 193 s.,  
    205, 213, 216, 227, 231  
*incorporea*, see *natura*, *silva*, *species*  
*individuus* 67  
*infectio* 195  
*initium* 55, 137  
*inpetibilis* 33, 160, 190, 234  
*in qua (in quo)* 31, 95  
*inseparabilis*, see  $\delta\chi\omega\rho\iota\sigma\tau\circ\varsigma$   
*intellectus* 192, 214  
    *intellectus dei* 136, 211  
    *intellectus turbidus* 226  
    *intellectus - opinio* 213 ss.  
*intelligentia = providentia* 34  
*intellegibilis*  
    *intellegibile - opinabile* 227  
*genus intellegibile* 218  
    *primum intellegibile* 130  
    see *silva*, *species*  
*item*, see *sub 'et'*  
  
*Limes (πέρας)* 137  
*locus* 219 ss.  
  
*Maiestas* 36  
*malitia* 91, 117, 124 ss.  
*materia*  
    *materia principalis* 26, 161, 204  
    *materiae = elementa* 42, 124  
    *materiae = naturae* 141  
*materies* 195  
*mens*  
    *mens dei* 30, 38, 136  
    *mens secunda* 30  
  
*mundus*  
    *mundus intelligibilis* 62  
    *mundi constitutio* 15, 41, 70, 239  
    *mundi exornatio* 42, 55, 239  
    *mundi generatio* 41  
  
*Natura* 190, 193  
    *natura = substantia* 173  
    *natura incorporea* 64  
*necessitas* 31 ss., 39  
    *necessitas - providentia* 34 ss., 120  
    *necessitas obsecundans* 120  
    *necessitatis rigor* 37, 39, 110, 120  
*numeri* 43  
*nutricula*, see  $\tau\iota\theta\hbar\eta\eta$  146, 175, 233  
  
*Obscuritas* 11, 185  
*opera dei (= ideae)* 90, 135  
*opinabilis* 225 ss.  
*opinio* 129, 227  
    *opinio - scientia* 215  
*opinor* 64, 72, 76, 164  
*opportunitas*, see *silva*  
*origo*  
    *origo causativa* 59  
    *origo corporea* 47  
    *origo divina* 135  
    *origo exemplaris* 47  
    *origo silvestris* 135  
*ornatus* 119  
  
*Pallor* 197  
*parentia provida* 36  
*patibilis (silva)* 13, 147 ss., 159, 169  
*persuadere* 37, 120, 122  
*perversitas* 115 s.  
*piaculum* 119  
*possibilitas* 82, 91, 152 s., 173  
*potentia* 152 s., 173, 238  
*praesumere* 174, 184  
*praesumptio* 174, 184  
*probatio* 129  
*providentia* 29 s., 63, 70, 76, 117, 239  
    ss.  
  
*Ratio = deus* 100, 114  
*ratio seminalis* 101  
*remedium* 11, 130, 201  
*receptaculum* 187, 199, 233  
*recordatio* 216  
*recreatio* 139  
*resolutio* 50, 128 ss., 132 ss., 152, 162,  
    187

*Salubris* 37 s., 117  
*sapientia* 58 s.  
*scaevas* 116  
*scaebrae* 48  
*silva* 31  
     *silva corporea* 63, 66, 167, 170  
     *silva intelligibilis* 43, 63, 65, 167, 170  
     *silvae anima* 113, 117, 118  
     *silvae capacitas* 64, 196  
     *silvae constitutio* 70  
     *silvae cupiditas* 90  
     *silvae iactatio* 39, 45 s., 239  
     *silvae motus inconditus* 126, 238  
     *silvae nomina* 144 ss.  
     *silvae opportunitas* 63, 173, 196, 235,  
         241  
     *silvae parentia* 37 s.  
     *silvae potentia* 173  
     *silvae tenebrae* 201  
     *silvae usus* 187  
*species* 89, 110, 193, 204 ss.  
*species archetypa* 44, 231

*species intelligibilis* 43, 213, 218  
*species corporea* 47 s.  
*species secunda* 26, 211, 231  
*speciei bonitas* 111  
*spiritus* 98  
*subiectio prima* 31, 161 s.  
*subiectio principalis* 204  
*substantia* 221  
     *primae substantiae* 228  
     *sincerae substantiae* 44, 141  
         = *essentia* 96, 173  
*suspicabilis* 227  
*suspicio* 223 ss.  
*syllogismus* 128 ss.  
*Tenebrae*, see *silva*  
*Usque quaque* (= δι' ὅλων) 35, 98  
*usus* = *natura*, see *silva*  
*Vestigia corporum* 236, 241  
*vis (vires)* 117, 173